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DECLINE AND FALL OF THE
SASANIAN EMPIRE

THE SASANIAN-PARTHIAN CONFEDERACY AND THE ARAB CONQUEST OF IRAN

PARVANEH POURSHARIATI
Decline and Fall of the Sasanian Empire
Parvaneh Pourshariati is Assistant Professor of Near Eastern Languages and Cultures at Ohio State University. She is the author of many scholarly articles on ancient Iran.

‘This is a monumental work of first-class scholarship. Its publication represents a landmark, and it immediately becomes the point of departure for further work on the many subjects it deals with. I can think of few other books I have read over the years that can match this work’s astounding combination of originality, bold vision, clarity of presentation, meticulous examination of the sources, and practical puzzle-solving. I learned immensely from reading it. Dr. Pourshariati’s book is in my view one of the most important individual contributions to our understanding of the history of Iran since Christensen’s L’Iran sous les Sassanides, published seventy years ago. Especially remarkable is the breadth of the author’s agenda, and the way in which she has convincingly woven together different strands. These include: the political rivalry of the great families, the Sasanians’ collapse before Byzantine and Muslim attacks, the religious diversity of medieval Iran, questions of historiography, the substance of the Iranian popular epic, and the important details to be gleaned from seals and other documents. Any one of these would be (and for many scholars has been) a subject for full immersion for many years, but Pourshariati has integrated each into a complex and meaningful whole, even as she has made signal contributions to the more detailed study of each one.’

Fred M. Donner, Professor of Near Eastern History, University of Chicago

‘A fundamental reappraisal of a major issue in Near Eastern history, and a book that will be referred to whenever the subject is discussed, Decline and Fall of the Sasanian Empire is the most important re-examination of late Sasanian and early Islamic history since the work of Christensen in the 1940s.’

Hugh N. Kennedy, Professor of Arabic, SOAS, University of London

‘Dr. Pourshariati’s book proposes a reinterpretation of the structure of the Sasanian Empire and of the power struggle that followed the end of the Byzantine–Persian War of 602–628. The author argues that throughout most of its history the Sasanian state was a confederative structure, in which the north and east (the old Parthian territories of Media and Khurasan) were highly autonomous both politically and culturally. It was Khusraw II’s (590–628) disastrous effort to centralize the state that led to its collapse and to the Arab Conquests. Dr. Pourshariati also argues for a significant redating of critical moments in the Arab conquests in Iraq. Taken as a whole, Decline and Fall of the Sasanian Empire is original, innovative, bold, and generally persuasive.’

Stephen Humphreys, Professor of Islamic and Middle Eastern History, University of California, Santa Barbara

‘Both impressive and intellectually exciting, Decline and Fall of the Sasanian Empire is a major, even pathbreaking, work in the field—a field which this book should revolutionize.’

Stephen Dale, Professor of History, Ohio State University
Decline and Fall of the Sasanian Empire
The Sasanian–Parthian Confederacy and the Arab Conquest of Iran

Parvaneh Pourshariati

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In loving memory
of my father:
Houshang Pourshariati
(1934–2004)
# Contents

Note on transliteration and citation ........................................ xi  
Acknowledgments ................................................................. xiii  

Introduction 1  
The problem ................................................................. 6  
Sources and methodology .................................................. 10  

1 Preliminaries 19  
1.1 The Arsacids ............................................................ 19  
1.2 Agnatic families ....................................................... 27  

I Political History 31  

2 Sasanian polity revisited: the Sasanian–Parthian confederacy 33  
2.1 Sasanians / Arsacids .................................................. 37  
2.1.1 Christensen’s thesis ............................................... 47  
2.1.2 Dynasticism .......................................................... 53  
2.1.3 Early Sasanian period ............................................ 56  
2.2 Yazdgird I, Bahram V Gur, and Yazdgird II / the Surens . . . 59  
2.2.1 Mihr Narseh Suren ............................................... 60  
2.2.2 Yazdgird I ............................................................. 65  
2.2.3 Bahram V Gur ........................................................ 67  
2.2.4 Yazdgird II ............................................................. 70  
2.3 Piruz / the Mihrans ..................................................... 70  
2.3.1 Izad Gushnasp Mihran ............................................. 71  
2.3.2 Shapur Mihran ........................................................ 74  
2.4 Bilash and Qubad / the Karsins ..................................... 75  
2.4.1 Bilash ................................................................. 75  
2.4.2 Sukhra Karin ........................................................ 76  
2.4.3 Qubad ................................................................. 78
## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.4.4 Shāpūr Rāzī Mihrān</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4.5 Mazdakite uprising</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5 Khusrow I Nowshirvān / the Mihrāns, the Ispahbudhān, and the Kārins</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5.1 Khusrow I's reforms</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5.2 Interlude: <em>Letter of Tansar</em></td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5.3 The four generals</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5.4 The Mihrāns</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5.5 The Ispahbudhān</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5.6 The Kārins</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6 Hormozd IV / the Mihrāns</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6.1 Bahrām-i Māh Ādhar</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6.2 Simāh-i Burzin Kārin</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6.3 Bahrām-i Chūbin Mihrān</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.7 Khusrow II Parvīz / the Ispahbudhān</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.7.1 Vistāhm Ispahbudhān</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.7.2 Smbat Bagratuni</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.7.3 The last great war of antiquity</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.7.4 Shahrvarāz Mihrān</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.7.5 Farrukh Hormozd Ispahbudhān</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.7.6 Khusrow II’s deposition</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 The Arab conquest of Iran</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1 Question of sources: the futūḥ and Xwadāy-Nāmag traditions</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.1 Futūḥ</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.2 Revisiting Sayf’s dating</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 Shirūyih Qubād and Ardashīr III: the three armies</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.1 Shirūyih Qubād</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.2 Ardashīr III</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.3 Shahrvarāz’s insurgency</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3 Būrānduḵt and Azarmiduḵt: the Pārsīg–Pahlav rivalry</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3.1 The Ispahbudhān</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3.2 Analepsis: Arab conquest of Iraq</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3.3 Azarmiduḵt and the Pārsīg</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3.4 Būrānduḵt and the Pahlav</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3.5 The battle of Bridge</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4 Yazdgird III: Arab conquest of Iran</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4.1 The conquest of Ctesiphon</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4.2 The conquest of Khuzistān</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4.3 The conquest of Media</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4.4 The conquest of Rayy</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4.5 The conquest of Gurgān and Ṭabaristān</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.4.6 The mutiny of Farrukhzād .......................... 260
3.4.7 The conquest of Khurāsān and the mutiny of the Kanārangīyān ........................................ 265
3.4.8 The conquest of Azarbayjān .......................... 278
3.5 Epilogue: repercussions for early Islamic history ................. 281

4 Dynastic polities of Ţabaristān ........................................ 287
4.1 The Āl-i Bāvand .................................................. 288
4.1.1 Kayūs ......................................................... 288
4.1.2 Bāv .......................................................... 289
4.2 The Kārins in Ţabaristān ........................................ 294
4.3 The Āl-i Jāmāsp .................................................. 298
4.3.1 Jāmāsp ....................................................... 298
4.3.2 Pīrūz ........................................................ 301
4.3.3 Jīl-i Jīlānshāh .............................................. 302
4.4 The Arab conquest of Ţabaristān ............................. 303
4.4.1 Peace treaty with Farrukhzād and Jīl-i Jīlānshāh .... 304
4.4.2 Farrukhān-i Bozorg Dhu 'l-Manāqib .................. 308
4.4.3 Yazīd b. Muhallab’s unsuccessful conquest of 716–718 310
4.5 Khurshid Shāh .................................................... 314
4.5.1 The spāhbed Kārin ....................................... 314
4.5.2 Sunbād’s murder .......................................... 315
4.5.3 Khurshid’s death and the final conquest of Ţabaristān 316

II Religious Currents ..................................................... 319
5 Sasanian religious landscape ........................................ 321
5.1 Post-Avestan period ............................................ 321
5.2 Orthodoxy – Heterodoxy ....................................... 324
5.2.1 Two pillars: the monarchy and the clergy? ............. 324
5.2.2 Kirdir ......................................................... 327
5.2.3 Āturpāt ...................................................... 334
5.2.4 Zurvanism .................................................... 339
5.2.5 Zandiks ...................................................... 341
5.2.6 Circle of Justice ........................................... 342
5.2.7 Mazdakite heresy ......................................... 344
5.2.8 Jewish and Christian communities ..................... 347
5.3 Mihr worship ...................................................... 350
5.3.1 Mithra ......................................................... 351
5.3.2 Mihr worship in the Achaemenid and the Arsacid periods 358
5.3.3 The Pārsīg–Pahlav religious dichotomy .................. 360
5.4 Mihr worship in the quarters of the north and east . . . . . . . 368
  5.4.1 Mihr worship in Ṭabaristān . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 369
  5.4.2 Mihr worship among the Mihrān . . . . . . . . . . . . 378
  5.4.3 Mihr worship among the Kārīn . . . . . . . . . . . . 379
  5.4.4 Mihr worship in Armenia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 386
  5.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 392

6 Revolts of late antiquity in Khurāsān and Ṭabaristān 397
  6.1 Bahrām-i Chūbin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 397
    6.1.1 Mithraic purview of Bahrām-i Chūbin’s rebellion . . 398
    6.1.2 Bahrām-i Chūbin and the apocalypse . . . . . . . . . . 404
  6.2 The ʿAbbāsid revolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 414
    6.2.1 Inner–Outer Khurāsān . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 417
    6.2.2 Post-conquest Iran and contemporary scholarship . . 420
  6.3 Bihāfarīd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 426
    6.3.1 Interlude: Arda Wirāz Nāma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 431
    6.3.2 Mithraic purview of Bihāfarīd’s rebellion . . . . . . 432
  6.4 Sunbād the Sun Worshipper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 437
    6.4.1 Sunbād and Bahrām-i Chūbin: recurrent narrative motifs 441
    6.4.2 Mithraic purview of Sunbād’s rebellion . . . . . . . . . 442
    6.4.3 Sunbād and the apocalypse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 445
    6.4.4 Gentilitial background of Sunbād . . . . . . . . . . . . 447
  6.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 451

Conclusion 453

Tables, figures and map 467
  Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 467
  Conquest of Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 468
  Conquest of Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 469
  Seals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 470
  Genealogical tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 471
  Map of the Sasanian empire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 472

Bibliography 473

Glossary 499

Index 509
Note on transliteration and citation

As this book deals with sources from many languages, it has been virtually impossible to be consistent in nomenclature. In general, we adopted the following ranking of languages in descending order of priority in our transliteration of foreign words: English, New Persian, Middle Persian, Arabic, Armenian, Greek, Avestan. A name or a term is then rendered in the first of these languages in which it is well attested. For instance, the third Achaemenid king in these languages is respectively Darius, Dāryūsh, Dārā, Dārāb, Dana, Dareios, Dāraiaiauauš. Since the first, English, form is already in common use, we render his name as Darius. Likewise, although Middle Persian spābed can be translated in English as general, or rendered in New Persian as ispahbud, we have opted to keep its Middle Persian rendition in order to remain as true to its intended meaning as possible. Similarly, we will use New Persian Nīshāpur, rather than Nishapur (English), New-Shābuhr (Middle Persian), or Nīsābūr (Arabic). These examples also underline another issue: names of places or offices may have changed over time, and so we will use the name that was prevalent at the period in question. Hence in the case of Nīshāpur, the older name Abarshahr is not used when discussing events in later Sasanian times. Similarly, instead of modern Istanbul, Roman Byzantium, or late Roman Augusta Antonina, we will refer to the capital of the Byzantine empire during the Sasanian period by its official East-Roman name, Constantinople.

The context and/or the intended meaning will also determine our adoption of a particular transliteration. We shall, therefore, use Armenian Mirranes instead of New Persian Mibrān, for the commander of Petra under Khusrow I; and we shall use Middle Persian kūst-i ādurbādagan, rather than its New Persian form kūst-i Azarbāyjān, for the quarter of the north. Likewise, to refer to the deity that plays a germane role in this work, the New Persian form Mibhr, or on occasion the older form Mithra, derived from Avestan Mīgra, is used in the Iranian context, whereas the English form Mithras is reserved for the Roman context (Roman Mithraism). In the index and the glossary, an attempt is made to provide cross-references to the most commonly attested forms.

In working with many different sources, the language as well as the script can cause problems. For scripts other than Arabic (like Aramaic, Pahlavi,
Armenian, Avestan, or Greek), we have followed the conventions of the translated source. To transliterate Arabic into Latin script, we have more or less followed the transliteration scheme used by the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. As we had to deal with both Persian and Arabic sources, we felt that following the *Encyclopaedia of Islam* rather than the *Encyclopaedia Iranica* would yield a more consistent scheme. We have, however, simplified this system for the four letters خ, ج, ص, and ش, which we transliterate ک, ز, ض, and ش instead of the respective underlined forms کh, زb, ضb, and شb. Thus we write Kheshm instead of خheshm or خešm. An additional complication of transliterating Arabic script is vowelization.¹ This is reflected, for instance, in the name of the Iranian general هرمزان. As his name is only attested in Arabic sources, we have maintained the Arabic transliteration, although its Persian form would have been هرموزان, derived from Persian هرمزد. We also opted to render Persian یذافیح as -i, and New Persian final ی as ib instead of e or eб.

Works are cited following the Harvard style (author plus year of publication),² except for the first citation, which is given in full.³ Articles in the *Encyclopaedia Iranica* and the *Encyclopaedia of Islam* are now readily available online. As we have availed ourselves of the online versions, our references to these may no longer have page numbers. We have dated each online article without a page reference to the present, that is to say, to 2007.⁴ For the benefit of the non-Arabic speaking reader, we have cited Ţabarî’s history, which is used extensively in this study, both in English (published in the series *The History of Ţabarî*) and in Arabic (de Goeje’s edition). For example, the citation Ţabarî 1999, p. 295, de Goeje, 988, means: page 295 in *The Šāsānids, the Byzantines, the Lakhmids, and Yemen*, and page 988 in de Goeje’s edition. Furthermore, for the benefit of the Persian speaking reader, many citations of non-English sources are followed by a citation to its Persian translation, whenever such a translation is available. As Khaleghi Motlagh’s last volume of his critical edition of the Šāhnāma has not yet been published, we had, unfortunately, only recourse to less critical editions. We ultimately opted for two, the Nafisi and Moscow editions, and where possible, we have cited both.

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¹This mainly applies to the short vowels a, e, i, o, u, but even ð when denoting a vowel, can be rendered as ُ or ُ depending on the word. The vocalization ِ is only used in Middle Persian or other older languages and never represents ی.
²In case there is no author, an alternative key is provided. All dates are converted to the CE calendar.
³E.g., the first citation would be: Ţabarî, *The Šāsānids, the Byzantines, the Lakhmids, and Yemen*, vol. V of *The History of Ţabarî*, Albany, 1999, translated and annotated by C.E. Bosworth (Ţabarî 1999); with any subsequent citation to this work given by the form between parenthesis.
⁴The same rule applies to papers that have not yet been published.
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Introduction

The history of Iran in the late antique, early medieval period (circa 500–750 CE) remains one of the least investigated fields of enquiry in recent scholarship. This, in spite of the fact that some of the most crucial social and political processes transpiring during this period in what Hodgson has termed the Nile to Oxus cultural zone, directly implicate Iranian history. The “last great war of antiquity” of 603–628 CE, between the two great empires of the Near East, the Byzantines (330?–1453 CE) and the Sasanians (224–651 CE), was on the verge of drastically redrawing the map of the world of late antiquity. For almost two decades during this period, the Sasanian empire was successful in re-establishing the boundaries of the Achaemenid (559–330 BCE) empire at the height of its successful campaigns against the Byzantines. As Sebeos’ account bears witness, when in 615 the Persians reached Chalcedon, the Byzantine emperor Heraclius (610–641) was about ready to become a client of the Sasanian emperor Khusrow II (591–628). When, in 622, a small, obscure, religio-political community in Mecca is said to have embarked on an emigration (hijra) to Medina—an emigration that in subsequent decades came to be perceived as the watershed for the birth of a new community, the Muslim umma—the Sasanians were poised for world dominion.

Unexpectedly, however, the tides turned. For in the wake of what has been termed “one of the most astonishing reversals of fortune in the annals of war,” and after the ultimate defeat of the Sasanians in the last crucial years of the war (621–628 CE)—itself a tremendously perplexing question—a sociopolitical upheaval unprecedented in the world of late antiquity began: the Arab conquest of the Near East. While the event truncated Byzantium beyond recognition by the 640s, its consequences were even more dire for the Sasanians. For with the

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5 There is no consensus among scholars as to when, precisely, one must date the end of the Roman and the beginning of the Byzantine empire. Dates varying from the early fourth to the early seventh century have been proposed.

6 A district near present-day Istanbul (the former Byzantine capital, Constantinople), called Kadiköy, Chalcedon was an ancient maritime town in the Roman province of Bithynia.


8 Sebeos 1999, p. xxiv.
INTRODUCTION

depth of the last Sasanian king, Yazdgird III (632–651), in the aftermath of the Arab conquest of Iran, came the end of more than a millennium of Iranian rule in substantial sections of the Near East. The Sasanian empire was toppled and swallowed up by the Arab armies. What had happened? Why was an empire that was poised for the dominion of the Near East in 620, when successfully engaging the powerful Byzantines, utterly defeated by 650 by the forces of a people hitherto under its suzerainty, the Arab armies? This work is an attempt to make sense of this crucial juncture of Iranian and Middle Eastern history. It will seek to explain the success of the Arab conquest of Iran in the early seventh century, as well as the prior defeat of the Sasanians by the Byzantines, with reference to the internal dynamics of late Sasanian history. Our very conceptualization of the internal dynamics of Sasanian history, however, will involve a heretical assessment of this history, for it will take serious issue with the Christensenian view of the Sasanians as an étatiste/centralized polity, a perspective that ever since the 1930s, when Christensen published L’Iran sous les Sassanides, has become paradigmatic in scholarship. The overarching thesis of the present work is that, episodic and unsuccessful attempts of the Sasanians at centralization notwithstanding, the Sasanian monarchs ruled their realm through a decentralized dynastic system, the backbone of which was the Sasanian–Parthian confederacy.

The theses proposed in this work have been formed after an exhaustive investigation and at times reevaluation of a host of external and internal sources pertaining to this period of Iranian history. Armenian, Greek, Syriac, and classical Islamic histories, especially the futūḥ (or conquest) narratives, have been utilized in a source-critical juxtaposition with literary and primary sources of Sasanian history, the Xwādāy-Nāmag (Khudāynāmag or the Book of Kings) tradition(s) as they appear in classical Arabic histories but especially in the Shāhnāma of Ferdowsi; Middle Persian literature produced in the late antique period of Iranian history; local Iranian histories; and, above all, the numismatic and sigillographic evidence of late Sasanian history. The present work, therefore, engages in a continuous and pervasive critical dialogue between the ways in which the Sasanians were perceived by their foreign, generally hostile, contemporaries or near contemporaries, the ways in which they wished to be perceived from an imperial, central perspective, and the ways in which they were actually perceived by the powerful polities within their own periphery—polities which in fact forcefully articulated their own perception of the Sasanians. The end result, as we shall see, is that the historiographical strengths evinced by each of

9Christensen, Arthur, L’Iran sous les Sassanides, Copenhagen, 1944 (Christensen 1944). See also page 7 and §2.1.1 below.

10Throughout this study, the term Parthian, referring to various powerful Parthian families, is used in contradistinction to the term Arsacid. As we shall see in greater detail in §1.1, the Arsacids were the particular dynastic branch of the Parthians who ruled Iran from about 250 BCE to about 226 CE. For a definition of dynasticism as used in this study, see §2.1.2.

these depictions of the Sasanians come to form a critical commentary on the shortcomings inherent in the others. The final picture that is formed is explicitly and irrefutably confirmed by the one corpus of data that suffers the least harm in a people’s historiographical production of their history: the primary sources of Sasanian history, the numismatic and sigillographic evidence. For the recently discovered seals pertaining to late Sasanian history remarkably confirm one of the main theses of this study, namely, that throughout the Sasanian history there was a dichotomy between the پارسیگ (Sasanians) and the پاهلی (Pahlav), which forced the Sasanians into a confederate arrangement with the powerful Parthian dynastic families living in their domains. As late as the seventh century, some of the dynastic bearers of the seals insist on identifying themselves as either a پاهلی or a پارسیگ.

As already mentioned, one of the central themes of this study is that the Sasanians ruled their realm by what we have termed the Sasanian–Parthian confederacy. This was a predominantly decentralized, and—borrowing a term from Cyril Toumanoff—dynastic system of government where, save for brief and unsuccessful attempts at centralization by the Sasanians in the third and the sixth centuries, the powerful dynastic Parthian families of the Kārins, the Mihrans, the Ispahbudhān, the Sūrens, and the Kanārāngiyān were, for all practical purposes, co-partners in rule with the Sasanians. In Chapter 2, we shall abandon the centrist/monarchical image of the Sasanians currently in vogue in scholarship, and, revisiting the Sasanians from the perspective of the Parthian dynastic families, we shall trace the ebb and flow of the Sasanian–Parthian confederacy and the tensions inherent in it. This Sasanian–Parthian confederacy ultimately collapsed, however. The inception of its debacle occurred in the midst of the “astonishing reversal of fortune in the annals of war,” when the tide turned and the Sasanians suffered their inexplicable defeats of 624–628 at the hands of the Byzantines. As we shall see, had it not been for the Parthian withdrawal from the Sasanian–Parthian confederacy toward the end of the rule of Khusrow II Parviz (591–628), the Byzantines might very well have become a client state of the Sasanians, and Heraclius a son instead of a “brother of Khusrow II.” The debacle of the Sasanian–Parthian confederacy during the last years of the Sasanian–Byzantine wars, however, had a far greater consequence for late antique Iranian history: the ultimate defeat of the Sasanians by the Arab armies and the eradication of their empire by the middle of the seventh century.

12The Middle Persian term for Parthian.
13For the geographical extent of these domains, see footnote 145.
14Our conceptualization of any given system of government as a centralized or decentralized polity, needless to say, ought not entail any value judgments as to the successful functioning of that polity.
15Toumanoff, C., Studies in Christian Caucasian History, Georgetown University Press, 1963 (Toumanoff 1963); see §2.1.2 below.
16While a detailed analysis of the Sūrens will not be undertaken in this study, they were in fact an integral part of this confederacy.
It was in the immediate aftermath of the final collapse of the Sasanian–Parthian confederacy, in the wake of Khusrow II’s deposition and murder in 628 CE, that the unprecedented chain of events that ultimately led to the total annihilation of the Sasanian monarchy after four centuries of rule commenced: the early Arab conquest of Sasanian territories. A second central theme of the present study—arrived at through a critical examination of the futūḥ narratives in juxtaposition with the Sasanian Xᵛᵛ-ḫwadr-Nāmag historiography—therefore, is that the early Arab conquest of Iraq took place, not, as has been conventionally believed, in the years 632–634, after the accession of the last Sasanian king Yazdgird III (632–651) to power, but in the period from 628 to 632. The conquest of Iraq occurred precisely during the period of internecine warfare between the Pahlav and the Pārsīg. The two factions, engrossed in their strife in promoting their own candidates to the throne, were incapable of putting up a united defense against the encroaching Arab armies. The subsequent conquest of the Iranian plateau, moreover, was ultimately successful because powerful Parthian dynastic families of the kūst-i khwārāsān (quarter of the east) and kūst-i ādurbādagān (quarter of the north) abandoned the last Sasanian king, Yazdgird III, withdrew their support from Sasanian kingship, and made peace with the Arab armies. In exchange, most of these retained de facto power over their territories.

The recalculation of the chronology of the early conquest of Iraq to the period between 628–632, in turn, has crucial implications, not only for the chronology of the conquest of Syria and the famous desert march of Khalid b. Walid, but also for a host of other significant events in early Islamic history. If, as we claim, the conquest of Iraq took place in 628–632, how then are we to perceive the role and whereabouts of the Prophet Muḥammad at the onset of the conquests of Iraq according to this alternative chronology? The conquest of Iraq is traditionally believed to have occurred after the death of the Prophet in 632 and, after the ridda wars (or wars of apostasy). If Prophet Muhammad was alive according to this newly offered scheme, how then will this affect our traditional understanding of early Islamic history? What of our conventional view of the roles of Abū Bakr and ‘Umar as caliphs in this period of Islamic history? If Muḥammad was alive, what of apostasy?

Our chronological reconstruction of the conquest of Iraq could potentially have revolutionary implications for our understanding of early Islamic history. We shall offer one possible, conjectural answer to these crucial questions here, for by the time we have expounded our thesis, it will become clear...
that its implications will require a thorough reevaluation of a number of crucial episodes of early Islamic history, a task beyond the confines of the present study. One thing will remain a constant in the midst of all of this: understanding the nature of the Sasanian–Parthian confederacy and disentangling its gradual and final collapse will lead to a better understanding of the nature and rise of the Arabo-Islamic polity. So much for the implications of our thesis vis-à-vis early Islamic history. How are we to view the effects of the Arab conquest in the context of the post-conquest Iranian history?

The Arab conquest of Iran has long been viewed by some as a watershed in Iranian history. Through it, the pre-Islamic history of Iran is presumed to have led to its Islamic history. Examining the histories of Tabaristān, Gilân, and partially Khurāsān, from the late Sasanian period through the conquest and up to the middle of the eighth century, we shall highlight the fallacies of this perspective. We shall argue that the Arab conquest of Iran ought not be viewed as a total overhaul of the political structures of Iran in late antiquity. For while the kingship of the house of Sāsān was destroyed as a result of the onslaught of the Arab armies, the Pahlav domains and the Parthian power over these territories remained predominantly intact throughout the Umayyad period. Here then we shall follow our methodology of investigating the history of Iran not through the center—this time of the Caliphate—but through the periphery. This then becomes a testimony to the strength of the Parthian legacy: as the Parthians had not disappeared with the advent of the Sasanians in the third century, neither did they leave the scene after the Arab conquest of Iran in the middle of the seventh century, their polities and cultural traditions long outliving the demise of the Sasanian dynasty.

This thesis is, in turn, closely connected to our assessment of the aims of the Arab armies in their conquest of Iranian territories. The course of the Arab conquest, the subsequent pattern of Arab settlement, and the topography of the ‘Abbāsid revolution, all give evidence of one significant fact: the overthrow of the Sasanian dynasty was not an intended aim of the Arab armies, but only an incidental by-product of it, precipitated by the prior debacle of the Sasanian–Parthian confederacy. For the primary objective of the Arab conquerors was not the actual conquest and colonization of Iranian territories, but to bypass these, in order to gain access to the trade entrepôts in Transoxiana. Recognizing this, chief Pahlav families reached a modus vivendi with the Arab armies.

In part two of the present study we shall turn our attention to the spiritual landscape of Iran during the Sasanian period. Providing a synopsis of the state of research on this theme during the past two decades, we shall then put forth the fourth major thesis of this study: the Sasanian/Parthian political dichotomy was replicated in the realms of spirituality, where the Pahlav predominantly adhered to Mihr worship, a Mithraic spiritual universe that was distinct from the Zoroastrian orthodoxy—whatever the nature of this—that the Sasanians

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23 These latter two themes will be addressed in detail in a sequel to this study.
I
NTRODUCTION
ostensibly tried to impose on the populace living in their territories. As the concentration of Pahlav power had always been in their traditional homelands, Parthava and Media—what the Sasanians later termed the kūst-i khwarāsān and kūst-i adurbādagan, the quarters of the east and north—so too was the preponderance of Mihr worship in these territories. Our evidence for the prevalence of Mihr worship in the northern, northeastern, and northwestern parts of the Sasanian domains will hopefully also become relevant, not only for further deciphering the religious proclivity of the Arsacids, but also for engaging the ongoing debate between Iranists and classicists about the provenance of Mihr worship in Roman Mithraism—a debate that has been resumed during the past three decades within the scholarly community.

Finally, we shall conclude our study with an analysis of the Mithraic features of the revolt of the Mihrānid Bahrām-i Chūbin at the end of the sixth century, and the continuity of these Mithraic themes in the revolts of Bihāfarīd and Sunbād in the middle of the eighth century. The upshot of our contention here is that, far from betraying a presumed synthesis of Iranian and Islamic themes, the aforementioned revolts evince startling evidence for the continuity of Mihr worship in Pahlav territories. In a sequel to this study, we shall trace the continuity of this Parthian heritage to the revolts of the Kārinid Māzīyar in Țabaristān and Bābak-i Khurramān in Azarbāyjān, assessing the connections of these to the cultural heritage that we perceive to have affected the Ābbāsid revolutionaries. A word needs to be said about the issues that instigated this study, and further remarks about the author’s methodology, before we proceed.

The problem

In 1992, Walter Kaegi wrote his magisterial work Byzantium and the Early Islamic Conquests. Here he provided an explanatory exposé of the rationale behind his opus. “For some scholars of Islamic history,” he wrote, “this subject may appear to be ill-conceived, because for them there is no reason why the Muslims should not have defeated and supplanted Byzantium. No adequate Byzantine historical research exists on these problems, certainly none that includes the use of untranslated Arabic sources.” In 1981, Fred M. Donner had already written The Early Islamic Conquests, a work that in the tradition of nearly a century of highly erudite scholarship sought not only to “provide a new interpretation of the Islamic conquest movement, . . . [but also to argue that] Muhammad’s career and the doctrines of Islam revolutionized both the ideological bases and the political structures of Arabian society, to the extent

24See footnote 77.
that they transformed . . . the face of . . . a large part of the globe.”27 Kaegi and Donner’s works are symptomatic of the state of the field in late antique studies. For, at the very least during the past half century, the late antique and early medieval history of Iran has found itself in a paradigmatic quagmire of research, where the parameters of the field have been set by Byzantinists and Arabists.28 While a host of erudite scholars continue to exert their efforts in disentangling the perplexing questions surrounding the nature and rise of the Arabo-Islamic polity and its dizzying successes, and while a number of erudite works have addressed aspects of Sasanian history, except for general observations and artificial asides, no one has bothered to address the Arab conquest of Iran and its aftermath from a Sasanian perspective.

The last magnum opus on Sasanian history was Christensen’s L’Iran sous les Sassanides, published in 1936.29 The path for all subsequent research on the Sasanians, including that of Christensen, however, had already been paved by the masterpiece of the nineteenth-century semitist, philologist, and classicalist, Theodore Nöldeke, Geschichte der Perser und Araber zur Zeit der Sassaniden, which appeared in 1879.30 If Nöldeke had been the father of Sasanian studies, however, it was the Christensenian thesis that had set the subsequent paradigm for Sasanian historiography. Building on Nöldeke’s work, and using the then available primary sources of Sasanian history—sources which belong predominantly to the third and partly to the sixth centuries only—and relying more or less credulously on the Xwaday-Nāmag tradition of Sasanian historiography and other secondary accounts of this history, Christensen argued that the rise of Sasanians, after their defeat of the Arsacids in the third century, heralded a new epoch in Iranian history. From this period onward, and through most of their subsequent history, some lapses notwithstanding, argued Christensen, the Sasanians were able to establish a highly efficient and centralized system of

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28 To give the reader a sense of this, one needs only mention the impressive series launched by Irfan Shahid, Byzantium and the Arabs, in which, in multi-volume format, the author has thus far treated the fifth and sixth centuries of this relationship. Shahid, Irfan, Byzantium and the Arabs in the Sixth Century, Volume 1, Part 1: Political and Military History, Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, Washington, 1995 (Shahid 1995). Equally remarkable for the depth of its scholarship, is the series edited by Averil Cameron on The Byzantine and Early Islamic Near East. In this series see, for example, Cameron, Averil and Conrad, Lawrence I. (eds.), The Byzantine and Early Islamic Near East, III: States, Resources and Armies, Princeton, 1995, papers of the Third Workshop on Late Antiquity and Early Islam (Cameron and Conrad 1995). An article by Zeev Rubin on the reforms of Khusrow I is included in the volume mentioned here. It must be said that the proclivity of the majority of Iranists, who in the wake of the Iranian revolution of 1978–79 have been obsessed with the modern and contemporary history of Iran, has also exacerbated this void in the field. Those who, like the present author, adhere to a long durée conceptualization of pre-modern history, will reckon that on some fundamental level, the implications of the present work also engage contemporary Iranian history.
29 We will use here the second edition, Christensen 1944.
government in which the monarchs functioned as the supreme rulers of the land. The lapses, Christensen argued, were significant and occasioned by de-centralizing forces exerted on the monarchy by the various strata of the nobility of the empire, some of whom were of Parthian origin. In spite of these recurrent lapses, one of which incidentally, as he himself admitted, continued through most of the fourth century, Christensen insisted that the Sasanians were always able to reassert their control and rule their empire as a centralized monarchical system. The height of this monarchical power came with Khusrow I Nowshirvān (531–579), who implemented a series of important reforms in the wake of another surge of the nobility’s power and the revolutionary Mazdaite uprisings. Through these reforms Khusrow I was able to inaugurate one of the most splendid phases of Sasanian history. In the tradition of Ardashīr I (224–241) and Shāpūr I (241–271), this exemplary king restored the normative dimensions of Sasanian kingship: a powerful, centralized monarchy capable of mustering its resources in order to ameliorate and stabilize the internal conditions of the realm, maintain its boundaries, and, when appropriate, launch expansionist policies. What had happened to the centrifugal forces of prior centuries, most importantly, to those of the powerful Parthian nobility? Allegedly, in the process of his reforms, Khusrow I had metamorphosed these into a “nobility of the robe,” bereft of any substantive authority. Meanwhile, in the late sixth century, for some inexplicable reason, two major rebellions sapped the power of the centralizing Sasanian monarchs, the rebellions of Bahrām-i Chubin (590–591) and Vistāhm (595–600). Curiously, both rebellions were launched by Parthian dynastic families. Unexpectedly, the Parthians had come to question the very legitimacy of the Sasanian kings. For a while they even usurped Sasanian kingship. The Mihrānid Bahrām-i Chubin forced the Sasanian king Khusrow II Parvīz to take refuge in the bosoms of their ancient enemies, the Byzantines. The Ispahbudhān Vistāhm carved, for all practical purposes, an independent realm in an extensive stretch of territory that ran from Khurāsān to Azarbāyjān. Even more Parthian insurgencies followed in the wake of these. Such outright rebellion against the legitimacy of the kingship of the house of Sāsān was unprecedented in the annals of Sasanian history. What is more, it was in the wake of the presumably successful and forceful centralizing reforms of Khusrow I that this trend was established. What had happened? Had Khusrow I not sapped the authority of the powerful Parthian families? Why had they come to question the very legitimacy of Sasanian kingship, unleashing havoc at the height of Sasanian supremacy? The Christensenian thesis could not address this. Neither could it address the reasons why the last Sasanian monarch of substantial power, Khusrow II Parvīz (591–628), the same monarch during whose rule the Sasanian empire was poised for world dominion, was suddenly to lose not only the war, but his very head by 628 CE. Christensen, likewise, did not address the subsequent turbulent history of the Sasanians in

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31 A more in depth analysis of his thesis will be given in §2.1.1.
any great detail. For him, as for all subsequent scholars of Sasanian history, the period from 628 to the last feeble Sasanian king, Yazdgird III (632–651), was simply too chaotic to be amenable to any systematic research. Christensen’s magnificent opus, therefore, stopped with the ascension of Yazdgird III, which was presumably when the Arab conquests had begun according to him and subsequent scholars of Sasanian history. And so the Christensenian reconstruction of Sasanian history came to an abrupt, perplexing end, leaving the student of Sasanian history baffled by the inexplicable spiraling demise of the dynasty.

One of the primary sources which Christensen had used in order to arrive at this thesis was an official historiography, patronized by the Sasanians and known as the Xwadāy-Nāmag, or the Book of Kings. The Sasanians, in fact, were the first to promote a literary account of Iranian history.32 Through this official historiography, the Iranian national history was traced from the first mythic Iranian monarch, Kayūmarth,33 to the last Sasanian king, Yazdgird III. While patronizing this national history, however, the Sasanians also undertook another feat: they deleted most of the annals of their defeated foes, the Arsacids (250 BCE–224 CE), from the pages of history, cutting in half the duration of their rule. In Das iranische Nationalepos, Nöldeke had already argued that in spite of this Sasanian censorial effort at deleting Arsacid history, the accounts of particular, powerful, Parthian families do appear in the pages of the Iranian national history. Thus, while there is next to nothing left of the history of the Arsacids in the Xwadāy-Nāmag tradition, several Parthian families did superimpose their histories during the Arsacid period onto the heroic sections of the Iranian national history.34 While Nöldeke and others underlined the continued cultural and political legacy of the Parthians to Sasanian history, and while some, including Christensen, even highlighted the continued presence of particular Parthian families in the course of Sasanian history, the Christensenian paradigm of Sasanian history continued to hold sway: with the defeat of the Arsacids and the murder of Ardavān in 224 CE, the Sasanians inaugurated a new era in Iranian history, establishing a centralized, étatiste, imperial power which, in collaboration with the clergy, imposed an orthodox creed on the flock living in its territories. But this was precisely the image that the Sasanians wanted to present of themselves. It might have been constructed under the influence of the model of caesaropapism effected in Byzantium from the fourth century. This étatiste model can certainly not be substantiated with reference to the primary sources of Sasanian history, for these, belonging primarily to the third

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33In the Iranian religious tradition, Kayūmarth or Gayōmart, literally meaning the mortal man, was the proplast of man. See Shaki, Mansour, ‘Gayōmart’, in Ehsan Yarshater (ed.), Encyclopaedia Iranica, New York, 2007a (Shaki 2007a).
34Shahbazi refers to this as the Ctesian method of historical writing, that is, the superimposition of contemporary histories onto remote antiquity.
and the sixth centuries, are far too disjointed to give us a picture of the nature of Sasanian administrative polity throughout its history.

Yet the *Xwādāy-Nāmag* image of the Sasanians was uncritically accepted by Christensen and adopted by those who followed him. So convinced were they by the Sasanian censorial effort in deleting Arsacid history, and so accepting were they of the Sasanians’ view of themselves as a benevolent and centralized monarchy, that none paid any heed to the implications of Nöldeke’s observation. When and how, then, had the Parthians engaged in their own historiographical endeavors in the official histories patronized by the Sasanians? One must certainly reckon with the oral dimension of Parthian historiography during the Arsacid period, as the late matriarch of Zoroastrian studies, Mary Boyce, underlined in her study of the Parthian *Gōsāns*. Yet this does not explain everything. For if the accounts of Arsacid history were deleted from the pages of the Sasanian *Xwādāy-Nāmag* histories and if the few Parthian families that existed under the Sasanians were ultimately under the *étatiste* pressure of the Sasanian polity, how then, as we shall see, were the sagas of various Parthian families so intimately, systematically, and integrally intertwined with the stories of successive Sasanian kings and queens in these histories? In fact, as soon as the historical, Sasanian, section of the *Xwādāy-Nāmag* tradition begins to acquire flesh, whether in the classical Arabic histories or in the *Shāhnāma* of Ferdowsi, the Parthian dynastic families appear side-by-side of the Sasanian kings. Some of these towering Parthian figures of Sasanian history are, moreover, depicted very positively in the histories of the Sasanians. A corollary of the present thesis, therefore, is that while the Sasanians were successful in deleting Arsacid history, they seriously failed in obliterating the history of the Parthian families from the pages of history. The Sasanians were unsuccessful in this attempt, because the Parthians co-authored substantial sections of the *Xwādāy-Nāmag* traditions, and they did so during the Sasanian period and most probably afterwards as well. This is patently clear from an examination of the *Xwādāy-Nāmag* tradition, which observation necessitates a word about the sources for Sasanian history and our methodology.

**Sources and methodology**

To reconstruct Sasanian history one relies on the *Xwādāy-Nāmag* tradition as contained, for example, in classical Arabic historiography; on Middle Persian sources written in the late Sasanian or early caliphal period; on Armenian, Greek, and Syriac sources dealing with Sasanian history; and finally on coins, seals, inscriptions, and other products of material cultural. The order of priority has been reckoned to be the reverse of what we have enumerated. These

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36 Nöldeke had already postulated this, but he had not examined it in any detail in his pioneering work on the Iranian national epic.
have been respectively termed the tertiary, secondary, and primary sources for Sasanian history.\textsuperscript{37}

Numismatists and scholars of material culture have long reprimanded historians for their inordinate emphasis and reliance on literary history, both foreign and native, at the expense of the material sources for Sasanian history. It is not for nothing that these latter have been considered \textit{primary} for reconstructing Sasanian history. Seals, coins, and inscriptions speak clearly, succinctly, and usually far more reliably and explicitly than the corpora of literary narratives, foreign or native, that suffer from layers of ideological underpinning, editorial rewriting, and hazards of transmission over centuries. They are, therefore, crucial for reconstructing Sasanian history and can serve as a gauge of the reliability of the information that we cull from literary sources. This study makes ample use of coins and seals. Among the latter is Rika Gyselen’s recently discovered collection of seals pertaining to the late Sasanian period. These seals put to rest, once and for all, the debate about the veracity of the military and administrative(?) quadripartition of the Sasanian realm following the much-discussed reforms of Khusrow I in the sixth century.\textsuperscript{38} They are by all accounts the greatest discovery of the past half century of primary sources for late Sasanian history; as such they are unprecedented in terms of their implications for this history. Remarkably, they corroborate, explicitly and concretely, our conclusions regarding the Parsig/Pahlav dichotomy prevalent throughout Sasanian history, for they give clear testimony to the continued significance of this dichotomous imperial identity late in Sasanian history.\textsuperscript{39} Recent scholarship in numismatics has likewise contributed substantially to disentangling crucial episodes of late Sasanian history. Recent works of Malik and Curtis, and Tyler–Smith on Sasanian numismatics, in particular, have added to our understanding of the chronologies of, respectively, the reign of the Sasanian queen Būrandukht, and the crucial battle of Qādisiya between the Arab and Iranian armies. It is only within the context of the narrative histories at our disposal, however, that the full ramifications of these significant recent strides in Sasanian numismatic history can be established.

While crucial, the primary sources for Sasanian history suffer from a clear limitation: they belong predominantly to the third and sixth century, leaving a substantial lacuna for the centuries in between. This in itself might be a telling indicator of the course of Sasanian history and the \textit{étatiste} junctures of this history. Even numismatists acknowledge that our primary sources for Sasanian

\textsuperscript{37}Gignoux, Philippe, ‘Problèmes de distinction et de priorité des sources’, in J. Harmatta (ed.), \textit{Prolegomena to the Sources on the History of Pre-Islamic Central Asia}, pp. 137–141, Budapest, 1979 (Gignoux 1979). It is not clear where exactly in Gignoux’s scheme we should put the \textit{Xwaday-Nāmag}.

\textsuperscript{38}Gyselen, Rika, \textit{The Four Generals of the Sasanian Empire: Some Sigillographic Evidence}, vol. 14 of \textit{Conferenze}, Rome, 2001a (Gyselen 2001a). For an enumeration of these seals, see notes 473 and 477, as well as Table 6.3 on page 470.

\textsuperscript{39}Significantly, the author became apprised of these seals after she had already formed the theses of this study based on literary narratives.
history are remarkably disjointed and comparatively limited to begin with.\footnote{Gyselen, Rika, ‘Nouveaux matériaux’, \textit{Studia Iranica} 24, (2002), pp. 61–69 (Gyselen 2002), here p. 180.} Besides, seals, coins, and reliefs, while clarifying crucial dimensions of Sasanian history, do not always give us a narrative. Coins and seals are not storytellers. As such they do not provide a context within which we can evaluate the sagas of significant personae and social collectivities powering Sasanian history. For this we have to resort to what Gignoux has termed the secondary and tertiary sources, the native and foreign sources for reconstructing Sasanian history.

Throughout this study we attempt to integrate—to the extent possible, but at times in detail—the strong and pervasive interdependencies of Iranian and Armenian sociopolitical, religious, and cultural history. Here, we shall underline the crucial significance of the rule of the Arsacids (53–428 CE)\footnote{For a synopsis of the history of the Arsacids in Armenia and sources for further study, see Chaumont, M.L., ‘Armenia and Iran: The pre-Islamic Period’, in Ehsan Yarshater (ed.), \textit{Encyclopædia Iranica}, pp. 417–438, New York, 1991 (Chaumont 1991). Also see page 43 and footnotes 82 and 192.} in Armenia into the fifth, and its legacies in the subsequent two centuries, in the context of the Sasanian–Parthian confederacy.\footnote{The author has merely been able to peck at this important fount of information for Sasanian history and the Sasanian–Parthian confederacy. It is hoped that future studies will further integrate this crucial Armenian dimension of Sasanian history into the late antique history of Iran.} To this end we make ample use of Armenian histories in our study.\footnote{Thanks to the tireless efforts of scholars of Armenian history who have admirably edited and translated a substantial collection of the primary sources of this history, students of the late antique history of Iran who have no knowledge of Armenian, such as the author, can now overcome this linguistic barrier and access this important historical corpus. These sources will be listed in the course of this study.} Explicit confirmation of the significant and central contribution of the Parthian dynastic families to Sasanian history abounds in the pages of Armenian histories.

Armenian historical writing was born under the aegis of the Christian Armenian Church in the fifth century.\footnote{See, among others, the introduction by Robert W. Thompson to Elishē, \textit{History of Vardan and the Armenian War}, Harvard University Press, 1982, translated and commentary by R. Thomson (Elishē 1982), pp. 1–3.} The birth of the Armenian alphabet, in fact, was integrally connected to the production of Christian Armenian histories. This overwhelmingly Christian dimension to Armenian historical literature, coupled with the increasing Byzantine pull on Armenia, ultimately led to a worldview in which Armenian chroniclers systematically downplayed the Iranian dimension of the kingdom’s political and cultural history.\footnote{Garsoian, Nina G., \textit{Armenia between Byzantium and the Sasanians}, London, 1985b (Garsoian 1985b).} Yet, as we shall see, precisely because the heritage of Arsacid rule was a recent and vivid memory in Armenian historical memory, the Parthian dimension of Sasanian history was systematically highlighted and underlined in early Christian Armenian historiography. As Lang, Garsoian, and Russell have been at pains to point out, furthermore, in spite of the ideological proclivities of Armenian
Introduction

historians, it is still possible to disentangle the pervasive Iranian undercurrents of Armenian history.\(^{46}\) Pending further research, one might even postulate that the commentaries that Christian Armenian chroniclers made on the religious landscape of the Sasanian realm were informed more by the recent pagan heritage of Armenia itself than by the religious inclinations of particular Sasanian kings, and, therefore, constituted a Christian commentary on the legacies of the Armenian past.

Alternatively, the picture that Armenian histories painted of the religious panorama of the Sasanian domains might have been a depiction of the religious predilections of the Iranian Parthian dynastic families, who struck deep roots in Armenia. In this context, we underlie not only the significance of Arsacid rule in Armenia to the Sasanian–Parthian confederacy, but also the clear evidence of Mihr worship in Armenia,\(^{47}\) and the connection of this to the evident prevalence of Mihr worship in the Pahlav territories in Iran. Besides Armenian histories, selective use has also been made of other foreign sources, especially Greek and Syriac sources relevant to the history of the Sasanians in late.

The \(X\)^{aday-Nâmag traditions, the \(futûb\) narratives, and other accounts of Iranian national history, as they appear in classical Arabic histories,\(^{48}\) are central to the present study. It has long been recognized that the \(X\)^{aday-Nâmag traditions were incorporated into the classical Arabic histories which were composed in the ninth and tenth centuries. Some of these, such as Tâbarî’s (839–923) \(Târikh al-Rusul wa ’l-Mulûk (Annales)\),\(^{49}\) Bal’ami’s (d. between 992 and 997) \(Târikh\),\(^{50}\) Tha’alibî’s (961–1038) \(Ghurar Akhbar Mulûk al-Furs wa Siyarihim\),\(^{51}\) Dinawari’s (d. between 894 and 903) \(Akhbar al-‘Twâl\),\(^{52}\) Ibn Balkhi’s \(Fârsnâmâ\) (written sometime between 1105 and 1116),\(^{53}\) and, finally, Yaquûbi’s (d. early tenth century) \(Târikh\),\(^{54}\) incorporate the \(X\)^{aday-Nâmag traditions systematically. We regularly resort to these in order to reconstruct Sasanian history. The most important of these works are those of Tâbarî and Tha’alîbî.\(^{55}\)

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\(^{47}\) Yarshater 1983b, pp. 360–363.


\(^{49}\) Bal’ami, \(Târjumih-i Târikh-i Tâbarî\), Tehran, 1959, edited by M.J. Mashkur (Bal’ami 1959).

\(^{50}\) Tha’alibî, Abū Mansûr, \(Ghurar Akhbar Mulûk al-Furs wa Siyarihim\), Paris, 1900, edited by H. Zotenberg (Tha’alibî 1900).


\(^{54}\) For other chronicles, such as Birûnî, Muḥammad b. Aḥmâd, \(Āthbâr al-Baqiya\), Tehran, 1984, translated by Akbar Danasirisht (Birûnî 1984); Birûnî, Muḥammad b. Aḥmâd, \(The Chronology\)
Among the most important sources containing the Xwaday-Nāmag (or Book of Kings) tradition, however, is the Shāhnāma of Ferdowsī (940–1019 or 1025).\textsuperscript{56} The Shāhnāma, the poetic epic of the scholar/poet Ferdowsī, was itself based on a prose account compiled at the orders of a compatriot of the poet, Abū Maṣûr ‘Abdalrazaq-i Tūsī (d. 962).\textsuperscript{57} One of the primary sources of the Shāhnāma-i Abū Maṣûr, was, in turn, the Xwaday-Nāmag(s). Scholars of Iran have long admired the Shāhnāma as one of the greatest poetic opera of Iranian national tradition, or of any ethnic community, for that matter. For an inordinate span of time, however, they have also dismissed the Shāhnāma as a source for reconstructing Iranian history. Not only Iranists, but also solitary classicists who touch on Sasanian history, have generally regarded the Shāhnāma as merely a literary epic, worthless for reconstructing Sasanian history. The reason: more than three fourths of this approximately 50,000-couplet epic poem details mythic and legendary accounts of Iranian history. And if one were to reckon the latter of no academic merit, one might just as well abandon the entire Shāhnāma of Ferdowsī.\textsuperscript{58} One fourth of the book, however, presumes to detail Sasanian history. What do we do with this? Until quite recently, when Zeev Rubin reprimanded the field, Iranists threw the ill-fated baby out with the bathwater. And why did they do this? Because its medium was poetic and as such it was presumed to take poetic license and hence more liberties than, say, the works of Ibn Farazdaq, Ibn Iṣḥāq, or Ṭabarī, the last of which, incorporating the Xwaday-Nāmag tradition,\textsuperscript{59} we, incidentally, do use regularly for reconstructing Sasanian history. The present work uses the Sasanian sections of the Shāhnāma of Ferdowsī systematically. And it will show that the Shāhnāma is not merely one of the sources, but often the only source that provides us with details corroborating the information contained in some of the primary sources for Sasanian history, such as the crucially significant sigillographic evidence, or in some of the secondary sources for Sasanian history, such as the history of the Armenian Bishop Sebeos.\textsuperscript{60} This is so because, as Omidsalar, Khaleqi Motlaq, and others


\textsuperscript{58}Naturally, students and scholars of Iranian myths, legends and pre-history may be justifiably appalled by this. For they regularly appeal to the Shāhnāma for assessing this dimension of Iranian history and identity. Besides, through the Ctesian method we will see examples of pertinent information on Sasanian history hidden even within these legendary tales.

\textsuperscript{59}Noldeke 1879, pp. xxi–xxii apud Yarshater 1983b, p. 360.

\textsuperscript{60}Sebeos 1999.
have warned us, Ferdowsi in fact slavishly followed the sources which had been entrusted to him in order to compile his opus on Iranian national history.\(^{61}\)

As we shall be investigating the Arab conquest of Iranian territories, the futuḥ narratives of classical Islamic historiography become essential to our study. As Albrecht Noth notes, an overwhelming majority of histories that deal with the period of the first four caliphs, also deal with the theme of the Arab conquest of territories outside Arabia.\(^{62}\) These are designated under the rubric of futuḥ narratives.\(^{63}\) Examining the futuḥ narratives in the context of the Xwaday-Nāmag historiography, we shall establish that Noth’s contention that Iran is a primary theme in classical Arab historiography is unmistakably valid. We shall also underline the ways in which the introduction of the hijra, annalistic, and caliphal structures of historical writing, as they appear in the works of Ṭabarī and those who followed him, have seriously undermined the chronology of the early Arab conquest of Sasanian territories as well as that of early Islamic history. Nevertheless, here we highlight the substantial reliability and the tremendous value of Sayf b. ‘Umar’s account, upon which Ṭabarī and later authors predominantly based themselves, in his retention of the primary theme of Iran in his narrative of the early conquest of Iraq. We shall demonstrate that a critical juxtaposition of the Xwaday-Nāmag traditions with the futuḥ narratives not only disentangles the complex web of the Sasanian–Parthian confederacy, but does so for a crucial juncture in Sasanian history: the early Arab conquest of the Sasanian territories in Iraq. This is one of the numerous instances where we resort to Armenian histories in order to gauge the reliability of the conclusions that we have reached.

For a variety of reasons having to do with the nature of classical Islamic historiography, Crone once remarked that the “obvious way to tackle early Islamic history is . . . prosopographical,” and proceeded to do this in her Slaves on Horses: The Evolution of Islamic Polity.\(^{64}\) A year after these words appeared in print, so did Donner’s work, The Early Islamic Conquests, where he likewise engaged in a prosopographical study of important Arab figures of early Islamic history, specifically those who had participated in the conquest of the Fertile Crescent. In contrast, in the translated volume of Ṭabarī’s work dealing with the early Arab conquest of Iraq, a majority of the important Iranian figures

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\(^{63}\)For a more detailed discussion, see §3.1.1 below.

appearing in Sayf b. ’Umar’s narrative have been reckoned to be creations of Sayf’s fertile imagination. Sayf, it appears, comfortably and systematically concocted Iranian names and genealogies. The resultant prosopographical map that we have been left with is one in which the Arabs fight a host of ghosts in Iranian territories. And as ghosts cannot be active participants in any history, it is not clear whom precisely the Arabs fought in their wars of conquest in the Sasanian territories. The present work indulges in a heavy dose of prosopographical research in order to bring back to life the ghosts of the Iranian protagonists in late antique Iranian history, specifically those of Parthian ancestry. The reader must bear with us as we attempt to reconstruct these in the course of our narrative.

Prosopographical research on the late antique history of Iran, however, especially when we are dealing with the Iranian side of things, is complicated by the nature of the sources with which we have to deal. Except in minor, but crucial, instances, our primary sources are of comparatively much less use than our foreign and native literary sources. These latter, in turn, have their own shortcomings, for whether we cull our data from the Armenian, Greek, Syriac, or classical Arabic sources, including the futûh narratives, or even from the Xwâdây-Nûmag traditions, the fact remains that they have been handed down to us through centuries of transmission and after undergoing transformations at the hands of authors not at home in Middle Persian naming practice. Consequently, depending on the source, the names of important Iranian historical figures have been metamorphosed through the languages in which they have been carried. As we shall see, the Shâhnâmây of Ferdowsî—apart from some mild use of poetic license—comes closest to the original Pahlavi rendition of these names. The inflation of titles in Sasanian political and administrative culture exacerbates this problem. Particularly in Greek and Arabic sources, the titles of significant personae of Sasanian history are at times confused with their personal names. To complicate matters, in Arabic texts the names of important figures are often Arabicized. What aids us significantly in disentangling this confusing web in which Middle Persian names have been bastardized, and in identifying figures appearing in different sources under various names, titles, or epithets, however, is the crucial importance of genealogical heritage in Sasanian history. If tribal traditions ensured the retention of identities in early Arabic histories—albeit we know too well of forged genealogies—so too the agnatic social structure of Iran in late antiquity, and the crucial significance of belonging to an agnatic family, guaranteed the preservation of ancestral lines in Sasanian history. Genealogies were not simply the obsession of Arab genealogists. The upper crust of the hierarchical Iranian society, especially the Parthian dynastic families, were also adept at it. As this work deals with the saga of these families, it also serves as a prosopographical investigation into the fortunes of


66See §1.2.
important Parthian dynastic families in Sasanian history. In the course of the many identifications that are made, there will doubtless be some inaccuracies and inconsistencies. These will not detract, however, from the greater scheme that the author is proposing, namely, the Sasanian–Parthian confederacy.

A word remains to be said about what this work does not purport to be. This is not a work on Sasanian administrative history, nor the much neglected domain of Sasanian economic history. For the former, the standard works remain those of Christensen, Rika Gyselen, and a host of other scholars of Sasanian history. The economic history of the Sasanian empire continues to remain a barren field and, unfortunately, we shall not rectify this. While the Sasanian–Parthian confederacy and the general contours of the dynastic sociopolitical arrangement in Sasanian history will be investigated through the course of the present study, the precise administrative mechanisms through which this Sasanian–Parthian confederacy came to be implemented lie beyond its scope. This study is likewise not a detailed investigation of Sasanian religious life. While we stand by our postulate regarding the Mithraic dimensions of Parthian religiosity in the Sasanian period, and while we hope to offer significant insights into the religious inclinations of some of the Parthian families, this is a study neither of Mihr worship, nor of the precise nature of the Mihr worship prevailing among various Parthian families. All that we are proposing is that there is substantial evidence for the popularity of Mihr worship in the küst-i khwarāsān and küst-i ādurbadagān of the Sasanian domains and among particular Parthian families, and that this Pahlav version of Mihr worship was distinct from the place of Mihr not only in the orthodox Mazdean creed, but also in that which was current among the Sasanians (Pārsīg). And even here one must probably reckon with the religious inclinations of particular Sasanian kings. In bringing to bear the results of the recent fascinating research on the Sasanian religious landscape, and while discussing evidence of Mihr worship among the Pahlav, it is hoped that subsequent scholarship on the post-conquest religious history of Iran will reckon with the multifarious religious landscape of the Sasanian empire. For at some point we need to abandon the notion, still prevalent

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67 Except sporadically and in passing, moreover, scholarship has yet to engage the dialectic of the natural environment and human agency in Sasanian history. Michael Morony and Fred M. Donner’s works, as well as Christensen, Peter, The Decline of Iranshahr: Irrigation and Environments in the History of the Middle East 500 B.C. to 1300 A.D., Copenhagen, 1993b (Christensen 1993b), are valuable exceptions to this.

68 I owe this terminology to my good friend and colleague Dr. Asef Kholdani. As the process of conversion in Iran took many centuries to complete, the dichotomous conceptualization of history of Iran into pre-Islamic and Islamic periods seems unwarranted and superficial for the purposes of this study. As this study hopes to establish, the political and cultural currents of Iranian history in the period under study fall more properly into late antique history of Iran, the Islamic periodization marking an artificial watershed imposed on this history.

69 The multifarious character of Islamic sectarian movements in early medieval Iran is itself a testimony to the source which fed it. Madelung, Wilferd, Religious Trends in Early Islamic Iran, Albany, 1988 (Madelung 1988); Madelung, Wilferd, Religious and Ethnic Movements in Medieval Islam, Brookfield, 1992 (Madelung 1992); Madelung, Wilferd, Religious Schools and Sects in Medieval
in some corners, that the strict hold of an orthodox Zoroastrian religious culture on its flock eased the way for the conversion of Iranians into a coherently formed and egalitarian Muslim creed. A systematic methodology for investigating the course of conversion in Iran, \footnote{The only viable study on this crucial topic thus far remains Bulliet, Richard W., \textit{Conversion to Islam in the Medieval Period: An Essay in Quantitative History}, Harvard University Press, 1979 (Bulliet 1979). See our discussion in §6.2; also see Choksy, Jamsheed K., \textit{Conflict and Cooperation: Zoroastrian Subalterns and Muslim Elites in Medieval Iranian Society}, Columbia University Press, 1997 (Choksy 1997).} and detailed studies of a host of other issues in late antique history of Iran are yet to be devised and undertaken. While this remains to be the case, we need only to acknowledge, as does the present author, that our investigations of late antique history of Iran are preliminary.

Offering a number of dissenting perspectives, this study picks many fights. But it does so in the habit of a rebellious disciple indulging in a \textit{zandık} reading of the orthodox creed. For in the final analysis, it has been the nurturing of the latter that has paved the way for the present analysis. This debt will become apparent in the course of this study.
CHAPTER 1

Preliminaries

1.1 The Arsacids

Sometime before the middle of the third century BCE, an Iranian people known as the Dahae\(^{71}\) appear in our records on the southeastern borders of the Caspian Sea.\(^{72}\) To this region they ultimately gave their name, the land of the Dahae, or Dihistân. Shortly thereafter, a group of these, known as the Parni, entered the Iranian plateau through the corridor established by the Atrak\(^{73}\) valley in the mountainous regions of northeastern Iran. Somewhere here, in the ancient city of Asaak,\(^{74}\) they established their capital. In Asaak, around 247 BCE, they crowned their king, Arsaces (Ashk) I.

What had facilitated these momentous events was the turmoil that had engulfed the comparatively short-lived, post-Alexandrian, Seleucid kingdom of Iran,\(^{75}\) and the rebellions that had erupted against the Seleucids—preoccupied

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\(^{72}\)Which territories comprised the original homeland of the Dahae and their settlements have been the subject of intense debate in recent scholarship. See footnote 94 below.

\(^{73}\)The Atrak is a river in northeastern Iran, in the region of Khurásân. Following a northwest and subsequently a southwest course, the Atrak river flows into the Caspian Sea. See Bosworth, C.E., ’Atrak’, in Ehsan Yarshater (ed.), *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, New York, 2007a (Bosworth 2007a).

\(^{74}\)The precise location of Asaak is open to dispute. It has been postulated, however, that it was somewhere near the modern city of Quchân in the Atrak valley.

\(^{75}\)After defeating the Achaemenid Darius III in 331 BCE, Alexander conquered Iran and the regions to the east. Upon his return from India, he died in Mesopotamia in 323 BCE. After Alexander’s death, the eastern parts of the conquered regions, including Iran, fell into the hands of one of his generals, Seleucus, who subsequently established the Seleucid empire. The Seleucids, however, became a western-oriented empire from early on. As Bickerman remarks, Seleucus’ transfer of his headquarters to the newly established city of Antioch in Syria in 300 BCE, was a momentous decision that “changed the course of Iranian history.” Bickerman, E., ’The Seleucid Period’, in Ehsan Yarshater (ed.), *Cambridge History of Iran: The Seleucid, Parthian, and Sasanian Periods*, vol. 3(1), Cambridge University Press, 1983 (Bickerman 1983), p. 4. Thereafter, the Seleucids lost their Iranian possessions “within a period of roughly fifteen years from 250 to 235 BCE.” See Shahbazi, Shapur, Schipman, K., Alram, M., Boyce, Mary, and Toumanoff, C., ’Arsacids’, in Ehsan Yarshater (ed.), *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, pp. 525–546, New York, 1991 (Shahbazi et al. 1991), here p. 525.
in Egypt and Syria—in Bactria (Balkh) and Khurāsān. Taking advantage of the unsettled situation in the east, the Parni moved on to take over the province (satrapy) that—at least since the Achaemenid period—had come to be known as Parthava. This was around 238 BCE. Shortly afterwards, they also conquered Hyrcania. Hyrcania, an extensive territory to the east of the Caspian Sea, included the regions later known as Gurgān (the land of the wolves) as well as Tabaristān. Thenceforth, together with Parthava, the province of Hrycania/Gurgān became one of the most important centers of the Dahae (Parni).

After their king, the dynasty that this group of the Parni established came to be known as the Arsacids (Persian Ashkānīyān). After the new region which they occupied as their homeland, they came to be known as the Parthians, that is, the people of Parthava. The Parthians, then, were the collectivity—composed of many large agnatic families—of the Iranian people that entered the plateau in the middle of the third century BCE. The term Parthian, in other words, is an Iranian ethnicon that has been coined after a territory, Parthava. The Arsacids, on the other hand, were the particular branch of the Parthians that came to rule Iran. Arsacid, therefore, is a dynastic name.

By 170 BCE, the Arsacids had consolidated their rule in the southern regions of the Caspian Sea. The rule of one of their greatest kings, Mithradates (Mihrdād) I (171–138 BCE), saw further expansions to the west against the Seleucids, and later against Rome. By 148 BCE, they had conquered the important and ancient region of Media in western Iran. And by 141 BCE, Mithradates I’s power was recognized as far as the ancient city of Uruk in Mesopotamia. Around this time, Mithradates I also conquered the important Seleucid city Seleucia, where he crowned himself king. By this time, Arsacid power in Mesopotamia was beyond doubt. In the process the Arsacids had made another crucial conquest: the conquest of Armenia.

Ultimately, Arsacid rule (247 BCE–224 CE) over Iran and Mesopotamia lasted for more than four and a half centuries—more than their predecessors, the Achaemenids (559–330 BCE), or their successors, the Sasanians (224–651 CE). As we shall see in the course of this study, their control of Armenia

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76 Besides the rebellion in Bactria, the most important uprising was that of the Seleucid satrap (governor) of Parthava and Hyrcania, Andragoras, who rebelled against his Seleucid overlord, Antiochus II, around 245 BCE. It has been suggested, though not without controversy, that Andragoras himself was probably a Persian, his original old Persian name being Narisanka. For Andragoras, see Frye, Richard N., ‘Andragoras’, in Ehsan Yarshater (ed.), Encyclopaedia Iranica, p. 26, New York, 1991 (Frye 1991), p. 26.

77 The boundaries of the province of Parthava were subject to change depending on the political situation in which the region found itself. As a general rule of thumb, it might be said to have included the provinces of Khurāsān and Gurgān.


79 For the agnatic social structure of Iranian society, see §1.2 below.

80 Shahbazi et al. 1991.

81 Shahbazi et al. 1991.
also lasted for close to four centuries.\footnote{After the conquest of Armenia by the Arsacids, the Arsacid king Vologeses (Valakhsh I, 51–78), appointed his younger brother, Tiridates, to the Armenian throne in 62 CE. This junior branch of the Arsacids remained in power in Armenia until the Sasanians conquered the region under Shāpūr I (241–272). The Sasanian king then appointed his brother Hormozd-Ardashir as governor of Armenia. While Armenia remained a bone of contention between the Romans and the Parthians and, subsequently, the Byzantines and the Sasanians throughout its history, after a short hiatus, Arsacid rule was restored in Armenia under Bahram II (276–283) in 286–87. The Arsacids continued to rule Armenia until 428 when their kingdom was officially abolished (see footnote 192). As Garsoian underlines, therefore, there is no question that the “Armenian Arsacids were a junior branch of the Parthian royal house.” Garsoian, Nina G., ‘Prolegomena to a Study of the Iranian Aspect of Arsacid Armenia’, in Armenia between Byzantium and the Sasanians, pp. 1–46, London, 1985e (Garsoian 1985e), p. 3.} The Parthians remained the greatest unconquered foes of the imperialistic Romans through most of their rule. Any impartial observer of antiquity ought to have reckoned them as the equals of the Romans during this period. Early in the twentieth century some began to recognize this. Debevoise remarked in 1931, for example, that “the most cursory examination of the [classical] literature . . . \footnote{Debevoise, Neilson C., ‘Parthian Problems’, The American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literature 47, (1931), pp. 73–82 (Debevoise 1931), here, p. 74. Debevoise also gives a good summary of the extant, and unfortunately lost, classical literature dealing with the Parthians.} [underlined the fact] that Parthia was no second-rate power in the minds of the ancients . . . Poet and historian, dramatist and technician, all speak of the military and political strength of the Arsacidae. Collections of Latin inscriptions teem with references to Parthia. It was frankly admitted that there were but two great powers in the world: Rome and Parthia.”\footnote{After the publication of Rawlison, George, The Sixth Oriental Monarchy, or The Geography, History, and Antiquities of Parthia, Collected and Illustrated from Ancient and Modern Sources, New York, 1837 (Rawlison 1837), the first serious attempt at critically examining Parthian history was undertaken by Neilson Debevoise. In 1931, in an article entitled ‘Parthian Problems’, Debevoise first articulated the results of his research, and the problems confronting scholars interested in Parthian history; this was followed seven years later by Debevoise, Neilson C., A Political History of Parthia, Chicago University Press, 1938 (Debevoise 1938). In the early 1960s, there also appeared Lozinski, Philip, The Original Homeland of the Parthians, ’s-Gravenhage, 1959 (Lozinski 1959); Ghirshman, Roman, Persian Art, Parthian and Sassanian Dynasties 249 B.C.–651 A.D., New York, 1962, translated by Stuart Gilbert and James Emmons (Ghirshman 1962); and Neusner, J., ‘Parthian Political Ideology’, Iranica Antiqua 3, (1963), pp. 40–59 (Neusner 1963). Debevoise’s work, however, remained the standard on the topic. In 1967, Collège published Collège, Malcolm A.R., The Parthians, New York, 1967 (Collège 1967), and two decades later Collège, Malcolm A.R., The Parthian Period, Leiden, 1986 (Collège 1986). Most recently, other works have appeared: Schippmann, Klaus, Grundzüge der parthischen Geschichte, Darmstadt, 1980 (Schippmann 1980); translated into Persian as Schippmann, Kraus, Mahānī-i Tārīkh-i Parāyān, Tehran, 2005, translation of Schippmann 1980 by Houshang Sadighi (Schippmann 2005); Wieschöfer, Josef, Das Partherreich und seine Zeugnisse: The Arsacid Empire: Sources and Documentation, Stuttgart, 1998 (Wieschöfer 1998); Brunner, Christopher, ‘Geographical and Administrative Divisions: Settlements and Economy’, in Ehsan Yarshater (ed.), Cambridge History of Iran: The Seleucid, Parthian, and Sassanian Periods, vol. 3(2), 21}
§1.1: THE ARSACIDS

And until recently, when Soviet archaeological investigations in Dihiştân, Transoxiana, and the surrounding regions led to the discoveries of ancient, settled civilizations and communities, the nomadic background of the Parthians was established wisdom, as was their want of any notable cultural and political legacy to posterity.

The Arsacids, we are told, never really committed their history to writing. The skewed image through which they had been presented, therefore, was partly a legacy of Rome, of the ambivalence with which the classical authors had represented their enemies. Another group of foes, however, were equally and centrally involved in drawing this dismal image of Parthians and their history. These were an Iranian people, the Persîs, the early migrants to the Iranian plateau who had settled in the region of Fârs (Pârs) in southwestern Iran, from much prior to the arrival of the Parnî—at least a millennium before the common era. Many centuries later, it was from this same region of Fârs, with its tradition of hostility toward Parthava, that the Sasanians hailed. And, thus, having defeated the Parthians in the early third century, the Sasanians also inherited the added antagonism of the Persîs toward their conquered foes, the Arsacids. While the Arsacids had presumably left us few written records of their history, under the patronage of the Sasanians the first history of Iran, including what little they had left of Arsacid history, was committed to writing: in the Xwâdîy-Nâmag or Book of Kings.


86 Schippmann 1980; see footnote 94.
87 See in this context our discussion of sources on pages 10 and 459, as well as Boyce 1957a.
88 The Achaemenids, for instance, were Persîs.
89 See also our discussion at the beginning of §5.1.
90 The many epic traditions and romances which have a clear Parthian provenance, such as Vis o Râmin, Samâk-i ‘Ayyâr, and others, should warn us against taking this too literally.
91 See also page 171ff below.
92 The wealth of the sources pertaining to Parthian history is in material culture, specifically numismatic evidence. Besides recent archaeological investigations, through which, for instance, the ostraca of Nîsâ (near modern Ashkabâd), have been found, there are papyri from the western regions of Iran and Dura Europos (see footnote 2250) as well as Chinese sources. It should be mentioned, however, that archaeological investigations of Parthian homelands, Khurâsân and Tabaristân, have been practically nonexistent. Besides the sources listed above, also see Lukonin, V.G., ‘Political, Social and Administrative Institutions: Taxes and Trade’, in Ehsan Yarshater (ed.), Cambridge History of Iran: The Seleucid, Parthian, and Sasanian Periods, vol. 3(2), pp. 119–120, Cambridge University
on classical authors, and modern Iranists, some of whom uncritically accepted the Xwāday-Nāmag versions of Iranian history, the Parthians thus suffered, at best, from collective historical amnesia and, at worst, from bouts of hostile historiography.

A revival of Parthian studies in recent decades, however, has partially corrected this hostile representation of the Parthians and their contributions to the history of antiquity. Although we remain many decades behind a substantive knowledge of Parthian and Arsacid rule, our previous blind spots are being increasingly fixed.93 Recent archaeological discoveries, for example, have established that we can no longer date the beginnings of urbanization in Dihistān, Kopet Dāgh and the Murghāb regions—regions in which the nuclei of the Arsacid state were originally formed—to the Achaemenid or the Hellenistic periods, but to a much earlier period: the end of the third millennium BCE. By the beginnings of the first millennium BCE, the Iron Age, the pace of urbanization in these areas became even more rapid. The question that has now risen, therefore, is the extent to which the Dahae partook in the advanced settled cultures of these territories. What is clear, according to Schippmann and others, is that we can no longer simply speak of the nomadic Dahae/Parni.94 Critically re-examining our historical givens, the Parthian contribution to the contemporary and subsequent cultures of the area have been increasingly recognized. At its simplest, we now recognize, for example, that had it not been for the Parthian

93 Schippmann’s work gives a very good synopsis of the state of the field in Parthian studies. Schippmann 1980; Schippmann 2005. Disregarding conventional practice, mention also should be made of an electronic resource, parthia.com, whose authors have done an admirable job of presenting a bibliographic survey of works on Parthian history.

94 Archaeological investigations have unearthed three major cultures, belonging to the late Bronze Age (circa 3500–1450 BCE), in southern Turkmenistan: 1) The Dihistān culture in western Turkmenistan, belonging to 1200–650 BCE, takes its name from the Dahae, who at some point lived in the region. Settlements ranging from one to fifty acres and extensive irrigation networks testify to a centralized rule. The question of whether or not this culture belonged to the Dahae, however, has polarized scholarship. Wolski, basing himself on classical sources, argues that the Dahae only migrated to this region in the third century BCE. In opposition to him, I. N. Chlopin has argued that the Dahae had always lived in the eastern regions of the Caspian Sea, in ancient Hycrania, and that archaeological investigations in this area do not give any evidence of an aggressive inroad of nomadic populations in the third century BCE. This culture, argues Chlopin, does in fact belong to the Dahae; 2) The second culture, sometimes called the Namaqga VI culture, was found at the base of the Kopet Dāgh mountains. Extensive settlements, some as large as 70 acres, have been found here as well. The chronology of this culture has been traced to the third and second millennium BCE. It has been argued that, with intermittent periods of decline, this culture reached its height in the seventh to the fourth centuries BCE; 3) Finally, there was the culture of the Murghāb, belonging to 1500–1200 BCE. Over all, according to Schippman, we can now propose that prior to the first millennium BCE, and in the case of Dihistān even prior to this, large political confederations did exist in Dihistān and neighboring territories. Extensive irrigation networks, enclosed fortresses and settlements, as well as the emergence of iron, all testify to the fact that these three cultures developed on a comparable basis, although the details of their connection to one another is not yet clear. Schippmann 1980, pp. 78–81, Schippmann 2005, pp. 98–100.
protection of the frontier territories in Central Asia and Caucasus, even Rome would have suffered under the pressure of nomadic populations in these sensitive corridors of the East. In art, architecture, and even traditions of rule, the Parthian contributions to subsequent Iranian culture and to the cultural traditions of the region as a whole are being gradually and increasingly established—albeit at a snail’s pace—by scholarship. There is much that remains unclear about this era of Iranian history. One of the least investigated dimensions of the Parthian cultural contribution to posterity, for example, is the impact they made on the religions of the Near East and the Mediterranean world. A discussion of the state-of-the-field in Parthian studies is beyond the scopes of the present study and the reader is urged to look elsewhere for this. By way of background, however, some preliminary notes about the political and social structure of Parthian rule and their role in preserving and disseminating Iranian national history must be given.

**Political organization of the Parthian empire**

As mentioned, the Arsacids were only one of the families of the collectivity that we have come to know as Parthians, namely, the ruling family that had assumed power with the coronation of Arsaces I. There were besides these other, important, Parthian (Pahlav) families, who exerted tremendous power throughout the Arsacid period. Traditionally, it is said that there were seven of these, although this is most likely legendary. As it stands, besides significant, yet disjointed, sets of information, the details of the histories of these other Parthian families during the Arsacid period escape our knowledge. In fact, a substantial part of the information that we do have on these families pertains not to their histories during the Arsacid period, but to their saga among the Sasanians. This book is partly an account of this latter history.

What little we do know about these Parthian families during the Arsacid period relates to the later period of Arsacid history. Based on these, some have argued that the Parthian families’ participation in Arsacid history had rendered the sociopolitical and economic structures of the Arsacids feudal. As Schippmann, Neusner, and others have observed, however, the matter is not so simple.

The problem, once again, pertains to the question of sources for Arsacid history. The dearth of sources for the early Arsacid period has been debilitating

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96 Fortunately during the past decade a thorough investigation of the Parthian numismatic and political history has been undertaken by Farhad Assar. The scholarly community eagerly awaits the publication of his results, as well as the volume covering the Parthian period of the *History of Zoroastrianism* by Frantz Grenet and the late Mary Boyce.

97 The growth and spread of Mithraism in the Roman empire took place, after all, during the Parthian period. In a subsequent study, the author hopes to contribute to this topic.

98 For a summary bibliography, see footnote 84.

for scholarship. Here we are in the realm of conjectural history. Schippman provides one scenario for this: after his coronation, Arsaces I, as the commander of a small army, at once found himself sovereign not only over the Parni, but also over the population living in the conquered territories. Arsaces had to exert, therefore, all his efforts during this period toward strengthening his rule. His coronation in Asaak, the establishment of this as the beginning of the Arsacid calendar, and the minting of coinage bearing Arsaces’ effigy, are all evidence of measures taken by the king toward solidifying his rule in these territories. Already during this early period, however, we hear of a small number of powerful vassals, vassals who controlled extensive tracts of land and ruled over provinces next to the king. The lands under the control of these families were hereditary. From the rule of Mithradates I (171–138 BCE) onward, especially during the reign of Mithradates II (123–88 BCE), and in the wake of the extensive Parthian conquests in the west and the incorporation of the western city-states into their domains, we witness an imperial structure of rule developing within Parthian territories. The power and strength of the nobility, however, continued and, in fact, seems to have increased from then on. From the first century BCE onward, therefore, there seems to be clear evidence that the power of these families vis-à-vis the king was growing.\footnote{Schippmann 1980, pp. 81–88; Schippmann 2005, pp. 100–107.}

The nature of the political and economic structure of the Parthian state has thus raised two central questions in Parthian studies: 1) whether the selection of the king was effected through a council of nobility, a senatus or mahistān, or was based on the concept of hereditary kingship; and related to this, 2) the extent to which we can speak of a feudal structure when studying Parthian history. To begin with the first, we have evidence for the existence of such an executive body for some periods of Arsacid history, and we therefore presume its continued existence throughout. Our evidence also suggests that during the early period, that is, prior to the first century BCE, the power of the Arsacid king far outweighed the power of the nobility.\footnote{Schippmann 1980, pp. 100–106; Schippmann 2005.} The increasing power of the Parthian families in the late Arsacid period seems to be reflected in Arsacid political ideology, as we can reconstruct these from sources.

Basing himself on the accounts given by Strabo (64/63 BCE–21 CE) and Justinus’ epitome of Pompeius Trogus’ Historiae Philippicae, which was probably written in the third century, Jacob Neusner argues that the conditions of a conquering people who established hegemony by force of arms\footnote{Neusner seems to accept the nomadic background of the Dahae.} is reflected in the realities of the early Arsacid state, which “was governed by a king and a council, and was apparently centralized to some degree.” This state of affairs reflects conditions up to the first century BCE.\footnote{Neusner 1963, p. 43.} This then was a “feudal, but still centralized state, in which authority rested in the hands of a king, the royal family, priesthood, and a council of powerful nobles.” As the earliest coins
of the Arsacids, which mostly lack any honorifics, bear witness, such a state “would have considered itself legitimate by force of arms, requiring no further political authority to explain its authority.” Once we turn to the accounts of Flavius Arrianus of the second century CE, and consider the numismatic evidence of later Arsacid history, however, we realize that the political ideology of the Arsacids had undergone a transformation, incorporating in the process an important dimension into their claim for legitimacy: the Arsacids now claimed an Achaemenid genealogy. This claim, Neusner argues, was not advanced by the Arsacids before the end of the second century BCE. From then on, however, Arsacid co-option of Achaemenid heritage is evidenced not only in their coins, which bear the title King of Kings (shāhāns̄hāh), but also by their use in writing of Pahlavi side-by-side of Greek as well as other symbolic associations that they sought to make with ancient Iranian rule and the Achaemenids. Neusner believes that this change in Arsacid political ideology was a reflection of the changing fortunes of the dynasty. Initially instigated by the victories of the Parthians in the course of the first century, victories which recalled “the glories of Achaemenid Persia,” the change in Arsacid political ideology was thereafter sustained when, by the end of the first century BCE, “the powerful [Parthian] armies and government … fell apart … and the fundamental weakness of Arsacid rule became evident.” From then on the power of the nobility increased, while the strength of the state in the face of external enemies decreased. In view of this, there was a greater need for the state to continue to emphasize its legitimacy by resorting to extra-Parthian, ancient Iranian traditions of rule and hegemony. At this point, according to Neusner, a “feudal theory was required, which unlike an étatiste one, made a great matter out of original legitimacy, pure lineage, and proper succession of the monarch.”

Who were the Parthian feudal families exerting such power throughout Arsacid history? An impressionistic and romanticized account of the provenance of the Parthian families, an origins myth, is preserved for us in the accounts of the Armenian historian Moses Khorenatsʿi. The Arsacid king, Phraat IV (circa 38–2 BCE), relates Khorenatsʿi, had three sons and a daughter: Artashʿes (Artaxerxes), Kārin, Sūren, and Koshm, respectively. The first son became the successor to his father and ruled as Phraat V (circa 2 BCE–4 CE). The other two sons became the progenitors of the houses bearing their name, namely, the Kārins and the Sūrens. Koshm married a “general of all Iranians” after whom

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104 Neusner 1963, p. 44.
105 Neusner 1963, pp. 45–47.
107 Neusner 1963, p. 57.
108 Neusner 1963, pp. 50–58.
110 Also known as Phraataces.
his progeny “bore the title of Aspahpet Pahlav,” 111 the family who later came to be known as the Isphahbudhan family. This account is, doubtless, mythic. For, as Christensen argues, the existence of these families as great feudal nobility is established long prior to the periodization provided by Khorenats’i. 112 Unfortunately, we have little more than myths to go by for reconstructing the details of the histories of these families during the Parthian period itself. 113

It is suggested that these Parthian families considered the Arsacids only as primus inter pares, first among equals. 114 As a collectivity, these families had agreed to Arsacid rule for a substantial period of their history. Evidence seems to suggest, moreover, that this was increasingly not the case in the last century of Arsacid history, during which period internal struggles beset the dynasty. It was at the end of this period of inter-Parthian rivalry, during the early third century, that from Persis, the land of the Parsig, the forebears of the Sasanians rose. Our study traces the relationship of the various Parthian families, the Pahlav, with the Sasanians, the Parsig. Before we embark, a final word needs to be said about the nature of the Iranian family structure.

1.2 Agnatic families

From well before the Arsacid times, the family had been the primary unit of Iranian society. 115 A host of social constructs and restrictions bound the Iranian family together. Besides a strict system of rights and obligations, the family was also cemented together by important social customs and economic systems. The family shared worship that was structured around the “domestic altar and the cult of the souls of ancestors on the father’s side,” as well as specific religious rites. The family owned property as a collectivity. And, finally, the family engaged in common activities in production and consumption of resources. The life of the individual within the family, in other words, was bound to the latter by a network that reinforced itself on multiple levels, continuously.

Both the small and extended families, designated respectively by the terms dātak (literally smoke) and katak (house), consisted of “a group of agnates limited to three or four generations counting in descending order from the head of the family.” The crucial concept, however, is the agnatic group. For, whether small or extended, the family itself was only a nucleus that functioned within a larger network of a community of kinsmen, the “agnatic group.” As Perikhanian observes, the agnatic group, referred to in the Parthian and Sasanian society

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111Khorenats’i 1978, p. 166.
112Christensen 1944, p. 104, n. 1.
113Hopefully, the work of Assar will shed light on this.
114Although recently this too seems to have been the subject of some debate.
as nāf (family), tōkhm (seed), and gōhar (substance, essence, lineage), the two latter terms, incidentally, permeating the Shāhnāma of Ferdowsī, “was the most important structure within the civic community, replacing the earlier clan and tribal systems.” In its simplest form the agnostic group included several dozen extended families who defined themselves based on their lineage from a common ancestor from the father’s side three or four generations down the line.

In terms of the social and organizational patterns, perhaps the most important consideration to keep in mind is the impact of the agnostic group on Iranian society. According to Perikhanian, the agnostic group entailed a “(1) community of economic life, (2) solidarity in obligations, (3) community of political life, (4) territorial community.” While with the growth of the family as a social unit, property rights eventually came to accrue to the individual families, furthermore, “the agnostic group continued to retain latent rights over the possession of all families forming part of the group.” The characteristics of the agnostic social structure of the society under investigation here will be of crucial importance to the crux of the present investigation. When discussing the power of the dynastic families over the population living in their domains during the Sasanian period, it will be important to bear in mind, for example, that “the larger group also retained collective ownership of the common pastures, mills, irrigation works, farm buildings and so on.” Community of worship was also closely controlled by one’s agnostic group. The rites of passage of a youth into adulthood were celebrated by solemn ceremonies in the presence of the agnates. Other important ceremonies, such as marriages and juridical acts, equally required the presence of adult members of the agnostic group. By far, one of the most crucial characteristics of the agnostic group for our purposes, however, is the fact that each agnostic group constituted a territorial unit. Members of an agnostic group, in other words, lived in the confines of one and the same territory. Modern ethnographic studies of Iran, where whole villages are sometimes made up of kinsmen, corroborate the tremendous continuity of this aspect of the agnostic group in Iranian society.

The specific features of the agnostic group in Iran had important socio-cultural and political ramifications. Insofar as the religious panorama of Iran was concerned, for example, and in light of the diversity of the religious landscape in the region, community of worship would have probably meant that religious diversity in Iran had a local dimension to it. As we shall see, semi-regional or
regional communities had access not only to local religious traditions and lore, but also to their local forms of worship.¹²⁴

As Perikhanian observes, it was membership in an agnatic group that determined not only one’s legal capacity as a citizen, which in the Pahlavi legal terminology was rendered by the term ḏāzāt,¹²⁵ but also one’s membership in one of the estates of the nobility. Among these latter were the agnatic or dynastic families, who held the most prestigious places in the hierarchical Sasanian societal structure. Their local power bases set aside, we know that to the dynastic families, by virtue of their birth, also accrued privileges in the empire’s administration. With proper agnatic ties, in other words, came political power. Membership in a noble agnatic group, therefore, gave “one access to appointment to any state or court office of importance.” In the administrative public law documents, the word ḏāzāt is, in fact, “used in the sense of member of an agnatic group of nobility, representative of the noble estate, noblemen.”¹²⁶ Perhaps even more important for our purposes is Perikhanian’s observation that certain “offices even became, with the passing of time, hereditary in a particular group, and that branch of the clan which had acquired preferential right to hold a given office could take the title of this office as the basis of its gentilitial name.” The classic articulation of this, depicting the Parthian agnatic families, is found in Simocatta’s narrative which, while formulaic and articulating an idealized rendition of Sasanian sociopolitical structure, nevertheless, encapsulates the realities of the Sasanian–Parthian confederacy. Simocatta here quotes a “certain Babylonian, a sacred official who had gained very great experience in the composition of royal epistles,” as maintaining the following: “For seven peoples among the Medes, allocated by ancient law, perform the sagacious and most honoured of their actions; and he [i.e., the sacred official] stated that the procedures could not be otherwise; and they say that the people entitled Ar- sacid hold the kingship and these place the diadem on the king, another is in charge of the military disposition, another is invested with the cares of state, another resolves the differences of those who have some dispute and need an arbitrator, the fifth commands the cavalry, the next levies taxes on subjects and is overseer of the royal treasuries, the seventh is appointed custodian of arms and military uniforms.” This Simocatta claims, had been established since the time of “Darius [III (380–330 BCE)] the son of Hydaspe.”¹²⁷

¹²⁴The growth of regional traditions which, according to Boyce, sought to co-opt the homeland of Zoroaster into their own cultural milieu was only one of the consequences of this; see page 321ff.
¹²⁶Perikhanian 1983, p. 645. It is to be noted incidentally that this terminology is also replete in the Shāhnāma, especially when referring to the court nobility.
¹²⁷Simocatta, The History of Theophylact Simocatta, Oxford, 1986, English translation with introduction and notes by Michael and Mary Whitby (Simocatta 1986), p. 101. As we shall see, the fact that Simocatta diverges into this exposition when discussing the genealogy of Bahrām-i Chūbin is particularly significant in the context of our study (see §6.1).
The Byzantine historian Theophylact Simocatta wrote in the early seventh century, during the reign of Heraclius (610–641). His *History*, which covers the reign of the Emperor Maurice (582–602), is therefore not an eyewitness account. According to Simocatta’s editors, when giving the above passage, the “rare mention by Theophylact of an oral source may refer to a Persian ambassador to Constantinople during Heraclius’ reign.” If this is the case, then the germ of the tradition that he gives concerning the Parthian dynastic power in late Sasanian history must nevertheless be very valid. It is the dynamic of this Sasanian–Parthian relationship that we shall seek to disentangle as we proceed.

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128 For a discussion of the life of Simocatta and the sources on which he based his history, see Simocatta 1986, pp. xiii–xxviii.
Part I

Political History
CHAPTER 2

Sasanian polity revisited: the Sasanian–Parthian confederacy

Gradually and in the course of their long history, the Sasanians learned to be incredibly able propagandists. They attempted to obliterate the history of their defeated foes, the Arsacids (247 BCE–224 CE), through, among other exertions, a recalculation of the Parthian rule to half of its actual duration.\(^{130}\) They endeavored to connect their rather humble origins to remote antiquity.\(^{131}\) They envisioned and tried to implement the clerical–monarchical cooperation as the pillar of their polity, and to fuse the national and religious traditions in the service of a political agenda.\(^{132}\) And they attempted to subsume—and at

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\(^{130}\) Based on astrological calculations in vogue, and in order to make their rise coincide with the dawn of a new millennium, the Sasanians recalculated Arsacid rule from 474 to 266 (or 260) years. For a detailed investigation of this see, Shahbazi 1990.

\(^{131}\) Broadly speaking, the Iranian national tradition divides the history of the Iranians into four periods: (1) the Pîshdâdis, “the early kings who ruled over the world and contributed to the progress of civilization by their teachings and institution”; (2) the Kayânids (Kayâniyân), “who were the kings of Iran proper and who were in continual conflict with their neighbors, the Tûrûnians” (see also page 385ff); (3) the Ashkânîs (Arsacids), “who headed a feudal system and allegedly presided over the dark ages of Iranian history” (see also §1.1); and (4) the Sâsûnîs (Sasanians). Yarshater 1983b, p. 366. As we shall see on page 385ff, the Sasanians eventually connected their ancestry to the Kayânîds. For an extensive assessment of Iranian national history also see Nöldeke, Theodore, *The Iranian National Epic*, Philadelphia, 1979, translated by L. Bogdanov (Nöldeke 1979); Yarshater 1983b, especially pp. 386–87; Gnoli, Gherardo, *The Idea of Iran*, Rome, 1989 (Gnoli 1989), passim, especially pp. 122–123; Yarshater, Ehsan, ‘Were the Sasanians Heirs to the Achaemenids?’, in *L’Iran à l’époque médievale*, pp. 517–531, Rome, 1971 (Yarshater 1971); and Daryaee, Touraj, ‘National History or Kayanid History?: The Nature of Sasaniid Zoroastrian Historiography’, *Iranian Studies* 28, (1995), pp. 129–141 (Daryaee 1995).

\(^{132}\) The very “concept of Erânsâhahr . . . was an integral part of the politico-religious propaganda of the early Sasaniids . . . which linked the destiny of the Iranian nation to that of the Mazdean religion of the mções.” Gnoli has, systematically and convincingly, traced the origins of the fusion of the national tradition with the religious tradition to the pre-Avestan period. The coalescence of the national and religious traditions of Iran, therefore, has an ancient history that harks back to remote antiquity, and was not an innovation of the Sasanians. As we shall see below, however, and as Gnoli himself argues, the systematic formulation of a worldview which depicted the state and the church as the two pillars of government, and the use of this for political propaganda and as an ideology, was a legacy of the Sasanians (see §5.2.1). The development of Mazdaism into a state church through “successive redaction of the sacred texts by means of selection and censorship,” the establishment of a doctrinal and liturgic orthodoxy, the development of an official chronology, and the definite
times aspired to subordinate—a multifarious Iranian religious landscape under the aegis of an orthodox Zoroastrian system of belief and a controlled and hierarchical religious structure. In retrospect, the propagandistic efforts of the Sasanians were incredibly successful. Their crowning achievement in this direction was surely their patronage and promulgation of an official historiography, a feat hitherto unprecedented in the annals of pre-Islamic Iran, although perhaps in tune with historical processes current in the Mediterranean world by the third century. Setting aside for the moment other instruments pertaining to material culture for effecting political propaganda, such as inscriptions and coinage, the Sasanians were unique in that the first official history of Iran was written under their auspices. The importance of the above observation cannot be taken lightly. Most of the other efforts of the dynasty in promulgating and sustaining a political ideology, enumerated above, were subsumed under, written into, and articulated through this same official history. And so the Sasanians were successful in leaving to posterity an image of their fascinating story in the corpus that has come to be known as the Xwaday-Namag, or the Book of Kings.\footnote{Shahbazi 1990. For a further discussion of the Xwaday-Namag, see page 171ff.}

But it is surely not incidental that the most concerted efforts of the dynasty in the writing and rewriting of its history took place at junctures when it experienced acute crises in its history, as in the revolt of Bahrám-i Chūbin (590–591), when the last effective Sasanian king, Khusrow II Parviz (591–628), inherited a fragmented realm as his legacy.\footnote{For Bahrám-i Chūbin’s revolt, see §2.6.3 below.} Already by the time of Bahrâm V Gūr (420–438), we have evidence of the Book of Kings, and by the time of Khusrow I (531–579), “the history of ancient Iran was definitely compiled.” It was under Khusrow II, however, when “much new material was added to the Xwaday-Namag, and this then became the source of all early Islamic histories on ancient Iran.” According to Jahiz, when Khusrow II asked his paladin whether he knew of anyone more heroic than himself, the latter replied with a narrative of Bahrám-i Chūbin. Furious, the king made sure that the tale did not appear in the Book of Kings. In the context of the late Shahbazi’s disagreement with Nöldeke concerning the date of the compilation of this national history,\footnote{Shahbazi 1990, pp. 213–215 and p. 226, n. 52; Nöldeke 1979, p. 9.} we should note that the historical information about the Sasanians begins to take flesh by the mid-fifth century, during the reigns of Yazdgird II (438–457) and Pīrūz (459–484). As we shall see,\footnote{See §2.2.4, §2.3, and page 380 below.} these were also junctures in which the

\footnote{“Demonization of the figure of Alexander . . . [as part] of the political and religious propaganda of the new dynasty,” all of these processes are thought to have begun in the third century. Gnoli 1989, pp. 152, 140, 151. For the history of the demonization of the figure of Alexander in Iran, one of the first articulations of which can be found in Book IV of The Sibylline Oracles, where the author prophesies the death of Alexander “at the hands of coming Oriental successors of the Achaemenids on account of his injustice and cruelty,” see Eddy, Samuel K., The King is Dead: Studies in the Near Eastern Resistance to Hellenism 334–31 B.C., University of Nebraska Press, 1961 (Eddy 1961). Eddy dates The Sibylline Oracles to 325 BCE, Eddy 1961, pp. 10–14.}
Sasanians experienced acute crises. This then remains an important caveat to the Sasanian efforts at writing their history: they seem to have embarked upon it in an hour of need and at a time when their desire to create a hegemonic polity was forcefully questioned by forces that, as we shall see shortly, had agreed upon a partnership with the Sasanian, namely the Parthian dynastic\(^\text{137}\) families. The belated effort of the Sasanians at representing their realm and their history proved successful. It remains one of our most basic founts for reconstructing the Sasanian history of Iran with any degree of certainty. It portrays the Sasanians from a legitimist, monarchical perspective. It sanctifies, naturally, the Sasanians’ view of themselves as a centralized and benevolent hegemonic polity. And, in view of what seems to have been the wholesale destruction of this corpus in its original Pahlavi renditions, and through the process of translation, this history was adopted in toto by classical Islamic history, a historiography through which, besides the Persian Shāhnāma-genre, including the magnum opus of Ferdowsī,\(^\text{138}\) we have reconstructed the dynasty’s history. Ironically, the legitimistic bent of Sasanian historiography suited the purposes of a nascent Islamic caliphate admirably. Islamic historiography not only faithfully retained the legitimist monarchical tradition of Sasanian history in its transmission of this history, but highlighted this very dimension of it.\(^\text{139}\) As Gutas has brilliantly argued, the ‘Abbāsids considered their polity direct heir to that of the Sasanians. The Sasanian imperial ideology, with its emphasis on a centralized, semi-theocratic polity, furnished the nascent ‘Abbāsid regime with a normative model based on which it would depict the nature of its own polity.\(^\text{140}\)

One of the crucial dimensions of the Sasanian patronage of the Xwaday-Nāmag tradition, in turn, was that it had come to subsume an east-Iranian tradition.\(^\text{141}\) Whether this process had already been effected during the Arsacid

\(^{137}\)For the term dynasticism, see §2.1.2.


\(^{140}\)In the Annals of Tabari, the legitimistic and centrist portrayal of the Sasanian kings and their polity can be fruitfully compared with the representation of the ‘Abbāsids and their conception of the caliphate. The sort of detailed narratives, moreover, that we get in the Islamic historical tradition on the fall of Ctesiphon, the emphasis of this tradition on the battle of Qadisiya and the battle of Nihavand, and the rendition of Khusrow I Nowshirwan as the typologically ideal monarch, all bespeak the preoccupation of the Islamic historiographical tradition with the Sasanian imperial tradition, co-opting an imperial tradition, which, providentially, had ceased to exist.

Chapter 2: Sasanians

period, or whether it was under the patronage of the Sasanians that it took shape,\(^{142}\) it is certain that the Sasanians became heir to the traditions of Persis, the region from which they themselves had risen and which had been the cradle of the Achaemenids. Ever since the rise of the Arsacids,\(^ {143}\) however, the Persis (Pārsig), as we shall see below,\(^ {144}\) had not only clearly distinguished themselves from the Parthians (Pahlav), but had adopted a very hostile attitude to the newly rising power of Parthava in the east. This trend was continued in the political ideology of the Sasanians. During the Sasanian period, the geographical term Pahlav (Parthia, Parthava) referred to an extensive territory that was bounded in the east by Gurgān, in the north by the Caspian Sea, and in the southwest by the region between Khuszistān and Media.\(^{145}\) Masūdi, quoting the Nabateans, claims that the Pārsig were in “Fārs . . . [whereas] Māhāt\(^ {146}\) and other regions were Pahlav territories.”\(^ {147}\)

So while the patronage of the national Iranian historiography during the Sasanian period had the unprecedented effect of concocting a linear history with a remarkable degree of continuity—a history that ran from the first human-king, Kayumarth, to the last Sasanian king, Yazdgird III (632–651), through the paradigmatic model of kingship—the tensions inherent in this juxtaposition of the traditions of Persis with those of Parthava continued to inform the national Iranian tradition that was promulgated by the Sasanians. This conflictual relationship can best be seen in the uneasy correspondence that exists between the kingly and heroic traditions contained within the national Iranian tradition.\(^ {148}\) The present study, however, is not a literary investigation of the Iranian national tradition. Nor shall we attempt to give a theoretical assessment of this relationship. For it has long been recognized that a substantial portion of the Iranian national tradition, above all the heroic elements of this tradition, were

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\(^{142}\) For the debate over whether this eastern Iranian tradition was spread to the west by the Parthians, as argued by Yarshater, or whether it remained confined to the east and was incorporated into the Xwaday-Nâmāg tradition through the auspices of the Sasanians, see Yarshater 1983b, pp. 388–391; Christensen, Arthur, The Kayanians, Bombay, 1993a, translated by F. N. Tumboowalla (Christensen 1993a), pp. 39–41.

\(^{143}\) See §1.1.

\(^{144}\) See §5.3.3.


\(^{146}\) Māhāt (Māhān, Māhayn) were the names given by the Arabs to the two districts of Nihavand and Dinawar in Media. Although some Arab sources claim that Māh is the Middle Persian term for city, it more likely stands for Media (Mād). According to the Islamic tradition, Nihavand was conquered by the forces of Baṣrah and Dinawar by those of Kūfā. Thereafter the regions came to be called Māh al-Baṣrah and Māh al-Kūfā, respectively.


ان الفرس كانت بفارس و الماهات وغيرها من بلاد الفهلویون

\(^{148}\) One of the best efforts at disentangling this relationship is that of Davis, Dick, *Epic and Sedition: The Case of Ferdowsi’s Shāhnāmeh*, University of Arkansas Press, 1992 (Davis 1992).
in fact sustained, elaborated, and promoted under the patronage of the Parthian families, not only during the Parthian period but, more importantly, during the Sasanian period.\textsuperscript{149} Try as they may, therefore, to obliterate the annals of the Arsacids from the pages of their history, the Sasanians were never successful in obliterating the traditions which they inherited from the Parthians, neither in their historical writing nor in the historical reality of their four centuries long rule in Iranian history. A vivid, constant reminder of the Parthian heritage infused, perforce, the very polity that the Sasanians had constructed. For as we shall argue in this chapter, in spite of the sporadic attempts of the Sasanians to leash the centrifugal forces of the Parthian dynastic families who continued to hold tremendous power in their domains, they were never successful in ridding themselves of their influence. In fact, had it not been for the cooperation, what in this study we have termed the Sasanian–Parthian confederacy, that the Sasanians established with the Parthian dynastic families of their domain, they could never have sustained their rule for as long as they did.

\subsection*{2.1 Sasanians / Arsacids}

The Sasanian tradition of rule owed a great deal to the Parthians. It is generally recognized that through a substantial part of their history the Arsacids ruled through a decentralized system of government the backbone of which was the feudal\textsuperscript{150} nobility. Heir to the heritage of the Achaemenids and the Seleucids, the administrative and social structure of the Arsacid empire was a heterogeneous medley: there was first the predominantly Semitic, and substantially urbanized Mesopotamia; independent states in Mesopotamia and other Iranian frontiers; and finally the social and political conditions existing in the heartland of Parthia, the east and northeast of Iran.\textsuperscript{151} In the middle of the first century CE, even the Romans recognized the decentralized nature of the Arsacid administration, Pliny counting as eighteen the number of kingdoms that comprised the Parthian polity.\textsuperscript{152}

While a centrist perspective continues to inform our view of the Sasanian polity, a very cursory examination of the Sasanian social and economic infrastructure suggests that the above picture was not substantially changed under the Sasanians. The centrist depiction of Sasanian polity highlights the Sasanian efforts in assuming direct control of the provinces through the creation of

\textsuperscript{149}Christensen 1993a, pp. 127–129; Nöldeke 1979, pp. 12–14.
\textsuperscript{150}The term feudal and its attendant economic and political structures in the Iranian context have been the subject of much debate. It is used in this study for lack of a better term. The present author follows the analysis of the term by Toumanoff discussed in §2.1.2, although she disagrees with his conclusions regarding Sasanian Iran; see page 55. Also see Frye, Richard N., ‘Feudalism in Iran’, Jerusalem Studies in Arabic Islam 9, (1987), pp. 13–18 (Frye 1987); Widengren, Geo, Der Feudalismus im alten Iran, Cologne, 1969 (Widengren 1969).
\textsuperscript{151}Lukonin 1983, p. 714.
\textsuperscript{152}Lukonin 1983, p. 728. For a more detailed discussion, see page 24ff.
kingly cities beginning in the third century CE. One theory explains the background to this process. Ancient cities in the east had for a long time operated on the basis of slavery and were run by temple priests and city councils that had substantial land under their control. During the Hellenistic period these cities were granted self-rule as a *polis*. The Hellenistic kingdoms relied on these semi-independent cities in order to run their realms. These kinds of cities were the instrument for implementing the policies of Hellenistic dynasties and were required to give part of the income from their vast lands to the central treasury. Besides these, the Hellenistic kingdoms also created new cities, *poleis*, in the east.

In the third century, as a result of broader economic transformations, the slave basis of the economy of these cities was disrupted and the influence of kings increased. The Sasanians, who took over Mesopotamia, had as one of their aims the incorporation of this region into their *dastgirds* as kingly cities. When a city was turned into a kingly city, its affairs were put under the king’s representative (*shahrab*, governor), the city itself thus becoming a pillar of kingly authority. So, as Lukonin notes, while Ardashir I (224–241) was only able to create two such cities, Veh Ardashir and Ardashir Khurrah, with two *shabrabs* included in the list of his court nobility, by Shāpūr I’s (241–272) rule there were fifteen such *shabrabs* mentioned in the inscriptions of the *Ka’ba-i Zartusht*.

What needs to be highlighted when considering the centralizing efforts of the early Sasanian kings, however, is that by far the most systematic focus of their efforts in this direction was in the west and southwestern parts of their domains, especially in the core regions of Sasanian power in Fars and Mesopotamia. Compared to the rigor of their urban construction activity in the west during their long reign, very few cities were constructed by the Sasanians in the non-western parts of their domains. Pigulevskaja’s study confirms that the Sasanians’ efforts at urbanization and urban construction were

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156 See glossary.
159 Pigulevskaja 1963.
concentrated in Fārs and Mesopotamia, the latter of which had a long history of urbanization harking back to the ancient period. While Pigulevskaja’s conclusions were reached based on evidence provided for the western regions of Iran, therefore, they do in fact reflect the reality of urban construction, and by extension Sasanian efforts at centralization, throughout their realm. The most forceful evidence for Sasanian lack of interest in urban construction, or perhaps their economic and sociopolitical inability to undertake such construction, in non-western parts of their domain, can be found in the Middle Persian text *Shahrestānīha-i Ėrānshahr* (or, *Provincial Capitals of Ėrānshahr*).\(^{160}\) Composed under the patronage of the Sasanians themselves, the text describes the foundation histories of various cities in Iran.

While the final redaction of the *Shahrestānīha-i Ėrānshahr* dates back to the ‘Abbasid period (late eighth century), it was probably originally composed in the sixth century, sometime during the reigns of Qubād (488–531),\(^ {161}\) Khusrō I (531–579), or Khusrō II (590–628),\(^ {162}\) a period when the Sasanians had finally exhausted most of their construction activities. Even a cursory examination of the list of cities in the *Shahrestānīha-i Ėrānshahr* and the foundation myths and histories attributed to them reveals a striking fact: of the twenty-three cities listed in the territories comprising the quarters (kūst)\(^ {163}\) of the east (kūst-i khwārāsān), north (kūst-i adurbādagān)\(^ {164}\), and south (kūst-i nēmrōz)—that is the regions of Khurāsān, Sīstān, Azarbāyjān, and Ţabaristān—only five are credited to the Sasanians. Of the rest, one is attributed to the mythic period of Iranian history, ten others to the semi-historical and legendary Kayānīd history,\(^ {165}\) two to Alexander, and three to the Parthian period.\(^ {166}\) Of the remaining cities in these three quarters, the construction of one dates partly to the Parthian and partly to the Sasanian period,\(^ {167}\) that of another to mythic

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161For Qubād’s reign, which was interrupted for about two years around 497, see §2.4.3 below.

162Shahrestan 2002, p. 7. The reigns of the two Khusrōs will be discussed extensively below.

163A kūst was an administrative and military division of the Sasanian realm introduced under Khusrō I. For a comparative enumeration of these quarters, as they appear in various sources, see Brunner 1983, pp. 750–771, especially p. 750. For the meaning of the term kūst, see Marquart 1931, p. 25, No. 2, and Gyselen 2001a, pp. 13–14 and the references cited therein.

164Instead “of the word abābhatar, north, the geographical name Adurbāyāgan was also used for the region in general, to avoid naming north, the region in which, according to the Zoroastrian belief, the gate of hell is situated.” Tafazzoli, Ahmad, *Sasanian Society*, Winona Lake, 2000 (Tafazzoli 2000), pp. 8–9.

165As Yarshater observes, whereas “earlier kings are often of a mythical nature . . . the Kayanian kings from Kai Kavād to Kai Khusrau form a coherent group which exhibits dynastic features.” Yarshater 1983b, p. 436.

166These include the cities of Khwārazm, Marv al-Rūd, Pūshang, Nishāpūr, and Kirmān. Shahrestan 2002, pp. 18, 20. For further notes on these see, ibid., pp. 37 and 49.

times, though the Sasanians are said to have constructed only a fortress, and a last city is thought to have been built by Mazdak! The construction of twenty-one other cities in Padhashkhwārgar, which, in the Letter of Tansar, includes the territories of Ṭabaristān, Barshawādgān, Gilān, Deylamān, Rūyān, and Damāvand (Dumbāvand), are traced to the mythic period.

By contrast, of the twenty-four cities named in the quarter of the west (kūst-i khwarbarān), the construction of sixteen is credited to the Sasanians. Naturally, this brief analysis is not meant to be an exhaustive history of urban construction activity of the Sasanians, nor of the history of urbanization in Iran. Other studies, including that of Pigulevskaya, have investigated aspects of the process of urbanization during the Sasanian period in general, and have implicitly highlighted the concentration of this development in the western parts of the Sasanian kingdom. Neither have we attempted to investigate the administrative infrastructure of the Sasanian domains, through which they exerted their putative central control. Significantly, as Gyselen has observed, our knowledge about the administrative infrastructure of the Sasanians is seriously hampered by the fact that the primary sources at our disposal for reconstructing this history suffer from a serious gap of about three centuries. As has been observed in this connection, a “more carefully nuanced picture of the rate and effectiveness with which royal control was extended is obviously desirable, but large gaps in the evidence make it difficult to trace developments with precision.” It has been appropriately remarked, therefore, that as “most information for Sasanian administrative history pertains to the reign of Khusro I in the sixth century, when a centralised bureaucracy of some complexity functioned in the

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171 For the Letter of Tansar, see §2.5.2 below.
172 Following the orders of Armāyīl—one of the two righteous men who decided to pose as cooks in order to save some of the children whose brains were being fed daily to the evil Dāhēk (see footnote 2115)—these were built by seven families of mountaineers, some of whom are postulated to be historical. Shahrestan 2002, pp. 19, 44–45.
173 This enumeration does not include cities in Arabia, Syria, Africa, and Yemen, which also figure in the Shahrāstānīha-i Erānshahr. For the imperial outlook that the inclusion of these regions in the conception of Erānshahr reflects, and the deduction that the incorporation of these territories is a reflection of the territorial expansions during the combined reigns of Qubād to Khusrow II, see Shahrestan 2002, pp. 1–7; also see Daryaei, Touraj, ‘The Changing ‘Image of the World’: Geography and Imperial Propaganda in Ancient Persia’, Electrum: Studies in Ancient History 6, (2002), pp. 99–109 (Daryaei 2002).
175 For this the most admirable study remains that of Christensen 1944, and Gyselen 1989.
176 For a categorization of sources available for Sasanian history as primary, secondary, and tertiary, see our discussion on page 10.
177 Gyselen 1989.
capital Ctesiphon, ... it is clearly illegitimate to assume that such a level of organisation was characteristic of earlier centuries of Sasanian rule.”

Our superficial enumeration of Sasanian urban construction activity, therefore, is meant to bring to the fore one important fact: for all their preoccupation with the eastern parts of their domains, the Sasanians were, due to the balance of power in the region and logistic and sociopolitical considerations, a western-oriented empire, within which context we must gauge the equation of urbanization with centralization and the conclusions that we derive from this. This observation, likewise, is no epiphany. It is one, however, that seems to be constantly ignored in the investigation of Sasanian sociopolitical history. In their western gaze, and even in their initial administrative structures, the Sasanians were no different from the Parthians before them. The difference was the degree of control that they sought to exert on the heterogeneous population of their western and southwestern regions. Our ensuing discussion on the continued participation of the Parthian dynasts in Sasanian polity, therefore, needs to be put in the context of the predominantly agrarian economy of the non-western parts of the Sasanian domains, and the social relations that proceeded from this.

Altheim’s assessment of the economic landscape of the Sasanian state becomes pertinent here, although the conclusions that he reaches are not corroborated by the evidence. According to Altheim, “the Sasanian economic landscape divide[d] itself into two parts: on the one side [stood] the domain directly under royal rule, and on the other the domain of the landowning nobility in which central power operated only indirectly. It was in the interest of powerful, far-reaching royal control to increase the number of royal cities, and their attendant districts ... [This] had the effect of converting indirectly ruled districts, and only partly taxed districts into fully-covered ones. The history of the royal founding of cities thus also concerns the struggle between royal power and that of nobility.”

If this was indeed the case, and if, as we have seen, the Sasanians could boast of the construction of very few cities in the eastern, northeastern, northern, and even northwestern parts of their domains,

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179 As Lee observes, the overall picture of the third century “is one of initial continuity with the predominantly feudal arrangements of the Parthians.” Lee 1993, p. 17. See also Lukonin 1983, p. 730.

180 It is evidently understood that even while heavily urbanized, the western regions of the Sasanian domains were likewise dominated by a predominantly agricultural infrastructure, as their extensive construction of irrigation networks in Mesopotamia attests; see footnote 181.

181 Altheim, Franz and Stiehl, Ruth, *Ein asiatischer Staat: Feudalismus unter den Sasaniden und ihren Nachbarn*, Wiesbaden, 1954 (Altheim and Stiehl 1954), as quoted in Lee 1993, p. 17. Emphasis added. Lee also notes “that the most powerful testimony to the actual growth of centralizing control [during the Sasanian period] is the vast network of systematically laid-out irrigation canals and accompanying engineering projects which *archeologists have found in southern Iran and Iraq.*” Ibid., p. 16. Emphasis mine. Needless to say these indicate only direct Sasanian control over the aforementioned regions.
it follows that for a variety of reasons, not yet fully understood, “the struggle between royal power and ... [the] nobility,” as evidenced through the construction of royal cities, did not play itself out in extensive territories of the Sasanian realm. One of the primary reasons for this situation, it will be argued in this study, was the predominant power of the Parthian dynastic families in the quarters of the east and the north, kūst-i khwarāsān and kūst-i ādurbāda-gān, a power that continued to exert itself over these territories, in spite of the sporadic efforts of the Sasanians toward centralization.

One of the paramount legacies of the Arsacid dynasty to the Sasanian polity was the forceful continuity of the power of the Parthian dynastic families in these domains. As we shall be arguing in this study, Parthian dynasts, who were the co-partners in rule for the Arsacid dynasty, came to form a confederacy with the Sasanians as well. The names of some of these families appear in the origins myth of the Armenian historian Moses Khorenats‘i discussed above: the Kārins, the Sürens, and the Ispahbudhān. Two others, the Mihrān and the Kanārangiyān, must be added to these. Khorenats‘i also narrates, with much passion, a fascinating tale that details the part played by the Parthian dynastic families in the rise of the upstart Sasanian Ardashīr I to power: “After Artashir, son of Sasan, had killed Artavan [the last Arsacid king] and gained the throne, two branches of the Pahlav family called Aspahapet [i.e., Ispahbudhān] and Süren Pahlav were jealous at the rule of the branch of their own kin, that is Arta-shēs, [—who ruled over Parthava—] and willingly accepted the rule of Artashir, son of Sasan. But the house of Karēn Pahlav, remaining friendly toward their brother and kin, opposed in war Artashir, son of Sasan.” Khorenats‘i then proceeds to narrate the actions taken by the Arsacid Armenian king Khusrov on behalf of the Arsacid dynasty of Iran in the wake of the turmoil that ensued after the murder of Ardavān. Khusrov’s call to arms and his promise that upon victory he would bestow the crown of Iran on one of the Iranian Parthian families, went unheeded by the Süren and the Ispahbudhān families. The news also reached Khusrov that in the process of their struggle against Ardashīr I, the Kārins had been decimated, save for one child, Perozamat, who became “the ancestor of our great family of Kamsarakan.” Khorenats‘i’s account surely combines fact with fiction. It does, however, highlight one important fact: as the Sasanian primary sources for the third century testify, the end of the Arsacid dynasty did not mean the end of the Parthian dynastic families in Iran. As late as Ardashīr II’s (379–383) reign, the Sasanians still recalled the services rendered to them by Parthian dynastic families in the third century. According

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182 See page 24ff.
184 Khorenats‘i 1978, p. 218. Also see Lukonin 1986, p. 58.
185 Khorenats‘i 1978, p. 218–219. As we shall see, traditions that underline the total decimation of a particular Parthian dynastic family are replete in our sources and are nothing but topos meant to highlight the defeat of these families at various junctures. For again and again these families appear on the scene after having been allegedly executed to the last man.
186 For further discussion of these third century primary sources, see page 48 below.
to Khorenats’i, the Sasanian king recalled for Vramshapuh, the Arsacid king of Armenia (392–414),\(^{187}\) that he “remembered the services of his [i.e., Bishop Sahak, who was of Parthian ancestry] ancestors, the Princes of the line of Surèn Pahlav, who willingly accepted the sovereignty of my ancestor and homonym Artashir.”\(^{188}\) As we shall see, there is reason to suspect that the Sûren continued their loyal service to the Sasanians to the very end of the dynasty.

**Armenian Arsacids**

Even if we were to start with the fallacy that the ascendancy of the Sasanians ushered in a new age that obliterated the Parthian legacy and their traditions of rule, as the canonical Sasanian history would have us believe, we cannot afford to lose sight of a crucial dimension of Sasanian history, namely, its intimate and involved relationship with its northwestern neighbor Armenia, where an Arsacid dynasty continued to rule up until 428 CE. It has been poignantly argued, in fact, that the “political history of Iran during [both] the Parthian and Sasanian periods . . . is scarcely intelligible without reference to Armenia and Georgia.”\(^{189}\) The connection of Iran to Armenia harks back to remote antiquity and the Urartan period. When in 66 CE, emperor Nero (54–68) officially crowned the Arsacid Prince Tiridates I (53–75) king of Armenia, however, a new chapter was opened in the Armenian–Iranian relationship. The defeat of the Arsacids in Iran in the early third century, therefore, did not mean the disappearance of the Parthians from the scene. Far from it. For, in fact, when “the Parthians were overthrown by the Sasanians in 226 CE, the old Armenian royal house became redoubtable foes of the new Great Kings of Iran.”\(^{190}\) As Garsoian argues this theme of “Arsacid blood vengeance is ubiquitous in early Armenian literature . . . [and] is repeated from generation to generation . . . in Armenian literature. It [even] appears in as late a work as that of Moses Chorenatsi.”\(^{191}\) Not until 428, when the Armenian Arsacid dynasty was abolished, was this situation changed.\(^{192}\) As David Lang argues, the continued rule of the Arsacids in Armenia “helps to explain the singular bitterness of the relations

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\(^{187}\) Vramshapuh was the father of Artashes, last king of Armenia. Elîshê 1982, p. 60, n. 5.


\(^{189}\) Lang 1983, p. 517.

\(^{190}\) Lang 1983, p. 518.

\(^{191}\) Garsoian 1985e, pp. 2–3, n. 5. Moses Khorenats’i devotes a whole section at the end of his work to the “lament over the removal of the Armenian throne from the Arsacid family and of the archbishopry from the family of Saint Gregory.” Khorenats’i 1978, pp. 350–354.

\(^{192}\) In 416, the Sasanian Shapūr, son of Yazdgird I, had been appointed king of Armenia after the deaths of the Armenian Arsacid kings Vramshapuh and Khosrov III. When Shapūr died in 420 in an attempt to gain the Sasanian throne after the death of his father (see §2.2.3 below), Artashēs, the son of Vramshapuh, assumed the Armenian throne in 423. As a result of the dynastic struggles in Armenia, the latter was deposed in 428 by Bahram V Gūr (420–438) upon the request of the naxarars of the country. Thus ended the line of the Arsacids in Armenia. Thereafter, “the government of Armenia was conducted by marzbãns, who were sometimes picked from the Armenian nobility.” Chaumont 1991, p. 429.
between Arsacid Armenia and Sasanian Iran, extending right up to and even after the abolition of the Armenian Arsacid dynasty in 428.”

Armenian Arsacids continued to claim to be the champions of Iranian legitimacy. Until the Armenian Arsacids made Christianity the state religion of Armenia in 301 under Tiridates III (283–330), moreover, and probably for a substantial period after that, the Sasanians were forced to reckon with an Armenia that was not only Arsacid but also most probably predominantly Mithraist. This aspect of Armenian tradition and its connection to the religious panorama of the Sasanians also has important ramifications, which we will discuss below.

What is more, not only the royal house but also a good number of Armenian noble houses, as well as one of the most illustrious Christian dynastic lines of Armenia, that of the Armenian patron saint, St. Gregory the Illuminator, claimed descent from the Arsacids, in the latter case from the Sūrens, St. Gregory being remembered by the Armenian church “to this day by the surname Partev, the Parthian.”

Not only in Armenia but in Georgia as well, the Parthian legacy continued well into the Sasanian period. After the kingdom of Amazaspes of the Third Parnabazid dynasty in Iberia was replaced, sometime in the 180s CE, with that of Rev, the son of the sister of Amazaspes, there was for over a century “an Arsacid or Parthian dynasty in eastern Georgia, allied by blood to the Armenian Arsacids.” Upon the extinction of this Arsacid line in eastern Georgia in the fourth century, when the kingdom passed to king Mirian III, the latter established a dynasty called the Chosroids. These Chosroids “were [also] a branch of the Iranian [Parthian] Mihranids [i.e., Mihrāns].” As late as the reign of Khusrow I (531–579), when the Armenians were hard-pressed by the Byzantines, and a group of them went to the Sasanian king in order to solicit his aid, they continued to recall their Arsacid ancestry.

Procopius preserves a narrative that underscores this Arsacid consciousness among the Armenians: “Many of us, O Master, are Arsacidæ, descendants of that Arsaces who was not unrelated to the Parthian kings when the Persian realm lay under the hand of the

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195As Thomson remarks, “Koriun’s biography of Mashtots’ makes it clear that even in the early fifth century there were many in Armenia still unconverted.” Elíshè 1982, p. 12. See also footnote 2232 below.
196See §5.4.4.
198Lang 1983, p. 520.
199Beginning with Mirian III, the Chosroid dynasty also turned Christian. As Lang observes, the “political systems of Armenia and Georgia had much in common with the great monarchies of Iran. Considering that the Arsacids of Armenia were Parthian princes, and the Mihranids, Chosroids and Guaramids of Iberia all closely connected with one or other of the Seven Great Houses of Iran, this was only to be expected . . . It is [also] necessary to stress the many close links between Iran, Armenian and Georgia in religion, architecture and the arts, which continued even after the latter two countries had officially adopted Christianity.” Lang 1983, pp. 520, 527–528, 531, respectively.
Parthians, and who proved himself an illustrious king, inferior to none of his time. Now we have come to thee, and all of us have become slaves and fugitives, not, however, of our own will, but under most hard constraint . . . of the Roman power. The close connection of Iran to Armenia will become apparent in the pages that follow. Suffice it to say here that the de facto termination of Arsacid rule in Iran—even while ignoring the history of the Sasanian–Parthian confederacy with which we shall be dealing in the pages that follow—did not mean the destruction of the Parthian legacy among the Sasanians. For up to the first quarter of the fifth century, at the very least, the Sasanians were forced to reckon with an Armenia that was not only Arsacid but also conscious of the defeat of their brethren, the Iranian Arsacids, by the Sasanians. The Sasanians, for their part, could not have afforded to ignore this persistent legacy.

The continued relevance of the Parthian legacy to Sasanian history, and in fact their centrality in the affairs of the Sasanian dynasty, at its inception and throughout their history, was so overwhelming that popular traditions connected the lineage of the first Sasanian rulers to the last defeated Arsacid king. According to these narratives, when Ardashir I killed the last Arsacid king, Ardavan, and "vow[ed] not to leave a single soul from Ardavan’s house alive," he inadvertently married a member of the Arsacid royal family. According to Ţabarî, the bride was none other than Ardavan’s daughter. The *Nihayat*

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201 Although, naturally, a detailed investigation of this is beyond the confines of our study. The work of Toumanoff remains to date the magnum opus on the history Caucasia, Toumanoff 1963. For a series of fascinating studies on the Iran–Armenian cultural relationship, with aspects of which we shall be dealing further in this study, also see Garsoian 1985b; Russell 1991; Russell, James R. (ed.), *Armenian and Iranian Studies*, vol. 9 of *Harvard Armenian Texts and Studies*, Cambridge, Mass., 2004 (Russell 2004).

202 The intimate affinity of Armenia with Iran was not confined to this. For as Garsoian observes, the very “fabric of Armenian life, its social, legal and administrative institutions as well as its tastes and mores, reveals a far greater coincidence with the Iranian tradition.” Garsoian 1985e, p. 6.

203 A line of debate in the Sasanian creation of an image of itself revolves around how the dynasty conceived of its relationship to the Achaemenids. For these see Yarshater 1971; also see Daryae 1995 and the sources cited therein.

204 Yarshater 1983b, p. 380.


206 Another important source for Sasanian history is the anonymous Nihayat 1996, *Nihayat al-ʿArab fi Akhbār al-Furis wa l-ʿArab*, vol. 162, Tehran, 1996, translated by M.T. Danish-Pazhuh (Nihayat 1996). For some crucial junctures of the Sasanian history, it adds important details not found in other recensions of the Xw aday-Namag tradition. For the value of the Nihayat as a source, see Rubin,
maintains that she was a cousin of the Arsacid king, and Dinawari claims her to be the daughter of another Arsacid prince.

In the Kārnamag-i Ardashir-i Pāpagān, written apparently toward the end of the Sasanian period and containing a popular and romanticized version of the life of Ardashir I, this Parthian connection is pervasive. In one version of this matrimony given by the Kārnamag-i Ardashir-i Pāpagān, after defeating Ardashir I marries the unnamed daughter of the last Parthian king. The brothers of Ardashir, having found sanctuary with Kabulshah, later wrote to their sister and, chastising her for being oblivious to familial bonds, urged her to poison Ardashir I. Providentially, the poisoned cup that Ardashir I was about to drink was spilled and the king realized his wife’s mutiny. When the mōbadhān mōbad informed the king that the punishment for such acts against the king was death, and subsequently was ordered by Ardashir I to carry out the sentence against the Parthian princess, the latter informed the mōbad that she was seven months pregnant with the child of the Sasanian king. Realizing the king’s fleeting anger and anticipating his future regret, the mōbad forewent killing the princess and hid her from Ardashir I. The son that was subsequently born was the future king, Shapur I.

It is significant that this same story is also contained in the Shāhnāma of Ferdowski. The narrative of Shapur I’s matrimony to a daughter of Mihrak-i Nūshzādān, resulting in the birth of Hormozd I, is equally revealing. For while the precise Parthian ancestry of Mihrak cannot be established, the theophoric Mithraic name of Mihrak, the continued profusion of Mithraic terminology in his narrative, and the intense enmity existing between him and Ardashir I underline Mihrak’s exalted and perhaps Parthian genealogy. So important Mihrak’s ancestry seems to have been, in fact, that the Indian astrologers are said to have prognosticated that the kingship of Iran could be obtained only by him who was an offspring from the seed of Mihrak-i Nūshzādān and Ardashir I. In spite of Ardashir I’s insistence on the impossibility

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209At the inception of this story, with Arдавān’s favorite slave girl in his company, Ardashir I flees from the last Arsacid king. As we shall see on page 366, the imagery surrounding this flight is full of potent Mithraic symbolism, that is, symbolism borrowed from the predominant religious predilections of the Parthian families. Ardashir 1963, Kārnamag-i Ardashir-i Pāpagān, Tehran, 1963, translated by Sadegh Hedayat (Ardashir 1963), p. 182. For Mithraism among the Parthians, see Chapter 5, especially §5.4.
of this mixture,\textsuperscript{214} from the union of the daughter of Mihrak with Shāpūr I, Hormozd I was born.\textsuperscript{215} What is significant about these genealogical traditions is not their possible historical veracity, but the fact that in some quarters at least, the early Sasanians could gain legitimacy only by genealogical connections to the Arsacids. This belief, moreover, circulated even in late Sasanian period. For the purposes of the later Sasanian history examined in this study, moreover, it is important to keep in mind that the strongholds of Ardavān throughout his struggle against Ardashir I were the regions of Rayy, Damāvand, Deylam, and Padhashkhwāggar (Ṭabaristan), the traditional homelands of the Arsacid dynasty.\textsuperscript{216}

\subsection*{2.1.1 Christensen’s thesis}

The continued power of the Parthian families is acknowledged—in some corners more than others—by current scholarship on the Sasanians. The details of Sasanian administrative structure, based predominantly on the primary evidence of the third and the sixth centuries, and the secondary and tertiary literary sources, was long ago investigated in Christensen’s magnum opus, \textit{L’Iran sous les Sassanides}, a highly erudite work which continues to be the reference point of all current scholarship on the Sasanians. The paradigmatic narrative constructed by Christensen runs something like this:\textsuperscript{217} In its broad outlines, the social and administrative structure of Sasanian society harked back to antiquity. Its hierarchy was articulated in the Younger Avesta\textsuperscript{218} as the class of the priests, ādravān; the warriors, raϑaēštar; and finally the agriculturalists, vāstryōštuyant. In one instance, a fourth class of artisans or hūiti is also mentioned.\textsuperscript{219} Superimposed on the politically and socially more complex Sasanian society was a similar division: the clerical class, asravān; the class of the warriors, artēštārān; the bureaucrats, dibhērān; and finally the people. Included among the last were the farmers, vāstryōštān, and the artisans, butukhsān. Each class was itself stratified into various categories. The head of the priestly class was the mōbadhān mōbadh; that of the warriors, ērān-spāḥbadh; the bureaucrats, ērān-dibhērbadh; and finally the people were headed by the vāstryōštān sālār.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{214} Ardashir 1963, p. 204: \begin{quote}
آن روز ماد که از خم مهرک و اردوان کمی به ایرانشهر کامهار شود.
\end{quote}
\item \textsuperscript{216} Ardashir 1963, p. 184. Yarshater 1983b, p. 365.
\item \textsuperscript{217} The discussion of the Sasanian social and administrative structure is based on Christensen 1944, pp. 96–137. Also see Tafazzoli 2000.
\item \textsuperscript{219} Zamyad Yasht 1883, \textit{Zamyād Yasht}, vol. 23 of \textit{Sacred Books of the East}, Oxford University Press, 1883, translated by James Darmesteter (Zamyad Yasht 1883), §17, as cited in Christensen 1944, p. 98.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Third-century inscriptions

A second and for our purposes more important social division of the Sasanians, however, according to this narrative, was inherited from more recent times, the period of the Arsacid dynasty (247 BCE–224 CE). In the bilingual inscription of Shāpūr I at Hājī Ābād (SH) in the province of Fārs, these are listed as the Princes of the Empire, or shahrdārān; the high-ranking elite or vāspubrān; the grandees, or wuzurgān, and finally the freemen or azādbān. Divine Glory (or farr) was a quality possessed by the King of Kings. “Originally meaning life force, activity, or splendor, it [gradually] came to mean victory, fortune, and especially royal fortune.” But the King of Kings was not the only dignitary in possession of farr. The shahrdārān of the realm could also boast the attribute of Divine Glory. The highest members of the vāspubrān came from the seven great feudal families of the realm. In fact, the Sasanians were themselves only the first of these. As Christensen observes, “the members of these seven great families had the right to carry a crown, being in their origin the equals of the kings of Iran. Only the size of their crown was smaller than that of the Sasanian kings.” The shahrdārān were subordinate to the King of Kings, Shāhanshāh. These subordinate kings also included the large fief holders, as well as the vassal kings of other regions under the protection of the Sasanian king. Also included among those carrying the title of king and the splendor that accompanied it were a number of marzbāns (wardens of marches) “whose territories were particularly susceptible to enemy attacks and who were entitled to a reward in return for their defense of the realm.”

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221 See also footnote 126.
222 Meaning glory, derived etymologically from the Iranian word xwar/n for sun, and attested in various forms in other Iranian languages (Median and Old Persian farnah, Soghdian farn), the concept traversed into other cultural zones (in Buddhist Soghdian signifying the position of Buddha, and in Armenian signifying glory, honor, for example). It is “at the root of ideas that were widespread in the Hellenistic and Roman period … such as tyche basileus, fortuna regia,” and in Islamic Iran, it was translated into the concept of farr-i ilahi. Farr was a royal and divine attribute. Besides meaning “glory, splendor, luminosity and shine, [and besides being] connected with sun and fire … [its] secondary meaning … related to prosperity, (good) fortune, and (kingly) majesty.” It was associated with the stars and the great luminaries, various divinities, most importantly, as we shall see, with Mithra, as well as with waters and mountains. Its iconographical representations ranged from winged sun disks to rings in investiture scenes, figural images connected with light and fire, and finally to birds and rams, although there continues to be controversies surrounding some of these representations. See Gnoli, Gherardo, ‘Farr(ab)’, in Ehsan Yarshater (ed.), Encyclopædia Iranica, New York, 2007 (Gnoli 2007); Frye, Richard N., The Golden Age of Persia: The Arabs in the East, London, 1975a (Frye 1975a), p. 8. See the religion chapter for further discussion of this important Iranian concept, especially page 354ff.
223 Christensen 1944, p. 103.
224 Christensen, Arthur, Vaz-i Milat va Dowlat va Darbār dar Dowrih-i Shāhanshāh-i Sāsāniyān, Tehran, 1935, translated and annotated by Muftaba Minovi (Christensen 1935), p. 28. In the acts of the Syrian martyrs we find, among others, Mihrānid marzbāns from Bet-Darāyē and from Georgia, called respectively Shahrēn and Pirān Gushnasp. Hoffmann, G., Auszüge aus syrischen Akten per-
The seven great feudal families of the Sasanian period traced their descent to the Parthians. In fact only three, Christensen argues, seem to have held the same elevated position in the Arsacid feudal structure inherited by the Sasanians. These were the families of the Kārins, the Sūrens, and the Ispahbudhān. These all carried the title of Pahlav, or Parthian. The three other families were the Spandiyādhs (or Isfandiyār), the Mihrān, and “possibly the Ziks.” Together they formed a sort of feudal nobility. Their power primarily accrued to them from their large fiefs. A number of these families in time came to be associated with certain provinces in the empire. The family of Kārins, therefore, are known to have resided in the Nihāvand area (in Media), the Sūrens in Sīstān, and the Ispahbudhān in Dihistān in Gurgān. The centrifugal powers of this Parthian feudal nobility in Sasanian society has been acknowledged. Long ago Lukonin argued, for example, that “political centralization appears to have been achieved in Iran only at the end of the Sasanian epoch, when the reform[s of Khusrow I were] . . . completed.” Pioneering scholars have even attempted to trace the bare outlines of the history of some of these great Parthian feudal families in early Sasanian history. Patkanian, for example, highlighted that the Sasanians devoted a substantial part of their early history to combating the traditions of Parthava, traditions which still forcefully presented themselves against that of the Persis. It has been further observed that the high place that these dignitaries continued to hold in the court of the first Sasanian kings is a reflection of the fact that they formed a confederacy without the aid of which Ardashīr I could not have assumed power to begin with. The list of the nobility in the inscriptions of the first Sasanian kings in the Kaša-i Zartusht (ŠKZ), for example, argued Lukonin, makes it amply clear that it was as a result

\[\text{sicher Märtyrer, vol. 7 of Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, Leipzig, 1980 (Hoffmann 1980), pp. 64, 68 apud Khurshudian, Eduard, Die Partischen und Sasanidischen Verwaltungsinsti-

tutionen nach den literarischen und epigraphischen Quellen, Yerevan, 1998 (Khurshudian 1998), p. 71.}\]

\[225\text{Patkanian claims that indirect allusions in the works of Armenian historians seem to indicate that the Mihrāns were in fact a branch of the Isfahbūdhān family. But he does not elaborate on this. Patkanian, M.K., ‘D’une histoire de la dynastie des Sassanides’, Journal Asiaticque pp. 101–238, translated by M. Evariste Prud’homme (Patkanian 1866), p. 129. Nöldeke questions whether the Mihrāns were the same house as the Isfandiyār family for the base of both seems to have been in Rayy. I do not know based on what he conjectures the identity of the Isfandiyārs and the Mihrāns.}\]

\[226\text{Christensen 1944, p. 103.}\]

\[227\text{When describing the celebration of Isfandārmadh (Spandārmad), the Amahraspand of earth, called mard-qirān, Birüni maintains that this celebration was prevalent in the Parthian domains, in which he includes Isfahān and Rayy. Birüni 1984, p. 355. As we shall see, contrary to Christensen’s claims, there is little doubt that the concentration of the power of the Parthians families of the Kārin, the Mihrān, the Ispahbudhān, and the Kanārangiān during the Sasanian period remained in the lands of Pahlav and Media, the isolated names of villages and rivers outside of these territories notwithstanding. Christensen 1944, pp. 105–106.}\]

\[228\text{Through these reforms, argues Lukonin, “the system of shahrs was changed to a system of four large divisions of the state [kūst], headed by vice-regents appointed by the central government and each wielding both military and civil power in his vice-regency—a kind of revival of the institution of the shahrab.” Lukonin 1983, p. 731. Emphasis mine. Nöldeke 1979, p. 88, n. 1.}\]

\[229\text{Patkanian 1866.}\]

\[230\text{Patkanian 1866, pp. 119–120 and 126–128.}\]
of the cooperation of the kings of Andīgān, Kirmān, Aprenak, Sakistān, and Marv, as well as the cooperation of the Parthian feudal families of the Razz, the Sūrens, the Kārins, and not to mention the cooperation of the minor kings of Mesopotamia, that Ardāshīr I was able to assume power.\(^{231}\) Lukonin further argued that it is rather certain that in the court of Ardāshīr I, “the Sūrens, Kārens, Varāzēs and the kings of Andīgān held positions of great honor, ousting the representatives of the noble clan of Persis. In this instance there is a complete analogy with the appearance, at the court of the King of Kings of Iran of the new dynasty, of the kings of Marv, Abarshahr, Carmenia, Sakastān, Iberia and Adībene.” After all, argued Lukonin, “the extensive domains of the Sūrens, Kārens and Varāzēs must also have originally become part of the Sasanian state as semi-independent states,”\(^{232}\) and the king most probably could not interfere much in the regions under their control.\(^{233}\) In spite of the ostensible decimation of the Kārins at the hands of the Sasanians, therefore, even these continue to appear in the court of the Ardāshīr I as high dignitaries.\(^{234}\) There are also indications that the scribal personnel of early Sasanian society, a group that belonged to the third estate, were inherited from the Parthian scribal personnel. Thus, among the retinue of Shāpūr I (241–272) at the Karba-i Zartusht (ŠKZ), there is mention of one Aštād, “the (letter) scribe [pad frawardag dibīr in Parthian] from Rayy, from the Mīhrān family.”\(^{235}\) As far as the rule of the early Sasanians are concerned, therefore, the continuity of the political power of the Parthians in their polity is acknowledged by most scholars of Sasanian history. In spite of these reservations about the power of the Sasanians at the inception of their rule and during subsequent centuries, however, it was the Christensenian paradigm that came to dominate the field.

While acknowledging decentralizing forces operating at the inception of Sasanian history, Christensen argued that during the third century the monarchy obtained great powers. During this period the Sasanians attempted to assert their control over newly acquired territories formerly under the control of the Parthian dynasts and various other petty kings and leashed the decentralizing forces of their realm. During this century, argued Christensen, the Sasanians attempted to rid themselves of the legacy of the Parthians. “In few years, and with a heavy hand, he [Ardāshīr] welded together the rarely cohesive parts of the Parthian kingdom into a firm and solid unity ... and created a political...

\(^{231}\) Lukonin 1986, p. 57.


\(^{233}\) Besides the Parthian dynasts, we also know that the kings of Abarshahr, Marv, Kirmān, and Sakistān continued to rule their own territories during Ardāshīr I’s reign. Lukonin 1986, p. 21.


\(^{235}\) Tafazzoli 2000, p. 21.
and religious organism that lasted for more than four centuries[!]"\(^{236}\) Thus, Christensen argued, the advent of the Sasanians was not simply a political event: it marked the appearance of a “novel spirit in the Iranian empire . . . The two characteristic traits of the system of the Sasanian state . . . [were] heavy centralization and the creation of a state church."\(^{237}\)

What then of the power of the Parthian feudal families, those who were thought to be on a par with Sasanian kings, and those without whose aid Ardashir I could not have assumed kingship? Christensen argued that as the territories of these Parthian nobles came to be dispersed in the different parts of the kingdom—it is not clear how—this undermined their continued control over vast estates. The fragmentation of the territorial possessions of the Parthian feudal families was perhaps one of the causes, according to Christensen, through which, in time, these became more and more a “nobility of the robe and of the court,” losing the characteristics of real feudal nobility. In comparison to the area under the direct control of the state and administered by the royal governors, the territories under the control of the feudal nobility were never extensive.\(^{238}\) While this remained the case, we do not know the nature of the king’s jurisdiction over the territories under the control of the Parthian feudal nobility, and whether these had total or partial immunity. It is true that certain offices in the Sasanian realm belonged to these families on a hereditary basis and through ancient custom, Christensen admitted.\(^{239}\) Quoting the narrative of Simocatta about the hereditary positions of the nobility in Sasanian administration,\(^{240}\) he proceeded to argue that “[i]t is difficult to assess to which family each of the aforementioned posts belonged.” As the families of Sûren and Mihrân are generally mentioned among the generals of the army, one might conclude that each of these families controlled one of the military posts, Christensen conceded. As for the distribution of the civilian posts among these families, “we know absolutely nothing about this.”\(^{241}\) Finally, “all considered . . ., while it is true that the hereditary posts were very important positions, they were not the most important . . . In fact it is not likely that the primary posts of the empire, that of the prime minister, the commander in chief of all the armies of the king etc., should have been transmitted on a hereditary basis, and that the king would not have had the choice of his counselors . . . This kind of institution would have been incompatible with the absolutist government that was in effect the base of the Sasanian state, and it would have, in a short time, brought about the ruin of the empire.”\(^{242}\) The hereditary posts in the Sasanian empire, therefore, “were positions of honor that marked the privileged status of the seven Parthian

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\(^{236}\) Christensen 1944, p. 96. Emphasis mine.

\(^{237}\) Christensen 1944, p. 97. Emphasis mine.

\(^{238}\) Christensen 1944, p. 106.

\(^{239}\) Christensen 1944, pp. 106–107.

\(^{240}\) See page 29.

\(^{241}\) Christensen 1944, p. 109.

families. The power of these, especially in the period anterior to Qubad and Khusrow I, rested equally in the revenues of their fiefs, and on the force of feudal ties between these Parthian families and their subjects." What then did these Parthian families do with the wealth and manpower under their control? They used this as a “prerogative in the nomination of the highest posts in the empire,” according to Christensen. As we shall see, however, this included the appointment of the Sasanian kings themselves! While acknowledging long stretches of Sasanian history wherein the feudal nobility held sway, Christensen nevertheless carried his thesis of an absolutist, centralized monarchy to the end of the Sasanian period, making Khusrow I the quintessential absolute monarch, and devoting to him a substantial part of his opus. The Christensenian thesis carried the field. Accordingly, it was subsequently argued, for example, that while “the nobility from time to time during the Sasanian empire showed its power, on the whole the importance of the ruler and the centralization of authority continued … *The reign of Shapur II (309–379) can be considered the culmination of the process of centralization under the early Sasanian kings.*”

As we shall see, however, the centrist monarchical perspective promoted by this thesis falls seriously short of explaining the ongoing tension between the Sasanian monarchy and the decentralizing forces operating within its polity. Specifically, and most importantly, it fails to properly appreciate the tremendous and continuous power of the Parthian feudal nobility, the Pahlav, within the Sasanian realm. It cannot explain why episodic surges of the Sasanians’ attempt at centralization were thoroughly overshadowed by substantial periods when there was almost a total collapse of the power of the monarchy, and a resurgence of the power of the Parthian feudal families. If the Sasanians were so successful in creating an absolutist and powerful centralized polity, then we are at a loss to account for the stories of a multitude of Sasanian kings who were enthroned and deposed, sometimes in their infancy, at the whim of this same Parthian feudal nobility. If the height of Sasanian centralization was achieved in the sixth century, why was it that even after the reforms of the archetypal centrist Sasanian monarch, Khusrow I, Sasanian control was on the verge of collapse through the rebellions of Bahrām-i Chūbin and Vistāhm, both belonging to the Parthian families?

*A longue durée* investigation of Sasanian sociopolitical history, one which does not read the evidence for the third and sixth centuries into the rest of Sasanian history, reveals that, except for short periods in their history, the Sasanians were rarely able to centralize their rule and leash the power of the Parthian feudal nobility. In fact, if we were to read the history of the Sasanians not from the monarchical perspective or from the point of view of the Sasanian court in western Iran and Mesopotamia, the result would be a thoroughly different history, dominated by the tremendous power of the Pahlav families. The power

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243 Christensen 1944, p. 110.  
245 See §2.6.3 and §2.7.1.
of the Sasanian monarchy at the center, it will be argued in this study, was always contingent on the cooperation of the Pahlav families with the Sasanians, the inheritors of the traditions of Persēs. The Sasanians realized this early in their reign and recognized that the only viable and enduring polity that they could ever hope to establish was one in which the long-established power of the Pahlav families was acknowledged and rendered continuous. Thus, in direct continuity with the history of the Arsacids, the Sasanians knew they had to establish a confederacy with the Pahlav families. This policy was made viable by the fact that, throughout their long history, the Pahlav families had never been a homogeneous group to begin with. The divisions and rivalries long established among them made the Sasanians’ task easy, and the Sasanian–Parthian confederacy worked admirably, albeit with the ebb and flow inherent in any such political arrangement, throughout most of Sasanian history. In fact, the dissolution of the Sasanian polity was caused primarily by Sasanian efforts, late in their history, to do away with this confederacy. Part of the problem in appreciating the dynamics of the relationship between the Sasanian monarchy and the Parthian families is the conceptual framework that scholarship has adopted in order to investigate Sasanian sociopolitical and administrative history, a conceptual framework which, sustained by Christensen’s thesis, nevertheless fails to account for the realities of Sasanian history. Toumanoff’s study246 of Caucasia offers an alternative conceptual framework that is much more applicable to Sasanian society, through which we can appreciate the nature of the Pārsēg–Pahlav relationship throughout Sasanian history.

2.1.2 Dynasticism

In a detailed study of the history of Caucasia through the centuries, Toumanoff argues that the “social history of Caucasia is marked by an extraordinary permanence of form, which offers a sharp contrast to the vicissitudes of its political history … The perdurable form in question is one of a strongly aristocratic society which combined in an unusual way the features of a feudal regime with those of a dynastic regime evolved from earlier tribal conditions.”247 Citing recent studies of feudalism, Toumanoff notes that unfortunately in these studies “no notice was taken of Caucasian society, or that other component which may, in contradistinction to feudalism, be termed dynasticism.”248 Toumanoff then proceeds to conceptualize what he understands to be the nature of the two regimes of feudalism and dynasticism. Feudalism, Toumanoff argues, is born “of the revolutionary encounter of two more or less moribund elements.” One of these elements is the “state: a civilized, bureaucratic and centralized, cosmocratic, yet disintegrating polity—or, at least, an abortive attempt at one.”249 The other element “is the tribe in what has been called its Heroic Age, when,

246 Toumanoff 1963.
247 Toumanoff 1963, p. 34.
248 Toumanoff 1963, p. 34, nn. 1–2. Emphasis added.
249 Toumanoff 1963, p. 35.
instead of a gradual evolution into a polity, it suffers, under the impact of a too-pronounced outside influence of a State, the disruption of the ties of mystic kingship that have held it together and which are now replaced by personal and contractual bonds of lord–vassal relationship.”

The feudal society that results from the meeting of these two elements at a particular juncture of a society can thus be described as “a system of government, a polity, which is marked by the diffusion of sovereign power.” In spite of the horizontal and vertical ways in which sovereignty is pulverized in such a society, Toumanoff argues, “there is nevertheless unity in this society, besides diversity; it derives from the tradition of a centralized state, and, once enforced by the ruler–subject bonds, is now affected by the lord–vassal relations of the pyramidal group.” Relations, in such a system, “converge in the person of supreme overlord, or king, who is the theoretical source of sovereignty and of landownership in the polity.”

Opposed to this system, according to Toumanoff, stands that of dynasticism. In a dynastic system, the “same elements as with feudalism” are at work, only “here the tribe is basic and the State secondary.” Dynasticism is the “result not of the disruption of a tribal society and of the meeting of Heroic-Age warriors with a decaying cosmocracy, but of a gradual evolution of tribes into a polity.” The evolution of a society into a dynastic form of sovereignty “is brought about by the coalescence [presumably over an extended period] of clans and tribes dwelling in close vicinity, within a geographically and—though not necessarily—ethnically unified area; by the acquisition of the prerequisites of statehood: sovereignty, independence or at least autonomy, and of course, territory; and by the achieving of a higher degree of civilization, manifested, for instance, in written records.” What prompts this evolution, besides outside forces, according to Toumanoff, is the development “of a new social force inside: the rising class of the dynasts.” The monarchical regimes that thus rise in a dynastic system “display a greater degree of interpenetration of religion and polity . . . for they inherit more fully the theophonism of the tribe and in fact develop it further.”

The unity of such a system “rests on geographical, cultural and ethnic, rather than political foundations.” In such a society when “a number of small States coexist in a circumscribed area, the group of kingly dynasties ruling in them, though each unique in its own polity, come to form together, in the multiplicity of States, as it were one class.” This class cuts across political boundaries and comes to constitute “the highest stratum of the society of the entire area.” According to Toumanoff, this class might be called a dynastic aristocracy. Political unification in such a society involves not the “complete

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250 Toumanoff 1963, p. 35.
251 Toumanoff 1963, p. 35.
254 Toumanoff 1963, p. 36.
256 Toumanoff 1963, p. 37.
reduction of the fellow dynasts by the super dynasts, as in a centralized state . . . [but] the imposition upon them of only his political hegemony." In such a system, a “hierarchy of political, but also economic, or at least fiscal, and social, relationships is established which holds together the super-dynast or High King, the other dynasts . . . in the common governance of the nation.” 257 The sovereign power, here, is polygenetic. In contradistinction to this, a feudal regime “presupposes the fragmentation of the theoretically monogenetic sovereign power . . . to an essentially non-sovereign, noble group.” There is however, a greater difference between the two regimes that transcends political differences, and that is the condition of land tenure. While in dynastic regimes land ownership is “absolute and inalienable, feudal land tenure is conditional, contractual, and limited.” 258 As with the polygenetic nature of the political regimes that are thus established, land tenure in a dynastic society is also polygenetic, dominium directum, “as opposed to the unitary, monogenetic one, which reduces the land tenure of all save the supreme lord to a mere dominium utile.” A feudal society, on the other hand, is one in which there is a complete “political, social, and economic dependence of vassal on suzerain.” 259 Finally, a feudal state is something of “a middle way between dynasticism, on the one hand, and an anti-nobiliary and bureaucratic, total étatisme, such as characterized by the Roman Empire, on the other.” 260 Toumanoff then proceeds to argue that Caucasian societies were indeed dynastic. In Iran and western Europe, however, it was a feudal system that supplanted dynasticism.

Like scholars before and after him, however, Toumanoff based his study of Sasanian Iran on Christensen’s thesis, and not on an independent investigation of the Sasanian sociopolitical regime. 261 While he maintained that in Iran “the super-dynastic Crown early became powerful and, moreover, imperial, and evinced étatiste tendencies”, he also stated that the “only dynastic group in Iran was, to give it its Sassanian name, that of šahrādān or vassal kings.” Comparing the “seven great houses of the vāspuhrān,” sociologically and juridically, to the “Caucasian lesser, non-dynastic, nobility,” moreover, Toumanoff significantly maintained that the “political and social importance of . . . [these Parthian families] was commensurable with that of the greatest of the Caucasian [dynastic] Princes.” 262 It will be proposed in this study that a non-centrist investigation of Sasanian sociopolitical history highlights the fact that in spite of sporadic efforts of the Sasanians to create a feudal and, at times, an étatiste sociopolitical regime, the monarchy can in fact best be viewed as a dynastic regime. This dimension of Sasanian sociopolitical history can be corroborated with

261 The first reference that he makes once he assesses the Sasanian political structure is to Christensen’s work, Christensen 1944. Toumanoff 1963, p. 40, n. 14. Emphasis added.
reference to the agnatic sociopolitical and cultural infrastructure that characterized Iranian society throughout the Sasanian period.\textsuperscript{263} There is little doubt that the seven great Pahlav families were in fact dynastic sociopolitical regimes, over whom, ideally, the Sasanians would have liked to establish an étatiste or a feudal regime, but with whom the Sasanians were forced to enter into a dynastic confederacy, a confederacy in which, by agreement, the Sasanians functioned as the Kings of Kings (\textit{Sh"ahanshah}).

\textbf{2.1.3 Early Sasanian period}

Even without our knowledge of the Pahlav dynastic families’ substantial power in the court of Ardashir I, where they ousted the representatives of the noble clan of Persis, and even without all the other evidence adduced here to substantiate the continued forceful legacy of the Pahlav families and the western-focused nature of Sasanian attempts at centralization and urbanization during the third and subsequent centuries, the well-established fourth-century history of the Sasanians should have led to the realization that something is terribly skewed in this disproportionate emphasis on the centralizing measures undertaken by the Sasanians during the reigns of Ardashir I and Sh"ap"ur I (241–272). For while the third century has been characterized as the century of the monarchy, it has also been almost unanimously acknowledged that in “the fourth [century,] until Sh"ap"ur II [(309–379)] reached manhood, the nobility and the priesthood held sway.”\textsuperscript{264} Once Sh"ap"ur II comes of age, his reign is said to have witnessed the height of centralization in Iran. What is not highlighted in this appreciation of Sh"ap"ur II’s regime, however, is that he himself owed his very kingship to the designs of the nobility. The father of Sh"ap"ur II, Hormozd II (302–309), had left many sons behind. At the death of Hormozd II, as T.\abar{\i} narrates, the “great men of the state and the Zoroastrian priesthood saw their chance of securing a dominant influence in affairs, hence killed the natural successor to power, Hormozd II’s eldest son Adhar Narseh, blinded another, and forced a third to flee to Roman territory, and then raised to nominal headship of the realm the infant Shabur II, born forty days after his father’s death.”\textsuperscript{265} Of the first thirty years of Sh"ap"ur II’s reign, that is until the 330s, we seem to know next to nothing. But the king’s belated renewed warfare against the Byzantines, led even Christensen to suspect that once of age, Sh"ap"ur II must have had “difficulties to surmount in the interior of his realm.”\textsuperscript{266} Whether or not these had to do with leashing the nobility who had put him on the throne as an infant can only be surmised. As we shall see later on in this study, a major factor behind the power of the Parthian dynasts, and the Sasanian king’s reliance on them, was the military prowess of the Parthians and the manpower that they contributed to the Sasanian army. It is therefore indicative of their

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\textsuperscript{263}See §1.2.


\textsuperscript{265}\textit{T\abar{\i} 1999, p. 50, and n. 146, de Goeje, 836.}

\textsuperscript{266}Christensen 1944, p. 238.
continued strength at the height of Shāpūr II’s reign that some of his major campaigns during this period were headed by the Parthian dynastic families. In the wars that Shāpūr II undertook against emperor Julian (361–363)—who boasted of having among his own ranks the Arsacid king of Armenia, Arshak III—a general from the dynastic Pahlav family of the Mihrāns led the Sasanian forces, gaining for the Iranians a victory that was crowned with the murder of Julian in 363 CE.\textsuperscript{267} In his war against the Byzantines over Armenia and against the Armenian Arsacids, likewise, Shāpūr II was ultimately forced to send yet another Parthian dynastic family, the Sūren. Even Christensen admitted that during the fourth century, the “traditions of the Arsacid period continued to be strong in the blood of the great nobility, and the moment when a less energetic king unleashed the bridle of their ambitions, the danger of preponderance of the nobility and feudal anarchy” presented itself.\textsuperscript{268}

Given the current paradigms in scholarship on the Sasanians, it is curious that this same scholarship acknowledges that after Shāpūr II’s rule the monarchy became a pawn in the hands of the nobility. In fact, the course of Sasanian history during the fourth century must force us to reconsider the rule of Shāpūr II and his ostensible success in centralizing the Sasanian polity. For the reign of Shāpūr II’s successor, Ardashīr II (379–383), betrays the continued hold of the Parthian dynasts over the Sasanians. Ardashīr II’s assumption of the throne seems to have been approved by the great men of the state. Once secured in power, however, Ardashīr II “turned his attention to the great men and holders of authority, and killed a great number of them.”\textsuperscript{269} Naturally, this proved to be Ardashīr II’s undoing. For “the people then deposed him of power,” after a reign of only four years.\textsuperscript{270} It is indicative of our mainstream monarchist perspective on Sasanian history that the above episode has been interpreted in the following terms: “Tabari’s information that Ardashīr II slaughtered many nobility points to his being a personality who continued Shābūr’s policy of firm rule.” This may very well have been true. What seems to be forgotten in this picture, however, is that Ardashīr II lost his very head as a result of this undertaking after only four years of rule! The next monarch, Shāpūr III (383–388), did not fare much better than Ardashīr II. In his accession speech Shāpūr III declared to the nobility that henceforth deceit, tale-bearing, greed, and self-righteousness would have no place in his court and his polity.\textsuperscript{271} This,

\textsuperscript{267}Christensen 1944, p. 238.
\textsuperscript{268}Christensen 1944, p. 235. It has been argued that the “belief that the farr or mythical majesty of kingship had descended on a Prince would cause nobles to rally to one member of the royal family rather than another.” Frye 1983, p. 134. In all objectivity, however, this perspective does not give due credence to sociopolitical and economic expediencies that must have informed the relationship of the Sasanians with their Parthian constituents.
\textsuperscript{269}Tabari 1999, pp. 67–68, de Goeje, 846.
\textsuperscript{270}Tabari 1999, p. 68, n. 183. Emphasis added.
\textsuperscript{271}Ferdowsī 1971, vol. VII, pp. 259–260:
however, was too much to ask of the nobility. For the anecdotal narratives that briefly trace the short rule of this Sasanian monarch also apprise us that after a rule of five years, the great men of state (al-uzamā) and the members of noble houses (ahl al-buyūtāt) finally proceeded to kill the king by cutting “the ropes of a large tent Shābūr had had erected in one of his palace courts, [so that] the tent fell down on top of him.” As a result of the antagonism that his policies created among the great men of state and the members of noble houses, therefore, Shāpūr III also ruled for only five years.\(^{272}\) The successor to the throne, Bahram IV (388–399), seems to have been dethroned under unclear circumstances. He is said to have enjoined his army commanders to obedience,\(^{273}\) and to have been a self-involved king who never held mažālim court.\(^{274}\) He too suffered a violent death.

Even Christensen admitted, therefore, that Ardashīr II, Shāpūr III, and Bahram IV “were weak kings under whose reigns the grand nobility easily re-conquered the grounds that they had lost under the great Shāpūr II,”\(^{275}\) and that these were “times of trouble for the Sasanian state, with enfeeblement of the crown and aggrandizement of the nobility.”\(^{276}\) The successors of Shāpūr II, wrote Christensen, “were for the most part figures of little significance, and so the death of Shāpūr II marks the beginning of a period of close to 125 years[!] in which the king and the grandees of the empire vied for power. The great nobility, who had found an ally in the clergy,\(^{277}\) became, once again, a danger for the power of the royalty.”\(^{278}\) The end point of this rivalry, which apparently reached its height in the initial phases of Qubād’s reign (488–531), is presumed to have been the reign of the quintessential Sasanian monarch, Khusrow I Now-shīrvān (531–579), to be discussed shortly.

As we have seen thus far, while the continued forceful participation of the nobility in Sasanian history is not disputed, the problem remains, nevertheless, that due to the nature of the sources at our disposal up to the rule of Yazdāqid I (399–420), the actual noble families who came to wield such direct influence on the crown remain, for the most part, anonymous. Except for significant yet solitary figures in the monarchically patronized accounts of the Xwādāy-Nāmā tradition as reflected in the Shāhnāma or the classical Arabic histories, we are forced to deal up to this point with anonymous collectivities that are


\(^{273}\)Tabari 1999, p. 69, de Goeje, 847.

\(^{274}\)Ibn Balkhi 1995, p. 198.

\(^{275}\)Christensen 1944, p. 253. Italics mine.


\(^{277}\)For a discussion of the presumed power of the clergy, see Chapter 5.

\(^{278}\)Christensen 1944, p. 260. Emphasis added.
referred to by such generic terms as alḥ al-buṣūṭtāt, al-uzām, bozorgān, and so forth. From the rule of Yazdgird I, however, the nature of the information at our disposal begins to change. Henceforth, sporadically, yet meaningfully, the dynastic forces assume identity. From this point onward it is possible to identify the major noble families whose power and rivalries directed the affairs of the country in crucial ways. As we shall see, predominant among these noble families were the Parthian dynastic families. The information on these dynastic families becomes more and more substantial as we proceed further into Sasanian history—although the infrastructural base of the power of these families is not always explicit in our sources. Ironically, the emergence of the Pahlav families into the full light of history from Yazdgird I’s reign onward is most probably connected not only to the initial efforts of the Sasanians at creating a historiography, but, as Nöldeke acknowledged close to a century ago, also to the contribution of these same Parthian families to the creation of the Iranian national history and the Xwadāy-Nāmag tradition during the Sasanian period itself. For invariably, as we shall see, the Pahlav families are depicted in a very positive light in the Xwadāy-Nāmag tradition.

### 2.2 Yazdgird I, Bahrām V Gūr, and Yazdgird II / the Surens

We shall commence our story, therefore, with the rule of Yazdgird I the Sinner (399–420), an epithet bestowed upon him precisely by those who defeated him. Yazdgird I is said to have commenced his rule on a platform of justice. Now, bereft of its religio-ethical connotations, the platform of justice attributed to specific Sasanian kings must be understood in terms of their intention in agreeing to a dynastic/confederate arrangement. In contradistinction, the Sasanian kings who are accused of injustice, such as Khosrow II, are precisely those who did not abide by the natural order of things, that is, the explicit understanding that the Sasanian polity was a confederacy wherein the independent power of the Parthian dynastic families was left undisturbed. Thus, in the case of Yazdgird I the Sinner, in an inaugural speech to the elite of his realm, the king warned the families that he would restrain their unbrièd powers. He warned those who had power in his realm, and through this power inflicted injustice upon the needy, that he would deal with them harshly and that they ought to be wary of his wrath.

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279 It might still be possible to give some flesh to these through the use of other sources, such as the Armenian. This examination has not been undertaken in the present study.

280 Christensen 1944, p. 269.

281 For an exposition of this, see §5.2.6.

282 That this should be couched in terms of justice fits very well the Mithraic proclivity of most of the Pahlav families. See Chapter 5, especially pages 351 and 354.

relations with the elite of his realm, Tabari in fact maintains that Yazdgird I “had begun his reign over them with lenience and equity; but then they, or at least some of them, had rejected that policy and not shown themselves submissive, as servants and slaves should in fact show themselves toward kings. This had impelled him into harsh policies: he had beaten people and shed blood.”

### 2.2.1 Mihr Narseh Suren

Now during the rule of Yazdgird I begins the career of one of the most preeminent men of his kingdom, whom the king chose as his vizier, Mihr Narseh. Narseh, son of Burazih (Gurazih), went by the name of Mihr Narseh and the title of hazarbandi, which is most probably a corruption of the title hazarbed (hazarpat), the Chief of the Thousands. As Khorenats’i and Lazr Parpec’i inform us, Mihr Narseh belonged to the Suren Pahlav family. Mihr Narseh is...

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285 Based on Mihr Narseh’s long career, and the fact that forty years later he appears as the general of the army, Noldeke has argued that it seems improbable that Mihr Narseh was appointed as the minister immediately after Yazdgird I’s accession to power as maintained by Tabari. Noldeke 1879, p. 76, n. 1, Noldeke 1979, p. 177, n. 8. Based partially on Noldeke’s statement, and the fact that there seems to have been a change of policy for the worse toward the Christians of the realm in the latter parts of Yazdgird I’s reign, Christensen implicitly argues that Mihr Narseh might have been appointed toward the end of the reign of Yazdgird I. Christensen 1944, p. 273. From this Zaehner concludes that it was toward the end of Yazdgird I’s reign that Mihr Narseh was appointed. But Noldeke never specified a date for Mihr Narseh’s appointment, and Christensen only postulated a late appointment based on Noldeke. In any event the whole reasoning seems unsound as Mihr Narseh could have been appointed in his mid-twenties for all we know. And in any event the whole discussion is not crucial to the gist of the arguments that follow. It must be noted that the story of Mihr Narseh and his family is not found in Thalibi 1900, pp. 537–539.
286 Noldeke 1879, p. 76, n. 2, Noldeke 1979, p. 177, n. 9; Tabari 1999, p. 72, de Goeje, 849; Gyselen 2001a, pp. 20–22.
287 As we shall see shortly, the Suren continued to hold the most important offices in the Sasanian domains during the reign of Yazdgird I (399–420), Bahram V Gur (420–438) and Yazdgird II (438–457). According to Khorenats’i, during the reign of Bahram V Gur (Vram), the minister of the Aryans, the hazarpat, “was of the Surenean Pahlav” family. Khorenats’i 1978, p. 340. In fact, Bahram V Gur, under whose rule the Suren continued in power, had the Surenid minister persuade Sahak the Great of Armenia, also of the Suren family, to willingly abdicate his position, underlining their common descent in order to convince Sahak. The Surenean Pahlav hazarpat told Sahak that since “you are my blood and kin, I speak out of consideration for your own good.” Khorenats’i 1978, p. 340. The kinship of Sahak to the Surenean Pahlav hazarpat is reiterated in other places. Ibid., p. 344. Lazr Parpec’i mentions the hazarpat of Yazdgird as the infamous Mihr Narseh. He also calls him, like Moses, the hazarpat of the Aryans. Parpeci 1991, p. 75. In the court of Bahram V Gur (Vram), Lazr Parpec’i calls him the Suren Pahlav, the hazarpat of the royal court. Ibid., p. 58. Based on a genealogy that Tabari provides for this family, which is found only in the Sprenger manuscript, however, Christensen and Noldeke suspected that Mihr Narseh belonged to the Islandiyar family. Noldeke 1879, pp. 76–77, 139–140, n. 2, Noldeke 1979, pp. 170–171, 241, n. 81; Christensen 1944, p. 104, n. 1. Noldeke, however, as he himself admits, was only guessing this genealogical connection.
said to have come from the town (qarya) of Abruwân in the district of Dasht-i Bārin in the southwestern province of Fārs, in Ardashir Khurrah.

The extensive powers of the Sūren family during the combined reigns of Yazdgird I (399–420), Bahram V Gūr (420–438), and Yazdgird II (438–457) are reflected in all of our sources. Ṭabarî devotes an extensive section to this Pahlav family, without identifying them as Sūrens, 288 and praises them highly. Of Mihr Narseh’s several sons he singles out three as having reached an outstanding position. According to Ṭabarî, one of the sons of Mihr Narseh was called Zurvândâd and was chosen to pursue a career in religious law. So strong was the continuity of the power base of the Sūren family that under the rule of Bahram V Gūr, Zurvândâd was appointed the Chief herbad of the realm, a position second only to that of the Chief möbad. 289 A second son of Mihr Narseh, Mājusnas, or Māhghushnap, with the rank of vāstryōshān sālar, Chief Agriculturalist, 290 was in control of the financially crucial department of the land tax all through the reign of Bahram V Gūr.

Yet the powers of the Sūrens through the first half of the fifth century were not limited to influential standing within the clergy and extensive control over the agricultural wealth of the empire. A third important office was also filled by a third son of Mihr Narseh, Kārdār, 291 who was supreme commander of the army, and held the title ratbāštavān sālar, 292 a rank, according to Ṭabarî, higher than that of spāhbed and near to that of arjbadh (hargbed). Lofty constructions in the region are attributed to him. 293 Not only did the Sūrens exert a tremendous influence over the administrative, financial, and military affairs of the Sasanian state during this period. In their cooperation and connection to the religious hierarchy, they also exerted a moral hold on their contemporary society. At Jīrīh in Fārs, Mihr Narseh established a fire temple, called Mihr Narsīyān, which, according to Ṭabarî, was “still in existence today, with its fire burning to this present moment.” 294 As if this were not enough, in the process of founding four other villages in the environs of Abruwân, Mihr Narseh established four more fire temples—one for each village, naming these after himself and his sons: Farāz-marā-āwar-khudāyā, Zurvândâd-hān, Kārdâd-hān, and Mājusnasān. The three gardens that Mihr Narseh constructed in this area are said to have contained 12,000 date palms, 12,000 olive trees, and 12,000

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289 Nöldeke 1879, p. 110, Nöldeke 1979, p. 172. For a detailed discussion of the different classes of the Zoroastrian clergy, among which were included the high priests, the herbads and the möbads, see Kreyenbroek, Philip G., ‘The Zoroastrian Priesthood after the Fall of the Sasanian Empire’, in Transition Periods in Iranian History, Societas Iranologica Europaea, pp. 151–166, Fribourg-en-Brisgau, 1987 (Kreyenbroek 1987), p. 151.
291 Kārdār is most probably the title and not the name of this figure. See also Khurshudian 1998, p. 280.
cypress trees.\(^{295}\) Ṭabarī maintains that these “villages, with the gardens and the fire temples, have remained continuously in the hands of his descendants, who are well known till today, and it has been mentioned that all these remain in the best possible condition at the present time.”\(^{296}\) Mihr Narseh’s religious zeal was evident in his constructions of numerous fire temples. This zeal seems to have been intensified by his implacable hatred of Christians. It is a function of the hold of this Pahlav family over the monarchy that the persecution of Christians under Bahram V Gūr (420–438) and the flight of Christian refugees to Byzantine territory are said to have been largely the result of the influence of Mihr Narseh—who instigated as well the Perso-Byzantine war of 421–422—over the Sasanians during this period. Mihr Narseh himself led the Sasanian armies against Byzantium, in which he “played a notable role . . . and returned home having achieved all that Bahram V Gūr had desired, and the latter heaped honors unceasingly on Mihr Narsī.”\(^{297}\) Mihr Narseh continued to hold the office of prime minister, hazārbed,\(^{298}\) throughout the reign of Yazdgird II (438–457). It is indicative of the independent historiographical contributions of these Parthian dynastic families to the formation of the Xwādāy-Nāmag tradition that, according to Nöldeke, in a number of places in the Sprenger manuscript, Ṭabarī mentions a certain mōbad called Abū Ja’far Zarātsuht, the son of Ahrār, who lived at the time of the ‘Abbāsid caliph al-Muṭaṣim (833–842) “as the narrator of the last wars of Mihr Narsī with the Byzantines . . . and probably [for the name here has been changed] as the narrator for the events surrounding the family of Mihr Narseh.”\(^{299}\)

Here, then, we have evidence of a tremendously powerful Parthian dynastic family, the house of Sūren, who were basically the confederates in rule of Yazdgird I (399–420), Bahram V Gūr (420–438), and Yazdgird II (438–457) for a period of close to half a century. Even if the Sūren family rose to prominence only at the end of Yazdgird I’s reign, they were literally at the center of power for a substantial period of time. While we do not know to which period Ṭabarī’s observation of the continued social power of the family refers, it is significant that there was a tremendous continuity of the land holdings of the family in subsequent centuries, most likely into the post-conquest period, for it was only at this point that historians began using such phrases as “to this day”. We are fortunate in having this sort of detailed information about the infrastructural power of the Pahlav. The nature of our information and the positive light that it sheds on this Pahlav family most probably hint at the direct hand that the family had in writing this segment of the national history. They are portrayed

\(^{295}\) Twelve thousand, of course, is one of the eschatological numbers in the Zoroastrian tradition.

\(^{296}\) Ṭabarī 1999, p. 72, n. 192, de Goeje, 849.

\(^{297}\) Ṭabarī 1999, p. 103, de Goeje, 868.


\(^{299}\) Nöldeke 1879, p. xxiii, n. 1, Nöldeke 1979, p. 37, n. 23.
in extremely positive terms in almost all our histories. While the rivalries of the dynastic families vis-à-vis the crown and among themselves assume a greater and greater focus through the rest of the Sasanian history, the sort of detailed information that we get about the actual basis of the Sūrens’ power is lacking for other Pahlav dynasties in subsequent Sasanian history. Notwithstanding, the information on the Sūrens in the first half of the fifth century can be considered indicative of the power that accrued to other Parthian dynastic families in later Sasanian history.

But it is appropriate to pause and consider the precise nature of the Sūren’s power during their almost half a century of rule. Here we have a family that basically shared the government with the Sasanian monarchy. The Sūren were the hazārbēds, or prime ministers, of the realm. Isolated examples, pertaining to different junctures of Sasanian history, testify to the tremendous power of the hazārbēds in the Sasanian polity. As Gyselen points out, a royal inscription of the late third, early fourth century, “names the hazārbēd among those who upheld [the Sasanian] Narseh in his reconquest of the throne.”\(^{300}\) As we shall see, a hazārbēd of Hormozd IV’s (579–590) reign, one Wahrām Ādurmāh,\(^ {301}\) who held this office during Khusrow I’s reign as well, was among the dynastic leaders murdered by Hormozd IV in the course of his efforts at restraining the powers of the nobility in his realm. A third, tremendously powerful hazārbēd of late Sasanian history, Wistaxm\(^ {302}\) (the infamous Vistāhm of Hormozd IV’s and Khusrow II’s reigns, from the Parthian Ispahbudhān family), was, as we shall see,\(^ {303}\) not only responsible for bringing Khusrow II to power, but led a rebellion that crippled the Sasanians late in their reign. There is every indication, moreover, that as the examples of the Sūrens and the Ispahbudhān indicate, the tremendously powerful figure of hazārbēd was generally chosen from the Parthian dynastic families. From the Pahlav Sūrens of the first half of the fifth century, however, were not only the hazārbēds of the realm chosen, but also the vāstryōshān sālār (Chief Agriculturalist) and the rathāštārān sālār (Commander of the Army). The Sūrens, in other words, had a central hold over the administration, military, and treasury of the realm, not to mention the leadership of the clergy in Fārs. All this they managed to achieve at the very center of the empire. They had extensive, productive lands in their domains and exerted a direct influence over the spiritual direction of the regions under their control. Naturally, with all of this came the manpower that sustained their authority, hence their leadership in the wars that the Sasanians waged during this period. As we shall see, moreover, the military power of these Pahlav families was itself predicated upon the fact that they not only provided the backbone of the Sasanian army with their cavalry, but, through their peasant population, their slave contingents, and possibly mercenaries, also with their infantry. Slave ownership

\(^ {300}\) Gyselen 2001a, p. 21, and note 45.
\(^ {301}\) Gyselen 2001a. See also §2.6.1.
\(^ {302}\) Gyselen 2001a, p. 42–43, seals 3a, 3b.
\(^ {303}\) See page 107ff and §2.7.1.
was in fact a key source of wealth for the dynastic families. We have evidence of
slave ownership among the Sūren family as far back as the Arsacid period, when
Plutarch informs us that the Parthian general Surena had many slaves in his
army.\textsuperscript{304} After the siege of Amid, in southeastern Anatolia,\textsuperscript{305} during Qubad’s
reign (488–531), certain “senior commanders in the Persian army asked Kawad
[Qubad] to hand over one-tenth of the captives to them, arguing that the deaths
of so many of their relatives during the siege had to be requited.”\textsuperscript{306} At any rate,
Elishē summed up the powers of Mihr Narseh best: “He was the Prince and the
commander (hramanatar) of the whole Persian Empire . . . There was no one at
all who could escape his clutches. Not only the greatest and the least, \textit{but even
the king himself obeyed his command.”}\textsuperscript{307}

What seems to have been specific to the Sūrens, however, is that their in-
timate collaboration with the Sasanians ran throughout the course of Sasanian
history. In this sense they can be said to have maintained—as Khorenats’i’s
folkloric tradition and the list of the nobility in the inscriptions of the first
Sasanian kings in the inscriptions of Kaba‘ī Zartusht (ŠKZ) confirm—the all-
iance that they had initially made with the early Sasanians at the inception of
Ardashir I’s rise to power, so much so that they might even have come to adopt
the title of Pārsig itself.\textsuperscript{308} The original base of the Sūrens was the region of
Sistān in southeastern Iran, a region incorporated into the quarter of the south
after Khusrow I’s reforms. The proximity of the traditional territory of the Sū-
rens to the Sasanians’ home territory in Fārs, in other words, might explain the
strong hold that this Pahlav dynastic family exerted over the Sasanians at the
very center of their power. What powers could have accrued to the rest of the
seven great dynastic powers of the realm in their own territories, and away from
the reaches of the central authorities during the first half of the fifth century,
we can only imagine. Whether or not the Sūrens adopted the epithet Pārsig,
there is no doubt that they were a Parthian family. The reliance of Yazdgird
I, Bahram V Gūr, and Yazdgird II on this great dynastic Parthian family for
the very administration and control of their realm is symptomatic of a general

\textsuperscript{304}Perikhanian 1983, p. 635. The title of Mihr Narseh, \textit{hazārbandak}, has also been interpreted to
mean the “owner of a thousand slaves.” Ibid., pp. 627–681 and 635.
\textsuperscript{305} A strategically important city on the west bank of the Tigris, and the intersection of the north–
south and east–west trade routes, the city of Amid (Amida, modern day Diyarbakr), was a bone
of contention between the Byzantines and the Sasanians, from the early fourth century onward.
(Sellwood 1991), p. 998.
\textsuperscript{306} The Persians then “murdered the captives with a variety of techniques that none of our sources
had the stomach to report.” Joshua the Stylite, \textit{The Chronicle of Pseudo-Joshua the Stylite}, Liverpool
University Press, 2000, translated with notes and introduction by Frank R. Trombley and John W.
\textsuperscript{307} Elishē 1982, p. 140. Emphasis mine. For Elishē, see footnote 309.
\textsuperscript{308} Garsoian, in league with Justi and Christensen, suspects that the Sūren Pārsig are actually a
University Press, 1989, translation and commentary by Nina Garsoian (Buzandaran 1989), p. 410,
and the sources cited therein.
trend in Sasanian history from the reign of the Sasanian king Pîrûz (459–484) onward: the monarchical institution itself was sustained, and in fact could not have functioned without the help of at least one of the powerful Parthian dy- 
nastic families of the realm.

2.2.2 Yazdgird I

The power of Mihr Narseh, as well as the dynastic structure of the Sasanian 
army during this period, is clearly borne out by the account of Elishê. According to Elishê, in Yazdgird I’s wars against the Armenians, postulated by some to have been instigated by Mihr Narseh himself, the Sûrenid hazarpat gathered the armies of nobility in order to fight against the Armenian rebels. Mihr Narseh then “addressed the greatest nobles at the king’s behest, saying: ‘Each of you remember the command of the great king and set as your goal the fame of bravery. Choose death over a cowardly life. Do not forget the oil, the crown, the laurels, and the liberal gifts which will be granted you from the royal treasury. You are lords each of your own province, and you possess great power. You yourselves know the bravery of the Armenians and the heroic valor of each one of them. If perchance you are defeated, though alive you will be deprived of the great property you now have. Remember your wives and children, remember your dear friends.’ Likewise he reminded them of their many companions who had fled; although they survived the battle, they had received the penalty of death by the sword. Their sons and daughters and their entire families had been banished, and all their ancestral lands taken from them.” In other words, Mihr Narseh organized an army from various regions. Among the contingents that were thus gathered, Elishê mentions “the contingents of the Aparhatsik’, the Katishk’, the Huns and the Gelk, and all the rest of the army’s elite . . . [which were] assembled in one place.” The Aparhatsik’ were the people of Apar, that is, Abarshahr, the region of Nishápûr of medieval Muslim geographers; the Katishk’, a population from Herât; and the Gelk, the people of Gilân. The hazarpat Mihr Narseh, then, had not only the power to dictate foreign policy, but to gather the regional armies under his command. While the identities of the commanders of these armies are unfortunately not given, there is little doubt that the armies thus gathered were those of the dynastic families of the realm, who “are lords each of [their] own province, and . . . possess great power.”

309Elishê was an Armenian priest and historian, who wrote an account of the Armenian uprising of 451 against the Sasanians. While he claims to have been an eye-witness to these events, it is now generally agreed that he probably lived toward the end of the sixth century. It is also agreed, however, that this does not detract from the authenticity of his writing. Elishê 1982.


312He then set these in order and “extended his battle line . . . he disposed the three thousand armed men to the right and left of each elephant, and surrounded himself with the elite of his warriors. In this fashion he strengthened the center [of the army] like a powerful tower or an impregnable castle. He distributed banners, unfurled flags and ordered them to be ready at the sound of the great trumpet.” Elishê 1982, p. 168, nos. 10, 11, and 12 respectively.
For the purposes of later Sasanian history, it is important to keep in mind, therefore, that Mihr Narseh’s armies were regional armies of the realm.

Elishē’s account also betrays the circumstances through which Yazdgird I came to be given the epithet the Sinner. Having had the thorough cooperation of one dynastic family, the Pahlav Sūrens, Yazdgird I attempted to impose a feudal arrangement on them by usurping their land. It is rather certain that the policies pursued by Yazdgird I did not sit well with the grandees of the empire—who, except for the Sūren, remain anonymous in our sources—and that these were meant to undermine their wealth and power. According to Thāʿalibī, the elite became base during Yazdgird I’s reign, and “the leaders of the Pārsīs were destroyed.”\(^{313}\) It is said that he was “ill thinking, ill-natured, and bloodthirsty.” He would use any excuse in order to usurp a grandee’s wealth. In this way he “ran the great families into desperation.”\(^{314}\) The Shāhnāma devotes an extensive section to Yazdgird I: When he took control of affairs his grandeur increased, but his kindness diminished. The wise became base next to him and he forgot the king’s ways. The nobility lost all their repute with him. His nature turned toward tyranny.\(^{315}\) The mōbads were, likewise, unsettled by his policies.\(^{316}\) In fact the autocratic rule that Yazdgird I sought to impose, with the very help of the Sūren dynastic family, was most probably of the sort that the other nobility of the realm could not stomach. And hence the fate of the unfortunate king Yazdgird I the Sinner: he is said to have been kicked to death by a white horse that miraculously appeared from the Chishmih-i Sū or Chishmih-i Sabz (the green spring) next to the ancient city of Tūs, in northeastern Iran,\(^{317}\) and

\(^{313}\)Thāʿalibī 1900, p. 538:

Thāʿalibī 1989, pp. 347–348:

\(^{314}\)Ibn Balkhī 1995, p. 200:

خاندان‌نامه نزگ را استیصال گردید.

خواننامه پارسیان را سر بکوفت.

\(^{315}\)Ferdowsī 1971, vol. VII, p. 265:

بزرگی فزون گشته و موش یک باست
همه رم شاهیش بیکار گشته
همان دلش و بر هر خودان
جفا پیشه شد جان ناریک اژی

جوش بر جهان پادشاهی راست
خورشید زندگان و خوار گشته
کاراگی با پیلوا و ردان
یکی گشت با داود زندگی اژی


\(^{316}\)See page 335 below.

\(^{317}\)Monchi-Zadeh, Davoud, Topographisch-Historische Studien zum Iranischen Nationalepos, Wiesbaden, 1975 (Monchi-Zadeh 1975), pp. 201–202, and the notes cited therein. The color green and the messianic symbolism of a white horse appearing from a body of water in order to kill an unjust king are all symbolic representations of the God Mihr, in whose safekeeping not only the custody of the farr (xwarra or Divine Glory) rests, but who also bestows this farr on a suitable royal candidate;
inexplicably disappeared after trampling the king to death. This narrative is sure to have been inserted in the account of the king’s death by the Parthian dynasts who cherished the traditions of Parthava at the expense of Persis, for it puts Yazdgird I in the company of other illustrious figures who met their deaths in one of the capitals of Parthava.\textsuperscript{318} Nöldèke realized this: “I think that this narrative was constructed with a purpose in mind . . . They had killed the king, who was despised by the nobility, secretly and in distant Hycania (Gurgân), and later spread this story.”\textsuperscript{319} Nöldèke also suspected that Ferdowsi had fecklessly grafted this tradition onto traditions of his hometown, Tûs. This tradition, however, certainly belongs to a far earlier period than that of Ferdowsi. Whether Hycania or Tûs, the place remains squarely within the traditional homeland of the Parthians and within the realm of at least three powerful Parthian dynastic families. In fact, among the dynastic families whose power had been undermined by Yazdgird I, the one Ferdowsi does list is the Kanârangiyân family. The Kanârangiyân, as we shall see, was a Pahlav family who had their traditional fiefdom in Tûs.\textsuperscript{320}

2.2.3 Bahram V Gûr

The power vacuum left at the death of Yazdgird I set the stage for the intrigues of the dynastic families. As Ţabarî notes, having done away with Yazdgird I, the elite decided not to support any of his offspring as the successor to the crown, and settled instead on a prince from “a collateral line of descent from the first Sasanian king” called Khusrow.\textsuperscript{321} We have a number of lists of these nobles who conspired against Yazdgird I’s offspring. While two of these lists are anachronistic superimpositions of powerful Parthian figures of the sixth century onto a mid-fifth century account, the list is nonetheless significant for the dynastic leaders it mentions.\textsuperscript{322} Among the nobility listed in Bahram V

\textit{see \S5.3.1, especially page 354ff.}

\textsuperscript{318}Ibn Balkhi in fact gives a folkloric rendition of this that is quite significant: “They say that [the horse] was an angel that god . . . made into the guise of a horse and [given the task] of ridding the world of his oppression.” Ibn Balkhi 1995, p. 203:

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و گفتند این فرشته بود که خداوند عزت و جل که صورت اسیه گماشت که گمانه از مر یا گمانه از مر یا \\

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\textsuperscript{319}Nöldèke 1979, p. 178, n. 10.

\textsuperscript{320}See page 266ff.

\textsuperscript{321}Ṭabarî 1999, p. 87, de Goeje, 858.

\textsuperscript{322}Ferdowsî 1971, vol. VII, p. 387. Besides Ferdowsi’s list, we also have one in Dinawari 1960, p. 55, Dinawari 1967, p. 59. See page 109ff for further discussion.
Gûr’s realm, Ferdowsî includes members of the Parthian dynastic families of the Kârin, the Mîhrân and the Kânûrangîyân: Gostaham, or Vistûh, who was the minister (dastûr); Kharrâd-i Mîhr Pîrûz, Farhâd-i Mîhr Burzûn, Bahrâm and Pîrûz-i Bahrâmîyân, and Rahâm.\textsuperscript{323}

After the news of his father’s death in 420 reached him, the Prince Shâpûr—who had been appointed king of Armenia by Yazdgird I in 416 CE\textsuperscript{324}—hastened to Ctesiphon to take over the throne of his father. But it was not to be. At the capital he was killed by the nobles and the clergy of the realm.\textsuperscript{325} At this juncture Bahrâm V Gûr (420–438) enters the story. The romanticized story of Bahrâm V Gûr’s heroic assumption of the throne, in which the prince is forced to snatch the regalia from the midst of two lions, among other things, need not detain us here.\textsuperscript{326} According to Ferdowsî, when, after seven years of rule, Yazdgird I fathered Bahrâm V Gûr and the astrologers predicted that the child would become a great king, the mîbads, the king’s minister, and the elite gathered and, anxious that the crown prince would have the same nature as the king, proposed to the king that he should send the prince abroad for his

\textsuperscript{323}Rahâm is certainly a Mîhrân, as we shall see in §2.3 below. In Chapter 5, we will show that the theophoric dimensions of most of these names, incorporating the name of the Mithraic Burzûn Mîhr fire of Khûrân, or simply the god Mîhr, also points to the Pahlav affiliation of these figures. There is a strong possibility that the Bahrâmîyân mentioned also belong to the Mîhrân family. Other nobles mentioned are Gîlân Shâh, the king of Rayy—Rayy, as we shall see, was an ancient center of the Mîhrân; Dâd Burzûn, who was in control of Zâbulistân, Kârin-i Borzûn-Mîhr, and finally Râdburzûn. Ferdowsî, \textit{Shâhnâmâ}, Tehran, 1935, edited by S. Nafisi (Ferdowsî 1935), p. 2196. Neither Ferdowsî’s nor Dinawarî’s list should be trusted, however, for, as we will argue on page \textsuperscript{109ff} below, they are in fact anachronistic lists that belong to the period of Khusrow II and his struggle against Bahrâm-i Chûbûn, which has been superimposed onto the struggle of Bahrâm V Gûr with the nobility. It is most probably as a result of this that Christensen, who took the list at face value, observed that it is remarkable that within the list of names provided by Dinawarî we do not see the name of the Sûrenid Mîhr Narseh, the powerful minister of Yazdgird I and later of Bahrâm V Gûr. Christensen 1944, p. 275. This also explains why the wars that Bahrâm V Gûr is supposed to have undertaken in the east sound so anachronistic given the historical conditions. See Nöldeke 1879, p. 99, n. 1, p. 103, n. 1, Nöldeke 1979, p. 189, n. 72, and p. 192, n. 80.

\textsuperscript{324}Khorenatsî 1978, p. 323. Shâpûr had ruled over Armenia for four years at this point. Ibid., p. 326. See also Chaumont 1991, as well as footnote 192.

\textsuperscript{325}Khorenatsî 1978, p. 326; also see \textit{Ţabari} 1999, p. 87, n. 229. Ferdowsî names these in the following account:

\textbf{\textit{Crop}}

It is important to note that, while this list appears in the \textit{Shâhnâmâ}, it is not given by Tha’alîbî. Moreover, in \textit{Ţabari}’s account, of all the nobility, besides Mîhr Narseh and his family, only the name of Vistûh is given. Nöldeke 1879, p. 96, Nöldeke 1979, p. 162.

upbringing. Upon Yazdgird I's death Bahram V Gur claimed the throne but was faced with the stern opposition of the elite of the realm. Bahram V Gur tried to appease them by acknowledging all “[of which] they have accused Yazdgird I of responsibility.” In assurance, Bahram V Gur promised the nobility of the realm that if God would bestow upon him the royal power, he would “put right all that he [i.e., Yazdgird I] has done wrong and repair what he has split asunder.” Bahram V Gur allegedly even asked for a year of probationary rule in order to fulfill his promise. Nöldeke remarks that the Sprenger manuscript details these promises as the lowering of taxes, an increase in the army's pay, and the promise of even greater offices to the nobility. As there does not seem to have been a standing army at the disposal of the Sasanians prior to the reforms of Khusrow I, the first two conditions presented to Bahram V Gur by the dynastic families in lieu of their agreement to his kingship must have involved one and the same thing. For prior to Khusrow I’s reforms, the money the dynasts calculated for the upkeep of each cavalry that they provided was deducted from the amount that they were required to direct to the central treasury. One of Bahram V Gur's first acts, therefore, was to resume payment of the army in a timely fashion. He then proceeded to make amends with the nobility who had initially opposed him. He gathered all those whom Yazdgird I had dispersed, and allocated, or, most probably, restored to them various regions (kishvar) and their revenues (badr). Bahram V Gur also maintained

331 Ferdowsi 1935, p. 2120:
the Sūrenid Mihr Narseh in the office of prime minister.\textsuperscript{335}

2.2.4 Yazdgird II

Of the rather long career of Yazdgird II (438–457) our sources have very little to offer. Invariably their treatment is short.\textsuperscript{336} Invariably as well, they give a very positive representation of the king, applauding his justice, although a tradition preserved in Thaʿalibi highlights the continuing strife between the king and the dynastic families. According to Thaʿalibi, Yazdgird II followed for a while his father’s policies, presumably vis-à-vis the elite. But after a while, he turned away from these. When the elite informed him that his new policies had offended the populace, he objected that “it is not correct for you to presume that the ways in which my father behaved towards you, maintaining you close to him, and bestowing upon you all that bounty, are incumbent upon all the kings that come after him . . . each age has its own customs.”\textsuperscript{337} Yazdgird II did not name either of his two sons, Hormozd and Pīrūz, as his successor, delegating the matter of succession “to the elite of the realm and the major marzbāns.”\textsuperscript{338} What is certain about Yazdgird II’s reign, however, besides his many wars, is that Mihr Narseh continued as his vizier. While ultimately defeated, the Sūrenid Pahlav dynasty led the campaigns of Yazdgird II in the east as well as the west, and is accused by Elishē of being “guilty of treachery on many counts . . . [and bearing] responsibility for the ruin of Armenia.”\textsuperscript{339} On account of these defeats, Mihr Narseh “was [finally] dismissed to his home in great dishonor.”\textsuperscript{340} The total silence of the sources on Yazdgird II’s twenty years of rule is, nevertheless, hard to explain. Which dynastic families, besides that of the Sūrens, played precisely what roles during Bahrām V Gūr and Yazdgird II’s reigns unfortunately cannot be ascertained given the sources at our disposal.

2.3 Pīrūz / the Mīhrāns

As much as the Sūrens were intimately and powerfully enmeshed in Sasanian rule, the very rise to power of Pīrūz (459–484), the son of Yazdgird II, was brought about through the efforts of a member of another dynastic family:

\textsuperscript{335}Tabarī 1999, pp. 99, 105, de Goeje, 866, 870. Tabarī adds that Bahrām V Gūr “gave them hopes of future beneficence.” Ibid., p. 93, de Goeje, 863.


\textsuperscript{337}Thaʿalibi 1900, pp. 571–572, Thaʿalibi 1989, p. 367.

\textsuperscript{338}Thaʿalibi 1900, p. 573, Thaʿalibi 1989, p. 368.

\textsuperscript{339}Elishē attributes these defeats to the “disunity of his army,” and maintains that after the defeat Mihr Narseh was “much afraid, for he himself was the cause of all the disasters that had occurred.” Elishē 1982, p. 193. In the aftermath of his defeat and, in order to redirect the king’s wrath, Mihr Narseh is also accused by Elishē of instigating the king’s slaughter of the Armenian captives in Nīshāpūr. Ibid., p. 194.

\textsuperscript{340}Elishē 1982, p. 238.
Rahām from the Parthian Mihrāns. Elîshê specifically informs us that Pirūz was a protégé of the Mihrānid Rahām. Upon the death of Yazdgird II, when the army of Aryans had become divided in two, according to Elîshê, the Parthian Mihrānid Rahām was in command of one of the armies of the realm. Rahām defeated and massacred the army of the “king’s elder son [Hormozd III] . . . and capturing the king’s son ordered him to be put to death on the spot . . . The surviving troops he brought into submission, unifying the whole army of the Aryans.” Rahām then “crowned his own protégé Peroz.”

2.3.1 Īzad Gushnasp Mihrān

The significant part played by the house of Mihrān during Pirūz’s reign is corroborated by Armenian historians. In fact, Pirūz seems to have established what the Armenian historians term foster relationships with the house of Mihrān. According to Łazar P’arpec‘i, at the inception of Pirūz’s reign his foster brother (dayeakordi, son of one’s tutor) was a certain Yēzatvšnasp (Īzad Gushnasp) “whom he loved very dearly.” This Īzad Gushnasp was the son of Aštat (Ashtāt) from the Mihrān family. Father and son played a prominent part in the significant revolt of the Armenians in 451–452, and, together with other, seemingly more significant members of the Mihrān family, also in the course of Pirūz’s reign. Łazar P’arpec‘i relates the role played by father and son in the release of the Armenian nobility who had participated in the Armenian revolt and who, together with their priest, had been captured and, by Yazdgird II’s order, imprisoned in the vicinity of “Niwšapuh [Nishāpur], the capital of the land of Apar,” near the village of Rewan. At the inception of Pirūz’s reign, the king ordered his foster-brother Īzad Gushnasp (Yēzatvšnasp) “to take the Armenian nobility, together with their families and their cavalry, to his father Aštat [i.e., Ashtāt], to the city of Hrev [i.e., Herāt], in order to settle these there and use them as cavalry in Aštat’s army.” Łazar P’arpec‘i’s account gives us significant insight into this branch of the Mihrān family. Īzad Gushnasp was the commander of the fortress of Bolberd, northeast of the Armenian city of Karin. Bolberd, also known as Bolum, was the site of the gold mines run by the Sasanians. Its control was a matter of

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342 Parpeci 1991, p. 159.
343 For a critical assessment of Łazar P’arpec‘i, who was writing on behalf of the Armenian dynastic house of Vahan Mamikonian, and his work, History of Łazar P’arpec‘i, see the introduction provided by Robert Thomson, in Parpeci 1991, pp. 1–31.
344 The Armenian revolt of 451–452 is said to have been precipitated by the efforts of Yazdgird II to impose Mazdaism on the Armenian population. Most likely, these measures were instigated in part by Mihr Narseh. For accounts of the revolt see Elîshê 1982; Parpeci 1991; Chaumont 1991, pp. 428–429.
345 Parpeci 1991, p. 133.
346 “Let them stay there,” he said, “with their cavalry, and carry out whatever task Aštat, father of Yēzatvšnasp, may set them to do.” Parpeci 1991, p. 159. We should note the discrepancy between the accounts of Elîshê and Łazar P’arpec‘i regarding the treatment of the Armenian captives in Nishāpur. See footnote 339.
great dispute between the Sasanians and the Byzantines. The wealth obtained from the gold mines in Armenia must have been great, for one of the charges brought against the leader of the later Armenian rebellion in 482–484, Vahan Mamikonean, was that he did not allow Persian officials to attend to their duties in the mines. He intended instead to offer the gold to the Byzantine emperor or to the Huns in return for support for his rebellion. In fact, in what Łazar P’arpec’i implies was a ruse, Vahan came to Pirüz’s court with great quantities of gold and argued in the king’s presence that this voluntary offering ought to be enough to assure the king of his loyalty to the Sasanian crown. Łazar P’arpec’i informs us as well that the slanderers of this same Vahan reminded Pirüz “of his [i.e. Vahan’s] ancestors one by one: ‘Which of them had not disturbed the land of Aryans and had not caused tremendous damage and many deaths’.” This, without doubt, is a recollection of the hostility of this branch of the Armenian Arsacids toward the Sasanians. The position of the commander of this valuable fortress was, therefore, a very sensitive post, which was bequeathed to Izad Gushnasp, described by Łazar P’arpec’i as the confidant of Pirüz. The father of Izad Gushnasp, Ashtāt, was the general of the army. The participation of the Mihrāns in the military organization of Pirüz’s realm, however, was not confined to this.

The author of the fascinating Tārikh-i Tabaristān, Ibn Isfandiyār, gives us further information on Izad Gushnasp (rendered by the author as Yazdān) and Ashtāt, whom he considers to be brothers. According to him, they were from the mountainous region of Deylam, southwest of the Caspian Sea, but as a result of antagonism between them and a member of another noble house, “one of the grandees and prominent men of Deylam,” they left Deylam and settled in Tabaristān. We cannot ascertain to what particular history Ibn Isfandiyār is referring for his account of the brothers’ migration. What is interesting, however, is that the familial relationship of this branch of Mihrāns with Pirüz is included in the guise of a romantic narrative in the history of Ibn Isfandiyār. In this narrative, Pirüz dreams of a beauty with whom he falls helplessly in love. To find her, he sends yet another of his relatives from the Mihrān family, one Mihrfīrūz. According to Ibn Isfandiyār, this Mihrānid Mihrfīrūz was also very close to the king, residing with him at the royal court, which Ibn Isfandiyār

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348 For Vahan Mamikonean, see Buzandaran 1989, pp. 419–420 and the sources cited therein.
352 Ibn Isfandiyār, Muḥammad b. Ḥasan, Tārikh-i Tabaristān, Tehran, 1941, edited by ’Abbas Iqbal (Ibn Isfandiyār 1941), p. 69:

خَصْمِي را از کِتَار دیلم و معروفان ان ناهیم.

353 Tabaristān is an extensive territory south/southeast of the Caspian Sea, originally known by the name Mazandarān. We will discuss its history in more detail in Chapter 4.
Chapter 2: Sasanians

§2.3: Piruz / Mihrans

locates in Balkh.\textsuperscript{355} The beloved turns out to be none other than the daughter of Ashtāt. The king marries this Mihrānid princess and at her behest builds the city of Āmul in Ṭabaristān.\textsuperscript{356} What exact status Īzad Gushnas, Ashtāt, and Ibn Isfandīyār’s Mihrfūrūz had at the court of Pirūz we cannot ascertain. There were other, more significant members of the house of Mihrān, however, about whose status and activities during the reign of Pirūz we have more information.

Almost contemporaneous with the Armenian revolt of 482, the Sasanians experienced troubles in Georgia.\textsuperscript{357} They seem to have feared the cooperation of the two rebellious regions, and the possibility of the Georgians enlisting the aid of the Huns. While Zarmihr of the house of Kārin\textsuperscript{358} was sent against the rebellious forces of Vahan Mamikonean and other insurgent Armenian nobles,\textsuperscript{359} a certain Mihrān was sent to the Georgian front.\textsuperscript{360} As events unfolded, Mihrān engaged his forces also against the Armenians.\textsuperscript{361} In his wars against the Armenians, Mihrān is reported to have been surrounded by a numerous army and powerful warriors. His role, not only as one of Pirūz’s foremost generals but as his confidant, is underlined in Łazar P’arpec’i’s narrative.\textsuperscript{362} Mihrān advised Vahan Mamikonean to submit to Pirūz, assuring Vahan that he would intercede on his behalf to the Sasanian king. The king, he told Vahan, “loves me and listens to my words . . . I shall beseech the king and reconcile him with you. And whatever it is right for you to be given, I shall try to see that he

\begin{enumerate}
\item[355] Ibn Isfandiyār 1941, p. 66:
\item[356] Ibn Isfandiyār 1941, p. 72. The Mihrāns are the third Parthian dynastic family who are given credit for the construction of the city of Āmul in Ibn Isfandiyār’s account. This, doubtless, is a reflection of the different Parthian traditions on urban construction in Ṭabaristān circulating in the region. For the etymology of the city’s name, see Marquart 1931, p. 110.
\item[357] For the intimate connection of Iran to Georgia, analogous in cultural terms to that which existed between Iran and Armenia, see Lang 1983.
\item[358] As we shall see shortly, another important Kārinid leader is Sukhrā. Our sources sometimes confuse Zarmihr with Sukhrā. Moreover, toward the end of Qubād’s reign, a son of Sukhrā with the name Zarmihr also appears. It is rather unlikely that this is the same Zarmihr mentioned here. Christensen suggested that Sukhrā seems to have been the family name of the dynastic family of the Kārins to which Zarmihr belonged. Christensen 1944, p. 294, n. 5. Equally plausible is that Zarmihr was the name of both Sukhrā’s father and son.
\item[359] The commander-in-chief of the operations in Armenia during this violent phase of the Armenian–Sasanian relationship was Zarmihr Hazarwuxt (hazarwuxt), who prior to the outbreak of the revolt was commander-in-chief of the forces fighting the rebellion of the Georgian king Vax’t’ang (Vakhtang I Gorgasali, 452–502), in Albania (Arrān). Under his command Zarmihr (see previous note) had contingents of Armenians. Parpeci 1991, pp. 166, 184. For a fascinating article on Caucasus and its topography, and the role of the Parthians, specifically the Mihrans, in Arrān, see Minorsky, V., ‘Caucasia IV’, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 15, (1953), pp. 504–529 (Minorsky 1953). An assessment of the connection of this history to the rebellion of Bābak Khurramdīn in Azarbājān in the early ninth century will be made in the author’s forthcoming work.
\item[362] Parpeci 1991, p. 193.
\end{enumerate}
gives.” It is to Mihran that Vahan Mamikonean likewise argued his case for his loyal behavior toward the Sasanian kings and the unfair recompense that he and Armenia had received through the Sasanians’ destructive policies in the region.364 Mihran urged the insurgent rebels to convert and “take refuge in fire and worship the sun.” In the midst of his negotiations with the Armenians, Mihran was suddenly summoned back to the court by Piruz.365

2.3.2 Shapur Mihran

During the next campaign season in the spring of 484, it was the turn of the Karinid Zarmihr to be sent to Armenia with a large force. After a while, however, Zarmihr was also recalled by Piruz, who informed him of his attack on the Hephthalites.366 The king then advised Zarmihr first to go to Georgia and either to kill or expel the Georgian king. At this point in his narrative Lazar Parpec’i introduces a certain Sapuh (Shapur) of the house of Mihran. Piruz had advised Zarmihr to install this Shapur Mihran as the marzpan of Georgia with a detachment of troops. Whatever the case, Shapur Mihran takes to Bolberd some of the Armenians earlier captured by Zarmihr, specifically the wives of the Kamsarakan noble house, and entrusts them to the care of Izad Gushnasp, the Mihranid commander of the fortress in control of the gold mines.367 Shapur Mihran seems to have been from the same branch of the Mihrans as Izad Gushnasp, for as the latter is described as a foster brother of Piruz, the former also partook in the dayeak system of foster family. He too is described as having known the devotion of the Kamsarakan family to Christianity because he had been raised among the Armenians.368 Like Izad Gushnasp, Shapur Mihran had the power of intercession with the Sasanian king. He advised the Kamsarakan family: “fear not, and do not abandon the service of the king of kings . . . [for] through my mediation, I shall have the king of kings forgive your guilt. Whatever is right I shall have granted to you . . . And because I love you like sons, I am advising you like children as to the way you can live and survive.” That the Mihrans at this point no longer enjoyed the same power as the Karins is borne

363 It is significant, as we will discuss on page 392ff below, that the term used by Lazar Parpec’i for mediation is mijnord. Parpeci 1991, p. 193 and n. 1.
366 Parpeci 1991, p. 202. The identity of the Hephthalites/White Huns (or Hayatila), a steppe people from Mongolia, is unknown. The Armenian sources call them, anachronistically, “Kushans or Huns who were Kushans.” They were apparently just beginning to arrive in Transoxiana, Bactria, and the northern fringes of Khurasan at this time. They are mentioned in the Chinese sources as having their original home in Central Asia. It was in the fifth century that they moved to Bactria. Once there, they adopted the local written language, Bactrian, which was written in modified Greek. For the Hephthalites, see Bivar, A.D.H., ‘Hayatila’, in P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, and W.P. Heinrichs (eds.), Encyclopaedia of Islam, Leiden, 2007b (Bivar 2007b); Frye, Frye 1983, p. 146.
368 See Parpeci 1991, p. 206, and n. 1, where Thomson remarks that this is a reference to the system of san and dayeak.
out by the fact that they were put under the command of the Kārinid Zarmihr in Armenia. In the midst of his wars against the Armenians, Shāpūr Mihrān received a grievous and distressing letter from the “Persian nobles and . . . other relatives and friends who had escaped the crushing defeat by the Hephthalites,” informing him of the death of Pīruz in battle.\(^{369}\) It is noteworthy that according to Łazar P’arpec’i, Shāpūr had other relatives who had participated in Pīruz’s campaigns against the Hephthalites. It is also significant that in line with the traditions contained in the Xwâdāy-Nāmag, the messenger who brought the news of the disaster to Shāpūr blamed the whole affair on the folly of Pīruz.\(^{370}\)

Now it is almost certain that in the figure of Shāpūr Mihrān we are actually dealing with the son of the great Mihrān, the general who was sent against the Armenian rebel Vahan Mamikonean in 481–482. This was, in other words, yet another father and son couple from the house of Mihrān with whom Pīruz was on intimate terms, as he was with İzad Gushnasp and Ashtāt from the same family. Shāpūr and his father, however, are also closely connected with Pīruz’s administration and described by the Armenian sources as the king’s closest confidants. They had the authority not only to cajole the king but, together with the Kārins, to function as king-makers by bringing Bilāsh (484–488) to power on Pīruz’s death. It is quite possible that the elder Mihrān was recalled by Pīruz to participate in the Hephthalite campaign, leaving the son to deal with the Armenian situation alone. This would explain Shāpūr Mihrān’s own recall after the news of Pīruz’s disastrous defeat, the murder of the king, and the loss of the greater part of his army. It was at this point, then, that Shāpūr Mihrān hastened to the capital to take part in the selection of the new king, Bilāsh, an appointment in which the Mihrāns must have followed the lead of the Kārinid Sukhrā, to be discussed below. At any rate one thing is clear: the prominent role of the Mihrāns both in the Armenian campaign and at the court of Pīruz, and his successor, Bilāsh, is amply demonstrated through the narratives of Łazar P’arpec’i of the events of 482–484.

### 2.4 Bilāsh and Qubād / the Kārins

#### 2.4.1 Bilāsh

Bilāsh’s accession (484–488), however, marks the start of an all-out dynastic rivalry between the Mihrān and the Kārin families.\(^{371}\) Just as the career of the

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\(^{369}\)Parpeci 1991, p. 214.

\(^{370}\)“The cause was no one else save the king.” Parpeci 1991, p. 214. The theme of the covenant that Pīruz had made with the Hephthalite king and then broken, as well as the notion of an unjust war, also looms large in Łazar P’arpec’i’s narrative. Ibid., pp. 214–215. For the significance of this, see Chapter 5, especially page 380ff.

\(^{371}\)After Pīruz’s death yet another civil war engulfed Iran. According to Ṭabarī, when Bilāsh assumed the throne, he had to contend for power with one of his nephews, Qubād, who was twice forced to flee to the east. But sources based on Ibn Muqaffā’s claim that Qubād fled only once, from his brother Jāmāsp—whose saga we will follow in §4.3.1—when he was forced to stay with the Hephthalites for two years as a hostage. Bilāsh nonetheless was forced to fight his other brother
Sūrens and the Mihrāns enmeshed the Sasanian monarchs during the first half of the fifth century, the tremendous power of another Parthian dynastic family, the Kārins, overshadowed the very rule of Sasanian monarchs for more than half a century subsequent to this. The career of Sukhrā of the Kārin therefore takes the center stage during the latter part of the reign of Pūrūz (459–484), the entire reign of Bilāsh (484–488), and the first part of the reign of Qubād (488–531). In fact, from the end of Pūrūz’s reign to the Mazdakite uprising, the fortunes of the Sasanian kings can best be understood through the saga of the Parthian house of the Kārin.

### 2.4.2 Sukhrā Kārin

In Ṭabarī’s narrative, transmitted through Ibn Muqaffa, Sukhrā appears as the avenger of Pūrūz’s second, humiliating, and foolhardy defeat at the hands of his enemies in the east, a defeat the “like[s] of which . . . [the Persian army] had never before experienced,” when Pūrūz’s “womenfolk, his wealth, and his administrative bureaus” had fallen into enemy hands. Sukhrā is here identified as coming from the district of Ardashīr Khurrah. In a heroic feat, Sukhrā defeated the enemy, rescued the captives, and secured all the wealth that had fallen into enemy hands. According to Ṭabarī, when Sukhrā returned victorious to Iran, the Persians “received him with great honor, extolled his feats, and raised him to a lofty status such as none but kings were able to attain after…

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372 As the career of Surena of the house of Sūren found its way into the national historical tradition in the saga of the mythical hero Rustam, so too the Kārins are almost certain to have left their mark on the national historiography. Nöldeke compares the part played by Sukhrā in avenging Pūrūz’s humiliating defeat to that of Kārin in the legendary sections of the national history. Nöldeke, Theodore, ‘Das iranische Nationalepos’, Grundriss der iranischen Philologie II, (1896), pp. 130–211 (Nöldeke 1896), p. 9; Ṭabarī 1999, pp. 120–121, and n. 308, de Goeje, 880.

373 For a discussion of the controversy surrounding the chronology of the Mazdakite uprising, see §2.4.5 below.

374 Ṭabarī gives three narratives on the rule of Pūrūz. The first one is apparently taken from Ibn Hishām. The second, much longer and more detailed, was, according to Nöldeke, transmitted through Ibn Muqaffa. And a third, given without attribution, is also found in Ferdowsī’s Šāhnāma. Nöldeke 1879, p. 119, n. 1, p. 121, n. 1, and p. 128, n. 3, Nöldeke 1979, pp. 200–201, p. 227, n. 19, p. 229, n. 21, p. 233, n. 43. Cited also in Ṭabarī 1999, p. 111, n. 287.

375 Bosworth notes that Pūrūz actually undertook three wars against the peoples of the east. “At the time of his first war with the powers of the eastern lands, Fūrūz’s enemies there were probably still the Kidarites, who controlled Balkh, as they were the Persian ruler’s foes in his second war of 467 . . . It would thus have been natural for Fūrūz to have sought aid from the Kidarites’ enemies, soon to replace them as the dominant power in Transoxiana and Bactria, the Hephthalites, and equally natural that he should fall out with his erstwhile allies once the formidable power of the Hephthalites was firmly established just across his eastern frontiers.” Ṭabarī 1999, p. 110, n. 284, de Goeje, 873. For the wars of Pūrūz against the Hephthalites in the east and the Caucasus also see Joshua the Stylite 2000, pp. 10–21.

376 In Ṭabarī’s first narrative, Sukhrā appeared as the avenger of the death of Pūrūz and is identified as a man from Fārs.
Here, Ţabarî gives the exalted genealogy of the Kârins, who traced their descent, as it had become fashionable, even among the Sasanians, from Pîrûz’s reign onward, to the Kayânid king Manûchîhr.

According to Ferdowsî, before leaving for his last war in the east Pîrûz left his brother Bilâsh, presumably as vice-regent, in the capital. He installed Suûhrâ, whose name is rendered first as Surkhâb and later as Sûfrây in Ferdowsî, as minister to Bilâsh. Upon hearing of Pîrûz’s defeat, Suûhrâ set out to avenge the king. He defeated Khushnavâz, the Hephthalite king, negotiated a truce, and returned to Iran in the company of Qubâd, who had been taken captive by Khushnavâz.

Łazar P’arpec’i emphasized the dominant role in Bilâsh’s accession played by the Kârins, although he calls their main leader Zarmihr rather than Suûhrâ. After detailing the mindless follies of Pîrûz, the Kârinid Zarmihr instructed the incumbent king Bilâsh: “[You are] to reduce by soft words and friendship the nations who have rebelled; to acknowledge each person among the Aryans and non-Aryans according to his individual worth, to recognize and distinguish the excellent and the worthless, to consult with the wise; to love well-wishers, but to scorn and destroy the envious and slanderous.”

Even Christensen admits that the Kârinid Zarmihr (Suûhrâ?) was the real ruler of Iran during Bilâsh’s short reign. In Ferdowsî’s narrative, after avenging the death of Pîrûz and returning to the capital in the company of Qubâd, the Kârinid Sukhrâ became the true ruler of the Sasanian realm. Sukhrâ gets the lion’s share of Ferdowsî’s attention in this account. He was the hero responsible for restoring kingship. All the other grandees of the empire were at his command, all the affairs of the country under his control.

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378 See page 385.
379 Ţabarî 1999, p. 117, de Goeje, 878. In a third narrative—this version is also very much in agreement with that given by Ibn Isfandîyâr—Ţabarî maintains that Sukhrâ was in fact put as deputy of the king over the cities of Ctesiphon and Bahurâsîr (Veh Ardashir)–the two royal residences. In this narrative, Sukhrâ is made the governor of Sîstân and the two cities. Ibid., p. 118. Other sources claim Sukhrâ to be the governor (marzâbân) of Sîstân and Zâbulistân. Thâ‘alibî 1980, p. 582, Thâ‘alibî 1989, p. 374. His name is given as Shûkhrâr in Dinawârî 1960, p. 62, Dinawârî 1967, p. 63. In the Iranian national history, the Kayânid king Manûchîhr avenges the murder of Fereydûn’s son, Iraj, by his brothers. During his reign the incessant feud between Iran and Tûrân begins, to which the Sîstân cycle of the Iranian national history is added. For the primacy of Manûchîhr, see page 375ff in Chapter 5.
380 According to Christensen (via Nöldeke and Ţabarî) it is a daughter of Pîrûz, the future mother-in-law of Qubâd, who is brought back, not Qubâd himself; and even that he thinks is fiction. Christensen 1944, p. 296.
382 See footnote 358.
384 Christensen 1944, p. 295.
2.4.3 Qubād

Finally Sukhrā set out to depose Bilāsh and crown Qubād (488–531) king. He reproached Bilāsh that he did not know the way of kingship, making a mockery of it, and that Qubād was more fit for this. 386 So after four years of Bilāsh’s rule, Sukhrā deposed him from the throne and installed Qubād in his stead.

The Karīn/Mihrān rivalry reached its heights during Qubād’s reign. It was one of the most important instigators of Qubād’s Mazdakite phase, and it most certainly precipitated Qubād’s and Khosrow I’s (531–579) reforms, 387 the most important dimension of which was concentrating the power of the Sasanians in the monarch’s hand and undermining the centrifugal tendencies of the dynastic houses of the empire. What, then, was the nature of this rivalry? With a juvenile king at the throne, according to the chroniclers, Sukhrā ruled the country. It was as if Qubād was not king, for Sukhrā controlled all the affairs of the empire. None had access to the king except Sukhrā, and even the clergy were not under Qubād’s authority. 388 Tabari’s narrative corroborates that of Ferdowsī. He portrays Sukhrā’s power in an account detailing Qubād’s supposed flight to the Khaqān of the Turks during Bilāsh’s reign. 389 When Qubād finally came back to Madā’in (Ctesiphon), “he sought out Sukhrā . . . [and] delegated to him all his executive powers.” 390 Sukhrā “was in charge of government of the kingdom and the management of affairs . . . [T]he people came to Sukhrā and undertook all their dealings with him, treating Qubād as a person of no importance and regarding his commands with contempt.” 391 Ferdowsī provides


387 See §2.5.1 below.


389 According to Bosworth the historicity of this flight is difficult to accept, “Tabari having confused, probably, Qubād’s one or two stays with the Hephthalites.” Tabari 1999, p. 128, n. 330.


391 Tabari 1999, p. 131, de Goeje, 885.
even more details on the extent of Sukhrā’s power. After five years in which Sukhrā was for all practical purposes ruling, his power went beyond what the king could tolerate, and Qubād began to assert his control.392 One of his first acts was to send Sukhrā into exile, away from Ctesiphon, to his native Shirāz in southwestern Iran. Once back in his native land, according to Ferdowsī, Sukhrā controlled all except the kingly crown. He boasted of putting the king on the throne. It was to him that various regions and the other members of the elite paid their tribute. Rumor had it that the king ruled only in name, for neither the treasury nor the army were under his control. No one heeded his orders. Those privy to Qubād enquired into the reasons behind his complacency. In search of a remedy, Qubād decided against sending an army to attack Sukhrā, lest he rebel. In any case, Qubād had no army to speak of, as the military was under Sukhrā’s control.393

Two points stand out in Ferdowsī’s depiction of Sukhrā’s power. One is the wealth at the disposal of the chief of the Karins. Great wealth is in fact the one common denominator of all the Pahlav dynasts covered in this study. Ferdowsī highlights a number of times how the Parthian Kārinid Sukhrā—like the Sūren highlights a number of times how the Parthian Kārinid Sukhrā—like the Sūren

392 According to Ferdowsī, Qubād was sixteen years old when Sukhrā promoted him as the Sasanian king; see footnote 388.
393 Ferdowsī 1971, vol. VIII, pp. 30-31, Ferdowsī 1935, pp. 2290–2291:

ترجمة

۳۹۲ بر اساس Ferdowsī، Qubād بعمر ۱۶ سال وقتی Sukhrā او ران به عنوان هیاتی نشانده و هم هم باز جمعیت زیر کوروشی گرفت هر خسوسی که پیش از آن شد. همین سببی بود که به جمله نشانده یکی از پادشاهانِ این دوره بود. Qubād چهارمین پیروزی او به جزیره نشانده یکی از پادشاهان، این تخت را به سبکی برای سندن زمینه او را انتخاب کرد. Or again, Ferdowsī 1971, vol. VIII, p. 31, Ferdowsī 1935, p. 2290:

ترجمة

۳۹۴ Ferdowsī 1971, vol. VIII, p. 31, Ferdowsī 1935, p. 2290:

ترجمة
A second characteristic of the Pahlav dynasts is their control of independent sources of manpower. The Sasanians came to rely on them militarily. Ferdowsi makes this abundantly clear in his narrative, never more so than when he describes Qubad’s lack of manpower with which to confront Sukhra. In fact, Qubad shirked the possibility of sending troops against Sukhra, had he been able to, for this would have made Sukhra an even more formidable enemy and led him to rebellion. The manpower at the disposal of the Parthian dynastic families is a theme reiterated again and again in the chronicles. Detailing the crises incapacitating the monarchy in the wake of the rebellions of Bahrám-i Chubín and Vistáhm in the late sixth, early seventh centuries below, we still observe this continued reliance of the Sasanians on the military force provided by the Parthian dynasts even after Khusrow I’s ostensible military reforms and the creation of a standing army.

2.4.4 Shapur Razi Mihrân

It is indicative of the nature of the power of the dynastic families during this period that in order to rescue his kingship from the stranglehold of the Karins, Qubad was forced to turn to another Parthian dynastic family, the Mihrâns. When Qubad complained that he did not have an army, or a commander in chief (razmkhâh), for that matter, with which to confront Sukhra, he was reminded that he did still possess loyal subjects who were powerful. Our sources are unanimous in calling the Mihrânid protagonist at whose hands and power Sukhra and the Karins lost their hegemony as one Shapur Râzî, that is, Shapur of Rayy, a clear reference to the Mihrânid power base in Tâbaristân, of which Rayy was the chief city. Significantly, Dinawarî clearly identifies him as Shapur Râzî, “one of the sons of the great Mihrân, and his [i.e., Qubad’s] governor over Khutrânîya and Babylonia.” Tabari identifies him as the supreme commander of the land (ishabâbâd al-bilâd) and remarks, as does Ferdowsi in his long narrative, that Shapur Râzî was asked to come to the king with the troops under his command. Ferdowsi leaves us no doubt that in his recall of Shapur Râzî,
Qubād was relying on one of the staunchest enemies of Sukhrā.\textsuperscript{399} It was he who could destroy the Kārinid Sukhrā. The aftermath of Qubād’s beckoning of Shāpūr Rāzī was a war that took place not between Qubād and Sukhrā, but between the agnates of two dynastic families: the Mihrānīd Shāpūr Rāzī and the Kārinid Sukhrā. Together with his army, Shāpūr Rāzī collected that of other discontented nobles and set out against Sukhrā to Shirāz. Sukhrā was defeated, captured, and brought back to Ctesiphon together with his treasury. Even in captivity in Ctesiphon, however, he was deemed to be too powerful. And so Sukhrā was put to death.\textsuperscript{400}

The rivalry of the houses of Kārin and Mihrān, and the ephemeral positions of one or the other vis-à-vis the monarchy is said to have become proverbial in their contemporary society. The expression that “Sukhrā’s wind has died away, and a wind belonging to Mihrān has now started to blow,” circulated among the people.\textsuperscript{401} Still, as we shall see, it was with the aid of Zarmihr, the son of Sukhrā, that Qubād regained his throne after being deposed by the nobility and the clergy on account of his adoption of the Mazdakite creed.\textsuperscript{402}

The rivalry between the Parthian Mihrāns and the Kārins during this period also highlights a crucial factor in the dynamic between the monarchy and the nobility that is symptomatic of the sociopolitical history examined here: in spite of their corporate interests, the various Parthian dynastic families did not always function in a unitary fashion. The maneuverability of the monarchy, and the ability of the Sasanians to sustain themselves in the face of Parthians’ hold on the monarchy was, therefore, to a great degree contingent on the divisions and rivalries among the Pahlav dynasts. Division within one and the same family—or even patricide and fratricide, a common enough means of succession at the disposal of the Sasanian monarchy—were certainly nothing unprecedented, as the careers of Bahrām-i Chūbin\textsuperscript{403} and his brother Gorduyih,\textsuperscript{404} and that of Sukhrā and his son Zarmihr, amply demonstrate.

\textsuperscript{399}“Nowhere in the world was there a greater enemy of Sukhrā than he.” Ferdowski 1971, vol. VIII, p. 32, Ferdowski 1935, p. 2291:

\begin{verbatim}
که بر سوئرا دختم اندر چهان
نوبدي جرام اشکار و نهان
\end{verbatim}

\textsuperscript{400}Ferdowski 1971, vol. VIII, p. 35, Ferdowski 1935, p. 2293:

\begin{verbatim}
چيتن گفت پس شاه را رهمنون
که یارد با او همه تیستمون
زدهنار و از دور پرستان ما
گراو اندر ایران ماباب درست
шашه ی باید نزا دست شست
\end{verbatim}

\textsuperscript{401}Tabari 1999, p. 132, de Goeje, 885.

\textsuperscript{402}Dinawari 1960, p. 65, Dinawari 1967, p. 69. For a discussion of the Mazdakite rebellion, see §2.4.5 and §5.2.7.

\textsuperscript{403}For the rebellion of Bahrām-i Chūbin, see §2.6.3 below.

\textsuperscript{404}Tabari 1999, p. 308, de Goeje, 997.
2.4.5 Mazdakite uprising

Much has been said about the hold of the so-called nobility over Qubadh in his initial stages of his kingship, and the fact that this situation precipitated his ultimate resort to the Mazdakite creed in order to stamp out their power. The history of the Sasanians at this crucial juncture will lack any substance, however, if we fail to identify the Parthian dynasts involved and ignore their far reaching rivalries. The conventional narrative of this episode of Sasanian history runs something like this: So strong was the hold of the nobility over the monarchy that at some point during his long career, presumably during his second term in office, Qubadh rebelled against them. A felicitous opportunity presented itself to the king in the form of the Mazdakite doctrine, in whose adherents Qubadh is said to have found the perfect constituency with which to combat the powers of the nobility. And so, presumably, during his reign and with his tacit support, was unleashed one of the most remarkable upheavals in Sasanian history: the Mazdakite uprising. The effects of this rebellion on the nobility are thought to have been nothing short of devastating. The financial and social infrastructures that sustained the nobility are thought to have been attacked systematically by a mass popular movement. Whole families among the nobility are presumed to have lost their power in an apparently extended revolutionary phase, although the chronology again is utterly confusing. As a result of the Mazdakite predilection for *ibāhaʾ l-nisāʾ* (communal sharing of women), by the time Khusrow I took power, multitudes of children are said to have been conceived out of wedlock by noble women! It has even been argued that the Mazdakite uprising was orchestrated from above in order to achieve Qubadh’s aim after his epiphany that the noble houses had become overbearing. It was presumably also to undermine the dependency of the monarchy on the manpower of the nobility that Qubadh began a cadastral survey as a preliminary step toward a taxation reform. As his son’s later reforms, this was meant to bring enough resources to the central treasury to establish a standing army, a new nobility that would ensure the strength of the Sasanian monarch in the face of centrifugal powers within his realm. In short, as Zeev Rubin observes, while there has been much controversy about the nature and chronology of the Mazdakite uprising, there has been little disagreement about its outcome: “The old Iranian aristocracy was its main victim, and once its power was swept away the road to change was opened.”

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405 We will discuss the popular and possibly communist nature of the Mazdakite rebellion below in §5.2.7.
406 See §5.2.7.
An incapacitated nobility opened the way, therefore, it has been argued, for the unprecedented reforms of Qubād’s son and successor, Khusrow I. Rubin again recapitulates the near consensus of the field: “Something drastic must have happened to enable a king to override the powerful nobility of the country which so far [had] . . . successfully managed to block any initiative for change. The explanation is supplied by the Mazdakite revolt under Khusrow I’s father and predecessor Kavād I.”\(^{429}\) And so enters one of the most paradigmatic figures in Sasanian history, Khusrow I Nowshīrvān, of Immortal Soul, whose auspicious reign epitomizes what the Sasanians had always aspired to be and nearly achieved, a centralized, powerful oriental polity. What, however, was the fate of the Mihrāns and other great feudal families in the wake of the Mazdakite uprising?\(^{409}\)

However one answers the question of periodization, and whatever the nature of Khusrow I’s fiscal and military reforms, there is no doubt about this, as we shall see: the pattern of a confederacy between the Sasanian monarchy and the Parthian dynastic families did not change. Neither did the history of the ebb and flow of the fortunes of the dynasts vis-à-vis each other and the monarchy. Players on the scene might have changed, but the paradigm of Sasanian history remained unscathed. For one of the astounding facts of the post-Mazdakite and post-reform narrative of Sasanian history is that with the Kārins conveniently out of the way, thanks to the resources and manpower of the Mihrāns, the stage was now set for the ascendancy, once more, of the Mihrān during Khusrow I’s rule. Another great feudal family, however, the Ispahbudhān, likewise assumed center stage in subsequent Sasanian history.

### 2.5 Khusrow I Nowshīrvān / the Mihrāns, the Ispahbudhān, and the Kārins

#### 2.5.1 Khusrow I’s reforms

The kernel of the image of Khusrow I Nowshīrvān is that of a powerful king who, through his reforms, inaugurated one of the most splendid phases of Sasanian history, restoring, in the tradition of Ardashīr I, Shāpūr I, and Shāpūr II, the normative dimensions of Sasanian kingship: a powerful centralized monarchy capable of mustering the empire’s resources to stabilize the realm internally while solidifying its external boundaries and even engaging in expansionist policies. As mentioned previously, the chief architect of this image is doubtless Arthur Christensen,\(^{410}\) who, in his seminal work draws its contours, systematically and persistently. Commencing his chapter on Khusrow I with the letter, preserved in Ṭabārī, which the king is said to have written to his pādhūspān\(^ {411}\)

\(^{429}\)Rubin 1995, p. 229.

\(^{410}\)He in fact devotes almost one sixth of his œuvre to an assessment of Khusrow I’s reign. Christensen 1944.

\(^{411}\)For the office of pāygospa (pādhūspān, protector of the land), see, for instance, Khurshudian 1998, §1.2.
of the north, Christensen observes that we have in the fragments of the letter a “king who has clearly reemerged as the center of all authority. He rules in an absolute manner over the nobility as well as the commoners, even the clergy are under his sway.” The glory of the Sasanian kings reached its apogee during his reign and Iran entered one of the most brilliant phases of its history. In his systematic construction activity, among which was the building of the Tāq-i Kisrā, the most illustrious example of the Sasanian monarchy’s celebration of itself, Ctesiphon witnessed its greatest expansion during his reign. Together with his rigorous and systematic patronage of the arts and sciences, Khusrow I inaugurated “one of the most brilliant epochs of Sasanian history,” achieving a grandeur surpassing even “the periods of the great Shāhpūrs.” Minor reservations notwithstanding, Khusrow I remains the epitome of Sasanian kingly glory.

There is indeed much to commend in Christensen’s portrayal of Khusrow I and his times, an image the deconstruction of the exaggerated aspects of which has begun elsewhere and is not within the purview of the present study. Even so, the image has in the meantime acquired paradigmatic dimensions. It is not a question of whether or not the Sasanians during this period, or indeed throughout their history, were one of the two major powers on the international scene of late antiquity, a role that the Byzantines, their only other peer in late antiquity, recognized “after a delay for mental adjustment.” Likewise, there is no denying the cultural achievements of the Sasanians throughout their history. A bare knowledge of antiquity bears witness to this. It is not even a matter of questioning the notion that “the apparatus of government, administrative, fiscal, and military, both at the center and in the province, reached a relatively advanced stage of development early in the Sasanian era of Iranian history,” although this latter notion is itself based more on deductions than on any detailed investigation of a wealth of information contained in the literary or extant primary sources that at times defy any attempt at chronological reconstruction. Here a question of methodology comes in, which we will discuss shortly. Suffice it to underline here that one of the foremost authorities investigating the administrative geography of the Sasanian history warns against the disequilibrium of the information contained even in the primary sources at our disposal—inscriptions, coinage and seals—for reconstructing a detailed

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412 Christensen 1944, p. 363.
413 Christensen 1944, p. 364. Emphasis mine.
414 Christensen 1944, pp. 363–442.
415 Christensen 1944, p. 438.
administrative geography of the span of Sasanian history. For even from the purely chronological point of view, our current data belong to two distinct periods of Sasanian history. On the one hand, there are the monumental inscriptions belonging to the third century, and on the other, the administrative seals that belong to the sixth and seventh centuries.\footnote{For this and other problematics inherent in our primary sources, see Gyselen 2002, p. 180.}

The question, rather, is the following: How does one reconcile the ostensible success of Khusrow I’s centralizing reforms with the understanding that, as we shall see, it was ultimately centrifugal forces that brought about the demise of the Sasanian dynasty? This is not the place to engage in a detailed study of Khusrow I’s reforms. A recent study by Zeev Rubin has done this admirably.\footnote{Rubin 1995.}

In brief, Khusrow I’s reform is said to have attempted a modernization of the Sasanian fiscal system, involving, above all, a rationalization of the empire’s taxation system in order to ensure a stable source of income for the central treasury.\footnote{Christensen 1944, p. 367.} Having established a financially sound fiscal system under the strict supervision of the central administration, Khusrow I is said to have used his newly acquired resource for the ultimate purpose that the fiscal restructuring had been conceived to begin with: the creation of a standing army that would replace the problematic and unreliable “army of retainers, brought to the field by powerful feudal lords over whom the king had little effective control.”\footnote{Rubin 1995, p. 228.}

This too is thought to have been achieved. It is here that the social crisis in the wake of the Mazdakite uprising is said to have come in handy. With the great noble families presumably out of the way as a result of the Mazdakite uprising, the king reportedly set out to turn his new military recruits into a new nobility. As Rubin remarks, there is a crack here in the consensus of the field: while some have suggested that “they were recruited from among the gentry of the dehkāns, … the more common view is that they belonged to a higher social rank.”\footnote{Rubin 1995, p. 228, and the references given in n. 5.}

The scholarly consensus of Khusrow I’s rule then builds upon the image constructed by Christensen of a powerful centralizing monarch who, through a keen sense of expediency and farsighted measures, managed to achieve what had hitherto remained unrealizable: a sound fiscal system as well as a standing army. As Rubin’s fascinating study points out, however, there are a number of problems with this scenario. Before proceeding with Rubin’s analysis, however, we should highlight a number of points about the forces that might have instigated Khusrow I’s reforms.

### 2.5.2 Interlude: Letter of Tansar

In order to do so we may start with a document authored during the Sasanian period, the Letter of Tansar. The greater part of the Letter of Tansar presumes to be the response of Tansar (or Tosar), the chief herbad of Ardashīr I, to the...
challenges that the ruler of Ṭabaristān, Gushnasp, is supposed to have made against
the first Sasanian king, Ardashīr I, when the herbad had asked Gushnasp to
submit to Ardashīr I. Now the precise date of the Letter of Tansar has been the
subject of debate. While the letter presents itself as being written during the
reign of Ardashīr I at the inception of Sasanian rule, and while there is some
agreement that parts of the Letter of Tansar might in fact pertain to this period,
the evidence for a sixth-century authorship is too overwhelming to be simply
brushed aside as instances of interpolations.424 One of the primary criteria for
attributing a sixth-century date to the letter, in fact, is its informational content:
it refers to the post-reform period of Khusrow I’s administration.425 The letter
appears to transpose the events that transpired during Khusrow I’s reign onto
the conditions that are presumed to have existed during the reign of Ardashīr I.

To begin with, there can be no doubt that the Letter of Tansar contains
a veiled description of the Mazdakite rebellion. Among the first few charges
against Ardashīr I, the Letter articulates Gushnasp’s accusation that “the King
of Kings demands of men earnings and work (makāsib o m-r-d-h).”426 Tansar
then proceeds to give a classic articulation of the desirability of maintaining the
four estates of the kingdom, enumerating these as the clergy, military, scribes,
and artisans and tillers of land at the head of which stands the king, arguing
that it “is through these four estates that humanity will prosper as long as it
endures,” and reminding Gushnasp that assuredly there ought not be any “pass-
ing from one to another” estate except under exceptional circumstances.427 He
then describes for Gushnasp the ways in which this four-fold division of society
had been threatened with destruction—the point of reference always being pre-
sumably the Arsacid period—when “men fell upon evil days” and “fixed their
desires upon what was not justly theirs.” When this transpired, argues Tansar,
“violence became open and men assailed one another over variance of rank and

424 Among these one can list the usage of the old Kayānid names, which became prevalent only
after Pīrūz’s reign (see our discussion on page 385ff); the mention of the “Lords of Marches, of Alan
and the western region, of Khwārezm and Kābul,” who can be called kings—a situation which only
transpired during Khusrow I’s reign; the reference to the Turks who appear in the northeastern
parts of Iran only in the sixth century; the borders given of the Sasanian empire; and finally the
references to the treatment inflicted on the heretics and the emphasis on the ranked order of the
social structure, which betray a Mazdakite context (see our discussion below). In her assessment
of the authorship of the Letter of Tansar, Boyce admits that “the evidence for a 6th century date for the
Letter is . . . considerable.” She also acknowledges the fact that the “consensus of scholarly opinion
has come to be that the treatise is in fact a literary forgery perpetrated for political purposes, the
prestige of the founder of the dynasty and his great herbad, Tansar, being drawn on to help Xusrav
re-establish the authority of both state and church.” Tansar 1968, Letter of Tansar, vol. XXXVIII
of Istituto Italiano Per Il Medio Ed Estremo Oriente, Rome, 1968, translated by Mary Boyce (Tansar
1968), p. 16.
425 For further evidence, see Tansar 1968, and the references cited therein.
word m-r-d-h translated as work is doubtful.” Tansar 1968, p. 37, n. 5, where she refers to Minovi’s
Tehran edition, p. 12, n. 5 of the Letter. I am following Iqbal’s edition of Tārikh-i Tabaristān in
which the Letter is contained. Can an emended reading of m-r-d-h be mard, meaning men, here?
It is to be noted that what Tansar is describing here is an antagonism among the people of rank, a horizontal war as a result of variance of rank and opinion, and not a vertical antagonism between the four estates. Immediately afterwards this is made amply clear. For it was at this point, Tansar reminds Gushnasp, that the “veil of modesty and decency was lifted, and a people appeared not enhanced by nobleness or skill or achievement nor possessed of ancestral lands; indifferent to personal worth and lineage … ignorant of any trade, fit only to play the part of informers and evil-doers.” Through their exertions in this direction, Tansar continues, these people “gained a livelihood and reached the pinnacle of prosperity and amassed fortunes.” What we are dealing with here, in other words, is analogous to the creation of a bourgeoisie, for lack of a better term, a class amassing fortune through means other than land ownership. The significance of this will become clear as we proceed. Thus far we do not have a description of the Mazdakite uprising, for among all our accounts of the latter it is the theme of the destruction of property that is highlighted, and while passing reference is also made to the low-born acquiring wealth, no account maintains that as a result of the uprising the Mazdakites reached the “pinnacle of prosperity and amassed fortunes.” Tansar then continues to describe this same state of affairs while replying to another, related aspect of Gushnasp’s accusation, the fact that Ardashir I had committed excessive bloodshed. There used to be no reason to impose unduly harsh punishments on the population, because “people were not given to disobedience and the breach of good order.” “Were you not aware,” Tansar rhetorically asks Gushnasp, “that chastity and modesty and contentment, the observance of friendship, true judgment and maintenance of blood ties, all depend upon freedom from greed?”

Tansar then begins to describe the consequences of this state of affairs, a mass popular uprising. It is here therefore that Tansar’s description of the Mazdakite uprising starts. When “greed became manifest and corruption became rife and men ceased to submit to religion, reason, and the state,” then the “populace [ʾāmma], like demons, set at large, abandoned their tasks, and were scattered through the cities in theft and riot, roguery and evil pursuits, until it came to this, that slaves (bandigān) ruffled it over their masters (khudavandigān) and wives laid commands upon their husbands.” Here, then, is a replica of all the other accounts contained in various versions of the Xwādāy-Nāmag tradition describing the Mazdakite uprising. At this point, Tansar explains, Ardashir I was compelled to use excessive force. In all probability, then, this account is not a description of the events during late Arsacid period, but of those prevailing during Qubad’s and Khusrow I’s reign. Tansar then describes the measures

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429 It is to be noted that the actual term used by the Letter of Tansar, and rendered as roguery in the translation, is ʿayyārī. This is one of the many pieces of evidence at our disposal connecting the Mazdakite social movement with the phenomenon of ʿayyārī. This latter, in turn, as we have noted elsewhere, clearly replicated the ethos of Mihr worship. The author hopes to address this in her upcoming work on ʿayyārī and Mihr worship.
taken by the king in order to rectify the turbulent conditions of the realm.\footnote{Tansar 1968, p. 40; Ibn Isfandiyār 1941, pp. 20–21.} But before proceeding with this, it is necessary to describe the following section where the theme of greed and blood-line is taken up once again.

Tansar here addresses Gushnāsp’s concerns about the affairs of the great families (ahl al-buyūtāt), and his complaint that “the king of kings has established new customs and new ways.” To this charge Tansar replies that “the decay of family and rank is two-fold in nature. In the one case men pull down the family and allow rank to be unjustly lowered [that is presumably by the king or other families].” The other case, however, and that which forms the greater cause for concern, is when “time itself . . . deprives them of honour and worth . . . Degenerate heirs appear, who adopt boorish ways and forsake noble manners . . . They busy themselves with the earning of money and neglect to garner fair fame. They marry among the vulgar and those who are not their peers, and from that birth and begetting men of lower rank appear.”\footnote{Tansar 1968, pp. 43–44, Ibn Isfandiyār 1941, p. 23. The emphasis of the Letter of Tansar on the newly fashionable trading interest of the great families is in fact quite interesting for as we know both the nobility as well as the Zoroastrian orthodoxy “relegated trading to the lowest rung of their ethic, the Dinkard considering trade as the lowest and least of activities.” Gnoli 1989, pp. 160–161, n. 37.}

Here we have likewise a description of the conditions that existed prior to the Mazdakite uprising, when greed and corruption were the order of the day and cause for neglecting the “maintenance of blood ties,” and when people busied themselves “like tradesmen with the earning of money.”

The king, Tansar now explains, “set a chief (ra’īs) over each and after the chief an intendant (sārid) to number them, and after him a trusty inspector (mutfattish) to investigate their revenues.” A teacher was likewise appointed to each man from childhood to instruct him in his trade and calling. The king also appointed judges and priests who busied themselves with preaching and teaching. Another crucial dimension of the measures that the king undertook, however, was that he “ordered the instructor of the chivalry [Middle Persian andarzbad i aspwaragan, Arabic muwaddib al-asāwira] to keep the fighting-men in town and countryside practiced in the use of arms and all kindred arts that all the people of the realm may set about their own tasks.”\footnote{Tansar 1968, p. 41, Ibn Isfandiyār 1941, p. 21.}

Of two facts there can be no doubt: First, these passages deal with the corruption that had supposedly engulfed the affairs of the great families (ahl al-buyūtāt), that is, the Parthian dynastic families, in the period immediately preceding Khusrow I’s reign—a period that, as all agree, engendered the Mazdakite uprising. And second, after detailing the Mazdakite uprising, the section describes the measures undertaken by Khusrow I in remedying the greed and corruption of the great families. The Letter of Tansar is thus describing the reforms that Khusrow I undertook in order to bridle the Parthian dynastic families, the ahl al-buyūtāt. Among the sources of their power, the letter informs us, was the
fact that they busied themselves like tradesmen with the earning of money. The
fame that they achieved in this manner was not fair fame. Khusrow I’s measures
consisted in the appointment of a chief and an intendant (āriz) over these dy-
nastic families in their provinces. The function of this āriz is, in fact, extremely
significant. His responsibility was “to number them”, that is to say, to take a
census. This census, however, was not only of the tillers of the land under the
dynasts’ control, but also of the fighting men whom the Parthian dynasts con-
tributed to the kings’ army. The responsibility of the inspector (mufattish), in
turn, was an investigation of the revenues produced by the tillers.

Part of Bal’amı’s account on Khusrow I’s reforms seems to be, in fact, an
abridgment of the Letter of Tansar.433 Here Ba’amı informs us that after Khus-
row I Nowshırvan implemented the taxation reforms, he used these revenues
to re-arrange the army, “so that, as we know whence this wealth comes, so we
would know where it is going.”434 The information that Ba’amı subsequently
provides is of significant value for assessing not only the maladies affecting the
Sasanian army prior to Khusrow I Nowshırvan’s reign, but also the part played
by the Parthian dynastic families, who provided the backbone of this very army.
Khusrow I appointed a certain Bābak-i Behruwān435 to pinpoint the precise
problems affecting the army. He complained to Bābak-i Behruwān that the
criteria through which they distributed remuneration to the army lacked any
justice and logic whatsoever. He then instructed Bābak-i Behruwān to imple-
ment measures to rectify the situation, allocating to the grandees (mahābūdhān)
what they deserved. A long list of problems are then enumerated by the king.
“There are those, whose worth is 1000 dirham who receive only 100. There are
those who do not have a mount, but who receive the pay of the cavalry. There
are those who have a mount, but who do not know how to ride. There exist
those who are not archers, but receive the salary of an archer, and the same with
swords and lances.”436 Bābak-i Behruwān was then instructed to restructure the
army437 and allocate to each member of the cavalry and the infantry a fixed pay,

433 The reforms of Khusrow I in one of the recensions of Ba’amı’s work appear under the headings
“taxation measures” and “reform of the army.” Ba’amı 1959, pp. 169–171 and 171–175 respectively.
For an erudite exposition of the variant recensions of this work, see Daniel, Elton L., ‘Manuscripts
434 Ba’amı 1959, p. 172.
435 For the reading of the name see Tafazzoli 2000, p. 23, n. 25, and p. 15, n. 86.
436 Ba’amı 1959, p. 172.
437 A similarly detailed list of the precise measures to be implemented is also given. Each cavalry
is then required to wear complete armor, their mail, with complete upper part, together with a
stirrup. On their heads must be a helmet, and they should carry chains and foreleg covers (bar sar
khud va silsila o sāghayn). On their arms must be iron forearms (va andar dast sā’ādin-i ābānin).
On their mounts there must be a mail (burgustwān bar asp). They should have a spear, a sword, and
a shield, and they should be wearing a belt, have a feed bag, and an ironed mace. On the saddle bow
(bih yik sū-y-i kūhih) there must be a battle ax and on the back of the saddle a bow-holder (kamāndān)
the latter not receiving less than a 100 dirhams. In the symbolic narrative that follows, however, the jackals appearing in the lands of the Arabs heralded the injustices precipitated by the reforms undertaken by Khusrow I Nowshirvān. Characteristically, the mōbadhān mōbadh articulated this: the kārdārān (tax collectors) in charge of collecting the taxes (harag, kharāj) after the reforms, had been oppressing the peasantry. They were collecting more than the regulated taxes and were inflicting injustice. Khusrow I Nowshirvān then appointed mōbads over the kārdārs, hence the profusion of seals belonging to mōbads (maguh) in precisely the regions belonging to the Parthian families. 438

The dynamics of the relationship of the Parthian dynasts with the central administration prior to the reforms is thus fully exposed in Bālamī’s narratives. Prior to the reforms, the dynasts were responsible for forwarding to the central treasury the revenue that they had procured from their domains. In the assessment of their revenue, and the part that they were expected to forward to the central administration, however, they entered calculations that did not reflect the actual amount of wealth that they had collected or needed to spend. Taxation from trade through their territories, as the Letter of Tansar informs us, most probably greatly augmented this wealth. A cadastral survey and the imposition of a fixed rate of taxation, which, once decided upon, was no longer left to the self-serving calculations of the dynasts but was to be forwarded directly to the central administration, was meant to fund the central treasury with the actual wealth of the empire.

But, as Bālamī’s narrative significantly underlines, there was a second, very important mechanism through which the central treasury lost a substantial amount of wealth: the Parthian dynasts deducted exaggerated expenses for the armies that they provided. They counted as cavalry those who were only infantry and without any mounts. They deducted inflated expenses for providing their armies with costly armor and war gear, which they then did not provide. As the organization of their army was at their own discretion, they might have used untrained peasants or slaves, or mercenaries whom they probably paid less, as cavalry, the reduced expenses of which they nevertheless calculated as cavalry pay. They might have refused to pay a cavalry member his proper dues as a member, hence the king’s complaint that there were mounts without riders. In short, they greatly overestimated their expenses and thereafter deducted these when they provided the Sasanians with armed contingents. Add to this the proceeds from trade, and one could very well imagine the substantial amount of wealth that never actually left Parthian domains in order to make its way to the central Sasanian treasury. No wonder the Letter of Tansar complains that the ahl al-buyūṭāt had acquired tremendous wealth. Part of this wealth, as the Letter of Tansar maintains, came from trade, when degenerate heirs adopted boorish


438 Bālamī 1959, p. 172. For the seals, the majority of which belong to the Pahlav lands of Āmul, Damāvand, Hamadān, Gurgān, Rayy, Tūs, and Qūmis; see Gyselen 2002, pp. 61–69.
ways and, forsaking noble manners, busied “themselves like tradesmen with the earning of money and neglect[ed] to garner fair fame.” As Bālamī’s narrative makes clear, however, a substantial part of this wealth was gained as a result of the direct control that these dynasts had on the collection of revenue from their domains and the liberty that they had in dispensing this wealth. The Sasanians had very little control over all of this, and hence the dire need for a reform of the system. A strict echelon of control, of checks and balances and counter-checks, had to be imposed in order to even begin to address the problem. As Gushnasp put it, “the King of Kings demands of men earnings and work.” As Zeev Rubin’s admirable studies have shown, however, the system introduced was itself very soon beset with problems and, as Bālamī’s narrative highlights, susceptible to perennial abuse, over-collection, and under-accountability of the wealth produced by the empire. Such extensive and potentially meticulous degrees of control over Parthian domains and interference in their affairs were probably unprecedented in Sasanian history; hence the rebellion of one Parthian dynast after another during and after the reign of Khusrow I’s son, Hormozd IV, and the downward spiral of the Sasanian state when the measures imposed sapped the decentralized system that had hitherto functioned with comparatively much greater success.

Rubin argues that Khusrow I does not seem to have been as vigorous a personality as conventional sources make him to be. Newly tapped sources for Khusrow I’s reform present him as “a vacillating and temperamental ruler who bows to pressure and contents himself at the very end of the day with the introduction of half measures.” The fiscal reform that he is said to have successfully implemented, moreover, took a long time to implement, and was susceptible to tremendous abuse. The built-in control mechanism imposed by Khusrow I implied an intense involvement of the mūbads, as they were supposed to ensure the just implementation of the reforms. But this control mechanism, supervised by “the qudāt al-kwar, none other than provincial mūbads, under the authority of the great mūbads, proved to be as susceptible to corruption as the system that had to be controlled.” To be sure, for “a time the new system appeared to be functioning in perfect order. [And] [r]oyal revenues from the land and poll taxes were doubled.” But there were other, perhaps even more powerful forces at work that seem to have helped Khusrow I to achieve this.

There is first the issue of other, substantial sources of income that aided Khusrow I through his first four decades of rule. One of the most important of these was the customs on the silk trade that ran through the Iranian territories,
specifically the Parthian regions, one might add. This wealth seems to have augmented the income of the central treasury of Khusrow I. As the Letter of Tansar implies, Khusrow I was envious of the wealth from the silk trade revenues monopolized by the Parthian dynasts. Neither were the subsidies paid by the Byzantines, amounting to 11,000 pounds of gold, an unwelcome windfall for Khusrow I at the conclusion of their peace treaty. The circulation of currency in the market seems to have been also plentiful, and this not on account of the “economic soundness of the system as whole,” but due to the fact that the volume of silver currency was on the rise ever since Shāpūr II’s reign, becoming especially noticeable during the rule of Pīrūz. Other economic indices, such as agricultural productivity, seem also to have been on the rise, offsetting inflationary tendencies inherent in the increased flow of currency. The successes of Khusrow I both internally and in his external relations seem, therefore, to have been affected by other factors besides the putative success of his fiscal reforms. As for the question of the manpower necessary to sustain a standing army, Rubin’s study shows clearly that the dearth of manpower contemporaneous even with the reforms of Khusrow I seems to have led to, as Rubin put it, a “barbarization of the Sasanian army.” Rubin’s evidence pertaining to the end of Khusrow I’s reign, “when enough time had passed for his fiscal reforms to have an impact on the organization of the army,” contains the startling feature that even after the reforms, Khusrow I was forced to continue enlisting nomadic groups as a source of manpower for the army, a practice without which Qubād himself could not have regained his kingdom. What is more, this evidence suggests that the standing army created by Khusrow I was “significantly ineffective in warfare against the Turks [the Sasanian enemies in the East], prone to alarm and demoralization.” In short, as Rubin observes, the picture that may be drawn from this evidence “is a far cry from that of an army whose backbone is provided by a restored class of rural landlords, the dehkāns.” In fact, the continuing use of dynastic armies during Khusrow I’s reign is clearly reflected in Simocatta’s narrative: As the Byzantine campaigns “ravaged through Azerbaijan as far as the Caspian (Hyrcanian) Sea in 577, . . . unlike the Romans going on campaign, Persians do not receive payment from the treasury, not even when they are assembled in their villages and fields; but the customary distributions from the king constitute a law of self-sufficiency for them, they administer these provisions to obtain a subsistence and hence are forced to support themselves together with their animals until such time as they

445 For this and the complicated issues of Sasanian monetary system, see Rubin 1995, pp. 262–263, and the sources cited there.
448 Simocatta also observes that in Hormozd IV’s war against the Byzantines in 582–586, the Parthian general Kardārīgan “was marching against the Romans. Having enrolled throngs, who were not soldiers but men inexperienced in martial clamour.” Simocatta 1986, p. 52.
invade a land." That there were recruits from the nobility is acknowledged by Rubin. These, however, must have been drawn from the ranks of those nobility whose parentage was not clear. Why would Khusrow I recruit from among the ranks of these? The answer brings us full circle to the Mazdakite social uprising. For the problem created by the Mazdakite movement, with its supposed indulgence in the practice of *ibāha l-nisā, “was not that there [were] no young men of aristocratic origin [as the noble families will have been blessed as a rule with many children] but rather that there were too many youngsters of unrecognized parenthood at the fringes of the aristocracy, which Khusrow I was striving to restore.” Why would Khusrow I—whose quintessential aim in the reforms is said to have been the sapping of the powers of the nobility—want to restore this same nobility? Contemporary scholarship has yet to answer this. For the contention that these were a nobility of the robe and therefore directly answerable to Khusrow I, not only disregards the subsequent course of Sasanian history, but neither can it accommodate the new evidence brought forth in the present study. What is clear is that the effects of Khusrow I’s reforms are wrought with so many complications and uncertainties that the Christensenian thesis of a strong centralizing monarch in the person of Khusrow I falls seriously short. The whole issue, however, takes us back to the Mazdakite social uprising.

As far as the Mazdakite rebellion(s)[?] is concerned, what must be borne in mind is that in spite of the tremendous social and doctrinal influence of the Mazdakites—and in spite of the legacy that they left well into the Islamic centuries—their revolutionary dictum of overhauling the rigid class-based order of society was evidently never achieved. The social, political, and economic ramifications of the Mazdakite doctrine, even if we were to uncritically follow the sources, were simply too threatening to the status quo. There is no denying the fact that as an ideology the Mazdakite heresy had a long-lasting effect. As an ideology it had successfully exploited, as we shall see, the Mithraic ethos of the Circle of Justice, and there are a number of indications that, as an ideology, Mazdakism had permeated Iranian society for an extended period prior to its eruption as a mass popular uprising. This does not seem to have been the case as far as the social consequences of the Mazdakite uprising are concerned, however. Much has been said of these destructive effects of the Mazdakite uprising on the class structure of Iranian society. There is probably some truth to this, as these effects are the focus of many of the sources dealing with it. As far as

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450 "In this instance, [i.e., toward the end of Khusrow I’s reign,] the king of the Persians, fearing mutinies in his army, resolved to participate in discussions about peace with Tiberius [II the Caesar ([574, 578–582])]." Simocatta 1986, iii. 15.4, 5, p. 95, n. 66 and p. 96. Emphasis added.


453 See §5.2.7.

454 See page 354.

overhauling, or even seriously threatening, the rigid class structure of Sasanian society is concerned, however, the testimony of the sources—which, after all, bear witness to the normative, strictly class-based, dimensions of Iranian society and which were reworked by the Sasanians after the eruption of the revolts—needs to be dealt with cautiously. This is especially the case where the effects of the movement on the upper echelons of Iranian society, like the Parthian dynastic families, are concerned. The crucial problem here is that the testimony of these sources needs to be weighed against the agnatic character of Iranian society.\footnote{As Perikhanian observes the agnatic structure was a quality intrinsic to “the [social] structures … [and] organization of the whole civic population of Iran.” Perikhanian 1983, pp. 641–642; see also our discussion in §1.2.}

The economic, politico-religious, and finally territorial dimensions of the agnatic structure of Iranian society, and the strong cohesive bonds that these established, rendered the fabric of Iranian society far too interconnected for it to be overhauled easily. This agnatic structure especially applied to the Parthian dynastic families. The disruptions ostensibly caused by the Mazdakite uprising in the fabric of dynastic communities, therefore, have to be gauged against the formation of these latter as agnatic groups.

In view of this, the contention that the Mazdakite social uprising—even if we were to believe its destructive force as our sources would have us believe—severely disrupted the power bases of the great dynastic families needs to be reassessed. An extensive destruction of property in times of revolutionary fervor is one thing, but to romanticize the effects of the Mazdakite social uprising and argue that it decimated substantial agnatic groups of dynastic families implies a revolutionary upheaval of such intensity that, considering the coercive powers at the disposal of these same dynastic families, is hard to imagine. Members of a particular branch of agnatically based dynastic families might have been particularly hard hit, but there were, as Rubin notes, certainly enough of them to go around. In keeping with the Sasanian legal system, another branch of the same family could very well have claimed and inherited the powers of the family as a whole subsequently. That neither the Mazdakite uprising, nor the reforms of Khusrow I were able to undermine—or, in the case of the latter, were even meant to undermine—the power of these families is, in fact, borne out clearly by the course of Sasanian history from the reign of Khusrow I onward. In order to assess this, we shall have to abandon temporarily our chronological narrative for the reigns of Khusrow I, Hormozd IV, and Khusrow II.

### 2.5.3 The four generals

One of the many points of controversy over Khusrow I’s reforms has had to do with whether or not, in the course of his military and administrative reforms, the king replaced—as our literary sources inform us—the office of ērān-spāḥbed (ispāḥbudh al-bilād or supreme commander of the land) with that of four spāḥ-beds assigned to the four cardinal points of the Sasanian empire. The thesis that such a reorganization was undertaken by Khusrow I was first promulgated...
most forcefully by Christensen. In recent decades, however, this measure of Khusrow I’s reforms has come under intense scrutiny. In 1984, for example, Gignoux questioned the historicity of the alleged quadripartition of the empire under Khusrow I. Arguing on the basis of the dearth of primary inscriptions, stamps, seals, coins, and so on—as opposed to literary sources—that testify to such a reorganization, Gignoux contended that the notion of an administrative quadripartition of the empire was most probably largely symbolic with no correspondence to any historical reality. Following Gignoux, others accepted his conclusion that the administrative quadripartition was probably no more than a literary topos, but argued that the military quadripartition of the empire was probably “not totally devoid of historical value.” While questions surrounding the precise boundaries of the four kūsts are still outstanding, and while the longevity of this quadripartition after Khusrow I is still open to dispute, its implementation under Khusrow I is now established beyond doubt by Gyselen’s sigillographic discovery.

Quadripartition of the empire

One paramount feature of Khusrow I’s reform was the military and possibly administrative quadripartition of the empire, where the king divided his realm into four quarters or kūsts. Over each of these he appointed a supreme commander, a spāḥbed. Khusrow I Nowshirvān undertook these measures, it was argued, in order to further centralize his rule. This was yet another attempt at undercutting the powers of the nobility, in other words. The king was successful in achieving this and through his reign there were no major uprisings. These spāḥbeds, it was argued, like the new army that Khusrow I created, did not belong to the ranks of the nobility and most certainly did not come from the Parthian dynastic families. During the rule of Hormozd IV, however, something unprecedented happened: For some inexplicable reason, a Parthian dynast, Bahram-i Chubin of the house of Mihran, launched a major uprising that engulfed the quarters of the north (kūst-i ādurbdāgan) and

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460 Gnoli 1985, pp. 268–269. We will argue below that it was even in place as late as Khusrow II’s reign.
462 The paradigmatic articulation of this, as other aspects of Khusrow I’s reforms, seems to have been made in Christensen 1944, pp. 364–373. For some of the subsequent scholarship on this see Gignoux 1984; Gnoli 1985; and most recently, Rubin 1995, and the sources cited therein.
Bahrām-i Chūbin’s rebellion was unprecedented in a number of ways. To begin with, it marked the first time in Sasanian history when a Parthian dynast questioned the very legitimacy of the Sasanians and rebelled against the Pārsīg. Significantly, as Boyce underlines, the rebellion also showed “how sturdy a resistance Iran had put up to Persian propaganda about the illegitimacy of the Arsacids.” Bahrām-i Chūbin’s rebellion was ultimately put down and the rebel killed. In order to do this, however, as we shall see, the Sasanians were forced to muster all of their resources, including, significantly, the aid of other Parthian dynastic families. What is more, the Parthian Bahrām-i Chūbin and his powerful constituency had in a sense achieved part of their intended aim before their defeat: they had deposed and murdered the ruling king, Hormozd IV, and had raised to the throne another, Khusrow II Parviz. In fact, Bahrām-i Chūbin’s rebellion was only put down at the inception of Khusrow II’s reign. Even considering what little we have enumerated so far about the saga of Bahrām-i Chūbin, historical hindsight should have already alerted us to the problems in Christensen’s thesis and led us to suspect the continued and forceful power of this Parthian dynastic family in the post-reform period of Sasanian history.

We recall that it was the Mihrāns who had helped secure Qubād’s power against the stranglehold of the Kārins. As far as Khusrow I’s quadripartition of his realm—intended to further undermine the power base of the nobility—is concerned, therefore, the questions before us are as follows: what happened to the Mihrāns after Khusrow I’s reforms? And if in fact they had been decimated in the course of these reforms, as we are led to believe, why did they so forcefully appear again during the reign of Hormozd IV? The problem, furthermore, is that the Mihrāns were not the only Parthian dynastic family who reappeared, almost volcanically, in subsequent Sasanian history. Shortly after Khusrow II’s accession to power, yet another powerful Parthian dynast, Vistāhm of the Ispahbudhān family, launched a second major rebellion. This time, Vistāhm did not limit himself to merely disrupting the kingdom and engaging in rhetoric over the legitimacy of the Sasanians. He in fact carved for himself an independent kingdom covering most of the quarters of the north (kūst-i ādurbādagān) and east (kūst-i khwarāsān). Neither would this be the last time the Pahlav rebelled against the Pārsīg and assumed the crown. To the details of each of these episodes in Sasanian history, we shall get shortly. For now it is worth highlighting again the inadequacies of the conventional portrayal of the rule of Khusrow I Nowshīrvān as a centralizing monarch and his presumed success in establishing an absolutist polity. Why did Parthian dynasts rise one after another if Khusrow I was in fact so successful in his reformist

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463 For our discussion of the political and religious aspects of this rebellion, see §2.6.3 and §6.1 respectively.
465 See §2.7.1 below.
What then of the destructive effects of the Mazdakite rebellion on the elitist fabric of Sasanian society? The paradigmatic Christensenian thesis once again falls short, because it uncritically accepts the Sasanians’ portrayal of themselves. Khusrow I’s quadripartition of his empire in fact engaged the same long-established pattern of Sasanian polity: the Sasanian–Parthian confederacy, through which it continued to function. There was no discontinuity in the power of Parthian dynastic families, and no overhaul of the power of these, during his reign. To the contrary, major Pahlav families continued to be as much involved in the power structure of Khusrow I’s administration as previously. To be sure, there continued to be the ebb and flow of the fortunes of particular dynastic families. But even in this the power structure of Sasanian polity had remained unscathed. What is our evidence for this?

All our literary sources, Armenian, Greek, and Arabic, as well as the Shāhnāma, attest that the paradigmatic image of Khusrow I as an all-powerful monarch who through his reforms undermined the power of the great nobility needs to be substantially revised. The pattern of the Sasanian–Parthian confederacy lasted through the reforms of Khusrow I Nowshirvān and into the reigns of Hormozd IV (579–590) and Khusrow II Parviz (591–628). Already by Hormozd IV’s time, however, and partly as result of the reforms of Khusrow I, the mechanisms that had ensured the collaboration of the Pahlav with the Pārsīg began to crumble, however. The end result of this was that the Sasanians lost their legitimacy, a legitimacy that they had in fact sustained through this confederacy. The collaboration between the Pahlav and the Pārsīg was predicated upon a broad understanding through which the Pahlav agreed to Sasanian kingship in return for maintaining a substantial degree of independence in their respective Pahlav territories. These were concentrated in the quarters of the east and the north, including the Partho–Median territory, the control of which remained, in the words of Toumanoff, allodial, that is, absolute and inalienable, to the Pahlav dynastic families.466 Within the heavily agricultural territories of the north, east, and south—the last of which will not be the focus of our studies—the agnatic dynasts maintained their hegemony, while upholding the Sasanians by contributing military manpower and agricultural revenues to the central treasury.

In the process of dividing his realm into four quarters, however, Khusrow I introduced, as we shall see, one other novelty: he uprooted some of the chief agnates of key dynastic families from their traditional territories and relocated these to other parts of the realm, putting them in charge of the home territories of other agnatic families. By this means he seems to have intended to undermine the agnatic bonds of these families with their constituency. This measure of reform, like the others, not only did not have its anticipated results, but even further antagonized the dynastic families. Khusrow I had attempted to break the tradition of non-interference in the affairs of the Parthian dynastic families.

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466 Toumanoff 1963, p. 39.
Recently discovered spähbed seals

The remarkable fact about the continued dependence of the Sasanians on the Parthian dynasts is that the recent sigillographic evidence corroborates the literary evidence. What then is the nature of the sigillographic evidence? In 2001, Rika Gyselen published the results of an incredible discovery that she had recently made in London.\footnote{I was not aware of Gyselen’s work on the Four Generals until I had finished investigating the literary evidence for the Parthian participation in Sasanian history. The fact that the sigillographic evidence in fact corroborates the hypotheses that I had reached prior to having access to these becomes therefore all the more significant and testifies to the value inherent in literary sources for reconstructing Sasanian history. The present discussion is based on Gyselen 2001a; Gyselen 2002; Gyselen, Rika, ‘Lorsque l’archéologie rencontre la tradition littéraire: les titres des chefs d’armée de l’Iran Sassanide’, Comptes Rendus de l’Académie des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres Jan, (2001b), pp. 447–459 (Gyselen 2001b); Gyselen, Rika, ‘La notion Sassanide du Kust i Âdurbâdagân: les premières attestations sigillographiques’, Bulletin de la Société Française de Numismatique 55, (2000), pp. 213–220 (Gyselen 2000). I am indebted to Rika Gyselen for kindly providing me with copies of her valuable works. For a complete list of the seals, see notes 473 and 477, as well as Table 6.3 on page 470.} These were a set of seal impressions or bul-lae. Upon closer examination, she ascertained these to belong to the period of the quadripartition of the empire, and to the various spähbeds assigned to the four quarters of the Sasanian empire. One of the greatest finds of the past century, as far as the primary sources for Sasanian history are concerned, this set of sigillographic evidence contains a wealth of information as to the identity of the four generals, spähbeds, who, in the wake of Khusrow I’s reforms, were appointed to the four quarters of the realm. To begin with, the seals provide us with the names and the titles of these spähbeds. Literary evidence can be particularly notorious if used for identification of paramount figures of Sasanian history. Where available, names are subject to scribal errors, linguistic transformations from one language to another, and limitations of the literary sources in general. In terms of our ability to identify these figures, therefore, the seals are, in and of themselves, highly significant. For, as we shall presently see, where identification is possible we can now investigate the tremendous part played by the Parthian dynastic families in late Sasanian history by comparing the names of these generals, as they appear on the seals, to those given in our secondary and tertiary sources, and where possible to follow their sagas in late Sasanian history.

At times, however, the seals also provide us with crucial information on the gentilitial background of these figures, thereby clarifying the dynastic family to which they belong. For among the seals recently discovered, there are those that insist on distinguishing the holder of the office as a Parthian aspbed, aspbed i pahlaw,\footnote{Gyselen 2001a, seal 1b of a figure called Dâd-Burz-Mihr, p. 36, and the personal seal of this same figure, seal A, p. 46.} or, alternatively, as a Persian aspbed, aspbed i pârsig,\footnote{Gyselen 2001a, seal 2c, p. 39, and the personal seal of this same figure, seal B, p. 46.} confirming in fact one of the theses proposed in this study. As the seals bear witness, the incredible dichotomy of the Parthian (Pahlav) versus Persí (Pârsig) affiliation
of members of high nobility and the clear importance of such affiliations, persisted through the reforms of Khusrow I and in fact to the end of the Sasanian period. Taken together with the names, this information on the gentilitial background of the four generals, the territorial domains under their control, as well as the kings under whom they served, enables us finally not only to prove the continued participation of the Parthian dynastic families in the sociopolitical structure of late Sasanian history, but, through our literary sources, also to investigate the nature of this participation at this crucial juncture of Iranian history. Significantly, the seals underline one crucial fact: the Sasanians were unable to destroy either the Parthian dynastic families or their consciousness of their Pahlav ancestry. The Parsi–Pahlav dichotomy which had begun, as Eddy underlines, with the very rise of the Parthians in the third century BCE, therefore, continued to inform Iranian history through the end of the Sasanian period. Finally, as we shall see in our examination of the religious panorama of the Sasanians, the seals also shed light on the religious affiliations of the four generals, information which becomes tremendously significant in the context of the debates surrounding the religious trends existing within the Sasanian empire. Specifically, as we shall see, this information highlights the fact that the Parsi–Pahlav consciousness of their heritage percolated, as a general rule, into the religious traditions that the members of each group embraced.

There are two crucial issues, moreover, that this evidence establishes beyond any doubt. First and foremost, not only did the power of major Parthian dynastic families already on the rise not abate in the post-Mazdakite and post-reform period of Sasanian history, but, in fact, Khusrow I continued to avail himself of the powers of at least three of these families, the Mihrans, the Karins, and the Ispahbudhan—whose saga we shall shortly discuss. Second, the sigillographic evidence corroborates the literary evidence and above all the information contained in the Shahnama. It is time, therefore, to search these literary traditions, including the Shahnama, which are predominantly based on the Xwaday-Namag tradition, for further evidence. For these in fact do allow us to reconstruct the Sasanian history not only from the center, the cradle of Parsi domination, but also from the edge, the domains of the Parthian dynastic families.

The collection unearthed by Gyselen contains eleven seals belonging to eight different spahbeds, of all four quarters of the Sasanian realm, from the reign of Khusrow I onward. Two spahbeds have seals showing their appointment

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470 The monarchs named on the seals are Khusrow and Hormozd. As we shall argue shortly, these pertain to the rules of Khusrow I, Hormozd IV, and Khusrow II.

471 See our discussion in §5.3.3.


473 Seal 1a, “Cihr-Burzén ... erān-spāḥbed of the side of the east (kūst-i khvarāsān),” belonging to Khusrow’s reign; seal 1b, “Dād-Burz-Mihr, Parthian aspbed ... erān-spāḥbed of the side of the east (kūst-i khvarāsān),” belonging to Hormozd IV’s reign; seal 2a, “Wahrām ... Ādurmāh ... erān-spāḥ-
under two separate kings, one of the two Khusrows\textsuperscript{474} and Hormozd IV;\textsuperscript{475} one spābed has two seals which are identical except for the addition “[of the] Mih-rān [family]” on the second;\textsuperscript{476} and the remaining five seals pertain each to a spābed under a single king. Apart from these eleven spābed seals, the collection also contains two personal seals, each belonging to one of the individuals already named on the spābed seals.\textsuperscript{477} Hence in total, the collection consists of thirteen seals. Significantly, of these thirteen seals, two that belong to the same individual identify the bearer as a Parthian spābed,\textsuperscript{478} and two, also belonging to one individual, identify the bearer as a Persian spābed.\textsuperscript{479} Three seals, belonging to three separate figures, moreover identify the bearer as belonging to the Mih-rān family.\textsuperscript{480} Because the Mihrāns also claimed a Parthian ancestry, together with the two Parthian spābed seals, according to the given information of the seals alone, five\textsuperscript{481} out of the thirteen seals unearthed by Gyselen already belong to Parthian dynastic families.

But the seals can further corroborate the continued participation of the Parthian dynastic families in the post-reform period and in fact through the rest of Sasanian history. For with the aid of narrative histories, central among which

\textit{bed} of the side of the south (\textit{kūst-i nēmrōz}),” belonging to Khusrow’s reign; seal 2b, “Wahrām ... āDurmāh ... ārān-spābed of the side of the south (\textit{kūst-i nēmrōz}),” belonging to Hormozd IV’s reign; seal 2c, “Wēh-Sābūhr, Persian spābed, ... ārān-spābed of the side of the south (\textit{kūst-i nēmrōz}),” belonging to Khusrow’s reign; seal 2d/1, “Pirag-i Šahrwarāz ... ārān-spābed of the side of the south (\textit{kūst-i nēmrōz}),” belonging to Khusrow’s reign; seal 2d/2, “Pirag-i Šahrwarāz ... ārān-spābed of the side of the south (\textit{kūst-i nēmrōz}), [of the] Mih-rān [family],” belonging to Khusrow’s reign; seal 3a, “Wistaxm, hazārbed ... ārān-spābed of the side of the west (\textit{kūst-i khwârārān [sic]}),” belonging to Khusrow’s reign; seal 3b, “Wistaxm, hazārbed ... ārān-spābed of the side of the west (\textit{kūst-i khwârbarān}),” belonging to Hormozd IV’s reign; seal 4a, “Gōrgōn [of the] Mih-rān [family] ... ārān-spābed of the side of the north (\textit{kūst-i ādurbādagān}),” belonging to Khusrow’s reign; seal 4b, “Sēd-hōš [of the] Mih-rān [family] ... ārān-spābed of the side of the north (\textit{kūst-i ādurbādagān}),” belonging to Khusrow’s reign. Gyselen 2001a, pp. 35-45 consecutively.

\textsuperscript{474} The name of the king only appears as Khusrow on the seals, making an identification of which Khusrow extremely difficult. Rika Gyselen has argued that all of these seals must belong to the period of Khusrow I and Hormozd IV. Gyselen 2001a, pp. 18–20. As we shall see, the present study will argue that while some of the attributions of the seals to Khusrow I remain valid, others must be dated to Khusrow II.

\textsuperscript{475} Seals of Wahrām āDurmāh, seals 2a and 2b; and Wistakhm, seals 3a and 3b. Gyselen 2001a, pp. 37–38, 40–41 and 42–43 respectively.

\textsuperscript{476} Pirag-i Šahrwarāz, seals 2d/1 and 2d/2 respectively. Gyselen 2001a, p. 43.

\textsuperscript{477} Seal A, “Dād-Burz-Mihr, Parthian spābed, refuge into Burzēn-Mihr”; seal B, “Wēh-Sābūhr, Persian spābed,” who are identical with those mentioned in seals 1b and 2c respectively. Gyselen 2001a, pp. 36 and 39. For a table with all these seals, see page 470.

\textsuperscript{478} Dād-Burz-Mihr, seal 1b and seal A. Gyselen 2001a, pp. 36 and 46 respectively. It is extremely interesting to note that on the personal seal, Seal A, “on trouve le motif, plutôt rare, de deux chevaux ailés, choix qui peut être mis en relation avec le titre \textit{spābed}, littéralement maître du cheval.” This also applies, however, to Seal B, p. 46, which has the same motif of two horses facing each other, but with the addition of a tree between them. See also footnote 602.

\textsuperscript{479} Wēh-Sābūhr, seal 2c and seal B. Gyselen 2001a, pp. 39 and 46 respectively.

\textsuperscript{480} Those of Pirag-i Šahrwarāz, seal 2d/2, of Gōrgōn, seal 4a, and of Sēd-hōš. Gyselen 2001a, pp. 41, 42 and 43 respectively. As already noted, Pirag-i Šahrwarāz has a second seal, seal 2d/1, without his family name Mihrān, but otherwise identical to seal 2d/2; see also footnote 768.

\textsuperscript{481} In fact, six, when we also count seal 2d/1, of the same person as seal 2d/2.
is the *Shāhnāma* of Ferdowsī, we will establish that, except for the two seals of the Persian *aspbed*,\(^{482}\) and two seals of a figure whose gentilitial background remains unclear,\(^{483}\) in fact nine seals belonged to Parthian dynastic families.\(^{484}\)

What is more, we can now confirm that together with the Mihrāns already mentioned in the seals, we have also *spāḥbeds* among the Parthian Kārin and Ispahbudhān families. Moreover, some of the seals that have been identified by Gyselen as belonging to the reign of Khusrow I Nowshīrvān actually belong to that of Khusrow II Parvīz. The ramifications of this novel piece of information for understanding the course of Sasanian history are tremendous. The seals confirm not only the continued participation of Parthian dynasts after the Mazdakite uprising through the reigns of Khusrow I, Hormozd IV, and Khusrow II, but also prove that neither Qubād nor Khusrow I were able to significantly change the fundamental dynamics of the Sasanian–Parthian confederacy.

In order to establish our claims we should return to our narrative. We recall that faced with the overwhelming military and financial powers of the Kārinid Sukhrā, Qubād had been forced to appeal to the Mihrānid Shāpūr Rāzī, his supreme commander of the land (*ispahbadh al-bilād*), thus setting off a war between the two dynastic families. This dynastic struggle among the Parthians led to the victory of the Mihrāns, and the temporary fall from power of the Kārins. What then was the fate of the Mihrāns and other dynastic families in the wake of the Mazdakite uprising, Khusrow I’s assumption of power, and the military reforms that he inaugurated? We should reiterate that, according to conventional wisdom, both the Mazdakite uprising and Khusrow I’s reforms are thought to have seriously undermined the power of the hitherto independent Parthian dynastic families.

### 2.5.4 The Mihrāns

Significantly, the seals already give substantial evidence of the paramount role of the Mihrāns in Khusrow I’s military administration. On Gyselen’s seals, three out of the eight *spāḥbeds* who assumed office during and subsequent to the rule of Khusrow I belong to the Mihrān family. Of these, two\(^{485}\) were *spāḥbeds* of the north (*kūst-i ʾdurbādagan*), and one, belonging to a certain Pīrag-i Shahrwarāz of the Mihrān family, was a *spāḥbed* of the south.\(^{486}\) All of these seals have been attributed by Gyselen to Khusrow I’s administration.\(^{487}\)

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\(^{482}\) Wēh-Shābuhr, seal 2c and seal B. Gyselen 2001a, pp. 39 and 46 respectively. See, however, footnote 840, postulating its Sūrenid affiliation.

\(^{483}\) Wahrām Adurmāh, seals 2a and 2b. Although we will further identify this figure in §2.6.1 below as Bahrām-i Māh Adhar, I have not been able to determine the dynastic family to which he belongs.

\(^{484}\) For a summary, see Table 6.3 on page 470.

\(^{485}\) These are the seals of Gōrgon and Sēd-hōsh, seals 4a and 4b. Gyselen 2001a, pp. 44–45.

\(^{486}\) Gyselen 2001a, pp. 41, seal 2d/2. The other seal of Pīrag-i Shahrwarāz, seal 2d/1, is almost identical with the aforementioned seal and only lacks the gentilitial patronymic Mihrān, and therefore most certainly belongs to the same Pīrag just mentioned. Ibid., p. 40.

\(^{487}\) Gyselen 2001a, pp. 18–20.
However, the attribution of the seals of Pirag-i Shahrvaraz to the period of Khusrow I is problematic. We claim that this Pirag-i Shahrvaraz is none other than the famous general Shahrvaraz of Khusrow II Parviz, who was one of the most powerful commanders of Khusrow II’s army in his wars against the Byzantines. In fact, Shahrvaraz’s subsequent mutiny—aided, as we shall see, by another dynastic leader—would lead to the very collapse of the Sasanian military efforts against the Byzantines, and bring him to briefly usurp kingship during the dynastic havoc of 628–632. Of even greater significance for our purposes, however, is that we can now assert that the towering figure of Shahrvaraz belonged to the Mihran family. This leaves us with the seals of the Mihranids Gorgon and Sed-hosh, both of whom were appointed as the spabbeds of the quarters of the north (kusti adurbadagan). Significantly, therefore, the Mihrans continued to hold the spabbedi of the quarter of the north, their traditional homeland, after Khusrow I Nowshirwan divided his realm into four quarters and appointed a spabbed over each.

Literary evidence substantiates the tremendous role of the Mihrans in Khusrow I’s administration. Their presence in Khusrow I’s military and civil administration is in fact overwhelming. One of Khusrow I’s viziers, the Mihranid Izadgushasp, whose fate under Hormozd IV’s reign we shall see shortly, is mentioned by Ferdowsi as one of the highest dignitaries of Khusrow I’s administration. He is identical to Procopius’ Isdigousnas whom, together with his brother Phabrizus (Fariburz), the Greek historian describes as “both holding most important offices . . . and at the same time reckoned to be the basest of all Persians, having a great reputation for their cleverness and evil ways.” They aided Khusrow I in his plans to capture Dara in Upper Mesopotamia, and Lazica (Lazistan) in western Georgia. In the annals of the Sasanian–Byzantine negotiations, the favorable reception of Izadgushasp by the emperor Justinian (527–565) on this occasion is said to have been unprecedented, Izadgushasp returning to Khusrow I with more than “ten centenaria of gold” as gifts presented by the Byzantine emperor. Izadgushasp’s brother Fariburz was also involved in Khusrow I’s wars in the west. Having been sent against the Lazi (circa 549–555), but forced to retreat, he left a certain Mirranes, yet another Mihranid, the Byzantine fortified city and trading center of Dara, built in 507 CE, was of tremendous strategic importance, both to the Byzantines and the Sasanians, and especially significant in the war between Khusrow I and the Byzantines. See Weiskopf, Michael, ‘Dara’, in Ehsan Yarshater (ed.), Encyclopaedia Iranica, pp. 671–672, New York, 1991 (Weiskopf 1991). Sebeos 1999, pp. 7, 163.

See page 119.

Procopius 1914, p. 519.

to protect the garrison in the city of Petra in Lazica. Khusrow I also resorted to Mermeroes (i.e., Shāpūr Rāzī) when Farīburz’s attempt resulted in a stalemate in the war against the Lazis.

**Seal of Golon Mihrān**

According to Sebeos, another Mihrān, a certain Mihrān Mihrewandak, also called Golon Mihrān, was sent to the Armenian theater of war in 573–575, where he advanced into Iberia in the Caucasus but was defeated. He then led an expedition into southern Armenia, where he seized Angl in Bagrewand, probably in 575 CE. Now as we have seen, among the seals unearthed by Gyselen, one belongs to a certain Gōrgōn from the Mihrān family, the spābed of the quarter of the north during one of the Khusrows. There is a strong possibility that this Gōrgōn of the seals is in fact the Golon Mihrān of Sebeos. In her remarks on the names of these figures, Gyselen notes that the name Gōrgōn might actually be Gōrgēn. If this figure is in fact Gōrgēn, and if he is identical with the Golon Mihrān of Sebeos, then quite likely this spābed of the north was the grandfather of Bahram-i Chūbin. What makes this identification more probable, besides the association of all Mihrāns with the quarter of the north and with Armenia and Azarbāyjān, is that Golon Mihrān is the only other figure, besides Bahram-i Chūbin, who bears the epithet Mihrewandak in Sebeos’ narrative. Bahram-i Chūbin, also called Mihrewandak, in fact claimed to be the great-grandson of Gorgēn Milād. While Gorgēn Milād, ancestor of the Mihrāns is a legendary, Kayānīd figure to whom the Mihrāns traced their genealogy, in the person of Gōrgōn or Gōrgēn of the seals we are most probably dealing in fact with a historical figure, the grandfather of Bahram-i Chūbin. At any rate, with such direct involvement of the Mihrāns in the Armenian theater of war in the late sixth century, it is not surprising that Bahram-i Chūbin is also said to have been stationed as a marzbān of Armenia by some of our sources, as we shall see.

**Mihrānsitād Mihrān**

The continued reliance of Khusrow I’s administration upon the Mihrāns went beyond this. During one of Khusrow I’s eastern wars, when the Khāqān of the Turks sued for peace and offered, as a gesture of friendship, his daughter to the Sasanian king, it was a Mihrān, identified by Ferdowsi as Mihrānsitād, whom

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497 Procopius 1914, pp. 529–531, 543.
498 See §2.4.4.
499 Procopius 1914, pp. 531–551.
500 Sebeos 1999, pp. 7, 10, 163.
502 “[P]rovided that it is a case of the -ē being badly written.” Gyselen 2001a, p. 32, n. 85.
503 See §2.6.3 and §6.1; for a discussion of the epithet, see page 399.
504 For a more detailed discussion, see page 116ff below.
Khusrow I sent to appraise the Khāqān’s daughter for the king. This daughter became the future queen of Iran, and from her union with Khusrow I, Hormozd IV was born. Mihrânsitâd later boasted to Hormozd IV of his significant role in this union.\footnote{Ferdowsi 1971, vol. VIII, pp. 177–179, Ferdowsi 1935, pp. 2586–2587. See page 124 below.} Mihrânsitâd’s son, Nastûh, was also centrally incorporated in the military and administrative state of Khusrow I and took part in the wars in the east.\footnote{See page 124.}  

The predominant role of the Mihrâns in Khusrow I’s administration, therefore, is beyond any doubt. We know now of at least two Mihrâns, Gorgûn and Sêd-hôsh, who assumed the post of spâbed of the north. Whether or not our identification of Gorgûn Mihrân with Gołon Mihrân of Sebeos holds, it is extremely probable that Gorgûn Mihrân was the grandfather of Bahrâm-i Chûbin. Where exactly in the dynastic line of the Mihrâns Sêd-hôsh should be placed, and what the family tree of the Mihrâns at this juncture of history would actually look like, requires further research, as does the sequence in which Gorgûn and Sêd-hôsh were appointed to the spâbedi of the quarter of the north.\footnote{For an identification of Sêd-hôsh with a legendary Kayânid general, see page 116ff below.} If we follow, however, the military career of the Mihrâns from Shâpûr Râžî Mihrân—on whose manpower and military prowess Qubâd relied in his struggle against the Kârinid Sukhrâ\footnote{See §2.4.4.}—to Bahrâm-i Chûbin, we see that the Mihrâns continued to muster substantial forces from the reign of Qubâd to that of Hormozd IV and Khusrow II at the very least. Bahrâm-i Chûbin was also able to gather together a huge army from within his traditional homeland with which he debilitated the forces of Khusrow II Parvîz.\footnote{See §2.6.3 below.} Considering that the Mihrâns continued to be appointed spâbeds of the north even after Khusrow I’s reforms, and keeping in mind that the careers of Shâpûr Râžî Mihrân and Bahrâm-i Chûbin were at their height precisely before and after the presumed reforms of Khusrow I Nowshirvân, it stands to reason that the Mihrâns never lost either their control over their traditional homeland or the military force which they could muster from these lands. As we shall see, they continued to function as king makers in subsequent Sasanian history. The Mihrâns, however, were not the only Parthian family upon whom Khusrow I depended during his reign. Once again, we begin our account with the sigillographic evidence that has recently come to light.

### 2.5.5 The Ispahbudhân

Among the seals discovered by Gyselen, two others deserve attention. Both belong to a certain Wistaxm and identify him as “Wistik̄m, hazār̄bed . . . ērān-spâbed of the side of the west” and “Wistik̄m, hazār̄bed . . . ērān-spâbed of the side of the west, blessed.”\footnote{Gyselen 2001a, p. 42–43, seals 3a, 3b.} One of these seals, seal 3a, identifies Wistik̄m
as the ērān-spāḥbed of Khusrow; it is not clear which Khusrow, although the seal has been attributed to Khusrow I.\(^{512}\) The other, seal 3b, has Hormozd IV as king. While both seals are thought to identify Wistaxm as the ērān-spāḥbed of the west, however, the reading of one of these seals, seal 3a, as belonging to the quarter of the west (namely, kūst-i khwarārān) is conjectural.\(^{513}\) Who was this Wistaxm? To answer this, we must look at another of the Parthian houses.\(^{514}\)

Asparapet, the great Parthian and Pahlav aspet

In his accounts of Khusrow I’s reign (531–579), Sebeos writes extensively of the part taken by a figure he calls the great Parthian and Pahlav aspet, one of “the generals of the Persian king who came one after another to this land of Armenia.\(^{515}\) The one crucial thing that we have to keep in mind about the gentilitial background of this aspet of Sebeos, therefore, is that he was a Parthian and a Pahlav. At times Sebeos calls this same figure Asparapet, or sparapet,\(^{516}\) and deals extensively with the fate of his offspring. In Sebeos’ narrative, therefore, we are dealing with a figure who holds two separate offices,\(^{517}\) the general of the cavalry (aspet) and the general of the army (asparapet) or spāḥbed—the titles of which are given in their Armenian rendition.\(^{518}\) Following Sebeos’ chronology, Thomson assigns the duration of the tenure of this Parthian and Pahlaw aspet, Asparapet (sparapet or spāḥbed) in Armenia as taking place between 580 and 586, that is during the reign of Hormozd IV.\(^{519}\) In the accounts of Sebeos, therefore, we are given the identity of a Parthian spāḥbed who ruled precisely during the reign of Hormozd IV and who was intimately connected—like all the other

\(^{512}\) Gyselen 2001a, pp. 18–20.


\(^{515}\) Sebeos lists a total of ten figures here. “[T]he great Parthian and Pahlav aspet” appears fifth in the list. Sebeos 1999, pp. 11, 14, 166 (v).

\(^{516}\) In one instance he refers to him as “the great Asparapet, the Parthian and Pahlav,” giving us a combination of the terms of identification for this personage. Sebeos 1999, p. 14.

\(^{517}\) In Sebeos’ narrative the office of sparapet is linked to the Mamikonean house on a hereditary basis. Unlike his usage of the term aspet, however, of the total of four occasions that Sebeos uses the term asparapet, or sparapet, three have a Persian context, and refer to the aforementioned figure. Sebeos 1999, p. 14, 17, 318. See Pourshariati 2006.

\(^{518}\) As Philip Huyse has noted, the title aspabēdes “is not to be confused with [the title] aspideides.” The latter term comes from Mā. ʾspēpt/aspēd (general of the cavalry) < ᪷ār. ʾaspētāti, and is rendered in Armenian as aspet. The former term, aspabēdes, “goes back to Mā. ʾspēpt/aspēd (general of the army) < ᪷ār. ʾspāḍa-pēti, cf., Arm. ʾaspapāhet and (a)spaparet: the latter word was borrowed twice into Armenian, once in Parthian times from Parth. ʾspēdpēt/ʾspēd > Arm. (a)spaparet and again in Sasanian times from Mā. ʾspēpt/ʾspēd > Arm. ʾaspapāhet.” See Huyse, Philip, ‘Sprachkontakte und Entlehnungen zwischen dem Griechisch / Lateinischen und dem Mitteliranischen’, in A. Luther, U. Hartmann, and M. Schuol (eds.), Grenzüberschreitungen: Formen des Kontakts und Wege des Kulturtransfers zwischen Orient und Okezident im Altertum, vol. 3 of Orients et Occidens, pp. 197–234, Stuttgart, 2002 (Huyse 2002). For the Armenian office of sparapet, see footnote 684 below. I am extremely grateful to Professor Huyse for providing me with this important observation in a personal correspondence. See Pourshariati 2006.

\(^{519}\) See §2.6 for a more detailed account.
Parthian dynasts so far examined—with the events in Armenia and the west, and was in fact the Asparapet over Armenia, among other regions. All the literary and contextual evidence suggest that Sebeos’ Asparapet, the *Parthian and Pahlaw aspet*, is in fact the spâbed of the west, in this case during Hormozd IV’s reign (under whose control came the troops of Iraq up to the frontier of the Byzantine empire) Sebeos confusing here the title of the figure with his personal name.

Now according to Sebeos, this Asparapet was the father of Vindûyih and Vistâhm. The daughter of Asparapet had married Hormozd IV, and it was from this union that Khusrow II was born. The *Parthian and Pahlaw Asparapet*, therefore, was the father-in-law of Hormozd IV, and the grandfather, on the mother’s side, of Khusrow II, making Vindûyih and Vistâhm the maternal uncles of Khusrow II. Now Vindûyih and Vistâhm, as has been long established, came from the Parthian Ispahbudhân family. There is very little doubt, therefore, that Sebeos’ Asparapet, the *Parthian and Pahlaw aspet*, was the patronymic member of the Ispahbudhân family and the figure who in all probability held the office of the spâbed of the quarter of the west during Hormozd IV’s rule.

Now, as Perikhanian observes, and as Khorenats’i’s tradition confirms, the Ispahbudhân were probably the original holders of the office of spâbed, and as a result came to use the title of the office as their gentilitial name. Based on literary evidence, Patkanian, Justi, and Christensen, among others, consider the gentilitial name of Ispahbudhân a given, Justi even reconstructing a family tree for them. According to Sebeos, in an episode corroborated by classical Islamic histories, Hormozd IV recalled and killed this senior member of the Ispahbudhân family, Asparapet, his father-in-law and the Parthian spâbed of the west, in 586, about six years into his reign.

What we cannot ascertain at the moment is the name of this spâbed of the west. Dinawarî maintains that his name was Shâpûr and that he was the

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520 Christensen 1944, p. 370.
521 The confusion of the title with the personal name seems to be a common practice in Greek sources as well. Theophylact Simocatta calls this same figure Aspebedes. Simocatta 1986, iv. 3.5. Once again I owe this observation to a personal correspondence from Philip Huyse. See Huyse 2002. Another Aspebedes appears in Procopius’ narrative as an important general during Qubad’s reign, who is probably the father of Sebeos’ Asparapet, and whose saga we will discuss on page 110ff below. Procopius 1914, pp. 83–84.
522 Sebeos 1999, p. 14. For a detailed assessment of the tremendous role of these figures in late Sasanian history, see page 127ff.
523 Sebeos 1999, p. 17. See also the genealogical tree on page 471.
526 As we shall see at the conclusion of this study, we can now add to the family tree that Justi had reconstructed; see page 471. For the Ispahbudhân family see, among others, Patkanian 1866, pp. 128–129; Justi 1895, p. 429; Christensen 1944, p. 104. Lukonin 1983, p. 704, disagrees with this identification.
527 “He [i.e., Hormozd IV] killed the great Asparapet, Parthian and Pahlaw, who was descended from the criminal Anak’s offsprings.” Sebeos 1999, p. 14.
son of Khurbundād.\textsuperscript{528} The \textit{Nihāyat} omits Shāpūr and calls him Khurbundādūyih, which is probably a combination of the name Khurbundād and the title \textit{jādhūyih}.\textsuperscript{529} Finally, the \textit{Shāhnāma} gives his name as Kharrād, which is a diminutive of Khurramād.\textsuperscript{530} According to Joshua the Stylite, in 503 CE, during Qubād’s war against the Byzantines, the Persian \textit{astabid} (the Syriac rendition of Iranian title \textit{spāhbed}) was called Bawi.\textsuperscript{531} The order of the genealogical tree of the Parthian Ispāhbuḍhān family, therefore, might be Bawi (Boe, Procopius’\textsuperscript{532} Aspebedes); Shāpūr (Sebeos’ Asparapet); Vistāhm and Vindūyih. The names given by other sources as Khurbundād, Khurbundādūyih, and Kharrād in lieu of Shāpūr are merely a combination of the titles \textit{khurra}, \textit{farrokh}, \textit{dād},\textsuperscript{533} and \textit{jādhūyih}.	extsuperscript{534} Significantly, the title \textit{farrokh} is also carried by Wistaxm on one of his seals.\textsuperscript{535} This genealogy then is the pedigree of the Ispāhbuḍhān family, who acquired their name by virtue of the fact that traditionally the office had remained in their family. It is a genealogy that is extremely significant for later Sasanian history, as well as the history of Tābaristān.\textsuperscript{536}

\textit{Seal of Vistāhm Ispāhbuḍhān}

As a general rule, even after Khusrow I’s reforms, the offices of the \textit{spāhbed} remained hereditary, certainly within the same Parthian dynastic families.\textsuperscript{537} This claim is now corroborated above all—and besides other evidence thus far presented—by the seals of Gōrgōn (of the) Mihrān (family) and Sēd-hōsh (of the) Mihrān (family), both of whom were \textit{spāhbeds} of the side of the north during Khusrow I’s rule. What is of crucial importance is that this general rule also applied to the Parthian Ispāhbuḍhān family, a family that after the Sasanians was probably the second most important family in Sasanian history. As Sebeos maintains, the \textit{spāhbed} in Armenia from 580–586 was the father of

\textsuperscript{528}Dinawari 1960, p. 102, Dinawari 1967, p. 111.
\textsuperscript{529}Nihayat 1996, p. 361:

\begin{verbatim}
بندويه و سطام ابن خرينداضويه
بسطام بن شيرنداد
\end{verbatim}

The office of \textit{jādhūyih} was probably a judiciary office with possible religious overtones. For further elaboration, see page 197.

\textsuperscript{531}Procopius calls him Aspebedes. Procopius 1914, pp. 83–84.
\textsuperscript{532}Joshua the Stylite 2000, p. 76.
\textsuperscript{533}Procopius 1914, pp. 83–84.
\textsuperscript{534}Dinawari 1960, p. 102, Dinawari 1967, p. 111.
\textsuperscript{535}From \textit{farr}, for which see footnote 222.
\textsuperscript{536}From the Avestan word \textit{datā}, meaning law, right, rule, regulation, the term \textit{dād} “is the most general word for the concept of law in the Iranian religious tradition.” It stands in contrast to \textit{dādestān}, meaning “civil law, justice, judicial decision.” Shaki, Mansour, ‘\textit{Dād},’ in Ehsan Yarshater (ed.), \textit{Encyclopaedia Iranica}, pp. 544–545, New York, 1991 (Shaki 1991).
\textsuperscript{537}See page 197.
\textsuperscript{538}As we shall see below, some of the names of other important members of this family are also composed with \textit{-farrokh}; see §3.3.1 and the family’s genealogical tree on page 471.
\textsuperscript{539}For the connection with the Āl-i Bāvand of Tābaristān, see §4.1.2.
Vistāhm and Vindūyih, the Parthian figure who was also the spāḥbed of the west, and was recalled and killed by Hormozd IV. The secondary and tertiary sources provide plenty of evidence about the paramount figure of Vistāhm, the uncle of Khusrow II, a figure who became intimately involved in the Parthian dynastic struggles that, as we shall see, engulfed the Sasanian dynasty precisely during the reigns of Hormozd IV and Khusrow II. Finally we should keep in mind that, as Gyselen remarks, the name Vistāhm is a “less common name.” Considering all this, and considering the subsequent course of Sasanian history, there is very little doubt that the figure whom the seals identify as Wistaxm, the spāḥbed of kūst-i khwarbarān (the quarter of the west) of Hormozd IV, is the extremely powerful Parthian dynast Vistāhm of the Ispahbudhān family, whom Hormozd IV appointed spāḥbed of the west after murdering his father Asparapet. The other seal of Vistāhm, seal 3a, as we have argued elsewhere, most probably belongs to the rule of Khusrow II, not Khusrow I, and to the period when Vistāhm was appointed spāḥbed of the east by Khusrow II, as a reward for the central role that he played, together with his brother, Vindūyih, in bringing Khusrow II Parviz to power. Shortly after this, Vistāhm led a rebellion in Khurasān. It is important to observe that according to Sebeos, the original land of the family of Asparapet, the Parthian and Pahlaw aspet, was the “region of the Parthians,” which clearly refers, in the context of Sebeos’ narrative, to Khurasān. In the midst of his rebellion, Sebeos informs us, Vistāhm, the son of Asparapet, moved from the region of Gilān to “the region of the Parthians, to the original land of his own principality.” When Vistāhm was appointed spāḥbed of the east, therefore, he had finally assumed power over the original land of his own principality, the land of Parthava.

Gyselen, who argues that seal 3a of Wistaxm belongs to the spāḥbed of the west as opposed to the east—an identification with which, as noted, we disagree—bases part of her reasoning “on the identity of the person who is spāḥbed of the western side. A person named Wistaxm appears in the literary tradition as a spāḥbed of the Sawād, a region which was definitely on the western side of the Sasanian empire.” The literary tradition to which Gyselen refers, unique in its identification of Wistaxm as the “spāḥbed of the Sawād who

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539 Gyselen 2001a, p. 32.
540 Gyselen 2001a, p. 43.
541 Pourshariati 2006.

بدان کار بندوی با کدخدایی
جهان دیده و راد و فرخند رای
بهرمود تا نوکرد رم و داد
خرسان مرمر به گسته داد

We will discuss this episode in more detail in §2.7.1 below.
had the position of hazāraft,” is the Akhḵar al-Ṭiwāl of Dīnawārī.\textsuperscript{547} Dīnawārī, therefore, confirms that a spāhbed of the west was called Wistaxm. The next question, therefore, is under which king did this Wistaxm serve?

Dīnawārī’s anachronistic account

Now Dīnawārī’s citation appears in the course of his narrative on the end of Yazdgird I’s reign (399–420), and the accession of his son, Bahrām V Gūr (420–438). As in other sources that we examined above, Dīnawārī points out that after the death of Yazdgird I, the nobility of Iran decided that, on account of the injustices committed by this king, none of his offspring should succeed him.\textsuperscript{548} Among the nobility, Dīnawārī mentions Wistaxm, the spāhbed of Sawād who held the position of hazāraft.\textsuperscript{549} Gyselen aptly remarks that “unless we have here two homonyms, the Wistaxm whose spāhbed seal we possess could well be the same as the one mentioned by Dīnawārī.” As for the fact that the Wistaxm of Dinawari belongs to the fifth century, while the seals of Wistaxm “would rather appear to be from the second half of the 6th century,” Gyselen observes correctly that “here we have one of those chronological confusions very common in the historiographical tradition concerning the Sasanian Empire.”\textsuperscript{550} As she remarks, we are in fact dealing here with a chronological confusion, but, as we shall argue, a confusion that has been caused by Dīnawārī’s transference of events pertaining to Khusrow II’s reign to those occurring in the aftermath of Yazdgird I. The confusion, in other words, does not pertain to the reign of Khusrow I.

Dīnawārī notes that after the death of Yazdgird I, the elite of Iran decided that on account of the deceased king’s injustices, none of his offspring ought to be considered fit for rule and therefore opted for a certain Khusrow, “from a side line,” to succeed to the throne. Upon hearing the news, one of Yazdgird I’s sons, Bahrām V Gūr, who was exiled to Ḥīrā,\textsuperscript{551} considering himself the natural heir to the throne, rebelled against the nobility and their puppet king Khusrow and seized the throne. Now, among Khusrow’s supporters, Dīnawārī mentions Wistaxm, the spāhbed of Sawād.\textsuperscript{552} The two protagonists of the dynastic struggle in Dīnawārī’s account of the aftermath of Yazdgird I’s death were, therefore, Khusrow, from a side line, and Bahrām, the pretender to the throne—the namesakes of the figures of the dynastic struggle between Khusrow II and Bahrām-i Chūbīn.\textsuperscript{553} Dīnawārī has confused, in other words, the story of the struggle between Khusrow II and Bahrām-i Chūbīn with the accounts of the struggle between Khusrow and Bahrām V Gūr. Given that other historical narratives,
including Dīnawarī’s, speak extensively of a Vistāhm who actively participated in Sasanian politics during the second half of the sixth century—namely, the uncle of Khusrow II, the Parthian dynast of the Ispahbudhān family—little doubt ought to remain as to the transposition of Dīnawarī’s narrative from the time of Khusrow II to that of Yazdgird I.

What strongly corroborates this hypothesis are the seals of Pīrag-i Shahrvarāz of the Mihrān family. Among Bisti’s (Vistāhm’s) fellow notables, Dīnawarī mentions a “Firak, entitled Mihrān.” We claim that this Firak is none other than “Pīrag-i Shahrvarāz . . . spābed of the side of the south, [of the] Mihrān [family].” As Gyselen observes, the literary sources always identify Shahrvarāz in the same context: as a powerful figure who played a dominant role in Khusrow II’s long drawn out wars with the Byzantines (603–630) and who finally mutinied against him. Like Wistaxm, therefore, the Parthian Mihrānid Pīrag-i Shahrvarāz is a powerful general of Khusrow II Parvīz. Dīnawarī thus identifies in his anachronistic account four figures from the second half of the sixth century: the king Khusrow II Parvīz, the rebel Bahrām-i Chūbin, and the two Parthian generals Wistaxm and Shahrvarāz.

The Ispahbudhān and the Sasanians

Before we proceed with the identification of other seals, which further substantiate the confederacy of other Parthian dynastic families besides the Mihrāns and the Ispahbudhān with the Sasanian monarchy after Khusrow I’s reforms, a few words must be said about the tremendous power of the Ispahbudhān family. The Parthian Ispahbudhān family was traditionally closely related to the Sasanian kings. At least since the time of Qubād—but most probably from early on in Sasanian history—there seems to have been a tradition according to which one of the daughters and/or sisters of the senior branch of the Ispahbudhān family would marry the incumbent Sasanian Prince. Procopius informs us of Qubād’s marriage into the Ispahbudhān family. In his desire to have Khusrow I Nowshirvān, rather than any other of his offspring, succeed him, Qubād schemed to have Khusrow I “be made the adopted son of the emperor Justinus.”

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554Seals 2d/1 and 2d/2. Contra Gyselen, who, in line with her previous argument, has identified the seals of Pīrag, as belonging to the reign of Khusrow I. Gyselen 2001a, pp. 40–41.
555Gyselen 2001a, pp. 22–23.
556See respectively §2.7.4 and §2.7.6 below.
557As we have seen on page 26, in the tradition given by Moses Khorenats’i, Koshm, the daughter of the Arsacid king Phraat IV, “married the general of all the Aryans who had been appointed by her father . . . [with the result that her progenies’ name became] Aspahapat Pahlav, taking this name from the principality of her husband.” Khorenats’i 1978, p. 166. That the Sasanians could have been following the practice of the Achaemenids and taking wives either among their own family or from those of the six other great noble houses is accepted by Christensen, who cites, besides the mother of Khusrow II (for which see page 132), a son of a sister of Khusrow II, “who carries the name Mihran” as evidence of this practice (see footnote 1137). For this and for further references to the Ispahbudhān family see Christensen 1944, pp. 109–110, n. 2 and p. 104, respectively. See also our discussion in §3.3.1.
558These were Zames (i.e., Jāmāsp) (497–499) and Caoses (i.e., Kayūs), for whom see §4.1.1.
thereby enlisting the support of the Byzantines if necessary.\footnote{559} For Qubād, Procopius maintains, “loved Khusrow I, who was born to him by the sister of Aspebedes, exceedingly.”\footnote{560} Both of the Khusrows, therefore, had direct Ispahbudhān lineage, their fathers Qubād and Hormozd IV having married into the family. No wonder Dinawari calls the Ispahbudhān family the “brothers of the Sasanians and their partners [in rule].”\footnote{561}

Throughout Qubād’s reign, the Parthian dynast Aspebedes of the Ispahbudhān family was one of the paramount figures of the king’s court. He arranged the peace treaty of 506 with the Byzantines.\footnote{562} And together with Mermores (Shāpūr Rāzī)\footnote{563} and Chanaranges (Ādharulbād) of the Kanārangiyn family,\footnote{564} he played a central role in the siege of the important city of Amida, contested between the Byzantines and the Sasanians in late antiquity.\footnote{565} Like their relationship with other Parthian dynastic families, however, the connection of the Sasanians with the Ispahbudhān was also marked by periods of tremendous belligerency.

*The nobility’s plot against Khusrow I*

Early in Khusrow I’s reign, Aspebedes joined a group of other discontented dynasts plotting to bring Qubād, a child of Khusrow I’s brother Jāmāsp (Procopius’ Zames) to power. Having discovered the plot, Khusrow I killed Jāmāsp, together with the rest of his brothers and their offspring as well as “all the Persian notables who had either begun or taken part in any way in the plot against him. Among these was Aspebedes, the brother of Khusrow I’s mother.”\footnote{566} In fact, the plot that Procopius mentions seems to have been nothing short of yet another Parthian dynastic struggle for the control of the throne of the Sasanians, for it was in vexation over Khusrow I’s “unruly turn of mind” and his strange “fond[ness] of innovation” that Aspebedes had joined other discontented dynasts and strove for dethroning Khusrow I from Sasanian kingship.\footnote{567} In this plot, Aspebedes was joined by yet another extremely powerful Parthian dynast, the Chanaranges, the Kanārangiyn Ādharulbād, who had secretly raised Jāmāsp’s son Qubād at his court in Khurāsān.\footnote{568} As a result of this plot, therefore, Khusrow I killed Aspebedes.

\footnote{559}{According to Procopius, Qubād was certain that “the Persians [would] … make some attempt to overthrow his house as soon as he [had] ended his life, … (He) was [also] certain that he would not pass on the kingdom to any one of his sons without opposition.” Procopius 1914, pp. 83–84. Emphasis mine.}
\footnote{560}{Procopius 1914, pp. 83–84. This Aspebedes is presumably the father (or grandfather) of Sebeos’ Asparapet, where again the title is substituted in the sources for his actual name.}
\footnote{561}{Dinawari 1967, p. 111, Dinawari 1960, p. 102.}
\footnote{562}{Procopius 1914, p. 77.}
\footnote{563}{See §2.4.4.}
\footnote{564}{For the Kanārangiyn family, see page 266ff. For the name, see footnote 1545.}
\footnote{565}{Procopius 1914, p. 195. Joshua the Stylite 2000, pp. 60–61, n. 292 especially. For Amida, see footnote 305.}
\footnote{566}{Procopius 1914, p. 211. Emphasis added.}
\footnote{567}{Procopius 1914, pp. xxiii, 4–10, 211.}
\footnote{568}{Procopius 1914, p. 211. For a more detailed account, see page 266ff below.}
Khusrow I was not the only Sasanian king to kill a close relative from the powerful Ispahbudhan family. As we have mentioned and will further discuss, Hormozd IV also killed his father-in-law, the great Asparapet, in the course of his purge of Parthian magnates. Likewise, as we shall see shortly, Khusrow II killed his uncles Vinduyih and Vistahm of the Ispahbudhan family—the sons of the great Asparapet—to whom he owned his very kingship. The rivalry between the Sasanians and the Ispahbudhan family was perhaps the most contentious of all the relationships of the Sasanians with the Parthian dynastic families, and we shall have occasion to see the tremendous implications of this. Having highlighted the role of the Mihran and the Ispahbudhan families in the military and civil administration of Khusrow I, we can now turn to the saga of the Kârins.

2.5.6 The Kârins

According to Dinawari and the Nihayat, in the final stages of the Mihranid Bahram-i Chubin’s rebellion against Hormozd IV and Khusrow II,\(^{570}\) when he was finally forced to flee east to Khurasan, Bahram-i Chubin and his forces were intercepted by their age old enemies, the Kârins.\(^{571}\) According to both narratives, in Qumis,\(^{572}\) Bahram-i Chubin was prevented from proceeding further east by one Kârin, the governor of Khurasan,\(^{573}\) who according to both accounts, was over hundred years old, and therefore sent his son to confront Bahram-i Chubin.\(^{574}\) In Khurasan, according to Dinawari, the Kârins were in charge of “war and peace, collecting taxation and the administration” of the region. Qumis and Gurgan were also part of the Kârins’ governorship.\(^{575}\) Both sources assert that the Kârins were appointed the governorship, spahbedi, of the region by Khusrow I Nowshirvan,\(^{576}\) and continued to hold this position during the reign of

\(^{569}\) See page 132 below.

\(^{570}\) For Bahram-i Chubin’s rebellion during this period see §2.6.3 and §6.1 below.


\(^{572}\) The province of Qumis was located to the south of the Caspian Sea, with Rayy and Khurasan forming its western and eastern boundaries respectively. Its main city, also called Qumis, and known as Hecatompylos (the city of hundred gates) by the classical authors, was one of the ancient capitals of the Arsacids. One of its eastern-most cities was called Bistam, a name which might hark back to its association with the Ispahbudhan Vistahm. Also see Bosworth, C.E., ‘Qumis’, in P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, and W.P. Heinrichs (eds.), Encyclopaedia of Islam, Leiden, 2007b (Bosworth 2007b).

\(^{573}\) Nihayat obviously exaggerates by maintaining that Kârin was the governor of Khurasan up to the borders of Byzantium. Nihayat 1996, p. 380.

\(^{574}\) In this crucial episode, Kârin’s son was killed, his army scattered, and Kârin himself retreated eventually to Qumis. Nihayat 1996, p. 380, Dinawari 1960, p. 94, Dinawari 1967, p. 103.

\(^{575}\) Dinawari 1967, pp. 102–103, Dinawari 1960, p. 94.

Hormozd IV.\(^{577}\) In his short term of usurping kingship, even Bahram-i Chubin (590–591) had confirmed their rule over the region.\(^{578}\)

We recall that during Qubad’s rule the power of the Karinid Sukhrā had reached such heights that the king was forced to solicit the help of the Mihrans to undermine and defeat him.\(^{579}\) What happened to the Karins after this can be reconstructed with the aid of Ibn Isfandiyār’s \(\text{Tārikh-i \ Ṭabaristān}\) and the seals. Although the Karins appear in Ibn Isfandiyār’s narrative in the garb of an anecdotal story,\(^{580}\) that betrays the circulation of popular traditions surrounding them, it is quite remarkable, in fact, that the historicity of the germ of this story can now be substantiated in reference to our sigillographic evidence.

According to the \(\text{Tārikh-i \ Ṭabaristān}\), after his fall from absolutist power, Sukhrā fled to Ṭabaristān with his nine sons.\(^{581}\) We recall that according to Ferdowsi, Sukhrā was killed.\(^{582}\) His reappearance in Ṭabaristān in the \(\text{Tārikh-i \ Ṭabaristān}\), therefore, must be excused on account of the anecdotal story in which it is garbed and which is meant to underline the Karins’ appointment over Ṭabaristān by Khosrow I. When Qubad died, however, Khosrow I (531–579) regretted his father’s treatment of the Karins and sought to reincorporate them into his administration.\(^{583}\) According to Ibn Isfandiyār’s narrative, the Karins heard about Khosrow I’s intentions and came with their army \textit{clad in green},\(^{584}\) and aided the king in his war against the Khāqān of the Turks.\(^{585}\) In return for their aid, Khosrow I took measures the effects of which clarify part of the subsequent history of Ṭabaristān\(^{586}\) and Khurāsān. According to Ibn Isfandiyār, Khosrow I gave control of Zābulistān to Zarmīhr, the eldest son of the late Sukhrā.\(^{587}\) One Karin, apparently a younger son, received parts of


\(^{579}\) See §2.4.2 and §2.4.3.

\(^{580}\) See also page 380.


\(^{582}\) See footnote 400.


\(^{584}\) For the significance of the color green and for the details of this episode, see page 380 below.


\(^{586}\) See §4.2 below.


\(^{588}\) Note that the control of Zarmīhr over Zābulistān might explain the revolt of the Karins in the Qūhistān and Nishāpūr regions in 654, shortly after the Arab conquest of Khurāsān, for which see page 277 below. Ferdowsi mentions a Dādburzin, who was another son of Sukhrā, as being in control of Zābulistān during Bahram V Gür’s reign. The list of nobles that Ferdowsi provides, here, however, is most probably affected by the \textit{Ctesian} method (see footnote 609 below). Ferdowsi 1935, p. 2196. Besides a Burzmihr, Thā‘alib also mentions a Bahram Adharmahān as one of the grandees of Khosrow I’s administration (for more on this figure, see §2.6.1). Thā‘alib 1900, p. 638, Thā‘alib 1989, p. 411.
For our future purposes, it is important to note that included in this region were Vand Omīd Kūh, Amul, Lafūr, and Farīm, the latter of which was called Kūh-i Kārin.589 Khusrow I followed this Kārin to Ṭabaristān, sojourned for a while in Tammisha, and gave parts of other territories to other rulers.590 Kārin was called the isfahbudh591 or spāhbed of Ṭabaristān.592

The sigillographic evidence corroborates the narratives of Dinawarī and the Nihāyat: the Kārins had indeed been installed as the spāhbeds of the east, which included not only Khurāsān but also parts of Ṭabaristān, during the reign of Khusrow I Nowshirvān. In his reconstructed family tree of the families ruling in Gilān and Ṭabaristān, which we will discuss in Chapter 4, the late Ferdinand Justi includes a genealogical table for the Kārins.593 Here he gives Sukhrā’s sons as Zarmihr, whom he dates to 537–558, and Kārin. Of Zarmihr’s five sons, one is given as Dādmīhr, obviously a shortened version of Dādburzmihr.594 Justi’s reconstruction of Dādmīhr’s identity, whom he dates to 558–575 CE,595 is corroborated by other literary sources besides the one he cites. Among the three figures whom Ferdowsī lists as having high positions in Khusrow I’s administration, figures who were later murdered by Hormozd IV as a result of this,596 there was one Burzmihr. This Burzmihr is already listed among the sons of Sukhrā during Qubād’s reign. According to Thāʾalibī, when Qubād returned from the campaigns against the Hephthalites with a large army, the elite, the mōbads, as well as Jāmāsp597 decided to avert another civil war and accept Qubād as king on condition that he would not harm either Jāmāsp or any of the elite. Qubād accepted and appointed Burzmihr, whom Thāʾalibī identifies as the son of Sukhrā, as his minister and remunerated him for his services. The Parthian dynast Burzmihr encouraged Qubād to avert taxation on fruits and grain from the peasantry.598 Motlagh, following Justi, identifies this figure with the legendary wise vizier Bozorg-Mehr of Khusrow I.599 We can now add that this illustrious figure of Islamic wisdom literature was in fact a Kārin; this is affirmed explicitly by Ferdowsī.600 Sigillographic evidence further confirms the information provided by Dinawarī, Nihāyat, Ferdowsī, and Justi. We now

590Ibn Isfandīyār 1941, p. 152.
591Isfahbudh is the Arabicized version of the Middle Persian term spāhbed or ispahbud.
592Ibn Isfandīyār 1941, p. 151.
593Justi 1895, p. 430.
594Justi 1895, p. 75. See also §2.6.2.
595Justi 1895, p. 75.
596See the beginning of §2.6.
597See §4.3.1 below.
possess seals from the Kārinid Dādmihr (Dādburzmihr, Burzmihr) as the spāhbed of Khurāsān during the rule of Khusrow I. Two seals in fact are in Gyselen’s collection, one maintaining Dādburzmihr as the ērân-spāhbed of the side of the east and another personal seal of the same figure. There is no doubt that the Dādburzmihr of the seals is the same figure as the Dādmihr of Justi and the Burzmihr of Ferdowsī, the two latter names being the shortened versions of the name as it appears on the seals. In both seals, moreover, Dādburzmihr insists on his Parthian genealogy by claiming to be a Parthian aspbed. Both seals, furthermore, have the added theophoric dimension of claiming the holder as taking refuge in the Burzīn Mihr fire of Khurāsān, thus once again confirming the local dimensions of the agnatic spiritual beliefs. There is, therefore, no doubt: the Kārins were appointed as spāhbeds of the side of Khurāsān (kūst-i khwarāsān) by Khusrow I Nowshīrvān in the course of the administrative/military reforms that he implemented when dividing his realm into four quarters. The novelty in Khusrow I’s reforms, was that, in order to establish control over the Parthian dynastic families in their extensive traditional homelands, he apparently assigned some of them to territories outside their ancestral domains, thus engendering further antagonism among the Parthian dynastic families and increasing the maneuverability of the monarchy vis-à-vis these. For Khurāsān, we recall, was the traditional homeland of the Ispahbudhān family and not that of the Kārins, whose ancestral land seems to have been Nihāvand. This then also explains Ibn Isfandiyār’s contention that in the course of his reforms Khusrow I partitioned the territories, for he must have done this to further divide the Parthian dynastic families. This certainly was the case with the Ispahbudhān and the Kārin families. The unfortunate results of this will become apparent in one of the most crucial junctures of Sasanian history, the Arab conquest of Khurāsān in the mid-seventh century.

We can now sum up the identifications proposed thus far as follows. In the course of the reforms that Khusrow I implemented, the Parthian families continued their cooperation with the Sasanian king. The Kārins were assigned as the spāhbeds of the east (kūst-i khwarāsān), the Ispahbudhān as the spāhbeds of the west (kūst-i khwarbarān), and the Mihrāns as the spāhbeds of the quarter

601 Gyselen 2001a, seal 1b, p. 36.
602 Gyselen 2001a, seal A, p. 36. In the Hermitage Museum in St. Petersburg, there is also a silver bowl with the inscription “Dādburzmihr, son of Farrokhān from the Gilsarān(?) family, spāhbed of the east;” see Khurshudian 1998, p. 153. How this can be reconciled with our gentilitial analysis requires further study. Another seal that most likely belongs to the same figure is the seal of a driyōšān jādaggūr ud dādvar (jādīnyaḥ, see page 197) with the inscription “Dādburzmihr, aspbed-i pahlav, [seeking] protection in the Exalted”, depicting two facing winged horses as on the personal seal of Dādburzmihr. Gyselen 1989, p. 159.
603 Gyselen 2001a, seals, 1b and A, pp. 36 and 46. For the Burzīn Mihr fire, see page 364 below.
604 We will elaborate on this point as we proceed.
605 Sebeos 1999, p. 42.
606 See for instance our discussion on page 243ff below.
607 See also page 295 below.
608 See §3.4.7 below, especially page 271ff.
of the north (kūst-i ādurbādagān). Therefore, not much seems to have changed in the dynamics between the Sasanians and the Parthian dynastic families even after the presumed Mazdakite uprising and Khusrow I Nowshirvān’s reform. By now, we must have also partially explicited the falsity of the scenarios about the presumed consequences of the Mazdakite uprising: even if there was any such mass uprising, it barely affected the fortunes of the Parthian dynastic families, or, as we shall shortly see, the dynamics of their relationship with the Sasanian monarchy.

Kai Khusrow’s army
This is corroborated by Ferdowsī’s description of Kai Khusrow’s battle against Afrāsiyāb, a classic example of the anachronistic editing that took place during the reign of the Sasanians, in all likelihood by the Parthian dynastic families. The late Shahbazi labeled this use of anachronism as the Ctesian method. According to Shahbazi, in this battle that is said to have taken place around Fārāb near Dihistān in the east, Ferdowsī gives a detailed description of the battle formation of Kai Khusrow’s army together with a list of names, most of which “are unfamiliar in Firdausī’s narrative of Kai Xusrāu’s reign.” Included in the army, are, moreover, foreign contingents such as the Yemenite, Roman, Moorish, and Caucasian units whose incorporation in the ranks of the army of the mythic king Kai Khusrow is bewildering. Shahbazi concludes, therefore, that the mention of these units as well as the detailed and careful description of the battle proves not only that Ferdowsī resorted to a “written record which, necessarily, related to the Sasanian army,” but also that the document must have been describing the battle of Khusrow I Nowshirvān against the Hephthalites.

What Shahbazi did not highlight, however, is that the ranks of Kai Khusrow’s army were populated with the Parthian dynasts thus far discussed. To start with, one Shēdōsh was fighting together with the men of Barda in Arrān and of Ardabil in Azarbāyjān. The whole contingent was put under the command of one Gūdarz the Karīn, who led Kai Khusrow’s left flank. It is almost certain that this Shēdōsh was none other than Sēd-hōsh of the Mihrān family, the ērān-spāḥbed of the side of the north form the seals. The Mihrāns,
with their home base in the quarter of the north, a quarter which included parts of Azarbâyjân, and having a long connection with Armenia, were therefore naturally in charge of the contingent of Barda’a and Ardabil. Included in the left flank was yet another familiar figure of Khusrow I’s establishment, one Farâburz. In all probability, Farâburz was none other than the Mîhrânid Phabrizus of Procopius, who, together with his brother Ízadgushasp (Procopius’ Isdigousnas) was directly involved in Khusrow I’s wars against the Byzantines.\textsuperscript{615} One Nastûh, the son of the Mîhrânid Mîhrânsîtâd of Khusrow I’s administration,\textsuperscript{616} also participated in this same left flank. Participating in the rear lines was also a certain Gorgên Mîlâd who appeared together “with men of Rey.”\textsuperscript{617} As we already mentioned, this Gorgên Mîlâd was probably the same Gorgôn of the seals, called Gołon Mîhrân in Sebeos.\textsuperscript{618} In other words, in the figures of Gorgên Mîlâd and Shêdôsh we have most probably confirmed the identities of the two spâhbeds of the northern quarter during the reign of Khusrow I Nowshîrvân, Gorgôn and Şêd-hôsh.\textsuperscript{619} Besides being the ērân-spâhbed of the side of the north, Şêd-hôsh is called on his seals the aspbed (leader of the cavalry) of the empire. Appropriately, therefore, in the army formation of Kai Khusrow, Shêdôsh appeared in the left wing, under the command of Gûdarz the Kârin.

We cannot ascertain why the name of this Kârin is given as Gûdarz. There are two possibilities. This Gûdarz may be one of the nine sons of Sukhrâ, some of whose names have been lost in our historical records, or Ferdowsî can be simply following through his Ctesian method, where the real name of the historical Kârinid figure, the one who was appointed as the spâhbed of the east, is supplemented by the name of a mythic ancestor of the house. In the course of restructuring his realm, Khusrow I, we further recall, had given Tâbaristân and Zabulistân to the sons of the Kârinid Sukhrâ. An army of Zâbulistân in fact did appear in Kai Khusrow’s battle formation under the command of one Rustam, who is put in charge of the right wing. In this same right wing were also the “Caucasian mercenaries under Gêv the Kâren.”\textsuperscript{620} Two other Kârins, Bîzhân and Rahâm, also participated in the rear lines.\textsuperscript{621} There is every reason to suppose that Tûs, the commander of the right flank, who carried the Imperial banner, is a representation of the Asparapet of Sebeos, the spâhbed of the western quarter, the father of Vistâhm and Vindûyih. His authority over the armies of Khuzistân and Yemen makes sense, as he was the spâhbed of the

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\textsuperscript{615} See page 102.
\textsuperscript{616} See page 103.
\textsuperscript{617} Shahbazi 1990, p. 213.
\textsuperscript{618} Gyselen 2001a, p. 44, seal 4a. See our discussion on page 103.
\textsuperscript{619} Gyselen 2001a, pp. 44–45, seals 4a and 4b respectively.
\textsuperscript{620} Shahbazi 1990, p. 213.
\textsuperscript{621} Shahbazi 1990, p. 213.
Finally, it is rather certain that in Rustam, who was put in command of the right wing, we are actually dealing with an agnate of the Süren family, whose exploits replicate those of the mythic character Rustam.

The identity of so many of these figures with those contained in our Armenian, Greek, and Persian accounts supports Shahbazi's assertion as to the use of Ctesian method and the substitution of figures from the reign of Khusrow I to that of the semi-legendary king Kai Khusrow. Moreover, it not only substantiates the reliability of Ferdowsi but also the contention of the present study. For, even if none of the postulates as to the identity of these figures with actual historical figures of Khusrow I's reign were to be admitted—quite unlikely in view of the overwhelming nature of the evidence—the list of the Mihrãns, the Kãrins, and possibly the Ispahbudhân and the Sürens in Kai Khusrow's army proves that the superimposition in question in fact replicates not only the rule of Khusrow I Nowshirvân but also that of all the dynastic figures participating in the defense and administration of his realm. Returning to our narrative, however, enables us to identify even more of the figures appearing on the seals as members of these same Parthian dynastic families.

### 2.6 Hormozd IV / the Mihrãns

For all the fanfare surrounding Khusrow I’s reforms, the one Sasanian monarch who actually attempted to do away with major Parthian dynastic families in a systematic manner, as we have already briefly mentioned, was Hormozd IV (579–590). His actions, as we shall see, had dire results: they led to the unprecedented rebellions of two Parthian dynasts, the Mihrãnid Bãrãm-i Chûbin and the Ispahbudhân Vistãhm. According to Tabari, Hormozd IV had “benevolence toward the weak and destitute, but he attacked the power of the nobles, so that they showed themselves hostile and hated him, exactly as he in turn hated them.”

Both Tabari and Ibn Balkhi relate that Hormozd IV removed the nobles from his court and killed “13,600 [!] men from the religious classes and from those of good family and noble birth.” It is Ferdowsi, however, who actually provides us with substantive information on some of the leading members of the nobility decimated by Hormozd IV. At the beginning of this narrative, Ferdowsi specifically informs us that Hormozd IV wanted to do away with the elite that had obtained privileged positions in the court of his father Khusrow I Nowshirvân and had become immune from harm therein.

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**Footnotes:**

622 See page 105ff. In this contingent, Ferdowsi also mentions one Tukhãr, which is a title rather than a name; see footnote 825.


Hormozd IV is portrayed as being preoccupied with the welfare of the poor and the peasantry. Significantly, he warned those with kingly pretensions (shāhvash) and those in search oftreasuries, that they would find their demise if they were to pursue accumulation of wealth. Immediately afterwards Ferdowsi provides us with concretenformation, singling out three dynasts whom Hormozd IV murdered. The identity of these can be compared against our recent sigillographic evidence.

The three magnates against whom Hormozd IV’s wrath was especially directed were İzadgushasp, Simâh-i Burzîn, and Bahram-i Mâh Adam. One by one, these high dignitaries of Khusrow I’s administration were done away with by Hormozd IV. We have already become quite familiar with the Mihrânîd İzadgushasp. He is identified by Ferdowsî as a vizier and dabîr to Khusrow I. One of the first casualties of Hormozd IV’s wrath was this İzadgushasp, who, according to a detailed narrative in the Shâhnâma, was first imprisoned and then killed by Hormozd IV.

2.6.1 Bahram-i Mâh Adam

The fate of two other leading feudal figures under Hormozd IV’s administration is even more revealing, for here we can actually match the identity of those singled out by Ferdowsî with the figures mentioned on the recently discovered seals. This identification is beyond any doubt at least for one of these figures.

626Ferdowsî 1971, vol. VIII, p. 318, Ferdowsî 1935, p. 2569:

627Ferdowsî 1971, vol. VIII, p. 319:

628See page 102.

629Also Dinawarî 1960, p. 84, Dinawarî 1967, p. 89.

630Bosworth maintains that this İzadgushasp is the same figure who later appears among the supporters of Bahram-i Chûbin. If Ferdowsi’s detailed narrative about the murder of İzadgushasp is to be trusted—there is no reason why it should not be—and considering that Ferdowsi, in fact, counts a certain İzadgushasp among the supporters of Bahram-i Chûbin—around the role of whom in Bahram-i Chûbin’s army there is likewise a detailed narrative—Bosworth’s identification of the two figures is not warranted. Tabari 1999, p. 299, n. 703. Justi, in fact, appropriately separates the two figures in this instance. Justi 1895, p. 149, under Yazdânsasp, numbers 4 and 5, and p. 429.
Bahrām-i Māh Ādhar. For among Gyselen’s collection, there are two seals that identify the bearer as Wahrām, son of Adurmāh, seals 2a and 2b. According to Gyselen, one belongs to the reign of Khusrow I and the other to that of Hormozd IV.\(^631\) Both of these identifications of Gyselen are correct. There is no doubt that Ferdowsī’s figure Bahrām-i Māh Ādhar\(^632\) is the same personage whose seals have been recently discovered. This Bahrām, who is identified in both of the seals as the spāḥbed of the south (kūst-i nēmrōz) is further identified with a number of epithets. For the reign of Khusrow I, he bears the title “chief of . . . and eunuch.”\(^633\) For that of Hormozd IV, his epithet is “chief of . . . and eunuch, hazāruft of the empire.”\(^634\) Following Ferdowsī’s narrative, it may therefore be supposed that at the inception of Hormozd IV’s reign, Bahrām-i Māh Ādhar was in fact maintained and promoted in his administration. Shortly thereafter, under unclear circumstances that seemed to have led to a change of policy under Hormozd IV, this leading figure of Khusrow I’s administration was done away with.\(^635\) The problem with Bahrām-i Māh Ādhar’s identity, however, is that in our present state of knowledge, and unlike the Mihrānid Īzadgushasp, we cannot clearly establish his gentilitial background. If there is any validity to Justi’s claim about the possible Sasanian lineage of this figure, and considering the fact that there might have been a greater participation of the nobility of Persis in the quarter of the south, then Bahrām-i Māh Ādhar was probably a Pārsīg. This leaves us with the third figure listed by Ferdowsī, that of Simāh-i Burzin.

### 2.6.2 Simāh-i Burzin Kārin

As we have seen, there are two seals which belong to the spāḥbeds of the east. We have already become familiar with one, that of Dād-Burz-Mihr, the Parthian aspbed of the Kārin. He was one of the sons of the Kārinid Sukhrā whom Khusrow I had appointed spāḥbed of the east (kūst-i khwarāsān) and whom Hormozd IV retained for a while in this capacity.\(^637\) The other seal identifies yet another

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\(^631\) Gyselen 2001a, pp. 37–38, seals 2a, 2b.


\(^633\) Gyselen 2001a, p. 37, seal 2a.

\(^634\) Gyselen 2001a, p. 38, seal 2b.

\(^635\) Justi cites him as being mentioned also by Theophanes. Justi identifies this figure as the mōbad of Hormozd IV’s reign. Under this same entry, however, he cites a seal of this Bahram in which he is identified as “Bahrām, son of Aturmhān, descended from gods.” Here, Justi questions, in brackets, whether this is meant to signify that he is a Sasanian. Justi 1895, p. 362, numbers 21 and 22, respectively. Ferdowsī 1935, p. 2578, Ferdowsī 1971, vol. VIII, pp. 319–320. Clearly, as the evidence of the seals makes it apparent, Justi’s identification of this figure as a mōbad is not warranted. That a seal from him already exists in which he claims descent from gods, however, is revealing, and might indeed point to a close relation between this figure and the Sasanians.

\(^636\) See previous footnote.

\(^637\) See page 114ff.
spāhbed assigned to the east for the reign of Hormozd IV, one Chihr Burzīn. This latter figure might be identical with a personage called Simāh-i Burzīn in the Shāhnāma. Chihr Burzīn, the literal translation of which is “having the face of Burzīn [fire],” is the exact equivalent of Simāh-i Burzīn, where chihr and simāh are identical in meaning. Using poetic license, one may postulate, therefore, that Ferdowsī substituted the name of Chihr Burzīn with that of Simāh-i Burzīn for the purposes of rhyme and rhythm, a practice in which the poet regularly indulges. In Ferdowsī’s narrative, Simāh-i Burzīn is depicted as one of the high elite of the reign of Khusrow I Nowshīrvān, who together with Bahram-i Māh Ādhar and Izadgushasp were among the nobility that were consulted by Khusrow I for choosing a successor. As Ferdowsī and Thaʿalibī’s accounts inform us, Hormozd IV began his onslaught on the Parthian dynastic nobility, partly through the age old mechanism available to the Sasanians: the instigation of one dynastic family against another. Ferdowsī informs us that in order to undermine the power of the dynastic factions of his realm, Hormozd IV instigated Bahram-i Māh Ādhar, the spāhbed of the quarter of the south (kūst-i nemrōz) during Khusrow I (seal 2a), as well as his own reign (seal 2b), against Simāh-i Burzīn, that is, if our identification is correct, against Khusrow I’s spāhbed Chihr Burzīn (seal 1a). In a private correspondence between the two powerful figures of Hormozd IV’s realm, and in response to Simāh-i Burzīn’s astonishment at the sudden change of demeanor of Bahram-i Māh Ādhar against him, the latter explained that Simāh-i Burzīn himself was to be held responsible for the turn of events, for he belonged to the faction that had voted for Hormozd IV’s kingship to begin with.

The dynastic background of Simāh-i Burzīn can only be conjectured. If even after Khusrow I’s reforms important offices of the realm, in this case the office of spāhbed, remained hereditary, and if Dād-Burz-Mihr, the Parthian aspbed (aspbed i pahlaw) and spāhbed of the east during Hormozd IV’s reign (seal 1b) is none other than the Kārīnī Dādmihr, then it might be conjectured that Simāh-i Burzīn or Chihr Burzīn, the spāhbed of the east during Khusrow I’s reign, also belonged to the Kārīn family. In fact, the Kārins continued to maintain the spāhbedi of the east until after Bahram-i Chūbin’s rebellion. As we have argued, the tradition of giving the spāhbedi of the east to the Kārins in fact began with the rule of Khusrow I. When Hormozd IV instigated Bahram-i Māh Ādhar, the spāhbed of the quarter of the south (kūst-i nemrōz) during his father’s reign, against Simāh-i Burzīn, or Chihr Burzīn, the spāhbed of the east during Khusrow I’s reign, therefore, he was instigating one leading dynastic agnate, Bahram-i Māh Ādhar, whose agnatic affiliation is not clear, against

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638 Gyselen 2001a, pp. 37–38, seals 1a, 1b.
639 See also our discussion of Bahram-i Chūbin’s epithet on page 399.
642 Gyselen 2001a, seal 1b, p. 36 and seal A, p. 46. See our argument on page 114ff.
643 For the details of this see the narrative of Bahram-i Chūbin in §2.6.3 below.
another leading dynastic figure, who belonged to the house of the Kārins, Simāh-i Burzin. Having done so, however, Hormozd IV could not take away the spāḥbedi of the east from the Kārīn family. For, as we have seen, the spāḥbed that he ended up assigning in the quarter of the east, Đād-Burz-Mihr (Đādmihr), the Parthian aspbed of seal 1b, was still a Kārīnid.

At any rate, what is significant for the purposes of the present discussion is that ultimately both Bahrām-i Māh Adhar as well as the Kārīnid Simāh-i Burzin were killed by Hormozd IV,644 and joined the fate of the Mihrānid Ḵazdgushasp as the leading dynastic figures of Khusrow I’s reign who were murdered by Hormozd IV.645 But that is not all. All our sources, including Sebeos,646 maintain that the father of Vindūyiḥ and Vistāḥm, Asparapet, the Parthian aspet of the Ispahbudhān family, of whom we have heard in detail,647 the father-in-law of Hormozd IV and the grandfather of Khusrow II, was also murdered during Hormozd IV’s purge of magnates. Such slaughter of leading agnates of Parthian families belonging to different dynastic houses was probably unprecedented in Sasanian history. That this decimation could not have been total and the king nevertheless was forced to continue to rely on the powers of the nobility is evidenced not only by Hormozd IV’s retention of the Ispahbudhān Vindūyiḥ and Vistāḥm in his administration and the tremendous power base of these, as we shall see, but also by the continued reliance of the king on the power of the Mihrāns and the Kārins. The ultimate treatment of these in the hands of Hormozd IV and his son, Khusrow II, however, commenced the unprecedented upheavals that led the Parthian dynastic families to question the very legitimacy of the Sasanians for kingship. We are referring here to the revolts of Bahrām-i Chūbīn of the Mihrān family and that of Vistāḥm of the Ispahbudhān family. The Parthian confederacy with the Sasanians was for the first time violently disrupted through the rebellion of Bahrām-i Chūbīn.

### 2.6.3 Bahrām-i Chūbīn Mihrān

Bahrām-i Chūbīn’s rebellion was unlike any other in Sasanian history. Except perhaps in Armenia, and not since the last Parthian king, Ardavān, was any Parthian dynast audacious enough to question the very legitimacy of Sasanian kingship. The monarchy might be dominated, directed, abused, and possibly mocked by the Parthian dynastic families. But the tradition had been established: even an infant Sasanian was deemed to be more legitimate for kingship—or so at least the Xᵛᵛadāy-Nāmag tradition would have us believe—than any member of the Parthian nobility, at least formally. As far as the Parthian dynastic families were concerned, the name of the game was confederacy. Bahrām-i Chūbīn’s rebellion changed most of this. As with the rise of the Parthians from the perspective of the Sasanians, Bahrām-i Chūbīn’s rebellion was also

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645 Ferdowsī 1935, p. 2570; see also footnote 627.
647 See §2.5.5.
attended by a religious dichotomy,\textsuperscript{648} that of Parthava versus Persīš, and a powerful messianic fervor. All the narratives of the rebellion in the literary sources are infused with millennial motifs. We shall deal with the religious dimensions of Bahrām-i Chūbīn’s rebellion below. For now, however, we concern ourselves only with the sociopolitical dimensions of his rebellion.\textsuperscript{649}

**Prognostication of Hormozd IV’s demise**

According to the narratives at our disposal, some years into his reign, previously prognosticated to be, significantly, the messianic number twelve, Hormozd IV found his realm attacked by the Turks from the east, the Byzantines from the west, the Khazars from the northwestern Caspian region, and the Arabs from the west.\textsuperscript{650} Significantly, it was Bahrām-i Ādhar-mahān (Bahrām-i Māh Ādhar) who had informed Hormozd IV that the apocalypse would soon arrive and that Hormozd IV was to be blamed for it on account of his injustice.\textsuperscript{651} Hormozd IV had become unjust because of the crimes that he had committed against the grandees of his realm, turning against custom and tradition (āvin o kīsh).\textsuperscript{652} For the first time in Sasanian history, Hormozd IV had unleashed an all-out attack against almost every single leading agnate of the Parthian and other dynastic families. Among the measures taken by Hormozd IV was a further reduction of the size of their cavalry, and a decrease in the army’s pay.\textsuperscript{653} Although Hormozd IV’s policies were in a sense the continuation of reforms inaugurated by Khusrow I, especially his taxation policies, his systematic onslaught on the Parthian dynastic families was of such intensity that in Bahrām-i Chūbīn’s rebellion, the theme of Parthian claim to rule was voiced for the first time in Sasanian history. While there continued to be dissension in their ranks, and while they finally lost as a result of it, at the inception of Bahrām-i Chūbīn’s rebellion, a powerful Parthian alliance was formed. It is for this reason that the theme of Sasanian–Parthian rivalry infuses not only the Persian and Arabic accounts of Bahrām-i Chūbīn, but also that of the western sources that were witness to its actual unfolding.

As already mentioned, the first episode of millennial prognostication is communicated to Hormozd IV by his and his father’s spābed of the south, Bahrām-i Adhar Mahān (Bahrām-i Māh Adhar), or, as he appears on the seals,
Wahrām, son of Ādurmāh, the hazārfūt. Recognizing his imminent doom, Bahrām-i Māh Adhar decided to make life unbearable thenceforth for the Sasanian king, and forecasted the demise of the king in twelve years. But the prognostication did not stop here. It was reiterated once more, this time, significantly, from the mouth of the Parthian Mihrāns. When the enemy attacked from all sides, the Mihrānid Nastūh, the son of Mihrānṣītād, informed the king that his father’s knowledge would be of use to the king. Hormozd IV then sent for Mihrānṣītād, who had taken up seclusion in Rayy, the traditional home-base of the Mihrāns, occupying himself, significantly, with Zand and the Avestā. When Mihrānṣītād was summoned to the king’s court, he first narrated for Hormozd IV, presumably out of fear, his own central role in choosing the king’s mother, the daughter of the Turkish Khāqān, and then informed Hormozd IV that the astrologers who had read the stars for the Khāqān had also forecasted that when the Turks attacked Iran, the savior of Hormozd IV’s throne would be a certain Bahrām-i Chūbin of Pahlav ancestry. Mihrānṣītād then advised Hormozd IV to search and summon Bahrām-i Chūbin to his court. According to Ferdowsī, having given this prognostication and introduced Bahrām-i Chūbin’s narrative, the aged Mihrānṣītād died instantly. As Ferdowsī’s poetic rendition informs us, this prompted Hormozd IV to avail himself of the services of the Parthian Mihrānid dynast Bahrām-i Chūbin, who in the course of his military campaigns in the west and the east in fact did help Hormozd IV sustain his kingship.

654 Gyselen 2001a, pp. 37–38, seals 2a and 2b, respectively.
655 While in prison Bahrām-i Māh Adhar sent a message to Hormozd IV that he should avail himself of a black box, left for posterity by Khusrow I Nowshīrvān, and that he should read the message contained therein, written on a white silk cloth. The message predicted the onslaught of enemies from the four corners of Iran, the blinding of the king, and his demise in the twelfth year of his kingship. Ferdowsī 1971, vol. VIII, p. 327, Ferdowsī 1935, pp. 2582–2583. Thāʿalibī 1900, pp. 637–642, Thāʿalibī 1989, pp. 411–413.
656 See page 103.
658 Ferdowsī 1971, vol. VIII, p. 335, Ferdowsī 1935, pp. 2586–2587. For the significance of reading the Zand, that is, the interpretation of the Avestā, see §5.2.5.
Bahrām-i Chūbin’s western campaigns

Already in 572, at the end of the rule of Khusrow I, Bahrām-i Chūbin had participated in the king’s campaigns against the Byzantines and in the Caucasus, and had been in charge of the cavalry that captured the Byzantine city of Dara. 661 According to some of our sources, Bahrām-i Chūbin, son of Bahrām Gushnāsp, started as a margrave of Rayy. 662 This piece of information fits quite well with the fact that the spāḥbeds of the north during Khusrow I’s reign were in fact from the Mihrān family. If our theory as to the familial relationship of Bahrām-i Chūbin with Görgön 663 is correct, then the appointment of Bahrām-i Chūbin after his grandfather as spāḥbed of the north further confirms our contention that the spāḥbedi of particular quarters was maintained within the same dynastic family. At any rate, Dinawari calls Bahrām-i Chūbin the marzbān of Armenia and Azarbāyjān, 664 a military and administrative jurisdiction that in fact corresponds to the spāḥbedi of the kūst-i ādurbādagān.

The Parthian genealogical claims of Bahrām-i Chūbin, as well as his provenance from the Mihrānīd capital Rayy, are highlighted by most of our narratives. 665 In the Shāhnāma, Rayy, as the capital of the Mihrāns, is clearly pitted against Persis. Jumping ahead for a moment in our narrative, in the mutual diatribe of the antagonists, Bahrām-i Chūbin and Khusrow II Parviz, when they are confronted in the battle scene near Lake Urumiya in Azarbāyjān, the Sasanian Khusrow II accused the Parthians of Rayy of complicity with Alexander and then of assuming kingship. 666 The regional dimension of the rivalry between the house of Sāsān and the descendants of Ardavān is underlined with Bahrām-i Chūbin’s threat to relocate majesty from Fārs to Rayy. 667 The theme of restoring Arsacid glory is in fact central to Bahrām-i Chūbin’s platform for rebellion. 668 In yet another exchange, Bahrām-i Chūbin reminded Khusrow II

663 Gyselen 2001a, seal, 4a, p. 44. See page 103 above.
664 Dinawari 1960, p. 79, Dinawari 1967, p. 84.
665 Czegledy 1958; Shahbazi 2007a.
666 Ferdowsī 1971, vol. IX, p. 30, Ferdowsī 1935, p. 2696:

667 Ferdowsī 1971, vol. IX, p. 32, Ferdowsī 1935, p. 2697:

668 Ferdowsī 1971, vol. IX, p. 30:
that his Sasanian ancestors had in fact usurped kingship from the Arsacids. After five hundred years, however, Bahram-i Chubin claimed, the demise of the Sasanians was imminent, and kingship must revert to the Arsacids. He would not rest, Bahram-i Chubin claimed, until he destroyed Kayanid kingship—a clear reference to the Sasanians’ forged claim of being the progenies of the Kayanids.

Bahram-i Chubin’s eastern campaigns

The substantial power of Bahram-i Chubin at Hormozd IV’s court is established beyond doubt. Simocatta maintains that once Bahram-i Chubin’s military successes increased, for example, he became the *darigbedum* (*dar¹gbed*) of the royal hearth of Hormozd IV. While the precise powers of the *darigbed* are not clear, it is clear that this must have been an extremely important office of late the Sasanian period. One of the few figures who carried this title in late Sasanian history, was the towering figure of Farrukhzad, whose story we examine in depth in Chapter 3. In 588, in the aftermath of the Hephthalites’ attack against Iran, Bahram-i Chubin was appointed as the commander-in-chief of the Sasanian forces and sent against the invading army. This is where our apocalyptic as well as historical narratives begin. Leading a messianic number of 12,000 cavalry to the east, Bahram-i Chubin conquered Balkh and the Hephthalite territories in what is now Afghanistan, crossed the Oxus, and killed the Khagan of the Turks. He finally advanced to a place called the Copper Fortress, Ru’yn Dizh, near Bukhara.

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669 Ferdowsi 1971, vol. IX, p. 29, Ferdowsi 1935, p. 2695:

670 See page 385ff for an elaboration of this.


674 Czegledy 1958; see also §6.1.2.

675 This latter figure is mistakenly rendered as Shawa, Sava, Saba. Shahbazi 2007a, p. 520.

676 Shahbazi 2007a, p. 520. For Ru’yn Dizh, see page 406ff.
Our sources claim that Bahrām-i Chūbīn’s successes in his western and eastern campaigns prompted the jealousy of the king, and instigated Hormozd IV to undermine him. In the face of Hormozd IV’s harassment, and prompted by other leading magnates who had gathered against Hormozd IV’s anti-elite policies, therefore, Bahrām-i Chūbīn rebelled in the east in 590 CE, collecting around him a substantial force from the quarters of the east and the north.

**Hormozd IV and the Ispahbudhān**

The Parthian rebel then set out for the capital of the ungrateful and foolhardy Sasanian king, Hormozd IV. Meanwhile, in the face of the tremendous support gained by the Mihrānīd Bahrām-i Chūbīn, another significant coup was launched. Partly in revenge for Hormozd IV’s murder of their father, Asparapet, in 586, the Ispahbudhān brothers Vistāhm and Vinduyih, now spearheaded a palace coup. The Sasanians proved once again to be at the mercy of the Parthians: two Parthian dynastic families came to steer the very fate of the Sasanian kinship. The Ispahbudhān brothers reenacted a recurrent chronicle of the house of Sāsān: they blinded, imprisoned, and finally murdered Hormozd IV, and attempted to enthrone his feeble son Khusrow II Parvīz. So powerless were Khusrow II Parvīz and his forces against Bahrām-i Chūbīn’s insurrection, that under the watchful guard of Vinduyih and Vistāhm, he was forced to flee to the bosom of the Sasanian’s age-old enemy, the Byzantines, until such time that they could muster an army. According to some accounts, one of the options discussed by the Parthian Ispahbudhān brothers and Khusrow II was to take refuge with the Arabs and seek their aid. With the Persian crown now vacant, Bahrām-i Chūbīn seized it when he entered Ctesiphon in 590 CE.

A Parthian dynast had finally nullified the contract of the Sasanian–Parthian confederacy by declaring himself king.

Even among the Parthians, however, this was hard to concede, especially by the Ispahbudhān brothers, who considered themselves “brothers [to] the Sasanians and their partners [in rule].” Moreover, with the support of the Byzantine emperor Maurice and the army that had finally gathered around the Ispahbudhān brothers, Bahrām-i Chūbīn’s chances and rhetoric had lost their appeal. A substantial sector of Bahrām-i Chūbīn’s constituency therefore deserted him. Under the command of Maurice’s brother, Khusrow II advanced toward Azarbāyjān to rendezvous with the 12,000-strong cavalry of Armenian forces under Mušēl Mamikonean, and the 8,000-strong cavalry organized by

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677See page 125.
678On his way Bahrām-i Chūbīn passed via the Mihrānīd capital Rayy and was joined by many veterans from the western front. Shahbazi 2007a, p. 521.
679The young age of Khusrow II and his lack of manpower is highlighted in Sebeos’ narrative among others: “For he [i.e., Khusrow II Parvīz] was a youth and the strength of his army was weak and modest.” Sebeos 1999, p. 26.
681Sebeos 1999, p. 18, but also Nihayat 1996, p. 366.
682Dinawari 1960, p. 102, Dinawari 1967, p. 111. See our discussion on page 110.
§2.6: Hormozd IV / Mihrans  Chapter 2: Sasanians

Vinduyih and Vistahm. Sebeos confirms that the Ispahbudhan’s base of operation was now Azarbeyjan, where they rallied “support . . . under the watchful eye of John Mystacon, *Magister Militum per Armeniam*, who was mobilizing troops throughout Armenia.” For our future purposes it is important to note that at this point the *army of Nimruz*, the army of the south, also set out to aid Khusrow II Parviz.

**Bahrām-i Chūbin’s defeat**

This predicament of the Sasanian king Khusrow II Parviz must be kept in mind in any assessment of the military reforms undertaken by his grandfather, Khusrow I Nowshirvan: Two generations after the latter was presumed to have established his absolutist kingship, overshadowing even the powers of Shāpur II, the Sasanian crown could only be salvaged with the aid of the Byzantines, the Armenians, and, most importantly, their closest of kin, the Parthian Ispahbudhan family. It was with the combined power of these armed forces—its reflection of the continued dependency of the Sasanians on the military prowess of the Parthian dynastic families—that Khusrow II was finally able to defeat the by now depleted forces of Bahrām-i Chūbin. It is symptomatic of Sasanian history and the traditional part played by Armenia in this history, that, as Sebeos informs us, at this point Bahrām-i Chūbin even wrote letters to the Armenian sparat Mušel Mamikonean. Now, by hereditary right, the Mamikoneans held the office of spahbed (sparapet) throughout the fourth century and even after. They claimed, moreover, Arsacid ancestry. It is certain, therefore, that the Parthian Bahrām-i Chūbin had his common ancestry with the Mamikonean house, as well as their shared heritage vis-à-vis the Sasanians, in mind when in his letter to Mušel, he wrote: “As for you Armenians


684 The office of sparatet, i.e., Middle Persian spahbed, in Armenia, like most Armenian institutions replicated the office in Sasanian Iran before the reforms of Khusrow I. As Garsoian informs us, the “office of sparatet was clearly the most important one after that of the king. [Throughout the fourth century it] was hereditary in the Mamikonean house, which held it by nature, fundamentally, originally . . . Like the other contemporary offices of this type it belonged to the family as a whole and did not pass in direct line from father to son . . . The hereditary character of the office was such that it was not affected by the inability of the holder of the title to perform the duties of his office because of his extreme youth . . . The royal [Armenian Arsacid] attempt to interfere in the normal succession and to bestow this office on a member of another family was viewed as flagrant abuse naturally ending in tragedy. The evidence . . . makes it amply clear that the power of the Mamikonean sparapets did not depend on the favor of the [Armenian Arsacid] kings whom they outranked.” Buzandaran 1989, pp. 560–561.

685 As Garsoian maintains, “rightly or wrongly the Mamikonean were traditionally considered to have been of royal [i.e., Arsacid] ancestry . . . The family may also have had Persian kinsmen.” After the second Armenian revolt against Iran in 572 CE, the “family’s fortunes began a slow decline, leading to the disappearance of its senior branch in the ninth century.” A “cadet branch [also] survived in Taron, while other members of the family played important roles at the Byzantine court.” Buzandaran 1989, pp. 385–386.
who demonstrate an unseasonable loyalty, did not the house of Sasan destroy your land and sovereignty? Why otherwise did your fathers rebel and extricate themselves from their service, fighting up until today for your country? As Howard–Johnston remarks, the extensive territorial and political concessions that Bahrām-i Chūbin promised to the Arsacid Mamikonean house in this letter were tantamount to offering the Armenians a “junior partnership in the Sasanian empire (the kingdom of the Aryans),” a Sasanian empire ruled by a Parthian dynastic family, that is. Bahrām-i Chūbin’s offer, however, was rejected by the Mamikoneans. It is indicative of the support for Bahrām-i Chūbin that it took the combined forces of the Byzantines, the Armenians, and the Parthian Ispahbadハン family to defeat him. The Sasanian crown was thus saved, thanks to the sagacity of another Parthian dynastic family, the Ispahbadハン. For as all our sources agree: as the Ispahbadハン brothers later reminded the ungrateful Khusrow II Parvız, had it not been for their protection of his kingship and for the forces that they were able to muster in Azarbāyjān—where the family had come to run deep roots, as we shall see also below—Bahrām-i Chūbin’s rebellion could very well have marked the end of the Sasanian dynasty.

When, in the wake of his defeat, Bahrām-i Chūbin was forced to flee east, he ran into yet another Parthian dynastic family, the Kārins. Even in flight, Bahrām-i Chūbin was able to defeat the Kārins, after which he proceeded to take refuge with the Khāqān of the Turks. As his continued existence was a humiliating affront to the Sasanians, however, Bahrām-i Chūbin was finally murdered. Two variant narratives trace the semi-folkloric take on his murder, one of which claims that he was assassinated, through a ruse, by an agent of the Sasanians. Here ends, temporarily, our account of Bahrām-i Chūbin’s saga.

The rebellion of the Mihrāns against Hormozd IV and subsequently his son Khusrow II Parvız galvanized the northern and northeastern territories of Iran, the former of which were the traditional homelands of the dynasty. Much of Khurāsān seemed to have supported the aspirations of the Mihrānid rebel, although, as the example of the Kārins bears witness, not all Parthians lent them their support. We recall from the seals that the Mihrāns were the spāhbeds of the north (kūst-i ādurbađagan) throughout the rule of Khusrow I and presumably all of that of Hormozd IV. The kūst-i ādurbađagan included not only parts of Gilān and Ṭabaristān, but also Azarbāyjān. The incorporation of

688 See, for instance, footnote 806.
690 Shahbazi 2007a, p. 521 and the sources cited there.
691 For its powerful effects on the post-conquest history of Iran, see §6.1 below.
692 See footnote 164.
693 The exact boundaries between the quarter of the north and that of the east are not clear. At
parts of Azarbāyjān in the quarter of the north explains the confusion in the sources for referring to Bahram-i Chūbin as respectively the marzbān of Barda’ā and Ardabil,694 or Azarbāyjān.695 The support that Bahram-i Chūbin received in the east is also significant. According to the Shāhnāma, when gauging the endorsement of other dynasts prior to his rebellion, a certain Khizravān Khusrow encouraged Bahram-i Chūbin to forego rebellion and settle instead in Khurāsān. In Khurāsān, he told Bahram-i Chūbin, he would be able to rule in an independent manner.696

What is of course significant in all of this is the fact that the regions in which the Mihrāns and, as we shall see, the Ispahbudhān found their staunchest support were precisely those regions designated by the term Parthava and Media in the classical sources. Included in this was also Ţabaristān. The age-old antagonism of Parthava against Persis was in full swing in the course of Bahram-i Chūbin’s rebellion, and it was perhaps this, more than any other single element in Sasanian history, that brought about the demise of the Sasanians in the wake of the Arab conquest.697 As always, the problem, of course, was that the Parthian nobility was never a unified collectivity. There were not only divisions within the Mihrāns, but also between them and the other major Parthian family at this point in Sasanian history, the Ispahbudhān. In Khurāsān, the Mihrāns also came into conflict with their age old enemies, the Kārins. Added to this was, as we shall see in Chapter 4, the history of Ţabaristān as a refuge for rebellious factions within the house of Sāsān. What is significant for our purposes, therefore, is that all these divisions not only played into the hands of the Sasanians—for a while—but also played themselves out in the northern, northeastern, and northwestern territories of the Sasanian realm, Gilân and Ţabaristān, Khurāsān, and Azarbāyjān, respectively. They engulfed, in other words, the quarters of the north and east.698

### 2.7 Khusrow II Parviz / the Ispahbudhān

The Parthian Ispahbudhān family remained the staunchest supporters of the Sasanians during Bahram-i Chūbin’s rebellion. Of this, our sources leave us no doubt. It was not so much that the Ispahbudhān were in favor of the legitimist claims of the Sasanians, having, as we have seen, their own volatile relation

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696Ferdowsī 1935, p. 2724:

بی آر بارس وز تیسون برگشن
گه اسانی و مهربد را سری
و گرم دیار ر خمری بدبل
بی شاه خرسان تن اسان بری

697We do not mean to downplay a host of other internal and external forces that affected the demise of the dynasty, only to highlight a crucial pattern in their history.
698In addition, Sistān also had a long tradition of independence.
with them. At issue, rather, seems to have been the newly found absolutist claims of the Sasanians under Hormozd IV—and not Khusrow I. The fact that it was a rather junior branch of the Parthians, the Mihrāns, that was now claiming sovereignty was probably also hard to swallow for the Ispahbudhan family. For the antiquity of their claim to Parthian nobility seems to have been much greater than that of the Mihrāns, not to mention their close familial relationship with the Sasanians.699 And thus is connected the saga of the Mihrāns to that of the Ispahbudhan family.

2.7.1 Vistāhm Ispahbudhan

Shortly after having saved his crown and secured the throne, Khusrow II turned in fact against his maternal uncles, Vindūyih and Vistāhm. The upshot of what transpired was the rebellion of the venerable Vistāhm of the Ispahbudhan family. What, however, instigated Khusrow II’s turn of heart? We recall that Vistāhm was appointed the spābed of Sawād (that is to say, the kūst-i khwarbarān) after his father’s murder in 586 by Hormozd IV.700 Sebeos, however, provides us with an invaluable piece of information: the traditional homeland of the Ispahbudhan family was not in the west but in the east, that is to say, in the Pahlav dominions. Twice in the course of his narrative Sebeos informs us that the “regions of the Parthians . . . [were] the original homeland of his [i.e., Vistāhm’s] own principality . . . under . . . [whose] control [lay] the troops of that region.”701 This post, Sebeos maintains, had been given to Vistāhm’s family in the third century when the Persian king restored to the ancestor of the Ispahbudhan family “his original Parthian and Pahlaw [lands], crowned him and honoured him, and made him second in the kingdom.”702 With such heritage and power at their disposal, it was only natural that the Ispahbudhan would not have acquiesced to being partisan to the schemes of Bahrām-i Chūbin.

Hormozd IV and Khusrow II were cognizant of their dependence on the Ispahbudhan. Prior to Khusrow II’s flight to the Byzantines, when Bahrām-i Chūbin was approaching to overtake the capital, Hormozd IV prompted Khusrow II to destroy Vistāhm and Vindūyih. Khusrow II refused his father’s advise, arguing that, faced with the forces gathered around Bahrām-i Chūbin, any

699 See page 110ff.
700 See page 107ff.
701 Here Sebeos is talking about the inception of Vistāhm’s rebellion and his attempt to bring the troops of Khurāsān under his own control. It is clear, however, that as the land was his original homeland, he was not going to achieve this through force, but through gathering support in the region. Sebeos 1999, p. 42. Emphasis mine.
702 Sebeos 1999, p. 14. Sebeos claims that the ancestor of the Ispahbudhan family was the Parthian “criminal Anak’s offspring.” Other Armenian sources inform us that Anak was also the father of St. Gregory, the Illuminator. According to Armenian sources, however, Anak was from the Süren family. In no other source, however, do we come across the information that the Ispahbudhan were from the Süren family. Chaumont observes, on the other hand, that there is a greater probability that St. Gregory was from Greek descent rather than from the Süren family as the Armenian sources would have us believe. Chaumont 1991, p. 426. For the Anak family, see Buzandaran 1989, pp. 346–347.
assault on the Ispahbudhân family would be tantamount to the end of Sasanian hegemony (sipâhast bâ ú fuzûn az shomâr).

Bahrâm-i Chûbin, meanwhile, devised a brilliant plan: he minted coins in the name of Khusrow II Parviz. Becoming suspicious that Khusrow II was in consort with the rebels, Hormozd IV contemplated his son’s murder. It was in fear for his life, therefore, that the young king Khusrow II fled to Azarbâyjân and thence to the Byzantines. And it was under these circumstances that the palace mutiny took place. In some traditions the whereabouts of Vistâhm at this time are not clear. Significantly, according to Sebeos, Vistâhm had already “stirred up no few wars in those days on his own account.” According to Sebeos, when Hormozd IV had Vindüyih imprisoned, Vistâhm had already fled from the king. In any event it is clear from the sources that the Ispahbudhân either directly led the palace mutiny against Hormozd IV, or were chosen as the leaders of the uprising. Sebeos underlines the Ispahbudhân’s claim for leadership of the group: “[b]ecause the queen, mother of the royal Prince and daughter of the Asparapet who was a noble of the house of the Parthians who had died, [was] sister of Vndoy and of Vstam, and Vndoy himself was a wise and prudent man valiant of heart, they [the nobility at Hormozd IV’s court] planned to release him [i.e., Vindüyih] and make him their leader and head of their undertaking.” By now we know the rest of the story: Hormozd IV was murdered in the palace coup, Bahrâm-i Chûbin was defeated at the combined hands of the Ispahbudhân, the Armenians, and the Byzantines, and Khusrow II Parviz was crowned as new king.

**Vistâhm’s rebellion**

After taking power, presumably in 590, Khusrow II began rewarding his supporters. Above all he remunerated his uncles, the chief architects of his victory: he made Vindüyih his first minister and Vistâhm his spâbbed of the east, in the traditional homeland of the family. Yet in a matter of months, Khusrow II is said to have changed course; his excuse: avenging his father’s murder. According to our sources, shortly after assuming the throne, he murdered Vindüyih. When news reached Vistâhm, he rebelled in the east. All territories

703 Ferdowsi 1935, p. 2676–2677:

که بیرام جویینه شد پیمان
سواران و گردان خنج‌گزار
به گنگ تیام جای نشست
ولیکن نگاه کن به روشان روان
سیاهست یا از فرآور اشمار
اگرما به گانشتم بارم دست

Significantly, here, once again, the theme of lack of manpower of the Sasanians against the Parthians is reiterated in the narrative.

705 Sebeos 1999, p. 15.
707 Sebeos 1999, p. 17.
709 Masâûdi 1869, p. 223, Masâûdi 1968, p. 270. See also our discussion of his seals on page 107.
previously galvanized in Bahrām-i Chūbin’s rebellion were now overtaken by this prominent Parthian dynast. Much of Bahrām-i Chūbin’s army joined him. A substantial group of the Parthians, therefore, had left, once again, the confederacy. This time, their success was half complete: Under the leadership of Vistāḥm, for seven years at least, the küst-i ādurbadagān and the küst-i khwāraśān ceded from Sasanian territories. The Parthian Vistāḥm began minting coins in the territories under his control. We possess coins belonging to the second to seventh years of his reign and minted, significantly, at Rayy, on which the Ispahbudhān rebel is called Pīrūz Vistāḥm, victorious Vistāḥm. As traditionally coinage reflected the regnal years of the king, however, a problem remains with the exact chronology of Vistāḥm’s kingship in the Pahlav domains. A consensus, nevertheless, reckons this to be circa 590–96 CE.

Vahewuni incident

The traditional chronology fails to explain, however, how a young and inexperienced Sasanian king, brought to power by the collective forces of the Ispahbudhān family, the Armenians, and the Byzantines, could in a single year become so powerful as to move against the powerful Parthian Ispahbudhān family. Howard–Johnston’s alternative chronology, supported by other sources at our disposal, addresses this. According to him, shortly after defeating Bahrām-i Chūbin, Khusrow II was faced with the Vahewuni rebellion of 594–595 in Armenia.710 Vistāḥm’s rebellion took place shortly after this. Howard–Johnston, therefore, dates Vistāḥm’s rebellion from 594 to 599–600.711 Indeed, if the Vahewuni incident is to be solidly dated to 594–595, then we must envision a situation in which the still feeble Khusrow II Parvīz was forced to deal with two major upheavals that engulfed all of his northern territories simultaneously. There is nothing unprecedented in this, as having to face wars on two fronts was a familiar paradigm in both Sasanian and Byzantine history. And indeed this might explain Khusrow II Parvīz’s diplomacy: collaborating with the Byzantines in undermining the Vahewuni insurrection. The idea that Khusrow II was forced to deal with the Vahewuni incident at precisely a time when almost half of his realm had ceded seems, nevertheless, quite unlikely. As Howard–Johnston maintains, it is more likely that Khusrow II dealt with the initial stages of Vistāḥm’s rebellion almost toward the end of the Vahewuni incident, where either through force or cajoling, he was able to bring a group of Armenian nobles in consort with him.712 This included settling these in Iṣfahān. According to Howard–Johnston, “incidental remarks [in Sebeos] reveal

710 For the Vahewuni incident, when a group of Armenian noblemen revolted against their overlords, the Byzantines and the Sasanians, see Howard–Johnston’s historical commentary in Sebeos 1999, pp. 175–179. See also page 301 below.
712 Among those who joined the Persian side, after the combined Sasanian and Byzantine forces had pursued the rebels to the Araxes valley area, were Mamak Mamikonean, Kotit, lord of Amatunik’, Step’anos Siwni, and other unnamed. See Howard–Johnston’s historical commentary in Sebeos 1999, p. 177.
that the troops mobilized in Persarmenia in Spring of 595 and their noble leaders accompanied Khosrov on his campaign against the rebels ... The campaign should therefore be dated to 595. This points to 594 as the year in which Vstam rebelled and gathered support.\footnote{Sebeos 1999, pp. 179–180.} Both the Nihayat and Dinawari confirm this dating of Vistahm’s rebellion, for both put it ten years into Khusrow II’s reign, in 599/600.\footnote{Nihayat 1996, p. 390; Dinawari 1967, p. 110, Dinawari 1960, p. 101: 
فمكت كمرى و يكاترهما عشر سنين.}

Citing the Khuzistan Chronicle, Howard–Johnston argues justifiably that there was also more than simple vengeance to Khusrow II’s onslaught on his uncles. The Nihayat confirms this. The combined accounts also aid us in settling the question of chronology. According to Howard–Johnston, after consolidating his rule, Khusrow II faced too much criticism by Vinduyih—who was now his prime minister—of his policies.\footnote{Sebeos 1999, p. 180.} This, and not simple vengeance, was in fact the true cause of Khusrow II’s belated epiphany about the culprits of his father’s murder. According to the Nihayat, after the revolt of Bahram–i Chubin, when Khusrow II had established his affairs (lammā istadaffa ’l-amr li kisrā) and his power increased (aẓuma sultaṇahu), the king pondered what his uncles had done to his father. “Binduyah was in control of his affairs and he had [all the] influence in his kingdom,”\footnote{Nihayat 1996, p. 390: 
و قد كان اndern اموري الى بندى و كان نافذ الامر في ملكته.} while Vistahm was in control of Khurasan up to the borders of Rayy. Khusrow II “watched Binduyah with a great fury, but he did not divulge any of it to him.”\footnote{Nihayat 1996, p. 390: 
وكان ينظر الى بندويه بالحنق الشديد؛ ولا يظهر له شيئا من ذلك حتى مضت عشر سنين.} Until ten years passed, according to the Nihayat, under this state of affairs, Khusrow II found an auspicious opportunity.\footnote{Nihayat 1996, p. 390: 
ان بموت الاموال لا تقوم بهذا التذير.} The anecdotal story in which the Nihayat subsequently garbs Vinduyih’s power itself bespeaks the ease with which the Parthian dynast opined on state matters and Khusrow II’s policies. For an incident in which Khusrow II exhibited his lavish spending provided the opportunity for the supreme minister to proclaim to the king that the “public treasury cannot withstand this kind of squandering.”\footnote{Nihayat 1996, p. 390: 
كن يموت الاموال لا تقوم بهذا التذير.} As Nihayat’s account makes clear, therefore, the saga of Khusrow II Parviz vis-à-vis his powerful uncles was no different than the
saga of Qubād under the Kārins or that of other Sasanian kings against their respective Parthian dynastic family: the Sasanians were at the mercy of their power.

According to Sebeos, when Vistāhm first rebelled and stationed himself in Rayy, Khusrow II set out to fight him. The Nihāyat, which is the only Arabic source other than Dinawari providing us with a detailed narrative of Vistāhm’s rebellion—for in fact the rebellion and secession against Khusrow II Parvīz are absent from all our other Arabic sources as well as the Shāhnama—incorporates a series of correspondences between Khusrow II and Vistāhm. In these, Vistāhm detailed the debt that Khusrow II had incurred toward his family. “Woe unto you, the companion of the devil (ansāka ʻl-shayṭān), didn’t my brother free you … and did he not give his life for you … when the heavens and the earth had deplored you. Did he not kill your father in order to consolidate your kingdom for you and set up your kingship?” According to Sebeos, contemporaneous with Vistāhm’s rebellion, the lands “called Amal [i.e., Āmul in Ṭabaristān], Ṣoyān, [i.e., Rūyān to the west of Ṭabaristān and] Zrehān and Taparistan [i.e., Ṭabaristān] also rebelled against the Persian king.” Vistāhm’s supporters incited him to rebellion using, as did the supporters of Bahram-i Chūbin, his claim to Parthian ancestry, and his privileged position in Sasanian history: “You are the son of Khurrbundād, with an ancestry that goes back to Bahman the son of Isfandiyār. You have been the confederates and brothers of the Sasanians. Why should Khusrow II have precedence over you in kingship?” Convinced by their arguments, and with a great army behind him, Vistāhm thus followed in the footsteps of the pioneering Mihrānid rebel Bahram-i Chūbin. He derided the Sasanian genealogy and boasted about his own, more exalted, pedigree: “Your ancestors,” Vistāhm told Khusrow II Parvīz, were after all no more than shepherds who usurped kingship from us.

720 The Xwaday-Nāmag tradition remains silent on Vistāhm’s rebellion: neither Ṭabarī, the Shāhnāma, Thālibī, nor Ibn Balkhi have anything to say about it. This leaves room for thought. The Xwaday-Nāmag’s rendition of Bahram-i Chūbin’s rebellion might still be used in articulating the legitimist claims of the Sasanians against a rebel of the Mihrān family. But how was this tradition to portray one of the most embarrassing episodes of Sasanian history: the secession for at least seven years of the northern regions of the realm, where a Parthian family set up a separate kingdom in what was ostensibly Sasanian domains?


722 Howard–Johnston appropriately notes that these rebellions were “surely not spontaneous but engineered by Vstam.” Ibid., p. 181.

723 This is a variant of the name of Vistāhm’s father, as we have seen on page 106.

724 Dinawari 1967, p. 111, Dinawari 1960, p. 102:

و انگم لاحوپب بئي ساسان و شرکؤهم

725 Dinawari 1967, p. 112, Dinawari 1960, p. 102:

و اعلم انکم لست پاچیه پیدا الامر می بئ انا احق به منک - عبر انکم يابئي ساسان غلفتمونا على حقنا و طفمنا و انا کم انکم ساسان راعی غم
It is symptomatic of the Sasanian predicament at this and future junctures of their history that in order to combat the Parthian Vistāhm, an Armenian contingent came to hold a central place in what subsequently transpired.\textsuperscript{726} The initial battle of Khusrow II against Vistāhm came to no fruitful conclusion, Vistāhm and his army having taken refuge in Gilān from whence Vistāhm “journeyed to the regions of the Parthians, to the original land of his own principality.”\textsuperscript{727} Meanwhile the Armenian forces who had been settled in Isfāhān\textsuperscript{728} by Khusrow II also rebelled and set out for Gilān, where they came across the Sasanian cadet Pīrūz,\textsuperscript{729} while others finally reached Vistāhm in Khurāsān. With an insurgency in most of the northern parts of his territory, the quarters of the north and the east, the regions predominantly under Parthian rule, the Sasanian monarch’s vulnerability was now complete. Khusrow II Parviz was forced to turn to the great Armenian dynastic family and its leader Smbat Bagratuni.\textsuperscript{730} Khusrow II gave Smbat the marzpanate of Vrkan, that is Gurgān, and dispatched him against his powerful enemy, the Parthian dynast Vistāhm of the Ispahbudhān family.\textsuperscript{731} Smbat was said to have achieved success and much else.\textsuperscript{732}

2.7.2 Smbat Bagratuni

Smbat’s governorship of Gurgān
Thomson argues that Sebeos puts Smbat’s term of office in Gurgān from 596–602 CE,\textsuperscript{733} a date that fits well with the traditional rendering of Vistāhm’s rebellion as taking place between 590 and 596, since Smbat was instrumental in ending Vistāhm’s rebellion. He maintains, however, that this date seems to be too early because, after having successfully completed his assignments in the east, Smbat was called to the court by Khusrow II in the eighteenth year of the latter’s reign, which brings us to 606–607.\textsuperscript{734} This, Thomson argues, is another indication that Vistāhm’s rebellion must be dated to somewhere around 594/599–600 CE.\textsuperscript{735} For by this time, Vistāhm was preparing a second major expedition against Khusrow II with the help of the Kūshāns, and it is fairly

\textsuperscript{726} The Nihāyat calls the leader of the Armenian contingent by that of his office, al-Nakhārjān, i.e., naxnar. Nihāyat 1996, p. 393.
\textsuperscript{727} Sebeos 1999, p. 42.
\textsuperscript{728} See page 133.
\textsuperscript{729} See §4.3.2.
\textsuperscript{730} Sebeos 1999, p. 42. For the Bagratuni family, see Buzandaran 1989, pp. 362–363 and the references cited therein.
\textsuperscript{731} Sebeos 1999, pp. 43–44.
\textsuperscript{732} According to Sebeos, Smbat also quelled the rebellions in Āmul, Rūyān, Zrēchan, and Tabaristān “and brought them into subjection to the Persian king. He established prosperity over all the area of his marzpanate, because that land had been ravaged.” Sebeos 1999, p. 44.
\textsuperscript{733} Sebeos 1999, p. 44, n. 271.
\textsuperscript{734} Howard–Johnston has no qualms about the matter: “His [i.e., Smbat’s] appointment as the governor (marzbān) of Vrkan (Gurgān) . . . , can precisely be dated to 599/600, since his retirement after eight years on the post is dated to Khusrov’s 18th regnal year (606/607).” Sebeos 1999, p. 181. 
\textsuperscript{735} Sebeos 1999, p. 48, n. 297.
certain that he was killed in 600, at the hands of one of his Kūshān allies. Gurgān, Howard–Johnston correctly observes, “was of crucial strategic importance since it was wedged between the Elburz range and Khurasan (the region of the east), which was now actively supporting Vstam.”

Besides the evidence provided by the Nihāyat and the arguments presented by Howard–Johnston, there is a curious numismatic peculiarity that corroborates the dating proposed by him, that is, the end of Vistāhm’s rebellion after ten years of Khusrow II’s rule. For, according to Gobl “[a]fter the 11th year of the reign of Khusrow II, and only in this particular year, we find the word ‘pd’ (praise) in the second quadrant of the border of the obverse of the coins issued by the king, although this terminology does not appear on every mint of Khusrow II Parvīz during this year.” While the precise significance of this inscription is not clear, according to Gobl, such novel innovation in precisely the eleventh year of Khusrow II’s reign, cannot be devoid of meaning: the appearance of this terminology on Khusrow II’s coinage during his eleventh regnal year supports Dinawari’s and Nihāyat’s dating of (the end of) Vistāhm’s rebellion to the tenth year of the king’s reign.

Whatever the chronology of Vistāhm’s rebellion, Sebeos’ narrative leaves no doubt that Smbat was instrumental in putting an end to it. The joint forces of Vistāhm, his supporters from Gilān and Tabaristān, and the Armenian nobility that had joined the Ispahbudhān’s camp engaged the combined large forces of Smbat and a figure that Sebeos calls Shahr Vahrīch in a village called Khekewand in the Komsh (Qūmis) area. Although the Parthian secessionist Vistāhm was killed, his murder did not mark the end of the rebellion of the regions where he found his support, according to Howard–Johnston. For after the murder of Vistāhm, Smbat himself was defeated in Qūmis by the supporters of Vistāhm in Gilān, who could bring to the field their own Armenian allies. It was only in 601, according to Howard–Johnston, in Smbat’s second expedition against the rebels that he was finally successful. When this news reached

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736 Howard–Johnston uses Dinawari to further corroborate his chronology. “For if his [i.e., Dinawari’s] chronology of Khosrov’s reign lags one year behind the true reckoning, as does Tabari’s, the only date which he gives in his full account of Vstam’s rebellion—Khusrov’s tenth regnal year (598/599 + 1)—would correspond exactly to the first year of Smbat’s governorship (599/600).” It should be noted though that Dinawari attaches this date to the start rather than the end of the rebellion (see footnote 714). Sebeos 1999, p. 181.


739 It is not clear whether this figure can be identified with the Mihrānīd Shahrvarāz, who in the next decade also rebelled against the Sasanian king.

740 Sebeos 1999, pp. 44–45.

741 Most likely, the ruler of Gilān at that time was the Āl-i Jāmāsp Pirūz, whom we shall discuss briefly at the beginning of §4.3.3.

742 According to Howard–Johnston “Sebeos’ account of Vstam’s rebellion is superior to those of the other sources. Whereas the others compress a complex series of events apparently into a single
Khusrow II, Smbat was greatly exalted in the king’s eyes.

**Smbat’s governorship of Khurāsān**

It is indicative of the Sasanian monarch’s policies during this period that in the face of the power vacuum in Khurāsān in particular, Khusrow II not only appointed Smbat as the governor of the region, but also greatly honored and promoted “him above all the marzbāns of his kingdom.” It is significant that immediately after Bahram-i Chūbīn’s rebellion (590–591), and Vstāhm’s spāhbedī of Khurāsān (590–593?) and his rebellion (594–600), Khusrow II was forced to resort to an Armenian dynast, Smbat, in order to calm the revolutionary fervor in the northern and the northeastern parts of his realm. The precise nature of Smbat’s activities in the region during this period is hard to follow. Whatever their course, it is clear that Smbat and his army were in control. In 606/607, however, Smbat asked Khusrow II for a leave in order to go to Armenia.\(^{745}\) Howard–Johnston’s chronology of the rest of Smbat’s career in Khusrow II’s administration appears quite sound. After his stay in Armenia, Smbat was once again recalled by Khusrow II. Smbat’s date of recall from Armenia and his second dispatch to Khurāsān, can be “inferred from the date later given for his death, the twenty-eighth year of Khosrov’s reign (616–617).”

Khusrow II’s remuneration of this Armenian nobleman upon his arrival at the court is symptomatic for the Sasanians’ posture vis-à-vis their native Pahlav dynasts. Howard–Johnston summarizes this: “Extraordinary powers were granted to him [i.e., Smbat]: together with the supreme command in the East, he was given delegated authority to appoint marzbāns . . . and was granted simultaneously a probably lucrative civilian office in charge of a central financial ministry.”\(^{746}\) From 599/600 to 606/607, on one occasion, and 614–616/617 on another, for a total period of almost a decade, therefore, a substantial part of Khurāsān was put under the command of the Armenian dynastic figure Smbat Bagratuni. Extensive powers were also granted to him in the capital of the Sasanian empire by the king. This then is indicative of the predicament in which the Sasanian monarchy had found itself after it was confronted with the rebellions of one Parthian dynastic family after another in the northern and eastern parts of its realm: for a not insignificant period, under what seems to have been

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\(^{744}\) Sebeos 1999, pp. 47–48. This might actually mean that Smbat was appointed the spāhbedī of the east, replacing Vstāhm (see page 107).

\(^{745}\) There seems to be very little information about Smbat’s stay in Armenia, for unlike other detailed accounts provided by Sebeos about this Bagratuni dynast, part of Sebeos’ text seems to be missing here. According to Howard–Johnston, Sebeos seems to have availed himself of a lost encomiastic biography of Bagratuni, from which information about Smbat’s stay in Armenia was perhaps lost in the excerption process. Sebeos 1999, pp. 178–79 and 184, respectively.

extraordinary circumstances, the Sasanian king was forced to exert his power in Khurasan through the agency of neighboring Armenian nobility!

The only information we have on Smbat Bagratuni’s governorship in Khurasan during the second half of his tenure in the east in 614–616/617, are the detailed accounts given by Sebeos of two military expeditions that he undertook in Khurasan. According to Howard–Johnston, the first of these took place when a Kushan army invaded the region. In Qumis, Smbat summoned about 2,000 Armenian cavalry from Gurgan, which he had stationed there during his first stay in the region in 606/607. At this initial encounter, Smbat’s forces defeated the Kushans, withdrew “and camped at Apr Shahr [i.e., Nishapur], in the province of Tus; and with 300 men took up quarters in the walled village called Khrokht.” At this point the Kushans asked for Turkish aid, and a great force of 300,000 [!] answered the call and crossed the Oxus (Vehrot). A raiding party besieged the walled village, “for the village had a strong wall encircling it.” Smbat managed to flee from the debacle with three of his followers, leaving the village to be defended by the commander (hrmanatar) “of their force” who was a certain Persian Prince named Datoyean, appointed by royal command.” Needless to say, Smbat and Datoyean’s forces were defeated by the Turks. The Turkish army then moved westwards and got “as far as the borders of Rey and of the province of Ispahan,” and after plundering the region, returned to its camp. An inspector from the court, a certain Shahrapan Bandakan, was then sent to Smbat and Datoyean. It is, once again, indicative of Khosrow II’s policies that Smbat was exonerated, but Shahrapan Bandakan was taken to court and executed. In Khosrow II’s second campaign, which, according to Howard–Johnston, took place a year later, Smbat reorganized his army and attacked “the nation of Kushans and the Hephthalite king.” Smbat’s forces defeated the enemy and followed them on their heels to their capital Balkh. Herat, all of Tukharistan, and Talish were plundered before Smbat returned and, with much booty, settled in Marv. At the news of Smbat’s victory “king Khosrov was happy and greatly rejoiced. Once again the king summoned the Armenian nobleman of Parthian descent … to the court. He ordered his son to be promoted and be called Javitean Khosrov. Smbat himself

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747 Sebeos 1999, p. 50.
748 It is significant in this context to recall that one of the residences of the Arsacids was in Qumis. Marquart 1931, p. 12, no. 18.
749 Sebeos 1999, p. 50.
750 According to Thomson this figure was the commander of the relief force, not the commander of the 300. Sebeos 1999, p. 51, n. 320.
751 Sebeos 1999, p. 51.
753 For the reasons why the Sasanians were able to engage the enemy on two fronts at this point, being heavily engaged in the west (see §2.7.3 below) conquering, for example, Jerusalem in 614, while Smbat was dealing with the Turks in the east, as well as for an explanation of the appearance of the Kushans in the east, see Sebeos 1999, pp. 184–188.
754 Sebeos 1999, p. 52.
got two honorific titles of Armenian tanutêr, and Persian Khusrov-Shum [i.e., Khusrow Shenûm], and the investiture and insignia of five sorts.” Treasures were distributed to his followers. Smbat then became “the third nobleman in the palace of king Khusrov and after remaining [there] a short time . . . die[d] in the 28th year of his [i.e., Khusrow II’s] reign,” in 616/7 CE. Clearly, Smbat’s services to Khusrow II Parviz were thought to have been so tremendous by the Sasanian king that he deemed it justifiable to shower him with honors hitherto bestowed only on the Iranian Parthian dynastic families. This then brings to an end the second most important episode of the breakdown of the Sasanian–Parthian confederacy.

2.7.3 The last great war of antiquity

From 603–630, Khusrow II Parviz engulfed Iran in one of the most devastating and long periods of warfare against its traditional enemy, the Byzantine Empire. In human and material terms, the costs of the war, which perhaps precipitated the onslaught of the horrific bubonic plague in the course of it, was staggering for the world of late antiquity. While Khusrow II was filling the coffers of his treasury with fantastic treasures all the while, and while in terms of territorial gains, at the height of Khusrow II’s victories, the monarch could boast of extending his boundaries to that which existed at the height of the Achaemenid empire, the Sasanian empire was engaged in an ultimately disastrous feat. It arguably suffered the most. That Khusrow II lost his crown in 628 through the familiar and paradigmatic mechanism of the joint forces of Parthian dynastic families unleashing their power against an exhausted monarchy paled in comparison to what was to come. The causes, courses, and effects of the last war of antiquity between a Sasanian monarchy that was soon no longer to be and a Byzantine empire that was soon to be truncated beyond recognition have been discussed in great detail in a corpus of erudite literature and are beyond the scope of the present study. What happened in the course of the war in terms of the balance of power within the Sasanian Empire between the monarchy and the Parthian dynastic families, however, is of central concern to us. We shall therefore turn our attention to the final chapter of this conflictual relationship.

First phase (603–610)

In order to provide a context for the issues under consideration, a very brief outline of the course of the last great war of antiquity between the Byzantines and the Sasanians is in order. Three clear phases of the wars of 603–628 can be discerned. The theaters of war in its first phase from 603 to 610 were Mesopotamia and the Caucasus. The fall of the strategically important city of

757 Sebeos 1999, p. 54.
758 The following outline is based on James Howard–Johnston’s account in Sebeos 1999, pp. xxii–xxv, 197–221, who reconstructs a detailed course of events as a commentary to Sebeos’ text in Part I, pp. 54–84.
Dara in 604 to the Sasanians and the opening of Armenia as a diversionary front of the war were probably two of the most important aspects of this phase, besides the fact that Khusrow II seems to have taken, initially at least, personal charge of directing the Mesopotamian war front. An important Sasanian general, Shāhīn—whom Nöldeke believes to have belonged to one of the seven great Parthian dynastic families, but whose pedigree we cannot establish with any degree of certainty\(^759\)—appeared on the western Armenian front, “before making a forward thrust into Cappadocia” and capturing Caesaria at the beginning of the second phase of the war, 610–621.

Second phase (610–621)

In this phase, the Persians overran northern Syria, thrust deep into Anatolia (611), reached the Bosphorus (615), pushed through southern Syria, and finally conquered Egypt (619–621). The conquests of Damascus (613), Jerusalem (614), and Egypt were, for both sides, the emotive hallmarks of this second phase. The direction of the wars in this phase were under the command of two of the foremost generals of the Sasanian armies, the aforementioned general Shāhīn and the towering figure of Shahrvarāz. Important aspects of their role in these wars remain unclear, however. Whether or not it was Shahrvarāz or Shāhīn who should be credited with the conquest of Egypt, for example, is one of these. The Sasanians were so successful during these first two phases that by 615 they had reached Chalcedon,\(^760\) across the Sea of Marmara from Constantinople. It was at this point that, according to Sebeos, the emperor Heraclius had agreed to stand down, allow the Roman empire to become a Persian client state, and even allow Khusrow II to choose the emperor. Heraclius would become a “son rather than a brother of the Sasanian king.”\(^761\) But in the late 620s, the Sasanians suffered “one of the most astonishing reversals of fortune in the annals of war.”\(^762\)

As Kaegi and Cobb have argued, a catalyst in this last phase of the war was the mutiny of the general Shahrvarāz. The aggregate of evidence here seems to corroborate Kaegi and Cobb’s argument that the relationship of Khusrow II and his foremost general turned sour “probably late in the year 626 or early in 627.”\(^763\) But who was this Shahrvarāz whose role in the last eventful years of Sasanian history was so paramount? Besides the name through which he has come to be known to posterity, Shahrvarāz is said to have carried at least two other names, a situation which has created substantial confusion in the study of the course of the Persian war efforts in Byzantine territory and the internal

\(^{760}\)See footnote 6.
\(^{761}\)Sebeos 1999, p. 211.
\(^{762}\)Sebeos 1999, p. xxiv. Emphasis added.
conditions that led to Khusrow II’s deposition.\textsuperscript{764} To this confusion, we will get shortly,\textsuperscript{765} but for now, we recall that throughout this period, when he was preoccupied with the events in the west, Khusrow II had put the east under the command of Smbat Bagratuni.

### 2.7.4 Shahrvarāz Mihrān

In the accounts of the eventful years that led to the Byzantine victory over Khusrow II, the role of one of the foremost generals of Khusrow II, a certain Shahrvarāz, looms large. What is clear from the complicated course of events is that Shahrvarāz rebelled and mutinied, probably late in 626 or early in 627, and formed an alliance with the Byzantine emperor Heraclius. As Kaegi and Cobb observe, Shahrvarāz’s mutiny is “critical for understanding Heraclius’ victory over Chosroes II, the disintegration of Persian authority in the region, as well as the historical background to the Persian evacuation of Byzantine territory, and, in general, conditions on the eve of the Islamic conquest.”\textsuperscript{766} What is of crucial concern for us here is the identity of this famous general of the Sasanian realm and the context of his mutiny. The timing of the outbreak of hostilities between Shahrvarāz and Khusrow II Parviz is also of crucial importance. The issue is not a moot one. For if, as Kaegi and Paul have argued, the mutiny of Khusrow II’s armed forces under Shahrvarāz was crucial in undermining the Sasanian power and the Byzantine victory over them, then, at the very least, it highlights the continued dependency of Khusrow II’s military power, in whatever reformed form, on the generals that steered his war effort. The gentilitial background of Shahrvarāz can now be reconstructed through sigillographic evidence, which in turn has tremendous ramifications for understanding the last crucial years of Khusrow II Parviz’s reign. As we have seen,\textsuperscript{767} the seals establish that the enigmatic figure of Shahrvarāz was (1) the spāḥbed of the south, and (2) a Mihrānīd.\textsuperscript{768} This brings us to a second important concern, closely tied in with the first: Shahrvarāz was most probably not alone in reaching an agreement with

\textsuperscript{764}Kaegi and Cobb’s investigation does not aim at deciphering the problem that we will be investigating. It should be pointed out, however, that one of their important conclusions, namely the fact that it was Shahrvarāz who should be credited with the conquest of Egypt, is corroborated by the Fārsnāma: “Shahrvarāz went to Jerusalem and then to Egypt and Alexandria and conquered these.” Ibn Balkhī 1995, p. 253–254.

\textsuperscript{765}See page 143ff below.

\textsuperscript{766}For the latest investigation into this, see the important article Cobb and Kaegi 2002, p. 123. Emphasis added. I would like to thank Professors Walter Kaegi and Paul Cobb for providing me with a copy of their forthcoming work. I would especially like to thank Paul Cobb for sending the article to me.

\textsuperscript{767}See §2.5.4.

\textsuperscript{768}Gyselen 2001a, seal 2d/2, p. 41. It is remarkable that according to Gyselen, the gentilitial name of Mihrān is clearly added to the seal at a later date for we do possess one bulla (impression) “which was made by the seal under its first form (seal 2d/1) and several made by the same seal under its second form (seal 2d/2), where the word -mtr’n- (Mihrān) has been added to the end of the inscription on a third line, just below the word spāḥbed, which addition might in fact be a sign of the growing independence of Shahrvarāz.” Gyselen 2001a, p. 11. Emphasis mine.
the Byzantines. The activities of another important dynastic power in Iran was also crucial in explaining the turn of events. Before we proceed, we ought to recall that in Dinawari’s anachronistic account,\(^{769}\) Shahrvarāz is listed together with Vistāhm from the Ispahbudhān family.

**Two figures in one: Shahrvarāz and Farrukhān**

Shahrvarāz’s name has been rendered in a number of forms in our sources.\(^{770}\) This, however, is not so much of a problem as the epithets through which the general has come to be known. For an outline of these it is best to follow the accounts of Tabarī and compare these with other narratives at our disposal. According to Tabarī, at the inception of the mutiny that led to the deposition and murder of the Byzantine emperor Maurice (582–602) and the accession of Phocas (602–610), Khusrow II decided to wage war against the Byzantines on behalf of Maurice’s son, who had taken refuge with him. To this effect he set out three armies under the command of three separate figures. One of these commanders of Khusrow II, Tabarī informs us, was called Rumiyūzān, and was sent to Syria and Palestine; a second general, our aforementioned Shāhīn, who according to Tabarī “was the pādhūspān (pādhūspān) of the west,” proceeded to capture “Egypt and Alexandria and the land of Nubia.” The third general appointed to the war front was a certain Farruhrān, or Farrukhān. Here starts the confusion. For according to Tabarī and some other sources, this Farruhrān “had the rank of Shahrbarāz” and carried the expedition against Constantinople.\(^{771}\)

Of the three commanders named by Tabarī the identity of one, Shāhīn, does not seem to be in dispute.\(^{772}\) The precise identities of the other two, however, remain unclear, so much so that it is not certain whether or not we are in fact dealing with two figures here. In part, the remark that Nöldeke made more than a century ago about the confusion surrounding these names still stands in the scholarship on the subject.\(^{773}\) It has been maintained, for example, that the figure of Rumiyūzān might in fact be identical with that of Shahrvarāz, for there is little doubt that it was the latter who captured Jerusalem in 614 CE.\(^{774}\)

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\(^{769}\) See page 109ff.

\(^{770}\) For a list of these, see Justi 1895, pp. 277–278.


\(^{772}\) As some sources, including Tabarī, called Shāhīn one of the pādhūspāns of Khusrow II, Nöldeke argued that Shāhīn, therefore, was one of the four satraps, that is to say, spāhbeds, of Khusrow II Parvīz. Now the *Chronicon Paschale* calls Shāhīn the “famous Babaman Zādīgān.” This Babaman Zādīgān, argues Nöldeke, is presumably nothing but a scribal error for Vahūman Zādag, that is a descendent of Bahman. This figure, therefore, argues Nöldeke, is from the progeny of Bahman, the son of Islāndiyār. Nöldeke 1879, p. 291, n. 2, p. 439, n. 3, Nöldeke 1979, p. 483, n. 4, p. 661 and p. 681, n. 12.

\(^{773}\) “In general one cannot decipher the truth, through the names that the Greeks, the Armenians, the Syrians, and the Arabs have given to the Iranian generals, unless an expert Armenionologist corrects these names on the basis of the Armenian sources.” Nöldeke 1879, pp. 290–291, n. 3, Nöldeke 1979, p. 482, n. 42.

\(^{774}\) Bosworth seems to maintain the identity of Rumiyūzān with Shahrbarāz and Farrukhān. Tabarī 1999, pp. 318–319, nn. 745 and 749, de Goeje, 1002.
Nöldeke’s suspicions about the identity of Shahrvarāz and Farrukhān, as we shall presently see, are in fact valid, although he himself did not offer an explanation for it. Thus far, to the author’s knowledge, no detailed investigation of the topic seems to have been made.

In the identification of Shahrvarāz with Farrukhān, two powerful figures have been in fact superimposed onto each other. It is apt to begin with a narrative that highlights this superimposition. In the course of their investigation of the circumstances that led to Shahrvarāz’s rapprochement with Heraclius and his eventual mutiny against Khusrow II, Kaegi and Cobb highlight the importance of the narrative contained in Zuhrī’s *Kitāb Futūḥ Miṣr wa Akhbāriḥā*, which, in conjunction with Ṭabarī’s narrative, can be used for reconstructing the course of events. Here Zuhrī gives us a narrative “concerning the cause of the Persian withdrawal from [Byzantium].” When Shahrvarāz’s stay in Syria was prolonged, Khusrow II reprimanded him. Frustrated with Shahrvarāz’s actions, Khusrow II then wrote letters to “the greatest of the Persian lords,” ordering him to kill Shahrvarāz, take charge of the Persian armies, and return to the capital. This Persian lord, who is not named in Zuhrī’s narrative, tried to persuade Khusrow II, in a series of three correspondences, against his decision, at which point Khusrow II became so aggravated that he now wrote a letter to Shahrvarāz ordering him to kill the Persian lord. When Shahrvarāz, reluctantly, set about executing Khusrow II’s command by informing the “greatest of the Persian lords” of the king’s orders, the lord produced the letters that Khusrow II had initially sent to him. At his submission of the first letter to Shahrvarāz, the latter proclaimed to the Persian lord: “You are better than I.” When the lord produced the second letter, Shahrvarāz “descended from his throne and” asked the Persian lord to “[b]e seated upon it.” Refusing the offer, the Persian lord then produced the third letter, at which point Shahrvarāz declared: “I swear by God to do evil to Chosroes! And he made up his mind to betray Chosroes.”

While the use of letters as a *topos* in Islamic historiography must be acknowledged and while the anecdotal nature of the letters under consideration speaks for itself, not every letter in the tradition can be dismissed as mere *topos*. There is no reason to doubt the fact that throughout the war preparations, Khusrow II must have kept in touch with his generals in the field. In fact, it is unrealistic to presume that some form of correspondence did not take place between the center, which had precipitated the war, and the armies in charge of directing the war efforts. In Ṭabarī’s rendition of the same account, for example, Khusrow II

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144

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775 Nöldeke seems to have remained undecided: once he argued that the identity of Rumiyūzān with Khurrahān, or Farrukhān, “which is the name of Shahrbarāz,” is probably correct, and once that “it seems inconceivable to suppose that Shahrvarāz’s name was Farrukhān or Khurrahān.” Nöldeke 1879, pp. 290–291, n. 3, p. 292, n. 2, Nöldeke 1979, p. 482, n. 42, and p. 484, n. 46.


availed himself of the services of the *barid* (courier service), an institution the crucial function of which was probably all the more obvious during times of crisis.778 While the precise content of the letters as produced by Zuhrī is not altogether trustworthy, there is every reason to assume that their general tenor is valid.

For one thing, Zuhrī’s narrative highlights the close connection, or even the participation of a second figure, the Persian lord, in Shahrvarāz’s campaigns. The existence of this second figure in close association with Shahrvarāz is confirmed through other sources. Whereas in Zuhrī’s narrative the identity of this greatest of Persian lords remains unknown, in Ṭabarī’s accounts of this same episode his name is disclosed, while the actions of the two figures are now transposed. We recall that at the inception of his narrative Ṭabarī had maintained that “Farruhān [i.e., Farrukhān], . . . had the rank of Shahrbarāz.” However, this is only one of the two traditions concerning this episode in Ṭabarī, given in fact without any *isnād*. The second tradition, narrated through Abū ʿIkramah, separates the two personalities. In this narrative, Farrukhān and Shahrvarāz are depicted as brothers.779 The following story is then given: “When the Persians were victorious over the Byzantines, Farrukhān was once sitting and drinking, and said to his companions, *I had a dream, and it was as if I saw myself on Kisra’s throne*.”780 When the news of Farrukhān’s design for the throne reached Khusrow II, the latter wrote a letter to Shahrvarāz ordering him to send him Farrukhān’s head. Shahrvarāz entreated Khusrow II to change his mind, arguing that he would “never find anyone like Farrukhān who had inflicted so much damage on the enemy or had such a formidable reputation among them.” Abū ʿIkramah’s narrative, like that of Zuhrī, underlines not only Farrukhān’s participation in Khusrow II’s campaigns in the west, but also his power and centrality in these war efforts. Confronted with the obstinacy of Shahrvarāz, Khusrow II, furious, had a radical change of heart and declared to the people of Persia: “I hereby remove Shahrbarāz from power over you and appoint Farrukhān over you in his stead.” He then sent a letter containing the transfer of power from one to the other as well as the order of the execution of Shahrvarāz by Farrukhān. In ʿIkramah’s narrative, it was when Farrukhān proceeded to implement the king’s order that Shahrvarāz produced for him the letters that Khusrow II had initially sent him ordering the execution of Farrukhān. At this point Farrukhān relinquished power back to Shahrvarāz. This then instigated Shahrvarāz’s rebellion and mutiny and his cooperation with Heraclius.

In his commentary on this section of Ṭabarī, Bosworth, doubting the identity of Shahrvarāz and Farrukhān as two separate figures, notes that here “the separation of Shahrbarāz-Farrukhān into two different persons” continues in

778 Ṭabarī 1999, p. 328 and n. 774, also n. 147, de Goeje, 1008.
779 Ṭabarī 1999, p. 328, de Goeje, 1008. The information that the two figures were brothers is, as we shall see, apocryphal.
780 Ṭabarī 1999, pp. 327–328, de Goeje, 1008. See also footnote 1141, putting this story in a different light.
Tabari’s narrative and remarks that “the second commander involved in the story is presumably in reality the Shāhīn mentioned” by Tabari prior to this.\textsuperscript{781} In fact, however, we are dealing not with one, but with two distinct figures, neither of whom is Shāhīn, whose sagas during this period are closely connected.

Some of the other eastern Christian sources (in Greek, Syriac, and Arabic) that have been investigated by Kaegi and Cobb give variant names for this second commander involved. Michael the Syrian’s account, for example, gives the name of the second commander as Kardārīgan. Now according to Simocatta, Kardārīgan is a Parthian title, the Persians being fond of being “called by their titles.”\textsuperscript{782} Agapius of Manjib renders the name Mardīf and Chronique de Seert gives Farinjān. Again Shāhīn is nowhere to be found.\textsuperscript{783} Foreign names, of course, are rendered differently and sometimes mutilated beyond recognition in the process of transcultural transmission. Farrukhān, the name given by the early Arabic sources—themselves based on the Xwaday-Nāmag tradition—is in fact closest to what was probably the actual name or possibly the title of the figure concerned. For deciphering this and for our argument that we are in fact dealing with two separate figures and not one, we fortunately possess a source that in this, as in many other cases, contains valuable information, and here must be deemed the most reliable, namely the Shāhnāma of Ferdowsī.

2.7.5 Farrukh Hormozd Ispahbudhān

Ferdowsī begins his narrative on the “injustices of Khusrow II and the ingratitude of the army” by naming three figures who were deeply involved at this juncture. The first of these is a figure called Gorāz, the second Zād Farrukh, and a third Farrukhzād Ādharmāgan. The last figure, Farrukhzād Ādharmāgan, was a despised tax collector.\textsuperscript{784} What, however, of the other two? According to Ferdowsī, Gorāz, about whom the author has not a few unkind words to say, was always in charge of protecting the Byzantine frontier, and was the first to become rebellious when the just king commenced his injustices. There is no doubt that Ferdowsī’s Gorāz is the same figure as Shahrvarāz, gorāz, borāz, or varāz, that is boar, being the suffix to shahr, that is, region or empire, whence boar of the empire, Shahrvarāz.\textsuperscript{785} For our future purposes it is also important to note that the wild boar has a significant religious symbolism, being

\textsuperscript{781}Tabari 1999, n. 775, pp. 328–329, de Goeje, 1008.

\textsuperscript{782}In Hormozd IV’s wars against the Byzantines in 582–586, a Kardārīgan, the satrap, is centrally involved. It is possible that Kardārīgan’s name is derived from the title kārdār, tax collector, in which case Michael the Syrian might have confused this commander with Farrukhzād Ādharmāgan; see footnote 784 below.


\textsuperscript{784}See Nöldeke 1979, pp. 563–564, n. 68.

\textsuperscript{785}Justi 1895, pp. 277–278.
a representation of the God Mihr.\textsuperscript{786} Ferdowsi’s account, therefore, confirms the identity of Shahrvaraz as a leading figure of the Sasanian–Byzantine wars. In the second figure, Zad Farrukh, however, as we shall see, we are most probably dealing with the son of the Farrukhan of Tabari. So what is Ferdowsi’s narrative, and who are Zad Farrukh and Farrukhan?

According to Ferdowsi, once Shahrvaraz/Goraz became rebellious, Zad Farrukh—who was “so close to Khusrow II that none dared to approach him without his permission”\textsuperscript{787}—also rebelled and joined forces with Shahrvaraz. Ferdowsi hints at the correspondence between Zad Farrukh and Shahrvaraz, at the end of which Shahrvaraz commenced his own correspondence with the Byzantine emperor, Heraclius, encouraging him to attack Iran.\textsuperscript{788} After it became clear that Shahrvaraz had mutinied against him, Khusrow II wrote a letter which he anticipated to be intercepted by Heraclius’ men. Khusrow II, in other words, used a ruse. In it, he encouraged Shahrvaraz to prepare for a coordinated attack against Heraclius, whereby the army of Shahrvaraz and that of Khusrow II himself would clamp that of Heraclius from two sides. Ferdowsi’s narrative makes it clear that Heraclius was either very close to or already within the Iranian territory. As intended, the message was intercepted by Heraclius and achieved its purpose of arousing his suspicions of Shahrvaraz’s peaceful intentions.\textsuperscript{789}

Meanwhile Khusrow II sent another message to Shahrvaraz, instructing him to send the mutinous members of his army to him. Shahrvaraz then instructed 12,000\textsuperscript{790} of his army to move toward Iran, set up camp at Ardashir Khurrah, not to cross the water, and remain united.\textsuperscript{791} Khusrow II, who “was not pleased with [the army’s] arrival,” sent Zad Farrukh to reprimand them for letting Heraclius invade Iran. Zad Farrukh delivered Khusrow II’s message. But in the guise of a messenger he, too, mutinied: he entered into secret negotiations with the mutinous army. As he was sympathetic toward the cause of Shahrvaraz


\textsuperscript{787}Ferdowsi 1971, vol. IX, p. 128, Ferdowsi 1935, p. 2894:


\textsuperscript{790}Note, again, the messianic number.

\textsuperscript{791}For a detailed exposition of the course of this last phase of the Sasanian–Byzantine war see Sebeos 1999, pp. 214–220.
§2.7: Khusrow II / Ispahbudhan

**Chapter 2: Sasanians**

(پیامبر یکی بود هیل بادي گوراژ), he instructed Shahrvaraz’s army to remain united and not to divulge the name of the mutinous members among them. Through a second set of correspondences with the army, Zad Farrukh reiterated his support and encouraged them not to fear the wrath of Khusrow II, arguing that it was he who had scattered the army to the corners of the world, and assured them that there were no longer any grandees at Khusrow II’s court who would lend him their support. Meanwhile, he retained his posture of loyalty vis-à-vis Khusrow II. The king, however, suspected Zad Farrukh’s mutinous intentions but did not divulge it. Here, Ferdowsi provides us with an extremely crucial piece of information: Khusrow II kept his knowledge of Zad Farrukh’s intent to himself because he was afraid of his brother, Rustam, who, with 10,000 men under his command, had already rebelled in his region.792 Zad Farrukh meanwhile gathered support for his mutiny. It was decided that Khusrow II’s time had come and that a new king must assume the throne. The above narrative is presented in a somewhat similar fashion in Ibn Balkhi’s account. According to him, it was to Zad Farrukh, rendered as Zadhan Farrukh, the commander of Khusrow II’s army, that the order of murdering 36,000 men from the “famous and elite and Princes and soldiers and Arabs” was given. When the latter refused to carry out the king’s orders and news reached the army, tumult spread among them, and the commanders of the regions, fearing their lot, each started strengthening the realm under their control. These finally conspired, in secret (در سرر), with the elite of Fars and the king’s ministers and deposed the king.793 They cast lots for Shiruyih Qubad, Khusrow II’s son, who had been imprisoned by his father.794

Ferdowsi’s account, therefore, leaves no doubt about two facts: first, the Parthian Shahrvaraz did indeed mutiny, and second, in his rebellion he was not


For a discussion of the regions under the control of the Ispahbudhan family, see page 188ff.


794Howard-Johnston maintains that at this point Shiruyih Qubad “made contact with a leading disaffected magnate, the former supreme commander of Sasanian forces. The latter gathered support for a coup at the court and in the higher echelons of Sasanian forces. The latter gathered support for a coup at the court and in the higher echelons of Sasanian forces, sent a deputation to inform Heraclius of the conspirators’ plans, and put them into action on the night of 23–24 February 628.” Sebeos does not give the name of this leading disaffected magnate. Sebeos 1999, p. 221.
alone and, in fact, had the collaboration of another force, stationed at the capital, and identified by Ferdowsi as the powerful Zād Farrukh. The figure of Zād Farrukh, and his conspiracy and correspondence with the army of Shahrvarāz, was crucial to the mutiny that subsequently took place against Khusrow II Parvīz. But Ferdowsi also furnishes us with another significant piece of information: with 10,000 troops at his disposal, Zād Farrukh’s brother, Rustam, had already staged a rebellion of his own during this period. This piece of information is of significant value in determining the period during the latter parts of Khusrow II’s reign in which these events took place.

Third phase (621–628)

We know that in the third phase of the Sasanian–Byzantine wars, in 624, there was a dramatic reversal of the course of the war in which, under the banner of holy war, Heraclius effected the conquest of Transcaucasia and, taking the northern route through Armenia, captured Dvin. Afterwards, the northwestern parts of Sasanian realms were at Heraclius’ mercy. Under the personal command of the emperor, the Byzantine army invaded Azarbāyjān and Media. In the same year, Gandzak was sacked by Heraclius’ army. The initial conquest of Azarbāyjān then, was the first important phase of the reversal of the course of the war. It was at this point that Khusrow II Parvīz recalled the Mihrānid Shahrvarāz. Azarbāyjān, however, was invaded by the Byzantines on two separate occasions, not only in 624–626, but also in 627–628. The combination of the information at our disposal therefore informs us that by 624 Heraclius’ army was in Azarbāyjān. By 626–627, Shahrvarāz had mutinied and Zād Farrukh had become a coconspirator of the Mihrānid in his mutiny against Khusrow II. Prior to the mutiny of Zād Farrukh and Shahrvarāz, the brother of Zād Farrukh, Rustam had already rebelled. All these crucial rebellions, therefore, took place in the period between 624–627, the period in which Heraclius invaded Azarbāyjān. Who, however, were the brothers Rustam and Zād Farrukh who held such tremendous power in Khusrow II’s realm? Who was the Persian lord conspiring with Shahrvarāz? And how was all this connected with Heraclius’ invasion of Azarbāyjān?

795 Theophanes, who calls the other general Kardarigas, specifically highlights his complicity with Heraclius. When Heraclius intercepts the letter that Khusrow II had sent to Kardarigas in which the Sasanian king had ordered the latter to murder Shahrvarāz, he showed the letter to Shahrvarāz. Shahrvarāz in turn asked Kardarigas whether he was resolved to do this. Theophanes then maintains, the “commanders were filled with anger and renounced Chosroes, and they made a peaceful settlement with the emperor.” Theophanes, The Chronicle of Theophanes Confessor: Byzantine and Near Eastern History AD 284–813, Oxford, 1997, translated with introduction and commentary by Cyril Mango and Roger Scott (Theophanes 1997), pp. 452–453. Emphasis mine.

796 Sebeos 1999, p. 214.


798 Minorsky, V., ‘Roman and Byzantine Campaigns in Atropatene’, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 11, (1944), pp. 243–265 (Minorsky 1944), p. 248. For a campaign said to have been undertaken in 621/2 in southern Azarbāyjān, “we have no authentic report.” Ibid.
Prince of the Medes

On a number of occasions Sebeos mentions a figure whom he calls the Prince of the Medes, 799 Kho-rokh Ormizd (Farrukh Hormozd). 800 The Prince of the Medes, Sebeos informs us, “was the Prince of the region of Atrpatakan [Azarbayjân].” 801 As Sebeos, Ferdowsî, and some of our Arabic sources clearly inform us, moreover, Rustam and Zâd Farrukh, or Farrukhzâd—Zâd Farrukh being simply an inverted rendition of the name—were the sons of Farrukh Hormozd (Kho-rokh Ormizd), Sebeos’ Prince of the Medes and Prince of Azarbayjân. 802 Sebeos further provides us with a fascinating and crucial piece of information: On the eve of Shahrvârâz’s rebellion, the army of the Persian empire had divided into three main parts. “One force was in Persia and the East; one force was Khoresham’s [i.e., Shahrvârâz’s] in the area of Asorestan; and one force in Atrpatakan.” 803 By the end of the Sasanian–Byzantine wars, therefore, the Iranian army had divided into three. As we shall see in Chapter 3, this division of the Iranian armed forces into three camps did not only precipitate the deposition and murder of Khusrow II Parviz, but it also led to four subsequent years of tumultuous crisis. For it is as a result of this factionalism that during the period 628–632 one Sasanian king and queen succeeded the other. We have, however, jumped ahead of our narrative. Which are the three armed factions enumerated by Sebeos? We will discuss the army of Persia and the East below. 804 The army under Khoresham, it is clear, was none other than the conquest army under the Parthian dynast, the Mihrânid Shahrvârâz in Asoristân. 805

It is the leadership and constituency of the third army, however, that once and for all clarifies the identity of the Persian lord. For there is no doubt that the army of Atrpatakan mentioned by Sebeos was the force under the command of Kho-rokh Ormizd (Farrukh Hormozd), the Prince of the Medes, and his sons Farrukhzâd (Ferdowsî’s Zâd Farrukh) and Rustam. As we have seen, Sebeos specifically maintains that Kho-rokh Ormizd was the “Prince of the region of

[802] Sebeos 1999, p. 92. As we shall see in the next chapter, many layers of confusion have been imposed on the traditions of this important Parthian dynastic family. On the most trivial level this has led to an obvious yet crucial mistake in the simple genealogy of this family where, even in some of our contemporary secondary accounts, Rustam is considered the son, as opposed to the brother of Farrukhzâd! For a detailed discussion of this family, see §3.3.1 below, but see also the genealogical tree on page 471.
[805] As we shall see in Chapter 3, the precise constituency of the force under Shahrvârâz’s control cannot be deciphered. This was a force that had probably seen years of exile during the Persian–Byzantine conflict. The force under his command included most likely a good number number of his Mihrânid constituency, but we should also recall that Pirag-i Shahrvârâz had been assigned as spâhbed of the quarter of the south (kist-i nemrov) by Khosrow II. This might explain Shahrvârâz’s complicity with the native Sistâni contingents in deposing Ardashir III, as we shall see in §3.2.3.
At some point shortly before the deposition of Khusrow II in 628, when Zād Farrukh, the son of the Prince of Atrpatakan, was secretly in correspondence with the forces of Shahrvarāz, and most probably contemporaneous with, or shortly after, Heraclius’ invasion of Azarbāyjān in 624, Rustam, the son of Farrukh Hormozd, had also rebelled, most probably in the same region over which his father ruled, Azarbāyjān.

In Ferdowsī’s narrative the name of the dynastic leader of the family, Farrukh Hormozd, is missing or is mistakingly replaced by that of his son, Zād Farrukh (Farrukhzād). Indeed, virtually the same actions performed by the father Farrukh Hormozd, who is called Farrukhān in Ṭabarī, are attributed by Ferdowsī to Zād Farrukh (Farrukhzād).

This is yet another example of the confusion in the sources about a father–son pair, to which we have already hinted, and which in any case is quite understandable in view of the agnatic power structure within a dynastic family, where a son could very well be acting on behalf of his father. That Farrukh Hormozd, however, was the prime instigator of the family’s policies and that therefore in the person of Farrukhān of Ṭabarī we are in all likelihood dealing with this same figure, is most clearly reflected in the subsequent history of the Sasanians. The army under the leadership of Farrukh Hormozd (Farrukhān or Khurrukhān) was, next to those of Shahrvarāz and of Shāhīn, most likely the third army division involved in the Sasanian–Byzantine wars, reflecting the accuracy of all the narratives at our disposal.

Shahrvarāz presented the case for his defection as well as that of his putative brother Farrukhān (Farrukh Hormozd) to Heraclius: “The ones who laid waste to your towns were my brother and my self, with our stratagems and our valor. But now Kisrā has come to envy us and wants to kill my brother. When I refused to do so, he ordered my brother to kill me. Hence both of us have thrown off allegiance to him, and are ready to fight at your side.”

A presumed brother and accomplice of Shahrvarāz is in this case apocryphal. The coconspirators of the Parthian Mihrānīd dynast, therefore, were the family of the Prince of the Medes. As Ferdowsī’s narrative’s inform us, the two factions collaborated

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806 Sebeos 1999, p. 89. This might be an indication that Farrukh Hormozd was appointed as the spāḥbed of the kūst-i ādurbdādāgān. We must assume that the Ispahbudhān, to which family Farrukh Hormozd belonged as we shall argue shortly, had lost their spāḥbedi over the kūst-i khwārāsān in the aftermath of Vistāhm’s rebellion and the appointment of Smbat Bagratuni over the region (see note 744).

807 This confusion between Farrukh Hormozd and his son Farrukhzād, with slightly different renderings of their names, persists in the narratives about the deposition of Ardashīr III and the ascension of Būrāndukht, as we shall see on pages 184 and 187.

808 See for instance the confusion between the Kārnīnīd Sukhrā and his son Zarmihr discussed in §2.4.3.

809 See §1.2.

810 Tabari 1999, p. 330, de Goeje, 1008.

811 So far as I can establish, there was no familial relationship between Farrukh Hormozd and Shahrvarāz, and in fact, we will shortly argue that Farrukh Hormozd belonged to the Ispahbudhān family.
secretly. Although Khusrow II was aware of their conspiracy and he did order the leadership of one faction—Farrukhān in Ṭabarī, Zād Farrukh in Ferdowsī—to kill the other, Shahrvarāz, he had to keep at least a semblance of cordiality toward the former family, that of the Prince of the Medes, Farrukh Hormozd.

And so all the motifs of the anecdotal series of letters between Khusrow II and his powerful generals, Shahrvarāz and the Persian lord Farrukhān (Farrukh Hormozd), are in fact historically valid. There is no need to conflate the identity of personalities that are clearly portrayed as two separate figures in most of our narratives. 812 In the last decisive months of the Sasanian–Byzantine wars, not only Shahrvarāz mutinied, but also Farrukh Hormozd, the Prince of the Medes, withdrew his army of Azarbāyjān, and indirectly, at least, cooperated with Heraclius. Moreover, the family of Farrukh Hormozd pursued a collective policy. It was perhaps this significant rebellion of the Prince of the Medes, or rather, as Sebeos and Ferdowsī maintain, of his son Rustam, in Azarbāyjān, that allowed Heraclius to invade Azarbāyjān in 624. An alternative scenario is equally plausible: the success of Heraclius in the eastern wars, together with the collective policies of Khusrow II, led the Prince of the Medes to withdraw his support from Khusrow II, thus allowing Heraclius to invade through Azarbāyjān, the territory under his control.

The precise turn of events as a result of the policies pursued by the Parthian leaders of the two great armies of Iran at this point, Shahrvarāz and Farrukh Hormozd, and their postures vis-à-vis Heraclius and Khusrow II Parvīz, need to be placed in the context of the theater of war in Azarbāyjān. 813 Those who maintain an earlier date for the agreement of Heraclius with Shahrvarāz and the figure that we have now identified as Farrukh Hormozd, namely 624–626/627 CE, 814 provide a more convincing version of events. 815 As Ṭabarī’s account highlights, Heraclius, Shahrvarāz, and Farrukh Hormozd must have reached some sort of understanding either prior to or in the midst of Heraclius’ invasion of Azarbāyjān. A thorough reexamination of the course of the war of 624–626 must account for the active participation of the army of Azarbāyjān, under the leadership of the dynastic family of Farrukh Hormozd, whose territory was invaded when the course of the war was reversed. In this campaign, Heraclius invaded Azarbāyjān, sacked Gandzak, Ormi, Hamadān, and Media. The fire of

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812 Incidentally, the confusion in the sources between these two figures might also be explained by the fact that Shahrvarāz’s full name, as it appears on the seals, was Pirāg-i Shahrvarāz, the first part of which would be rendered in Arabic as Fīrak and therefore could very well have been confused with Farrukh.
813 For the third phase of the war, see also page 149ff above.
814 Minorsky 1944, p. 248.
815 Howard–Johnston claims that there “is no hint . . . [in Sebeos] of any earlier political understanding, such as that alleged to have been reached by Heraclius and Shahrvaraz in 626 by Chronique de Seert, Tabari and Dionysius. The allegation should probably be rejected as a piece of deliberate disinformation, circulated to further Roman interests as the war reached a climax in 627–628.” Sebeos 1999, p. 223. In the face of the overwhelming evidence presented by the sources, however, to which we can now add Ferdowsī, Howard–Johnston’s claim is not tenable here. Also see Cobb and Kaegi 2002, passim.
 CHAPTER 2: SASANIANS §2.7: KHUSROW II / ISPAHBUDHAN

Ādhar Gushnasp was ransacked and extinguished. 816 Most significantly, when Khusrow II was deposed in February 628 CE, 817 and his son, Shirūyiḥ Qubād enthroned in April 628, suing for peace, the new king’s envoy was dispatched to Gandzak in Azarbāyjān, the territory of Farrukh Hormozd, where Heraclius’ army had encamped. 818

What led to “one of the most astonishing reversals of fortune in the annals of war,” 819 and the final victory of the Byzantines over the Sasanians in one of the great wars of late antiquity, therefore, was the desertion and mutiny of the leaders of two of the major armies that had steered the course of the war prior to this in favor of Khusrow II Parvāz. One mutinous party was Pīrag-i Shahrvarāz, the ērān-spāḥbed of the kūst-i nēmrōz of the Mihrān family, the Parthian general of Khusrow II. The other was the dynastic family of the Prince of the Medes, Farrukh Hormozd, and his sons Farrukhzhād and Rustam. While Shahrvarāz was from the Parthian Mihrānid family, moreover, it will be argued below that the family of Farrukh Hormozd was most probably none other than the Ispahbudhān family, 820 whose power extended not only over Azarbāyjān but also, as we shall establish, 821 over Khūrāsān. It was as a result of the mutiny of these two towering Parthian dynastic families that the last powerful Sasanian king, Khusrow II Parvāz lost one of the greatest wars of late antiquity, and eventually his very crown. Who, however, were the other factions involved in the mutiny?

2.7.6 Khusrow II’s deposition

In the aftermath of his conspiracy with Shahrvarāz, Farrukhzhād, the son of the Prince of the Medes, set upon toppling Khusrow II Parvāz and bringing another Sasanian king to power. 822 According to Ferdowsi, Farrukhzhād gathered a numerous army and met with the Armenian spāḥbed Tukhār, another leading conspirator against Khusrow II. This Tukhār was none other than Varaztirots’, the son of Khusrow II’s previous rescuer in the east, Smbat Bagratuni. Varaztirots’ had been educated at the Sasanian court and was later appointed marzbān of Armenia, acquiring the title of Javitean Khusrow. 823 For reasons that require further research, however, his relationship with Khusrow II Parvāz soured. The

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816 Sebeos 1999, pp. 214–215. For the Ādhar Gushnasp fire, see page 362 below.
818 Sebeos 1999, p. 222.
819 Sebeos 1999, p. xxiv.
820 This is an important claim of this study, a detailed investigation of which has to be postponed to a more relevant section, §3.3.1. For now we mention that in some of our sources Farrukh Hormozd is clearly maintained to be the son of the Ispahbudhān Vindūyiḥ; see page 187.
821 See page 188ff.

term *tukhār* in Ferdowsī’s narrative refers to the office of *tanutēr*, which was first given to Smbat Bagratuni.\(^824\) The *tanutēr* was the “senior member of a *naxarar* family,” in this case the Bagratuni house.\(^825\)

As we have seen, the Bagratuni house had become centrally involved in the military and administrative organization of the Sasanian realm during Khusrow II’s tenure, with Smbat being largely responsible for putting down Vis-tähm’s rebellion.\(^826\) Varaztirots’, however, joined the ranks of the rebellious factions who, according to Ferdowsī, were being led by Farrukhzād in the capital. That Varaztirots’ played a central role in the rebellion that toppled Khusrow II and led to Shirūyih Qubād’s succession is corroborated by the fact that upon assuming the throne, Shirūyih Qubād “summoned Varaztirots’, son of Smbat Bagratuni called Jāvītān, and gave him the office of *tanutēr*.”\(^827\) An Armenian faction, therefore, was also involved in the deposition of Khusrow II.

A third important faction involved in Khusrow II’s deposition was that of another Parthian dynastic family, the Kanārangiyān, whom we shall examine in detail later.\(^828\) For when Farrukhzād informed Tukhār (Varaztirots’) of the factions’ choice for the Iranian throne, the Armenian *naxarar* responded that “the choice would be pleasing to the kanārang as well.”\(^829\) Farrukhzād’s coup was successful and, according to Thaʿalibī, Shirūyih Qubād was taken to the house of Farrukhzād, whom the author depicts as the *ḥājib* of the king, where he was declared king the next morning.\(^830\) But with a young king on the throne, and in what is typical of the course of Sasanian history, Farrukhzād seemed to be actually running affairs.\(^831\)

There is a lengthy set of correspondences of Shirūyih Qubād who, at the instigation of the dynastic factions, enumerated those aspects of Khusrow II’s policies that had wreaked havoc on Iran. A key issue, as Shahbazi puts it, thirty years after the fact,\(^832\) was Khusrow II’s treatment of the Ispahbudhān brothers

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\(^824\) Sebeos 1999, p. 86, n. 534 and p. 49, n. 307. See also §2.7.2.

\(^825\) Buzandaran 1989, p. 563. *Tukhār* is the Persian rendition of the Armenian title *tanutēr* of a *naxarar* family (from Parthian *naxvadar*), “the general term designating the first Aršakuni society superior to the azat and referring to the nobility rather than a particular rank or office.” Buzandaran 1989, p. 549. In the revolt of Bahrām-i Chūb the two houses that had aided Khusrow II in regaining his throne were the houses of Mušel Mamikonean and Smbat Bagratuni. In 602, when the Byzantine emperor Maurice ordered the deportation and resettlement of a substantial section of the Armenian population, the Armenian nobility split. Mušel wavered between Khusrow II and Maurice, while Smbat’s house always took the side of Khusrow II. Chaumont 1991, p. 432.

\(^826\) See §2.7.2.

\(^827\) Sebeos 1999, p. 86.

\(^828\) See page 266ff.

\(^829\) Ferdowsī 1971, vol. IX, p. 245, Ferdowsī 1935, p. 2901:

\(^830\) Thaʿalibī 1900, p. 714, Thaʿalibī 1989, pp. 455–457.


\(^832\) Shahbazi 1991b, p. 182.

For the connection of the Kanārangiyān to the Ispahbudhān, see page 266.
Vinduyih and Vistāhm. In the *Shāhnāma*, after being accused of the regicide against his father Hormozd IV, Khusrow II is called upon to explain his treatment of the Ispahbudhān brothers. “They were my uncles,” Khusrow II Parvīz retorted, “without equals in all the regions. They had put their lives on the line for me. They were kind and of my blood. Yet, when they committed regicide and killed my father [Hormozd IV], I had no choice but to kill them.”

In Ferdowsī’s rendition of the events it was Farrukhzād who finally sent an assassin to murder Khusrow II Parvīz. This, as we shall see later, also corroborates our contention that the Prince of the Medes was from the Ispahbudhān family.

Nimrūzī army

Apart from Shahrvarāz and Farrukh Hormozd’s forces, an Armenian faction and the Kanārangiyān were also among the central players involved in the deposition of the last powerful Sasanian king. What, however, does Sebeos mean by the army of Persia and the East? While there is a probability that he is here referring to the forces of the Kanārangiyān family, the army of Persia and the East most probably refers to the army of Nimrūz, that is Sistān. While the *Shāhnāma* highlights the role of Zād Farrukh (Farrukhzād) from the Ispahbudhān family in the deposition of Khusrow II, Ṭabarī’s account, together with a group of other narratives, highlights the part played by the *spahbed* of Nimrūz and his son, making its identification with Sebeos’ army of Persia and the East all the more likely.

From the end of Khusrow II’s rule onward, the army of Nimrūz is one of three main factions that struggle for the control of the Sasanian throne, the others being those of Shahrvarāz and of Farrukh Hormozd. Unfortunately, the dynastic affiliation of the Nimrūzī faction requires further research, and we can only conjecture that it was controlled by the Sūren dynastic family, as Sistān

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834See §3.3.1. It is also reflective of the nature of the opposition against Khusrow II Parvīz’s rule that one of the issues raised by the factions was the charge that the Sasanian king had positioned armies in distant regions. Ferdowsī 1971, vol. IX, pp. 269–270, Ferdowsī 1935, pp. 2922–2923; Thālālī 1900, p. 722, Thālālī 1989, p. 458.

835A third, less likely alternative is that the army of Persia and the East refers to a force that had gathered in the Outer Khurāsān regions (see §6.2.1), an army that ultimately tried to set up the child Khusrow III as king. What could have been the make-up of this force, if in fact this alternative is valid, I have not been able to ascertain.

was the original fiefdom of the Sûrens.\textsuperscript{837} We propose that the Sûrenid dynastic family of Sistân in southeastern Iran had become so enmeshed with the house of Persís, on account of the greater coincidence of their sociopolitical interest with the Sasanians, that at least a group of them adopted the dynastic epithet Pârsîg, and functioned under the umbrella faction of the Pârsîg. What lends credence to this hypothesis is that we in fact have evidence of Sûrens who carried the epithet Pârsîg. Remarkably, as Christensen has already pointed out a long time ago, in the narratives of Faustus of Byzance we find two Sûrens who carry the Pârsîg epithet in addition to their dynastic family name.\textsuperscript{838} Among the spâhbed seals unearthed by Gyselen, furthermore, those of Wêh-Shâbûhr, the ērân-spâhbed of the küst-i nêmroz, bear the epithet aspbed i pârsîg, Persian aspbed.\textsuperscript{839} It is, furthermore, extremely probable that he had a Sûren agnatic affiliation. Citing the evidence pointed out by Christensen, Gyselen herself conjectures as much, although, again, all the evidence at our disposal remains inconclusive.\textsuperscript{840}

Several accounts underline the preponderant role of the Nimrûzî faction in the dynastic struggles that ensued, reaching their height at precisely the time when the Arab onslaught on Sasanian territories began. In these narratives, the Nimrûzî faction’s involvement began with the deposition and murder of Khusrow II and the accession of Shirûyih Qubâd in 628. We have evidence of an army of Nimrûz, however, at other crucial junctures of Sasanian history. We recall, for example, that when the Byzantines, the Armenians, and the Ispahbudhân brothers coalesced around Khusrow II against Bahram-i Chûbîn, the army of Nimrûz also set out to aid the feeble Sasanian king.\textsuperscript{841} As we shall see later on, at another highly critical juncture, when the Arab onslaught threatened the Sasanian monarchy, Rustam asked his brother Farrûkhzâd to solicit the cooperation of the army of Sistân. The army of Sistân, periodically mentioned at crucial junctures of Sasanian history, is therefore, in all likelihood, the force that Sebeos calls the army of Persia and the East.

According to Tabârî, when the Parthian led conspiracy of the house of the Prince of the Medes and the army of Shahrvârâz had brought Shirûyih Qubâd to power, Khusrow II was put in prison. The great men of the state then told Shirûyih Qubâd: “It is not fitting that we should have two kings: either you kill Kîsrâ, and we will be your faithful and obedient servants, or we shall depose you and give our obedience to him [i.e., Khusrow II Parvîz] just as we always did before you secured the royal power.”\textsuperscript{842} Struck with fear and crushed,\textsuperscript{843} Shirûyih Qubâd then sent an envoy, one Asfâdushnas,\textsuperscript{844} to

\textsuperscript{837} Sîstân was one of the main regions of the küst-i nêmroz.
\textsuperscript{838} Christensen 1944, p. 105, n. 2, as cited in Gyselen 2001a, p. 23, n. 56. See also note 308.
\textsuperscript{839} Gyselen 2001a, seals 2c and B, p. 46.
\textsuperscript{840} “One cannot rule out that the title of aspbed i pârsîg might have been reserved for the Sûrên family. But this is clearly only purely speculation.” Gyselen 2001a, p. 23, n. 56.
\textsuperscript{842} Tabârî 1999, pp. 381–382, de Goeje, 1046. Emphasis added.
\textsuperscript{843} Tabârî 1999, p. 382, de Goeje, 1046.
\textsuperscript{844} There is confusion surrounding the position of this figure. Based on Dinawarî, who claims that
Khusrow II Parvîz. Asfâdushnas was charged with communicating to the deposed king all his evil actions, and the reasons for his deposition and final murder.\textsuperscript{845} Asfâdushnas then met with Jîlinûs or Jâlinûs, a figure whom Tâbarî identifies as the commander of the guard in charge of keeping ward over Khusrow II. It is possible that Jîlinûs was in fact one of the Armenian dynasts ensnared in Sasanian history at this important juncture.\textsuperscript{846} If this was the case, then Tâbarî’s folkloric rendition is meant to highlight the complicity of the Armenian faction in the deposition of Khusrow II. At any rate, Tâbarî reiterates an elaborate exchange of grievances against Khusrow II and the latter’s reply to these.\textsuperscript{847} Being hard-pressed, Shirûyih Qubâd then ordered the execution of his father.\textsuperscript{848} From among “several men who had duties incumbent upon them of vengeance against Khusrow II Parvîz,” no one dared to undertake the task of regicide, however. Finally a “youth named Mihr Hurmuz [i.e., Mihr Hormozd], son of Mardânskhâ,”\textsuperscript{849} volunteered his services.

Mardânskhâ Sûren

According to one version of Tâbarî’s narrative, Mardânskhâ was Khusrow II’s pâdhûspân over the province of Nimrûz.\textsuperscript{850} It is to be noted that the cooperation of Mardânskhâ, the pâdhûspân of Nimrûz, with Shahrvarâz, the (former) spâhbed of the kûst-i nêmrôz, makes perfect sense, for the office of pâdhûspân was subordinate to that of the spâhbed of any given kûst. While Tâbarî’s narrative only implicitly connects the Mîhrânid Shahrvarâz with the Sistâni faction, other sources make their conspiracy explicit. Tâbarî, however, provides us with a piece of information that is possibly quite significant for Sistân’s history of affiliation with the house of Sâsân in the late Sasanian period. Mardânskhâ, Tâbarî maintains, was one of Khusrow II’s most obedient and trusty retainers.

he was “the head of the secretaries responsible for official correspondence (raûs kuttâb al-rasârî),” Bosworth has emended Tâbarî’s raûs al-katîbah (head of the cavalry) with that in Dinawarî, making Asfâdushnas the “head of the [royal] secretaries.” Tâbarî 1999, p. 382 and n. 948, de Goeje, 1046. It is more than likely, however, that Tâbarî’s original title for this figure is valid.

\textsuperscript{845}Tâbarî 1999, p. 382, de Goeje, 1046.

\textsuperscript{846}In an attempt to identify this figure, Bosworth notes that his name “looks Greek rather than Persian; possibly he was a Christian and had adopted a Christian name in addition to an unknown, purely Persian one.” Tâbarî 1999, p. 384 and n. 953, de Goeje, 1047. Citing other sources Bosworth further identifies him as someone who became a “leading general of the Persian troops combating the Arab invaders of Iraq and fell in the battle of Qâdisiya.” Tâbarî 1999, p. 384, n. 953; see §3.4.1. This Jîlinûs took part in the initial wars of the Sasanian against the Arabs. His name, therefore, might be the Arabic rendition, probably the title, of one of the Armenian dynasts that were at this point intimately involved in Sasanian affairs. As a son of Dawît, Mûsêl Mamikonean, and Gregory of Siwnik’ both fought under Rustam in the battle of Qâdisiya and were killed in 636, Jîlinûs might well refer to one of these figures. Sebeos 1999, p. 98.


\textsuperscript{848}Tâbarî 1999, p. 395, de Goeje, 1058.

\textsuperscript{849}Tâbarî 1999, p. 395, de Goeje, 1058.

\textsuperscript{850}Tâbarî 1999, p. 395, de Goeje, 1058. Justi calls Mardânskhâ a brother of the Mîhrânid Bahrâm-i Chûbin. Justi 1895, p. 196. As we shall presently see, we are more inclined, in view of his Sistâní provenance, to assign him to the Sûren family, who did call themselves at times Pârsîgs; see notes 308 and 838.
Some “two years before his deposition, astrologers and diviners . . . had told him [i.e., Khusrow II] that his fated death would come from the direction of Nimrûz.” Khusrow II had therefore grown suspicious of Mardânsbâh and become “fearful of his proximity, on account of Mardânsbâh’s great prestige and because there was no one in that region [i.e., Sîstân] who could equal him in strength and power.”

Cognizant of Mardânsbâh’s “faithful obedience to him, his good counsel to him, and his eagerness to please the king,” Khusrow II, however, spared Mardânsbâh’s life but cut off his right hand, rendering him incapable of holding office. Having his hand cut off in “the open space before the royal palace,” Mardânsbâh was so grief-striken that when the news of this reached Khusrow II Parvîz, the latter, in remorse, promised the pâdhûspân of Nimrûz that he would grant him anything he wished. The pâdhûspân chose death over living mutilated and dishonored. Reluctantly and with a heavy dose of guilt, Khusrow II granted his wish. “[T]he heart of all the ajam was distressed by this,” Ṭabarî’s narrative maintains.

At the prospects of murdering Khusrow II Parvîz, therefore, it was Mihr Hormozd, the son of Mardânsbâh, who volunteered for the regicide. Khusrow II Parvîz was “only too happy to have his life cut short by the son of a dignitary whom he had previously unjustly recompensed for his faithful service.” In Ḵalîlî’s account, the Sîstânî faction spearheaded the revolt that toppled Khusrow II Parvîz and appointed Shirûyih Qubâd as king. They were the ones who solicited the cooperation of the son of Vindûyih—unnamed in Balāmî’s account—in the deposition of Khusrow II. It is interesting to note that in Balāmî’s account, the list of grievances against Khusrow II included the murder of Mardânsbâh rather than that of Vindûyih and Vistâhm: Mardânsbâh’s murder was listed as one of the king’s gravest sins.

An important note on the provenance of the sources must be added. Khusrow II’s murder in vengeance has either been attributed to Farrukhzâd or to Mihr Hormozd in our sources. Each of these figures actually represents a

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853 Ṭabarî 1999, pp. 396–397, and n. 974, de Goeje, 1059. The same story is given in Balāmî’s Tarjumih-i Ĥarâb-i Ṭabarî, where he is also called Mardânsbâh. His title, however, is given as the amîr (governor) of Bâbîl and Nimrûz. Balāmî 1959, p. 241.
854 Ṭabarî 1999, p. 397, de Goeje, 1060.
855 In Balāmî’s version, after Khusrow II killed Mardânsbâh, he decided to appoint the latter’s son, Hormozd, in the position of his father. Hormozd, later called Mihr Hormozd (p. 253), however, refused, and gave up his position (az lashkarî towbîh kard). In this account, Ėlînâs was the general, sarhang, who was put in charge of keeping guard over Khusrow II. The house in which Khusrow II was kept as a prisoner belonged to a personage called Mâh Isfand, whose title is again sarhang. Finally, the person who was in charge of taking the list of the grievances against Khusrow II is called Asâd Ḫusayn or Asâd Ḥâsîs(?), the figure whom Ṭabarî calls Asfâdîshnas. Balāmî 1959, pp. 242–244.
856 This, together with the general Sûrûn emphasis of Balâmî’s account, highlights the Sûrûn provenance of Balâmî’s sources.
faction: Farrukhzād that of the Prince of the Medes (the Ispahbudhān857), with control over the army of Azarbāyjān, and Mihr Hormozd that of Nīmrūz, that is to say, Sebeos’ army of Persia and the East. If our identifications thus far are valid, therefore, what triggered “one of the most astonishing reversals of fortune in the annals of war” and the ultimate demise of the last effective Sasanian king, Khusrow II Parvīz in 628—commencing the downfall of the Sasanian dynasty—was the refusal of the powerful Parthian dynastic agnates to continue their confederacy with the Sasanian dynasty. The division of the Sasanian army during the last years of Khusrow II Parvīz into three separate entities, Shahrvarāz’s conquest army, Farrukh Hormozd’s army of Azarbāyjān, and the army of Persia and the East (the Nīmrūzī forces858), had devastating consequences for the Sasanians. Sebeos’ work is unique among all sources at our disposal in explicitly highlighting this debilitating aspect of the Sasanian state’s defensive and offensive posture at this crucial juncture.859 The Sasanians finally came to lose the greatest war of antiquity substantially because the two Parthian dynasts, Shahrvarāz of the Mīhrān family and Farrukh Hormozd of the Ispahbudhān family,860 mutinied against Khusrow II Parvīz. In insisting on taking credit for the murder of one of the most maligned Sasanian kings, furthermore, the narrative sources betray two separate traditions, emanating from the Ispahbudhān faction on the one hand and the Sīstānī (Nīmrūzī) faction on the other. The discrepancies in these narratives therefore also betray the ways in which the Parthian dynastic families edited the Xwādāy-Nāmag tradition.861

There is a reason, however, why of all possible dynasts involved at this crucial juncture of Sasanian history, our narratives underline the role of the Ispahbudhān and the Nīmrūzī factions in the deposition of Khusrow II Parvīz. For overshadowing the tripartite division of the Sasanian forces was the Sasanian–Parthian confederacy. It was under the respective Ispahbudhān and Nīmrūzī factions, established shortly after the deposition of Khusrow II, that the Iranians finally divided into two camps: the Pārsīg versus the Pahlav.862 The Sasanian–Parthian confederacy ultimately collapsed, and this at a highly critical moment in Sasanian history, when “from the Arab [regions] strong winds were blowing.”863 It is our goal to disentangle this ultimately disastrous episode for the Sasanians in the continuation of our story. A number of important

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857 See page 187ff
858 See page 155.
859 The recent analysis of Howard–Johnston sheds much light on our understanding of this important phase of Sasanian history. Unfortunately, Howard–Johnston totally overlooks the significant role of the army of Atrapatkan (Azarbāyjān) under the Prince of the Medes, and therefore fails to assess the true nature of this division and its ramifications.
860 As mentioned earlier, this identification will be substantiated in the next chapter; see page 187ff.
861 For an elaboration of this point, see also Chapter 6.5, especially page 462ff.
862 See page 214ff below.
863 Tha'ālibī 1989, p. 465, Tha'ālibī 1900, p. 731:
historiographical observations must be addressed in detail, however, before we can again pick up our narrative and discuss the effects of the Pārsīg–Pahlav debacle on the Arab conquest of Iranian territories.
CHAPTER 3

The Arab conquest of Iran

On the face of it, the saga of the Sasanians in the last decades of their rule seems to defy any understanding. From the deposition of the powerful Khusrow II in 628 CE to the accession of the last Sasanian king Yazdgird III in 632 CE, no less than half a dozen monarchs are officially counted in the roster of Sasanian kings in a period of about four years.\(^{864}\) Ṭabarī lists eight kings and two queens.\(^{865}\) It has been suggested that some of these ruled simultaneously.\(^{866}\) Exasperation has been voiced over how little we know of these rulers.\(^{867}\) There is a similar unsubstantiated consensus that these ephemeral monarchs were put on the throne by various factions of the nobility, a nobility that was created in the wake of Khusrow I’s reforms.\(^{868}\) Which were the factions who spearheaded the candidacy of these monarchs, however? To date, no systematic effort in elucidating the tangled web of Sasanian history at this crucial juncture has been undertaken. The picture has been deemed too chaotic to be amenable to any logical disentanglement.

3.1 Question of sources: the futūḥ and Xw adāy-Nāmag traditions

There is a bewildering array of Iranian names and personalities involved in this crucial period of Sasanian history. Through the process of transmission in the course of centuries, some of these names have all but metamorphosed into illegibility. Scholarly attitudes in dealing with this quagmire have been flippant. In certain respects Noth’s analysis is representative of the consensus. In investigating the personal names of some of the commanders in the wars of

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\(^{864}\) Five monarchs, inclusive of Yazdgird III, are listed in the chapter dealing with Sasanian history in the *Cambridge History of Iran*. Frye 1983, p. 178.


\(^{866}\) Nöldeke 1879, pp. 397–398, n. 5, Nöldeke 1979, pp. 594–595, n. 183. Analyzing Sebeos’ data, Howard-Johnston also comes to this conclusion, although, as we shall see, in line with the scholarship’s current consensus, the dates that he postulates for the Persian succession crisis are flawed. Sebeos 1999, p. 225.

\(^{867}\) Frye 1983, p. 171.

\(^{868}\) Christensen 1944, p. 497 and especially pp. 500–501.
conquest—names that are given in the futūḥ narratives—for example, Noth lumps together the order of the battles listed for the Arabs as well as those of the Iranians as mere topoi and argues that “it is impossible to say anything precise about the relation of these topoi to actual historical circumstances.” Noth then proceeds to examine the names of the Arab generals involved in these battles and concludes that “it is not clear if any or all of the formations and units which appear in a number of these traditions were already in existence in the early period.” Given the fact that Noth considers the theme of Iran as a primary theme in the early Arabic historical tradition, and given our knowledge of the nature of the futūḥ narratives, one would have expected Noth to have proposed caveats to this aspect of his thesis. This, unfortunately, is not the case. With very little investigation, Noth proceeds to argue that in “the description of the opposing side, especially the Persian side, we have to do with pure fiction.”

The present study will take serious issue with this aspect of Noth’s thesis. We cannot afford to continue to reckon with this period of Iranian history in a vacuum that has been occasioned by our own lack of research. And where, as Noth himself admits, we are given detailed and unique information, it behooves us to investigate such information in depth before dismissing it as fiction or the result of a fertile imagination of, for instance, Sayf b. ʿUmar, through whom posterity has received some of these traditions.

To begin with, while we might not have enough information about Arab
warfare and battle formation in pre-Islamic Arabia, we do possess enough information about the logistics of war, war strategies, and battle formations of the Sasanian army. Battle formations in right and left flanks, main body, complemented with cavalry, infantry, rearguard and vanguard, and so forth—all aspects of Sasanian battle strategy that Noth was examining—have had a long history in Iranian warfare. One needs only to browse the Shāhnāma of Ferdowsī in order to come across battle formations throughout the text, an observation that cannot be dismissed on account of Ferdowsī’s poetic imagination. In fact, as opposed to considering the explicit information given on Sasanian battle formations in the conquest accounts as a mere topos, we should reckon it an extremely valuable tool for deciphering the identities of the leaders of the factions involved in the Sasanian war efforts at this crucial juncture of their history. The Sasanians kept records of their campaigns. To argue that the “credibility of these statements—in which the names of the commanders, and their battle formations have been given in specific battles—] is . . . weakened by the occurrence of rhyming names such as Bandaway/Tiraway,” is only to betray unfamiliarity, replete in studies of the late antique period, with the Iranian side of events. Bandaway, whose name is in fact misspelled to utter illegibility—easily rectified with reference to Justi’s Iranisches Namenbuch—was in fact Vinduyih. Tiraway, that is Tiruyih, is a theophoric name after one of the Yazatas of the Iranian religious pantheon, Tir. And the suffix -uyih contained in the aforementioned names, as well as in others such as Shiruyih and Gurduyih, is regularly used in Iranian names. Ironically, both Vinduyih and Tiruyih were historical figures and none other than the sons of the Parthian dynast Vistāhm of the Ispahbudhān family. They participated, quite logically and appropriately, therefore, in the forces that were brought to the war front against the Arab armies by the Parthian Ispahbudhān dynastic family of Rustam. The fact that Bandaway was named after his murdered uncle, Vinduyih, in commemoration

881 In fact, as it has been justifiably observed, one of the chief problems of the Sasanian army was that “the Persians placed too great a reliance on the presence of their leader: the moment the commander fell or fled, his men gave way regardless of the course of action.” As we shall see, there were good reasons for this. Shahbazi 1991a, p. 498.
883 Noth 1994, p. 112.
884 Justi 1895.
885 Ibn al-Athir, Izz al-Din, Al-Kāmil fi l-Tarīkh, Beirut, 1862, edited by C.J. Tornberg (Ibn al-Athir 1862), vol. 2, p. 436. See also page 187ff, as well as the genealogical tree of the Ispahbudhān family on page 471.
886 As we will argue below on page 187, Rustam was a grandson of Vistāhm’s brother Vinduyih.
of this illustrious member of the family, makes perfect sense, and is not a fig-
ment of the imagination of the authors or the collectors of these traditions.
The names of these figures rhyme because they use suffixes prevalent in Iranian
naming practice.

3.1.1 Futūḥ

The superficial incomprehensibility of this period of Sasanian history, 628–632
CE, is further confounded by the fact that a whole new genre of Islamic histo-
riography professes to give historical accounts of events that presumably tran-
spired shortly after this period, namely the futūḥ narratives. The Arab bias
inherent in this genre of Islamic histories, one of the avowed purposes of which
was to highlight the meritocracy of the Arab generals and tribes who under-
took the Islamic conquests and established the Muslim polity, dominated the
historiography of the early Islamic period and possibly even constructed the
Arabist bias that dominates contemporary scholarship. As a result, while mod-
ern scholarship has been busy researching which Arab tribe at which juncture
and for what purpose chose to participate—or did not actually participate—in
which battles under the command of which Arab general, it has practically
all but written off any effort in reconstructing some of the same, potentially
analogous, variables for this period of Sasanian history from an Iranian per-
spective. In some very crucial sense the victors have managed to write the
Iranian history of late antiquity. Our efforts in rectifying the skewed recon-
struction of this period of Iranian history, however, will prove rewarding, for
they will explicate not only the ultimate success of the Arab conquests of Sasa-
nian territories and the dissolution of the Sasanian polity from the perspective

\[887\] See footnote 869.

\[888\] If one is predominantly interested in constructing the political dimensions of early Arabo-
Islamic history and polity, prosopography might very well be the only viable methodology at our
 disposal, as Crone has argued, and as both she and Donner—both also addressing the religious
dimensions of the emerging polity—have successfully undertaken for early Islamic history. As one
of Donner’s latest works on the subject emphasizes, the two approaches have more in common than
meets the eye at first sight. See Donner, Fred M., ‘Centralized Authority and Military Autonomy
in the Early Islamic Conquest’, in Averil Cameron and Lawrence I. Conrad (eds.), The Byzantine
and Early Islamic Near East, III: States, Resources and Armies, pp. 337–361, Princeton, 1995 (Donner
1999), p. 341 and n. 3; Crone 1982, especially p. 15; and Donner 1981, especially the appendices,

\[889\] In The Challenge to the Empires, admittedly, two diagrams seek to reconstruct the family tree
of one of the Parthian dynastic families, the Ispahbudhan family, which we shall further study.
However, the commentaries provided for these family trees are so dismissive that they make these
very charts superfluous. Ṭabarī 1993, pp. xxxi–xxxii.

\[890\] Our point of reference here is the interregnum period 628–632 and the conquest of Iran up
until the 650s. Nöldeke’s investigation for the interregnum remains the last serious effort in this
direction. Numerous other works that have dealt with this period from a general perspective will
be cited as we proceed.
of Iranian history, but also important aspects of the sociopolitical history of the northern and eastern quarters of Iran during the first two post-conquest centuries.

In assessing the reliability of the information provided by our sources about the events in Iran, however, an examination of the material at our disposal obliges us to unequivocally side with Noth’s assertion that the topic of Iran was one of the primary themes of early Arabic historical tradition. Noth argues justifiably that the information on Iran has been for the most part “connected with the theme of futūḥ in such a manner as to explain Muslim successes through Sasanian precedents, while at the same time identifying the futūḥ of Islam as the cause of certain developments in Iranian history.”

The futūḥ narratives, primarily those of Tabari, are based substantially on the traditions of Sayf b. ‘Umar. All of the futūḥ accounts of this period of Iranian history contain a serious

891 The wealth of literature that has addressed this specific issue thus far has fallen short of arriving at a satisfactory answer. The contention that the Arab conquests can be explained in terms of the “fortuitous weakness of the Byzantines and Sasanians just when the Muslims began their expansion . . . [raise the question of] whether the mighty empires were not weaker in the eyes of the scholars baffled by the astounding success of the conquests than they were in actual fact,” gives very little credit to what has been termed one of the greatest wars of late antiquity, that between the Byzantines and the Sasanians from 603–628 or the internal dynamics of either of these two empires during the previous centuries. Donner 1981, pp. 8–9. Kaegi 1992, passim.

892 We will provide in this study only a detailed political investigation of these two centuries for the Tabaristan region; see Chapter 4.


894 We know next to nothing of the life of Sayf b. ‘Umar, the compiler of early Islamic history, “except that he lived in Kufa . . ., probably belonged to the Usayyid clan,” of the Tamim tribe, and possibly died during the reign of Harun al-Rashid (170–193 AH/786–809 CE). We also know that medieval hadith specialists denigrated him, considered his material as untrustworthy, and accused him of being a zandik (see §5.2.5). Sayf in fact did not belong to their circle. Indeed most of the authorities to whom Sayf credits the source of his information are unknown figures of early Islamic history. Yet, as Blankenship argues, Sayf’s traditions “made an enormous impact on the Islamic historical tradition, especially because Tabari chose to rely mainly on them for the events of 11 [sic]-36 (632 [sic]-56), a period that spanned the reigns of the first three caliphs and included all the conquests of Iraq, Syria, Egypt and Iran . . . The overwhelming bulk of [Tabari’s] material for this period is from Sayf.” In spite of his importance, and solitary efforts to the contrary notwithstanding, however, Sayf’s material remains one of the most maligned corpora of early Arabic histories. Blankenship, summing up the consensus of the medieval and modern muhaddithun, proclaims in his introduction to the volume on the conquest of Iraq and Syria, for example, that Sayf’s materials “belong more to the realm of historical romance than to that of history.” One internet blogger even maintained recently that if Sayf were to be resurrected, he would kill him! See Blankenship’s preface to Tabari 1993, pp. xii–xxx. Important exceptions to the negative scholarly assessments of Sayf include Landua-Tasseron, Ella, ‘Sayf b. ‘Umar in Medieval and Modern Scholarship’, Der Islam 67, (1990), pp. 1–26 (Landua-Tasseron 1990); Donner 1981, pp. 143–144, p. 303, n. 36, p. 306, n. 94, p. 317, n. 212, p. 319, n. 247, p. 333, n. 118, and p. 338, n. 179; Crone 1980, pp. 9–10, and p. 206, n. 51. Also see Donner, Fred M., ‘Sayf b. ‘Umar’, in P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, and W.P. Heinrichs (eds.), Encyclopaedia of Islam, Leiden, 2007b (Donner 2007b) and Robinson, Chase, ‘The Conquest of Khuzistan: a Historiographical Reassessment’, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 68, (2004), pp. 14–39 (Robinson 2004), p. 38. As Donner maintains, “a definitive study of the historiographical complexities of all Sayf’s traditions remains an important desideratum.” The assessment of the present author of Sayf’s material will become amply clear at the conclusion of this chapter.
problematic, however: their chronology. While Sayf, and the sources that follow him, provide significant information about this period of Iranian history, 628–632 CE, they give these while detailing the initial conquest of Iraq, dated to the years 12–13 AH/633–634 CE, under the presumed command of Khalid b. Walid and Muthannā b. Haritha. While current scholarship acknowledges the problematic nature of this chronology and, while all admit that the course and details of this initial stage of the conquest of Iran are hard to reconstruct, the basic chronology of this phase of the Arab conquest of Mesopotamia has been accepted as 12–13 AH/633–634 CE. The present study will offer a revised chronology for this crucial juncture of Middle Eastern history, the early Arab conquest of Iraq. While doing so, we shall not provide an exhaustive and critical survey of these conquests. In fact, we shall neither be dealing with a detailed itinerary of the conquests, nor the topography or sociopolitical context of the Mesopotamian society on the eve of the Arab conquest. Neither will we be concerned with the logistic of wars on either side. These have been addressed admirably by other scholars. As we shall see, however, if the postulates that we are offering are valid, they will have important implications for a number of crucial issues in those debates that address early Islamic history, especially those that concern chronology, but also those that address the causes of the conquests. With these debates, we shall not engage in the course of the pages that will follow, for all deserve independent studies on their own. Having provided this disclaimer, a number of general observations must, nevertheless, frame our subsequent analysis.

### 3.1.2 Revisiting Sayf’s dating

Three primary themes have been confounded in the histories of the early conquest of Iraq: the overriding themes of 1) the *ridda* (or wars of apostasy), 2) the *futūh*, and 3) Iran. Sayf seems to have been the first to have combined these three themes. What complicates matters, however, is that secondary themes have been superimposed on these primary themes. The conquest narratives are arranged, especially in the works of Ṭabarī and other classical authors,
which, in turn, are based predominantly on the traditions of Sayf and analogous sources, in both an annalistic fashion as well as according to the rule of particular caliphs, in this case Abu Bakr and Umar. Now, as Noth notes, the “original arrangement of the great majority of traditions collected” in the works of such authors as Tabari, could not have been the annalistic structure we currently possess. “The formula and in this year (wa fī hādhībi l-sanna / wa fīhā) does not belong to the [originally transmitted] text.” Collections of material arranged according to the rule of caliphs, also typical of the work of Tabari and others, moreover, appeared even later than the annalistic style in Islamic historiography, long after the conquest narratives were first formulated. These annalistic and caliphal arrangements, as Noth observes, were secondary themes in this literature.

Hijra calendar
The problem of reconciling Sayf’s account of Iran for this period with his accounts of the early conquest of Iraq is further confounded by the fact that the annalistic style adopted in these reports is based on the hijra calendar. Now, as we know, a uniform chronology that was established with reference to the migration (hijra) of Prophet Muhammad from Mecca to Medina (conventionally dated to 622 CE) “was first introduced under ‘Umar in 16 AH/637 CE (the years 17 and 18 are also named).” As Noth observes, even several decades after Umar introduced this dating the “confusion that prevailed ... and the arbitrary manner in which hijra dates were imposed in later times, is clear ... [S]harp and irresolvable contradiction[s] ... prevail ... on not only dating, but even the order, of even the most central events in this history of the expansion of Islam.” This of course is a perfectly understandable situation given the limitations affecting the dissemination of information in the post-conquest

903 Noth perceptively maintained that both of these themes, the annalistic style and the caliphal arrangement, were secondary themes of the early Arabic historical tradition. Secondary themes, according to Noth, were all those themes that can be considered as offshoots of primary themes. These themes “are of no fundamental use in reconstructing what actually happened, however plausible and logical they may appear.” Noth 1994, pp. 39–48. As we shall see shortly, another important secondary theme is the hijra calendar.

904 Noth 1994, p. 43.

905 Noth 1994, p. 45.


907 As the hijra calendar is a lunar calendar without intercalary months, it is about 11 days shorter than a solar year as used in the Sasanian and Gregorian calendars. Since therefore 100 hijra years correspond roughly to 97 solar years, and since 1 AH corresponds to 622 CE, an approximate conversion between the two calendars is given by the formula $CE = 621 + 97 \times AH$ (this formula is only correct for the first few centuries AH, and even then only of course when ignoring the particular month of the year).


centuries and given that “the Arabs in earliest Islamic times were for the most part unfamiliar with any formal chronological system.”

How then is Sayf’s report on the early conquest of Iraq arranged? And what kind of relationship does this arrangement have with his account on the conditions prevailing in Iran in the period between 628–632 CE?

In Sayf’s narratives, the early conquests of Iranian territories in Iraq are arranged according to both hijra dates and reigns of particular Sasanian kings or queens. Sayf’s account puts these during the caliphates of Abū Bakr (632–634) and Umar (634–644), specifically during the years 12–13 AH/633–634 CE, that is, after the death of the Prophet in 632 CE. As Blankenship observes, Ṭabarī devotes a major section of his work to only these two years of the conquest of the Fertile Crescent. What is more, the space devoted to the conquest of Iraq in this section of Ṭabarī is double that devoted to the conquest of Syria.

While major debates have surrounded crucial aspects of these conquests, and while substantive issues have been raised, thus far the investigations of this initial phase of the conquest of Iraq have adopted this hijra dating wholesale. Following Ṭabarī’s arrangement, this is how the translated volume of this section of Ṭabarī is organized, for example. For the most part, the chronology of the accounts of these conquests—which include the battle of Madhār, the battle of Walajah, the battle of ‘Ayn Tamr, the battle of Firād, the battle of Namārīq, and finally the battle of Bridge (the former four dated by Sayf to 12 AH/633 CE, and the latter two to 13 AH/634 CE)—as told by Ṭabarī, through Sayf and other sources, have been followed in most of the secondary literature, their major flaws being noted intermittently.

The hijra chronology provided in the accounts of the futūḥ, however, occur side-by-side with a different set of chronological indicators, those of the rules of

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910 Noth 1994, p. 41.
911 This comprises the whole of the translated volume, The Challenge to the Empires (Ṭabarī 1993, de Goeje, 2016–2212).
912 Ṭabarī 1993, p. xiii.
913 In this context we have to reckon, for example, with the fact that the traditions detailing Khālid b. Walid’s participation in the conquest of Iraq might be spurious. Crone, Patricia, ‘Khālid b. Walid’, in Ehsan Yarshater (ed.), Encyclopaedia Iranica, p. 928a, New York, 1991a (Crone 1991a); Ṭabarī 1993, p. 1., n. 2.
914 Both Morony and Donner have argued for example that this battle seems to have taken place later. Based on this, Blankenship maintains that Madhār was “actually ... conquered by ‘Utbah b. Ghazwān later, so that Sayf’s report here is chronologically improbable.” Morony 1984, pp. 127 and 162; Donner 1981, p. 329, n. 66; Ṭabarī 1993, p. 15, n. 97. See also page 193ff below.
915 See page 195ff.
916 See page 201ff.
917 See page 201ff.
918 See page 211ff.
919 See §3.3.5.
various Sasanian kings and queens given in the course of recounting these same conquest narratives. The acute problem confronting us a result of this juxtaposition is that the two sets of chronologies do not correspond to each other.  

Almost every war that Sayf attributes to the years 12 to 13 AH (633–634 CE), is systematically attached to the particular reign of a Sasanian king or queen, Shīrūyih Qubād (628), Ardashīr III (628–630), Shahrvarāz (630), Būrāndukht (630–632), Azarmīdukht (630–631), and Farrukh Hormozd (631), ending with the inception of the rule of Yazdghird III in 632, corresponding, therefore, to the years 8–11 hijra.  

That is, based on this alternative chronology, the striking fact is that these wars fall, not as it has been conventionally believed, following the hijra calendar, in the years 633–634 CE, but between 628 and 632 CE, when the Sasanian monarchy was engulfed in a factional strife spearheaded by its nobility. As we shall see, there is such a cogent internal logic between the conquest accounts of particular important battles and the events that transpired under the rule of specific Sasanian kings or queens associated with each of them, that these two traditions could never have been haphazardly juxtaposed next to each other by the original narrators of these events or the subsequent collectors of the traditions. Unlike the characteristic static dimensions of individual khabars (reports), furthermore, Sayf’s narrative provides us with temporal, and at times, spatial movement.

Following this alternative, Sasanian-based chronology, then, these wars or raids would have taken place almost immediately after the Byzantine–Sasanian warfare, and during the period when the two empires were in the process of negotiating their peace treaty and attempting to implement the terms of it. This, for example, might explain the cooperation of the Byzantines and the Persians in the war that Sayf reports as Firād—attached by him to the year 12 AH (633 CE)—when the Byzantines as well as the Persians became “hot and angry … and sought reinforcements from the Taghlib, Iyād and Namir,” and encouraged each other to keep “[their] sovereignty in [their] own hands.” If we follow the Sasanian chronological indicators, therefore, this war took place not as reported by Sayf and traditionally accepted in 12 AH/633 CE, but after Ardashīr III’s deposition and around the time when the Byzantines were inciting Shahrvarāz to assume power, that is around 9 AH/630 CE, a period in which

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921 While Greek, Syriac, Armenian, and Coptic sources have been used, unsuccessfully, in order to comparatively resolve these chronological inconsistencies, no examination of the Sasanian chronological indicators have thus far been undertaken. Notth 1994, p. 42.

922 For our revised chronology for this queen, see §3.3.4 below.

923 To avoid confusion, we will provide henceforth only a hijra date when it is pertinent to our discussion.

924 See footnote 934.

925 The following examples are only given as illustration, and will be discussed in more detail in their appropriate context below.

926 Tabari 1993, p. 67, de Goeje, 2074.

927 Tabari 1993, p. 47, de Goeje, 2056.
Byzantine–Sasanian cooperation in fact would make perfect sense.928 Similarly, Ḥamza Iṣfahānī maintains, for example, that “the arrival of Khālid b. Walīd in Hīrā coincided with the regency of Būrāndukht and 12 years after the hijra . . . for Būrāndukht’s regency took place toward the end of the caliphate of Abū Bakr . . . [She ruled] three months in the period of Abū Bakr and four months in the period of ʿUmar.”929 Now, the chronological indicator of Būrāndukht’s regency would put the arrival of Khālid b. Walīd sometime in the years 629–631 CE, or possibly in 632 CE,930 during which period the cooperation of the Byzantines, the Arabs and the Iranians would still make sense. The chronological indicator equating the regency of Būrāndukht with 12 years after the hijra . . . toward the end of the caliphate of Abū Bakr [in 634 CE], however, would throw the whole thing off, for clearly it was not Būrāndukht who ruled in 634 CE, but Yazdgird III. How then can we possibly circumvent this and attempt to reconcile the two accounts, when faced with such blatant chronological confusion?

An objective methodology warrants that the Sasanian chronological indicators given by Sayf be taken more seriously than his hijra dating. There are no legitimate reasons for ignoring these Sasanian chronological indicators.931 After all, the chronology of the rule of important Sasanian kings and queens during this period—for whom we even have numismatic evidence—although still problematic, is nevertheless comparatively far better established than the uncertain early hijra calendar superimposed post facto onto these narratives. Here, therefore, we have an independent chronological scheme against which we can gauge our hijra dating. There should be no reason, therefore, to dismiss Sayf’s often maintained, alternative chronological indicators which place these wars in the period between 628–632 CE. The inertia in tackling this question of chronology has been conditioned by an uncritical acceptance of what the futūḥ narratives promote as the ideological locomotive of these wars, namely, that these wars were driven by the presumed policies of the first two Muslim caliphs after the death of the Prophet.

The methodology we propose for tackling the chronological confusion that permeates the futūḥ narratives comprises a threefold scheme. First, in §3.2 and

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928See §3.2.3. Sayf’s contention that the Byzantines, Persians, and Arab tribes cooperated together in this war, and were defeated by Khālid b. Walīd, has therefore led Fück to argue that this is a dubious piece of information. Fück, J.W., ‘Iyyād’, in P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, and W.P. Heinrichs (eds.), Encyclopaedia of Islam, Leiden, 2007 (Fück 2007) apud Ṭabarī 1993, p. 67, n. 383. According to our proposed revised chronology, however, Fück’s argument becomes moot, as we shall see.


930For Būrāndukht’s double regency, see §3.3, especially page 203ff, and §3.3.4, especially 210ff; for her dates based on a reassessment of the new and old numismatic evidence, see page 208ff.

931At the very least, one ought to satisfactorily answer why some of these wars are so systematically and seemingly anachronistically attached to the rule of ephemeral Sasanian kings and queens of this period.
the first part of §3.3, we will collect the information on the conditions prevailing in Iran during the reign of the Sasanian kings and queens who ruled from the deposition of Khusrow II in 628 to the accession of Yazdgird III in 632 CE, from sources that have their purview outside the provenance of the early Arabic historical tradition and the *futuh* narratives.\(^{932}\) Then, starting in §3.3.2, we shall turn to Sayf’s account of the conquest. Here, we shall temporarily ignore the *hijra* dates provided by Sayf and other *futuh* literature on the early conquest of Iraq and Iran, as well as any information pertaining to Arab generals, and concentrate instead on the data given for the conditions prevailing in Iran in these same accounts. Here, in other words, we shall proceed from the assumption that the information provided by the *futuh* literature on Iran on this juncture of Sasanian history ought to be collected and examined as if it originated from a separate, independent corpus.\(^{933}\)

Finally, we shall investigate how the information provided by Sayf in the course of his narrative on the early conquest of Iraq correlates with the Sasanian data of the same period that we had initially collected, in order to determine the internal logic of the information provided by Sayf. Based on this methodology, we shall conclude that, because Sayf’s information about internal Sasanian affairs in the context of his account of the early conquest of Iraq proves to be solid, these two sets of data, so systematically connected to each other, must, therefore, be interrelated. So much so that at some crucial junctures one set of events in fact explains the other. In the historical memory of the participants and early narrators of these events, these early conquests were so forcefully related to the conditions prevailing in Iran and to the reigns of specific Sasanian kings and queens of this period, that they inevitably maintained these connections.\(^{934}\) We shall conclude, therefore, that the events which Sayf systematically attaches to the rule of a particular Sasanian monarch did in fact transpire in that period and not at the *hijra* dates proposed by him.

\textit{Xw\textsuperscript{w}ad\textsuperscript{w}ay-N\textsuperscript{w}amag tradition}

In assessing the reliability of the information provided on Iran by Sayf for these crucial four years, 628–632, we are fortunate in that we are not simply confined to the accounts of the conquest. Besides these we can resort to Persian and Arabic sources that have their provenance in the \textit{Xw\textsuperscript{w}ad\textsuperscript{w}ay-N\textsuperscript{w}amag} tradition,\(^{935}\) foreign sources such as Sebeos—which probably are themselves based on Persian sources—and numismatic and sigillographic evidence. The fount of all of these sources, needless to say, is completely outside that of the *futuh* literature. A separate section of Ţabari details the accounts of the Sasanian dynasty including

\(^{932}\) We will discuss the nature of these sources shortly.

\(^{933}\) Albeit this will only be a working hypothesis, for as we shall see, we do not believe this to be the case.

\(^{934}\) We are well aware that the information contained in the *futuh* narratives was originally collected as individual short *khabars* on the conquest of particular districts, cities, or regions. Noth 1994, p. 32. Also see Leder 1992.

\(^{935}\) See also our discussion on page 13.
those monarchs ruling during the period of our concern. As has been estab-
lished during the past century, this section of Ṭabarī as well as all most other
sources dealing with this period of Iranian history, were most probably based
on the various renditions of the Xwadāy-Nāmag tradition, and hence completely
independent from the futūh literature.\footnote{Most of the narratives contained in this part of Ṭabarī’s opus do not contain a sanad, and the
three or so that do are attributed to ʿIkramah, Ibn Iṣḥāq, or Hīshām b. Muḥammad. See respectively, Ṭabarī 1999, pp. 324–327, de Goeje, 1005–1007; Ṭabarī 1999, p. 335, de Goeje, 1013; and Ṭabarī 1999, p. 379, de Goeje, 1044.} The Xwadāy-Nāmag tradition has its
own problems, especially during these tumultuous years. Nevertheless, as we
hope to show, the greater scheme of the events transpiring in Iran can be re-
constructed with reference to these sources. The material provided by Ṣayf not
only corroborates these outside sources, but also adds significantly to the informa-
tion contained in them. What we shall be attempting to do, in other words, is
to ignore the artificial rupture that is contained within our sources, where
the futūh literature is thought to have begun when the Xwadāy-Nāmag tradition
is reaching its end with the inception of Yazdgird III’s rule. The net effect of
this rupture in our sources has created a situation in which it has been difficult
to understand the progression of the conquests in the context of the events that
are transpiring in Iran itself during this period. Specifically, it has been hard to
examine the successes and the failures of the Sasanian army against the Arabs
during this period in the context of the alliances and rivalries unfolding within
Iran.\footnote{Walter Kaegi reflects on a similar problem when dealing with the Arab conquests of Byzantine
territories. Investigating the chronological or regional structures of the Arabic sources on the
conquest of Byzantine territories, Kaegi observes that these “structures of organization have their
value and of course without specific chronological references the task of the historian would be even
more formidable.” He notes, however, that what “has been lost in all these narratives, irrespective
of the reliability of the traditions that they report, is any understanding of the interrelationship and
potential coherence of those events.” Kaegi further argues justifiably that “there is always the danger
that coherence can be overemphasized . . . But the disconnected and fragmentary historical ap-
proach has tended, unconsciously, to obscure the inter-connections between the warfare and diplomacy
in Syria and that of Egypt and Byzantine Mesopotamia.” Kaegi 1992, p. 13. The nature of the predica-
ment of the Iranist investigating this juncture of Sasanian history is, therefore, quite analogous to
that of the Byzantinist.}

Once we have disentangled and streamlined the confusing narratives of the
last quarter of a century of Sasanian history beginning with the murder of Khus-
row II Parviz in 628, a major theme emerges. Although the bewildering array
of personalities and groups do not seem to lend themselves at first to any logical
or systematic understanding, they actually partake in a quite comprehensible
dynamic that bespeaks the course of Sasanian history: the struggle of the Pārsīg
against the Pahlav. As we shall see, the Sasanian–Parthian confederacy finally
exhausted itself in the last decades of Sasanian history. In this final period of
Sasanian history, a regional dynamic superimposed itself on all other contextual
historical givens. The quarters of the north and the east, where the regional
power of all the dynastic Parthian families thus far examined was concentrated,
ultimately ceded from those of the south and the west with the end result that
the house of Sāsān, which so successfully had managed to link these regions
together through the course of four centuries, was finally destroyed. There was
order within the chaos of latter day Sasanian history. And while we do not
claim to be able to explain this process in all of its sociopolitical complexities,
and while we are cognizant of other crucial factors that affected this period
of Sasanian history—of which the Sasanian wars against the Byzantines during
Khusrow II’s reign surely take the lion’s share of the responsibility for explain-
ing the economic and political exhaustion of the empire—it is the contours of
the Sasanian–Parthian confederacy and its final collapse, that we shall attempt
to elucidate. What then were the conditions prevailing in Iran at the outset
of Khusrow II’s murder that moved the Parthian dynastic families to the final
dissolution of their confederacy with the Sasanian polity?

3.2 Shīrūyih Qubād and Ardashīr III: the three armies

As explained previously, we shall begin our reconstruction of the interregnum
period 628–632 using sources outside the futūḥ literature. The reader should
anticipate that as a result of the particular methodology adopted, layers of in-
formation will become available on a piece-meal basis, the complete picture
emerging only at the end of this chapter.

3.2.1 Shīrūyih Qubād

We recall that the deposition of Khusrow II and the appointment of his son
Shīrūyih Qubād (628) to power was brought about by the collective conspira-
cy of a number of very powerful dynastic factions. It is important to recall
that except for the Nimruzi faction led by Mīhr Hormozd, who, probably be-
longing to a branch of the Sūren family,938 had adopted the title of Pāšīq,939
most other factions involved in overthrowing Khusrow II hailed from Parthian
families: the Ispahbudhān, represented by the powerful scions of the dynasty,
Farrukh Hormozd, Farrukhzād and Rustam; a branch of the Mīhrāns, under
the leadership of Khusrow II’s kūst-i nēmrōz; Shahrvarāz; the Armenian faction, represented by the son of Smbat Bagratuni, Varaztirots’
(Javitean Khosrov);940 and finally the Kanāragāyīn.941 The Iranian forces had
at this point also broken up, we recollect, in three distinct armies: the army of
Azarbāyjān under the leadership of Farrukh Hormozd; the occupation army of
Shahrvarāz; and the army of Nimrūz, what Sebeos calls the army of Persia and
the East, under the leadership of Mīhr Hormozd.

Before we proceed with the story of the Sasanians during this turbulent pe-
riod, a word of caution is in order. In line with their monarchical bias, the

938 See footnote 850.
939 See footnotes 308 and 838.
940 Sebeos 1999, p. 53. For Smbat Bagratuni, see §2.7.2.
941 For the Kanāragāyīn family’s agnatic background, see page 266ff.
sources at our disposal attribute substantial powers to the short-lived monarchs who ruled Iran from the deposition of Khusrow II onward. As the pendulum of Sasanian history had now swung in favor of the dynastic families, however, this was rarely the case, and certainly not for Khusrow II’s successor, Shīrūyih Qubād. Sebeos and some of the accounts based on the Xwādāy-Nāmag tradition make it appear as though Shīrūyih Qubād held a great deal of power. The peace treaty with Heraclius and the termination of the hostilities with Byzantium are both attributed to his actions. The appointment of Varaztirot’s, the son of Smbat Bagratuni, as the tanutēr of Iranian-controlled Armenia, where he enlisted the support of some of the other Armenian factions, is also attributed to Shīrūyih Qubād. Some Arabic sources based on the Xwādāy-Nāmag tradition even depict Shīrūyih Qubād as a despot and, tangentially, as a womanizer.

In order to drive home the latter aspect of the king’s personality, Ferdowsī includes an account of how Shīrūyih Qubād attempted to woo Shirin, the favorite wife of his father, Khusrow II Parviz, into marrying him. Shīrūyih Qubād might very well have been a womanizer. It is doubtful, however, that a king who was brought to power by the collective conspiracy of the dynastic families, had any substantial power at his disposal. The peace treaty with Heraclius was, as we have seen, instigated by Shahvarāz and the Prince of the Medes, Farrukh Hormozd. Shīrūyih Qubād, in fact, was born to Khusrow II through Maryam, the Byzantine emperor’s daughter. It might very well have been the case, therefore, that in their selection of Shīrūyih Qubād as king, the factions also considered the young king’s Byzantine connection. The support of the Armenian Varaztirot’s, moreover, was also most certainly made with the understanding that Varaztirot’s would continue to function as the tanutēr of Armenia under the new king. Shīrūyih Qubād’s acquiescence to this expectation was most probably already written into his promotion to the throne.

Shīrūyih Qubād’s minister Firūzān

Ferdowsī, in fact, graphically portrays the powerlessness of the youthful Shīrūyih Qubād in the hands of the nobility. He depicts him as being frightened and inexperienced (tarsandih o khām). When the dynastic factions had pressured Shīrūyih Qubād into killing his father, Khusrow II, the king was acting “like a

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942 Sebeos 1999, pp. 84–85.
943 According to Sebeos the “king Kawat [i.e., Shīrūyih Qubād] summoned Varaztirot’s, son of Smbat Bagratuni, called Kosrov Shum, and gave him the office of tanutēr. He made him marzpan [marzbān], and sent him to Armenia with [authority over] all his ancestral possessions in order to keep in prosperity.” Sebeos 1999, pp. 86–87. Sebeos in fact equates the office of tanutēr with the title Kosrov-Shum (Khusrow Shenūm). Ibid., p. 49.
945 This queen Shirin, probably of Armenian descent, is also the main character in the medieval romance of Shirin and Farhād, where this time her suitor, Farhād, was an architect at Khusrow II Parviz’s court. Nizāmī, Ganjavi, Khusrow o Shirin, London, 1844, edited N. Bland (Nizāmī 1844).
946 See page 149ff.
slave in their pawns,” fearful of disobeying their collective order.

Whereas, as we have seen, one set of traditions, including Ferdowsi’s, depicts the Pahlav dynast Zâd Farrukh (Farrukhzâd) as the primary instigator of both Khusrow II’s deposition and Shiruyih Qubâd’s promotion, and hence as the one in control of the young king,

other sources emphasize the role of a Fayruz, Firûzân, or Pirûz, as he is variously called. Shiruyih Qubâd’s murder of seventeen of his brothers, for example, is said to have been instigated by this same Firûzân, called the minister of Shiruyih Qubâd by Tabari. The Nihâyat also belongs to the set of traditions which maintain that Firûz ran state affairs under Shiruyih Qubâd. In the Shâhnâma, he is called Pirûz Khusrow, and is depicted as the commander of the army. The identity of this Firûzân is crucial for understanding the subsequent events. For now it is sufficient to note that this Firûzân, belonging to the same camp as the Nimruzis, as we shall see, ultimately assumed leadership of the Parsig. The factions responsible for bringing down Khusrow II Parviz, therefore, continued to take charge of affairs during the rule of Shiruyih Qubad.

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948 Ferdowsi 1971, vol. IX, p. 280; Ferdowsi 1935, p. 2933:

949 See §2.7.6.

950 Nöldeke 1879, pp. 381–382, Nöldeke 1979, p. 542. This Firûzân collaborated with a certain Shamta, one of the sons of Yazdin, “the official in charge of [the collection of the] land tax . . . from the entire lands.” Tabari 1999, p. 398, de Goeje, 1061. Bosworth notes that Nöldeke had identified Yazdin from the Syriac sources as Khusrow II’s treasurer Yazdin. Thomas of Margâ describes Shamta as the “real driving force behind the conspiracy to dethrone the Khusrow II.” As we have seen thus far, however, the conspiracy that led to the overthrow of Khusrow II Parviz involved far too many factions and was far too long in the making to have been instigated by a single individual. Nevertheless a question posed by Bosworth is worth pursuing, namely whether this Yazdin is the same figure mentioned by Sebeos as the governor of Armenia under Khusrow II Parviz. Considering the Armenian faction’s direct involvement in the overthrow of Khusrow II, this is by no means unlikely. Tabari 1999, p. 398, n. 980, de Goeje, 1061.

951 He is referred to as Barmak b. Firûz in the Nihâyat. Nihâyat 1996, p. 438:

In Balkamî’s account, Shiruyih Qubâd’s minister is called Firûz (Firûzân) and considered the ancestor of the Barmakids. This tradition is most probably spurious for the ancestors of the Barmakids were likely either Zoroastrian high priests, or Buddhist chiefs of the Nowbahâr temple in Balkh. The tradition, however, even if forged, and especially if forged, is nevertheless extremely significant, for it testifies to the continued currents of consciousness of Parsig identity through the eighth century and thereafter. The Barmakids also held the governorship of Fars, and it might have been in this region that this ancestral pedigree was attached to them. Balkami 1959, p. 253. For the Barmakids, see Abbas, I., ‘Barmakids’, in Ehsan Yarshater (ed.), Encyclopaedia Iranica, pp. 806–809, New York, 1991 (Abbas 1991).

952 According to Ferdowsi, Bûrândukht killed a Pârûz Khusrow, which therefore this time cannot be Firûzân, as he only died around 642 at the battle of Nihâvand (see page 241ff). Ferdowsi 1971, pp. 305–306.

953 For more details on Firûzân, see page 196 below.

175
The Byzantine–Sasanian peace treaty

Shiruyih Qubad’s powerlessness is also apparent in the decision-making process that led to the Byzantine–Sasanian peace treaty, bringing thirty years of warfare to an end. As we have seen and shall further elaborate upon, our evidence suggests that the peace treaty between the Persians and the Byzantines was concluded not only as the result of an understanding reached by Shahrvaraz and Heraclius, but also with the cooperation of Farrukh Hormozd and his sons Rustam and Farrukhzad, who, at this juncture of Sasanian history, probably represented all the factions, including the Nimruzi faction. As in later periods, all the contextual evidence at our disposal highlights the fact that the Prince of the Medes was involved in the negotiations that resulted in the peace proposals of 629. We should recall that during the third phase of the Byzantine–Sasanian war, Heraclius’ army had overrun the territories of the Prince of the Medes (Farrukh Hormozd) in 624. When in 8 April 628, the Sasanian king Shiruyih Qubad is said to have dispatched a letter proposing peace to the Byzantine emperor Heraclius, the latter was encamped in Gandzak, the territory of the Prince of the Medes in Azarbajjan. A peace treaty with the Byzantines now in partial control of his territories suited therefore the purposes of Farruk Hormozd admirably.

It took a while, however, to effect Shahrvaraz’s agreement to the peace treaty. For as Sebeos informs us, when Shahrvaraz was “ordered [ostensibly by Shiruyih Qubad to] collect his troops, come back to Persia, and abandon Greek territory ... [the latter] did not wish to obey that order.” According to Kaegi, it was in all probability only after Heraclius met with Shahrvaraz in July 629, that the latter agreed to withdraw his forces. Shahrvaraz’s initial...

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954 Sebeos’ account hints as much. For, prior to making peace, the king took “council with the nobles of his kingdom.” Sebeos 1999, p. 85.
956 The intimate relations between the Prince of the Medes and the Byzantines is, in fact, specifically highlighted for later periods. In describing the coalition that was being formed in 642–643 between the Byzantines, the Armenians, and the Ishapbudhan, Sebeos informs us that in his capacity as the successor to his father the Prince of the Medes (Farrukh Hormozd), Farrukhzad had already made a pact with the Byzantine emperor Constans II (Constantine, 641–668), the grandson of Heraclius, who had become the new emperor of Byzantium. The newly appointed governor of Armenia, Tu’mas “did not wish to break the pact between the emperor and the [son of the] Prince of the Medes. He brought all the princes [of Armenia] into agreement with himself, went to the [son of the] Prince of the Medes and made peace proposals to him. He received from him many gifts, and promised him with an oath that he would have T’iodoros brought in bonds to the palace, because he was the prince of Armenia.” Sebeos 1999, p. 107. We should add here that the epithet Prince of the Medes is applied by Sebeos also to other members of the family, as it is here to Farrukhzad (Khorokzhat).
957 See page 149ff.
958 Sebeos 1999, p. 222.
959 Sebeos 1999, p. 86.
960 The True Cross, the relic believed to be the cross upon which Jesus was crucified, was taken as a trophy to Khosrow II in 614. Its return to Jerusalem on 21 March 630, after the peace agreement with Shahrvaraz, therefore, only took place toward the end of the reign of Ardashir III. Kaegi 1992,
refusal to abide by this peace treaty indicates that, while his army was still in the western war-ridden territories, the affairs of the kingdom were conducted not only by Firuzan and the army of Nimirz, but also by the Ispahbudhan Farrukh Hormozd and the army of Azarbayjân. Being absent from the center, it was this collaboration that must have been worrisome to Shahrvaraz.

Heraclius, cognizant of the rivalries among the dynastic families, took full advantage of the situation, for he played the two important factions, the Mihrânid Shahrvaraz and the Ispahbudhan Farrukh Hormozd, against one another. Upon the death of Shiruyih Qubad in 628, Heraclius wrote to Shahrvaraz, whose armies were still in control of substantial sections of Byzantine territory: Now that the Iranian king is dead, “the throne and the kingdom has come to you. I bestow it on you, and on your offspring after you. If an army is necessary, I shall send to your assistance as many [troops] as you may need.” This gesture persuaded Shahrvaraz. For in the face of Farrukh Hormozd and the Sistan contingent’s alliance, a collaboration between the Byzantine emperor and Shahrvaraz was a necessity. Howard–Johnston, while dismissing any prior understanding between Heraclius and Shahrvaraz in 626 as political propaganda articulated by the Byzantines, maintains that that was no longer the case in the events that transpired at the end of Shiruyih Qubad’s reign, for by “629 . . . both Heraclius and Sharvaraz had compelling reasons for reaching an accommodation.” What were these compelling reasons for both sides? Heraclius’ predicament was clear enough. Shahrvaraz was the commander-in-chief of the actual occupation forces in control of substantial sections of the Byzantine territory.

Shahrvaraz, on the other hand, was very well aware that his faction was only one of the factions side-by-side of the Ispahbudhan, the Nimruz, the Armenians, and the Kanârangiyân that had participated in deposing Khusrow II Parviz. As the two traditions discussed above bear witness, moreover, during Shiruyih Qubad’s rule, the Ispahbudhan with their army of Atrapatan

pp. 66 and 67 respectively.
961Heraclius probably realized that Shahrvaraz’s army on its own could not reckon with the combined forces of the army of Azarbayjân and the army of Nimruz.
962Sebeos 1999, p. 88.
963The “allegation [contained in Chronique de Seert, Tabari and Dionysius] should probably be rejected as a piece of deliberate disinformation, circulated to further Roman interests as the war reached a climax in 627–628 CE.” Sebeos 1999, p. 223.
964Sebeos 1999, p. 223.
965As the peace treaty between the Byzantine emperor and the Mihrânid dynast makes clear, these included the territories of Jerusalem, Caesaria in Palestine, all the regions of Antioch, Tarsus in Cilicia, and the greater part of Armenia. Sebeos 1999, p. 224. It is extremely noteworthy that in the stipulations of the terms of this treaty Shahrvaraz was not willing to abandon all the advantages that the Sasanian forces of Khusrow II had gained in the course of the war. According to Howard–Johnston, “Chronique de Seert 724 states unequivocally that the Euphrates was recognized as the frontier between them, implying thereby that Shahrvaraz had insisted on retaining some of the territory beyond the traditional post-387 frontier which he and his troops had conquered, that is, the Roman provinces of Mesopotamia and Osrhoene which lay east of the Euphrates (with their principal cities, Amida and Edessa).” Sebeos 1999, p. 224.
(Azarbâyjân) and the Nîmrûzî faction of Firûzân had forged an alliance under the leadership of the powerful and towering figure of the Prince of the Medes, Farrukh Hormozd. Hence, as Howard–Johnston explains, “Sharvaraz needed to strengthen his position now that he was at odds with the government in Ctesiphon.” Shirûyih Qubâd managed to stay in power for six to seven months only. Tâbarî does not give an account of how he met his demise. In anticipation of our examination of the futûb narratives, and jumping ahead of our story for a moment, we should underline at this point that the Xwâday-Nâmâg tradition provides a crucial piece of information about the aftermath of Shirûyih Qubâd’s death. According to Tha’âlîbî, when the puppet king died, “enemies were on the march, and from the Arab [regions] strong winds were blowing . . . Shahrvarâz also started rebelling and conquered some of the cities in Byzantium and his affairs grew strong.” According to Tha’âlîbî, therefore, at the death of Shirûyih Qubâd in 628, when the child king Ardashîr III (628–630) was elevated to kingship, the Arabs, too, were on the move against the Sasanian empire. Dinawarî also furnishes us with a chronology that closely corresponds to Tha’âlîbî’s. For according to Dinawarî, when Bûrandukht assumed power, to be discussed shortly, and the news reached the Arabs that there were no kings left to the Persians, who therefore had resorted to a woman, Muthannâ b. Ḥâritha from Hira and Muqarrin from Ubullah, together with their tribe Bakr b. Wâ’il, began attacking the Persian realm. The promotion of Bûrandukht to regency, as we shall see further, however, actually started in 630 CE.

### 3.2.2 Ardâshîr III

The next Sasanian king, Ardâshîr III (628–630), son of Shirûyih Qubâd, was only a child, by some accounts seven years of age, when he was placed upon the Sasanian throne. On his coinage he is distinctly portrayed as a child. Considering his youth, it is clear that his appointment was a symbolic act meant only to ensure the presence of a Sasanian figure on the throne of the kingdom. It goes without saying that the child king’s actual power during this period must have inhered in one or another of the factions. Our evidence indicates that the same factions which had brought Shirûyih Qubâd to power, especially those

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967 Bosworth notes that according to Ibn Qutaybah and Ibn al-Athîr, the king ultimately died from a plague that had spread through the war-ridden territories of Iraq at this juncture (for which see §3.3.2 below), while Theophanes claims that the king was poisoned. Tâbarî 1999, p. 399. n. 984.
970 See §3.3.4.

For further references for his coinage, see Tâbarî 1999, p. 401, n. 990.
of the Prince of the Medes, Farrukh Hormozd, and of the Pārsīg, promoted and—for a while at least—sustained Ardashīr III’s regency.\footnote{Agreeing with Flusin’s dating of the event, Johnston maintains that “Shahrvarāz must have exercised power initially as regent for the young Artashir, since his execution of the boy and his own ascent onto the throne took place on 27 April 630, after Artashir had reigned one year and six months.” Sebøes 1999, p. 224. None of our Arabic or Persian sources contain any reference to this.} \footnote{Justi 1895, p. 354.}

**Ardashīr III’s minister Māhādharjushnas**

One set of narratives maintains, that the minister “in charge of the child’s upbringing and carrying the administration of the kingdom” during Ardashīr III’s reign was one Mīh Adhar Jushnas or Māhādharjushnas,\footnote{According to Ṭabarī, Māhādharjushnas “carried on the administration of the kingdom in [such] an excellent fashion, [and with such] . . . firm conduct . . . [that] no one would have been aware of Arda-
shīr III’s youthfulness.”\footnote{T. Ṭabarī 1999, p. 400, de Goeje, 1061.} Other sources such as the *Shāh-nāma*, however, single out a figure called Pirūz Khusrōw. It was to Pirūz Khusrōw that the child king supposedly relegated the control of his army.\footnote{Ferdowsī 1971, vol. IX, p. 294:} \footnote{Thaʿalibī 1989, p. 464, Thaʿalibī 1900, p. 732:} There is very little doubt that Pirūz Khusrōw of Ferdowsī and Khusrōw Pirūz of Thaʿalibī are none other than Ṭabarī’s Fayrūzān (Fīrūzān), Shīrūyih Qubād’s minister responsible for instigating the king’s fratricide.\footnote{See page 174.} The two sets of narratives, therefore, betray, yet again, two separate founts of historical provenance: a Pārsīg and a Pahlav, for we will presently see that Fīrūzān and Māhādharjushnas, respectively, each belong to one of these factions continuing to sustain Ardashīr III’s kingship.

### 3.2.3 Shahrvarāz’s insurgency

A while into Ardashīr III’s reign, Shahrvarāz rebelled against the child-king under the pretext that “the great men of the state had not consulted him about
raising Ardashār III to the throne.”⁹⁷⁹ According to Ibn Balkhī, Shahrvarāz reprimanded Māhādharjushnas for not consulting him.⁹⁸⁰ Alone, however, his army could not have withstanded the combined forces of the Nimrūzī and the Pahlav.⁹⁸¹ He needed therefore to break the bonds of the recently established alliance. And so, he approached the leaders of the Pārsīg and forged an alliance with the Nimrūzīs.⁹⁸² Along with 6,000 men from among the Persian army on the Byzantine frontier, Shahrvarāz set out for the capital of the Sasanian king.⁹⁸³ Together with Nöldeke, Bosworth notes that “it was indicative of the chaos and weakness into which the Persian state had fallen that such a modest force was able to take over the capital and secure power for Shahrbarāz himself.”⁹⁸⁴ The point, however, is that the army of the Persian state had already divided into three factions in the midst of the events that led to Khusrow II’s deposition.

We recall that the Byzantine emperor had in fact encouraged Shahrvarāz to mutiny and had promised him backup forces if he needed them.⁹⁸⁵ Māhādharjushnas, confronted by the eminent arrival of Shahrvarāz and his army, took charge of protecting the king and the Sasanian capital. The conspiratorial atmosphere is reflected in an anecdote relayed by Tābarī. When Shahrvarāz’s army besieged the capital, it was unable to gain entry. In need of help, the aspiring Mihrānīd made recourse to a ruse. “He kept inciting a man named Nēw Khusrōw, who was the commander of Ardashīr III’s guard, and Nāmdār Jushnas,⁹⁸⁶ the ʿishabadh (ispahbud, spāḥbed) of Nimrūz, to treachery, until the two of them opened the gates of the city to Shahrbarāz.”⁹⁸⁷ Surely, Nāmdār Jushnas, the spāḥbed of Nimrūz, and Nēw Khusrōw, the commander of Ardashīr III’s guard, had more important affairs on their hands than to open single-handedly the gate of the city for a besieging army. Potentially, Nēw Khusrōw (the heroic Khusrōw) is most probably a substitute for Pīrūz Khusrōw (the victorious Khusrōw), and hence was none other than Firūzān, the leader of the Pārsīg. Ferdowsī clearly portrays his power, when he writes of Pīrūz Khusrōw (Firūzān): “whether young warriors or old warrior paladins, all were the cohorts of him.”⁹⁸⁸ In

⁹⁸¹ Tābarī 1999, p. 401, de Goeje, 1062. Ferdowsī 1935, p. 2227:

که اگر جدید یه شاه شهید روزورگار یهان رای با اینکر دیگری واست

که اورا بنتی دوست در سر است

⁹⁸³ Tābarī 1999, p. 401, de Goeje, 1062.
⁹⁸⁴ Tābarī 1999, p. 400, n. 989.
⁹⁸⁵ See footnote 961.
⁹⁸⁶ Most certainly a different personage than Māhādharjushnas, as will become apparent in the remainder of the story.
⁹⁸⁸ Ferdowsī 1971, vol. IX, p. 298, Ferdowsī 1935, p. 2948:

همه یار پیدور خسرو تانست

اهگ نو جهان کوی اگر گو بندند
any case, the figures of Nēw Khusrow and Nāmdār Jushnas are meant only to represent collectively the armies at their disposal, made up of the Nimrūzī and Pārsīg factions, what Sebeos had called the “army of Persia and the East.”

Incidentally, Tābarī’s narratives on the depositions of Khusrow II Parvīz and Ardashīr III compliment one another. Mardānschāh, mentioned in the conspiracy against Khusrow II, was a pādhūspān of Nimrūz, while in the mutiny against Ardashīr III, Nāmdār Jushnas appears as the spāhbed of the region. There remains a discrepancy, however, insofar as Shahrvarāz’s seals also identify him as the spāhbed of the kūst-i nēmrōz under Khusrow II. This anomaly can be easily explained, however, if we consider that Shahrvarāz had already mutinied against Khusrow II toward the end of his reign, leaving the latter ample time to dispossess his general from his post. Besides, the unsettled conditions after Khusrow II was deposed were perfectly amenable to a Nimrūzī faction assuming the title of spāhbed, if the title in fact meant anything during this tumultuous period of Sasanian history. As the previous ērān-spāhbed of the quarter of the south (kūst-i nēmrōz), moreover, Shahrvarāz had presumably come to collaborate intimately with the Pārsīg during his tenure.

So, once again, the Pahlav were divided in their promotion of a Sasanian king. Moreover, the fate of the Sasanian monarch Ardashīr III was decided by the complicity of at least two of the three armies of the realm: the army of Persia and the East under the control of the spāhbed Nāmdār Jushnas of Nimrūz in collaboration with the Pārsīg leader Fīrūzān; and Shahrvarāz’s army. Having seized the capital of the Sasanians, Shahrvarāz seized a number of leading men and, appropriating their wealth, put them to death, along with the seven year old king. Among these was Māhādhārjushnas, the minister who had assumed the responsibility of raising and protecting the young king. Thus, in 630, the Nimrūzī faction collaborated with Shahrvarāz to topple the child Ardashīr III.

There then transpired an event that had only two other precedents in the four hundred years of Sasanian history, the accession of a non-Sasanian to the throne. Having deposed Ardashīr III, with the complicity of the army of Persia and the East, the Parthian Mihrānīd Shahrvarāz crowned himself king on 27 April 630. What is perhaps the most significant aspect of Shahrvarāz’s coronation, however, is that together with the Mihrānīd Bahrām-i Chūbin and the Ispahbudhān Vistāhm, he became the third Parthian dynast to claim Sasanian kingship. The Xwādāy-Nāmag narrative in Tābarī cloaks the Sasanian legitimist perspective on the sacrilege of having a non-Sasanian on the throne in the garb of an anecdote that highlights the usurper’s illegitimacy. As Shahrvarāz was not from the “royal house of the kingdom . . . when he sat down on the royal

989 See page 155ff.
990 See page 157ff.
991 See footnote 411.
992 See §2.5.4.
993 See page 149ff.
throne, his belly began to gripe, and this affected him so violently that he had no time to get to a latrine, hence he [swiftly] called for a bowl ... had it set down before the throne, and relieved himself in it.” Bosworth notes that this story “is meant to heighten the enormity of Shahrbaraz’s temerity and his sacrilege by sitting down on the royal throne when he was not from the royal houses of the Arsacids or the Sasanians.”

In fact, prior to the discovery of the seal of Pīrag-i Shahrvaraz, on which he insisted on his dynastic affiliation as a Mihrānid, and prior to our identification of this seal as belonging to the towering figure of Shahrvaraz, while his non-Sasanian descent was acknowledged, his gentilitial background remained unclear. Now however, we have a better understanding of Sasanian history from the late sixth century onward: a number of processes, including the reforms of Khusrow I Nowshīrvān and the policies of his son Hormozd IV, violently disrupted the confederacy of the Parthians with the Sasanians with the effect that, in the span of only four decades, from the 590s to 630, three Parthian dynasts had claimed the Sasanian throne: Bahrām-i Chūbīn from the Mihrān, Vistāhm from the Ispahbudhān, and Shahrvarāz from the Mihrān. This, however, is not the end of the Parthian aspiration to Sasanian kingship, as we shall see shortly.

To belong to the Parthian dynastic families, to have a substantial and loyal army, and to uphold Sasanian kingship through their confederation with the house of Sāsān was one thing. To usurp the title Shahanshāh, King of Kings, however, was, yet again, an altogether different story. The predicament of the Parthians throughout Sasanian history, after all, had always been their agreement to Sasanian kingship. To add insult to injury, upon usurping the throne, Shahrvarāz murdered many of the elite, among them Māhādharjushnas. The resulting opposition meant that Shahrvarāz’s rule would also be short-lived, lasting a total of only forty days, from 27 April to his murder on 9 June 630.

Who then was responsible for the murder of the Parthian Shahrvarāz? In Ṭabarī’s account the actual murder of Shahrvarāz is attributed to one Fus Farrukh, the son of Māh Khurshidān. In Bālamī’s account this figure is called Saqrūkh, which is clearly a scribal error for Fus Farrukh. In Thālibī’s narrative the name of this figure is given as Hormozd-i Īštakhri; together

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996 See §2.5.4.
997 See §2.6.3.
998 See §2.7.1.
999 See page 205ff below.
1000 Rendered in Bālamī as Mihr Ḥasis, as we have seen. Bālamī 1959, p. 256.
1002 Ṭabarī 1999, p. 402, and n. 992, de Goeje, 1063.
1003 Bālamī 1959, p. 258. The first letter Ḟb in Fus Farrukh is dropped whereas a dot is added to the second Ḟb of the name, turning it into the letter ghāf.
with his army, he besieged Shahrvarāz, defeated and killed him. Ibn Balkhī calls him Pusfarrukh and maintains, significantly, that he was put in charge of killing Shahrvarāz by Būrāndukht. According to Ṭabarī, “two of his brothers were roused to great anger at Shahbarāz’s killing of Ardashīr III and his seizure of royal power.” Fuṣ Farrukh and his brothers were joined by a figure called Zādḥān Farrukh-i Shahrdārān, as well as “a man called Māhyāy (?), who was the instructor of the cavalrmen (muwaddib al-asāwira). These were accompanied by a large number of the great men of state and members of the leading families.” The group aided Fuṣ Farrukh and his brothers “in killing various men who had assassinated Ardashīr III . . . [and] various members of the class of the great men of state.” Having done away with the Mihrānīd usurper, the group “then raised to the throne Būrān, daughter of Kīsra.” In this version of Ṭabarī’s account, therefore, two main personalities are depicted as serving a central role in the opposition to Shahrvarāz and are ultimately held respon-
sible for the murder of this powerful Parthian dynastic leader: Fuṣ Farrukh-i Māḥ Khurshīdān and Zādḥān Farrukh-i Shahrdārān. Now we recall that the deposition and murder of the child-king Ardashīr III was effected through the collaboration of Shahrvarāz and the Nimrūzī faction under the leadership of the Pārsīg Fīrūzān. It follows therefore that Fuṣ Farrukh-i Māḥ Khurshīdān and his brothers, together with Zādḥān Farrukh-i Shahrdārān, must have risen against these Pārsīg and Nimrūzī factions gathered around Fīrūzān.

### 3.3 Būrāndukht and Azarmīdukht: the Pārsīg-Pahlav rivalry

According to Ṭabarī, upon the murder of Shahrvarāz, when Fuṣ Farrukh and Zādḥān Farrukh promoted Būrāndukht to Sasanian regency, the latter “en-
trusted Shahrvarāz’s office to Fuṣ Farrukh, and invested him with the office of her chief minister.” This is reiterated also in Balʿamī’s account: Būrāndukht, rendered here as Tūrān Dukht, gave her ministership to Fuṣ Farrukh. Balʿamī adds one other significant piece of information: this Fuṣ Farrukh was from Khurāsān. Fuṣ Farrukh thus became the minister of Būrāndukht. Who then was Fuṣ Farrukh? In order to attempt an answer we should begin by an observation regarding his name: Fuṣ Farrukh (fuṣ from Middle Persian pus, son) is the literal equivalent of Zādḥān Farrukh (zād, child of), both meaning the son of Farrukh. Hence these names could simply be a substitute for the name Farruhzād. And in fact, Fuṣ Farrukh and Zādḥān Farrukh are one and the same.
§3.3: BURANDUKHT AND AZARMIDUKHT  
CHAPTER 3: ARAB CONQUEST

figure, but not, as one would expect from the name, representing Farrukhzād, the son of Farrukh Hormozd, but in fact, as we shall see shortly, representing Farrukh Hormozd himself. Besides the literal identity of the name of Farrukhzād with both Zādhan Farrukh and Fus Farrukh, do we have any grounds for considering him, or his father, to be the prime minister of Būrāndukht and the figure—representative of a faction—responsible for toppling Shahrvarāz?

Before we proceed, two more observations are in order. Ṭabarî’s epithet shahrdārān for Zādhan Farrukh clearly reflects his office, namely the governorship (shahrdārī) of a region (shahr). As for the epithet Māh Khurshidān, considering the rarity of this name, one must forego Justi’s explanation of Māh Khurshidān as a patronym, namely, son of Māh Khurshid, and simply opt for its meaning, someone who has “the spirit of the moon and the sun (as his protector).” Fus Farrukh thus becomes a dynastic figure who “seeks the protection of the sun and the moon,” not a far fetched assumption considering the religious currents prevalent in the Sasanian realm by any means.

We can now state our main claim concerning Zādhan Farrukh-i Shahrdārān and Fus Farrukh-i Māh Khurshidān: they are in fact none other than the famous Prince of the Medes, Farrukh Hormozd, the commander of the army of Azarbāyjān, under the leadership of whose family most other nobility were gathered to oppose Shahrvarāz and the army of Nīmruz. A major problem, endemic to the Arabic as well as the Persian histories of the period, is the confusion of the name of this dynastic scion, Farrukh Hormozd, with that of his son, Farrukhzād. As we shall see, layers of confusion in our accounts have jumbled not only the identity of the members of this important Parthian dynastic family and their ancestry, but also their central and crucial involvement in the history of the Sasanians. Before we identify these layers of confusion, it is best to investigate the accounts that unmistakably identify this important minister of Būrāndukht’s reign. We shall start with the account of the Armenian historian Sebeos.

According to Sebeos, shortly after Shahrvarāz attacked Ctesiphon and declared himself king, the elite rebelled, killed the mutinous general Shahrvarāz, and put Queen Bor (Būrāndukht), the daughter of Khusrow II, on the throne. After the enthronement “they appointed as chief minister at court Khoʾrokh Ormizd, who was the prince of the region of Atrpatakan.” This Khoʾrokh Hormozd, of course, is none other than the Prince of the Medes, the Farrukh Hormozd of the Arabic sources. All other narratives at our disposal corroborate Sebeos’ account on this point. However, Sebeos’ narrative hereafter parts

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1012 Justi only cites this same figure. Justi 1895, p. 187
1014 See Chapter 5, especially page 357ff.
1015 See also our discussions on pages 151 and 187.
1016 Sebeos 1999, p. 89.
1017 See page 150.
company with the Arabic and Persian sources. After narrating that queen Bor appointed Kho̰rokh Hormozd as the chief minister of the court, Sebeos informs us that “this Kho̰rokh sent a message to the queen [Bor]: ‘Become my wife’.” The queen consented to this matrimony.\footnote{Sebeos 1999, p. 89.} But as Sebeos informs us, this was nothing but a ruse, for under the pretense of marriage, Būrāndukht actually murdered Kho̰rokh Hormozd (Farrukh Hormozd). Queen Bor (Būrāndukht) was in power for two years, according to Sebeos, before she died.

Our other sources also identify the minister of queen Būrāndukht as Farrukh Hormozd. About this, therefore, there is no doubt: it was the Prince of the Medes, the leader of the Pahlav, who promoted Būrāndukht to the throne and fought against Shahvarz’s usurpation of the throne. The narrative of Farrukh Hormozd’s request of matrimony from a Sasanian queen is also provided by other Arabic sources. Here, however, all of our other sources deviate from Sebeos’ account: the queen in question is not Būrāndukht, but her sister, Azarmīdukht.\footnote{Yaqqūbi 1969, vol. 1, pp. 197–198, Yaqqūbi 1983, pp. 214–215, Ibn Balkhi 1995, p. 269.} The region under Farrukh Hormozd’s jurisdiction, moreover, is at times said to be Azarbāyjān, but at other times Khurāsān. Furthermore, in all other narratives it was Azarmīdukht and not Būrāndukht who ultimately killed the Parthian dynast Farrukh Hormozd.

According to Yaqqūbi, for example, when Azarmīdukht ascended the throne Farrukh Hormozd, the ispābbud of Khurāsān, approached her and declared: “Today I am the leader of the people and the pillar of the country of Iran.” Farrukh Hormozd then asked the hand of Azarmīdukht in marriage. The story of the ruse of the queen and her murder of Farrukh Hormozd, attributed to Būrāndukht by Sebeos, is then also narrated by Yaqqūbi, except that the queen in question is Azarmīdukht. Furthermore, after Azarmīdukht killed Farrukh Hormozd, “his son [i.e., the son of Farrukh Hormozd], Rustam, who was in Khurāsān, and who [later] fought Sād b. Abī Waqqās in Qādisiyah, came and killed Azarmīdukht.”\footnote{Yaqqūbi 1969, vol. 1, pp. 197–198, Yaqqūbi 1983, pp. 214–215.}

Why does Yaqqūbi maintain that Farrukh Hormozd was the spābbed of Khurāsān, while Sebeos calls him the Prince of the Medes and Atrapatkan? Was Farrukh Hormozd in power over Azarbāyjān or over Khurāsān? Most Arabic sources confirm that Farrukh Hormozd was the spābbed of Khurāsān. Ṭabarī, for example, maintains that during Azarmīdukht’s reign “the outstanding great man of Persia was ... Farrukh Hurmuz, ispābbadb of Khurāsān.”\footnote{Ṭabarī 1999, pp. 406–407, de Goeje, 1065.} Ṭabarī also underlines for us the fact that during Azarmīdukht’s reign “Rustam, son of Farrukh Hurmuz, the man whom Yazdjiird (III) was later to send to combat the Arabs, was acting as his father’s deputy in Khurāsān.”\footnote{Ṭabarī 1999, pp. 406–407, de Goeje, 1065.} The Fārsnāma identifies Farrukh Hormozd as the governor of Khurāsān and maintains that “there
was none greater than him among the Persians.” Balāmī adds the significant piece of information that at the time of the murder of his father, the “great spâbed of Khurāsān, Rustam, was himself in Khurāsān.” It is Masūdī, however, who finally clarifies the confusion. According to him, when Khurra Hormozd (Farrukh Hormozd) was murdered by Azarmidukht, his son Rustam, the future general at the battle of Qâdisiyya, and the figure who “according to some was the successor of his father in Khurāsān and according to others in Azarbāyjān and Armenia,” came to queen Azarmidukht and killed her. It is significant to note here tangentially that according to Masūdī, Rustam’s murder of Azarmidukht took place in 10 AH/631 CE. Rustam is called Rostam-i Ādharī (i.e., from Azarbāyjān) by Masūdī. This, for good reason, for initially Rustam was assigned the post of darīgbed of Azarbāyjān.

In short, while the confusion over the territorial domains of the family of the Prince of the Medes remains, all Arabic sources, unlike Sebeos, maintain that Farrukh Hormozd, the “leader of the people and the pillar of the country of Iran,” and the figure besides whom “there was none greater . . . among the Persians,” asked the hand of Azarmidukht and not Būrandukht in matrimony. All maintain, moreover, that it was Azarmidukht who was responsible for Farrukh Hormozd’s murder in 631 and who lost her own life as a result at the hands of Rustam. Moreover, Rustam, sometimes called Azarī, is most often identified as the spâbed of Khurāsān, functioning in lieu of his father.

### 3.3.1 The Ispahbudēn

Our narratives, therefore, identify Farrukh Hormozd as one of the most important figures of the reigns of the two queens Būrandukht and Azarmidukht. Some sources call this figure either Fus Farrukh or Zādhān Farrukh, that is, Farrukhzād, the other son of Farrukh Hormozd. Hence, already we can detect three layers of confusion here. Firstly, the actual name of this towering figure is variously given as Fus Farrukh, Zādhān Farrukh or, alternatively, as Farrukh Hormozd. A simple confusion is at work here: the name of the father, Farrukh Hormozd, and the son, Farrukhzād, have been confused. A second layer of confusion surrounds the jurisdiction and power of this figure. Farrukh Hormozd is sometimes called the prince of Atrapatkan (Azarbāyjān) and at times the governor of Khurāsān. It is therefore not clear precisely over which of these

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1024 Prior to this, Khusrow II Parviz had given the governorship (imârat) of Khurāsān to Farrukh Hormozd. According to Balāmī, while Farrukh Hormozd was in the capital serving Khusrow II, his son, Rustam, was serving as the representative (khalīfa) of his father in Khurāsān. Balāmī also includes the story of Farrukh Hormozd’s request of marriage from Azarmidukht and the queen’s refusal and ultimate murder of Farrukh Hormozd. Balāmī 1959, p. 259.
1025 Masūdī 1965 also contains Farrukh Hormozd’s request of marriage from Azarmidukht.
1026 Masūdī 1965, p. 103.
1027 Likewise, his father, Farrukh Hormozd, is said to be from Azarbāyjān. Masūdī 1965, p. 103.
1028 For the office of darīgbed, see Gyselen 2002, pp. 113–114; Khurshudian 1998, pp. 109–113; see also our brief discussion on page 126.
two regions our figure(s) held control. Thirdly, with the exception of Sebeos, the ministership of Farrukh Hormozd is always attached to queen Būrāndukht, and never to Azarmídükht, but it was from Azarmídükht that Farrukh Hormozd requested matrimony, and at her hands that he lost his life. Rustam, the son of Farrukh Hormozd and his deputy in Khurāsān, then killed Azarmídükht in revenge for his father’s murder.

Farrukh Hormozd, son of Vindūyih

Now the confusion over the actual name of Farrukh Hormozd and the substitution of the name of the father for his son, Farrukhzād, is a common occurrence in our sources.1029 This confusion has led to substantial misunderstandings, so much so that in some secondary literature to this day, Rustam, the other son of Farrukh Hormozd and the brother of Farrukhzād, has been rendered as Rustam-i Farrukhzād1030 that is, Rustam the son of Farrukhzād. This misunderstanding we must clear once and for all: Rustam was the son of Farrukh Hormozd and the brother of Farrukhzād.1031

The confusion of Farrukh Hormozd with his son Farrukhzād was pointed out long ago by Justi. Mīrkhwānd, for example, maintains that Farrukhzād was the father of Rustam.1032 Ṭabarī also commits the same mistake switching, many times over, the name of Farrukh Hormozd with that of the latter’s son Farrukhzād. Nöldeke noticed this confusion in Ṭabarī,1033 but did not recognize the full ramifications of it. This confusion is clearly illustrated in Balāmī’s account. For while in one passage, Balāmī correctly identifies Farrukh Hormozd as Rustam’s father, later in this same narrative he contradicts himself by saying that “the name of the father of Rustam, the governor of Khurāsān, was Farrukhzād.”

This confusion, in fact, had left a number of episodes of late Sasanian history inexplicable. Most significantly, it has in all probability thoroughly obscured the ancestry of the family of Farrukh Hormozd, the Prince of the Medes. With a high degree of confidence, we can now postulate that the family of Farrukh Hormozd is none other than the Ispahbudhān family. Farrukh Hormozd himself was the son of Vindūyih, the uncle and first minister of Khusrow II and the brother of the towering figure of Vistāhm, who both had helped Khusrow II to power, but later were killed by him.1034 This crucial piece of information,

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1032 Justi 1895, p. 96. According to Justi, in his *Histoire des Rois de Perse*, Nikbī ben Massoud not only transposes the figure of Farrukh Hormozd on to, this time, his son Rustam, but calls him Farrukhzād.
1034 See §2.7.1. For a reconstructed genealogical tree of the Ispahbudhān, see page 471.
however, has been lost as a result of the substantial confusion between the names of the father and son in our sources. For instance, as Bālamī’s editor observes,\(^\text{1035}\) the name is given in Ṭabarī as Farrukhzād-i Binduwān, that is, Farrukhzād, *son of Bindū*.\(^\text{1036}\) Ibn al-Athīr, too, succumbs to this confusion when he maintains that after the death of Ardashīr III, when the Sasanian crown had remained vacant, “the women of the Sasanian household spoke and instructed Farrukhzād, *ibn al-Binduwān* to choose a Sasanian king from wherever possible.”\(^\text{1037}\) Now, Bindū is the shortened, Arabicized version of Vindūyiḥ. Moreover, in almost all of the cases where Farrukhzād is rendered as Farrukhzād-i Binduwān, the context makes it amply clear that the person talked about is in fact Farrukh Hormozd. We must therefore amend these sources appropriately: Farrukhzād and Rustam were the sons of Farrukh Hormozd, who in turn was the son of Vindūyiḥ; Vindūyiḥ of the Ispahbudhān family, the brother of Vistāhm and the son of the famous Asparapet whose exact name remains confused in our sources.

**Territorial domains of the Ispahbudhān**

What strengthens this identification is our awareness of the formidable power of the two families, the Ispahbudhān and the family of the Prince of the Medes, as well as our knowledge of the overlap of their territorial domains. As established in the previous chapter, Asparapet and his sons Vistāhm and Vindūyiḥ held power, not only in the *kūst-i khwarbarān* (west), but also in the *kūst-i khwarāsān* (east),\(^\text{1038}\) where their original homeland was located, and where Vistāhm eventually carved out an independent kingdom for almost seven years.\(^\text{1039}\) Moreover, Sebeos makes it clear that in his fight against Bahrām-i Chūbin, Vistāhm’s power base was located in Azarbāyjān,\(^\text{1040}\) although he does not comment on the extent of the Ispahbudhān’s power in the latter region.\(^\text{1041}\) Now, these same territories were also under the control of the family of the Prince of the Medes. The agnatic structure of the dynastic families made this continuity inevitable even after the reforms of Khusrow I: dynastic domains ultimately remained within the families of a particular dynast even if that dynast, Vistāhm in this case, *had lost his exalted position in the eyes of the Sasanians*. It is impossible to consider the incredibly powerful families of the Ispahbudhān and the Prince

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\(^{1035}\) Bālamī 1959, p. 283 and n. 6.

\(^{1036}\) The Persian possessive in names is often rendered by the suffix -*in*, so that Farrukhzād-i Binduwān in this case means Farrukhzād of Bindū.

\(^{1037}\) Ibn al-Athīr 1862, vol. 2, p. 393:

\[تَنْمَمُ نَسَاءَ آلِ كَسِيرَيْ فُوؤَّي الْفَرْخَارِدَ بنَ البَندوَانَ إِلَى أن يَجْتَمعُ آلِ كَسِيرَيْ عَلَى مِنْ تَمْلَكُونَ إِنْ وَجْدُوهُ.

\(^{1038}\) For the sigillographic evidence, see page 107ff.

\(^{1039}\) See §2.7.1.

\(^{1040}\) See page 128.

\(^{1041}\) In the apocalyptic account that Sebeos provides from the prophecy of Daniel, he clearly connects the territory of the Medes and the Parthians: the “Sasanian kingdom . . . [has] three ribs in its mouth, the kingdom of the Persians, Medes and Parthians.” Sebeos 1999, p. 105.
of the Medes as two distinct families, if we take into consideration the genealogical tree that we have constructed and the agnatic infrastructure that regulated them together with the overlapping of the territorial domains of these families. The accounts of the \textit{X\textsuperscript{2} ad\textsuperscript{2}y-\textit{N\textsuperscript{2}amag}} tradition highlight the familial relation of the Ispahbudhān with the family of the Prince of the Medes. In all the accounts that detail Khusrow II’s deposition, the family of the Prince of the Medes is shown to have played a leading role. And in the list of grievances that was submitted to Khusrow II by Farrukhzād in a group of our narratives, as we have seen,\textsuperscript{1042} the murders of Vistāhm and Vindūyih took a primary place.

What further corroborates this genealogical reconstruction is that in the wars that subsequently took place against the Arabs, Rustam of the family of the Prince of the Medes brought to the front what was tantamount to a dynastic army, in which the sons of Vistāhm, Vindūyih and Tirūyih, together with other members of the Ispahbudhān family, fought side by side with Rustam, the grandson of Vindūyih, and other members of the family of the Prince of the Medes.\textsuperscript{1043} Moreover, following the age-old tradition of rivalry among the Parthian dynastic families, the dynastic struggles in which the family of the Prince of the Medes became involved—in direct continuity of the rivalries that had engulfed the Ispahbudhān family—were against none other than the Mihrān family.\textsuperscript{1044} In the unlikely event that the identification of Farruk Hormozd’s ancestry with that of the Ispahbudhān family does not hold under closer scrutiny, the postulate does not distract from the tenor of the rest of our argument, that is, from the period of Khusrow II onward, the Parthian family of Farruk Hormozd, Farrukhzād, and Rustam was one of the most powerful dynastic families to hold power over both Azarbājān and Khūrāsān, the latter being the traditional fiefdom of the Parthian families. Furthermore, Farruk Hormozd’s family was one of the primary factions that supported not only Shīrūyih Qubād’s and Ardashīr III’s kingship, but also Būrāndukht’s regency, bringing her to power in 630 CE. What then explains the tenor of the narratives that claim that Farruk Hormozd asked for the hand of Azarmīdukt in marriage? Here we shall have to stop our primary reliance on the \textit{X\textsuperscript{2} ad\textsuperscript{2}y-\textit{N\textsuperscript{2}amag}} tradition. Our search for an answer must now involve a critical examination and juxtaposition of the \textit{futūh} narratives—specifically the traditions handed down by Sayf b. Umar and those following him—with those of the \textit{X\textsuperscript{2} ad\textsuperscript{2}y-\textit{N\textsuperscript{2}amag}} tradition. Numismatic evidence will prove to be our corroborating gauge. Significantly, it is only in the course of examining some of the important battles in the early Arab conquest of Iraq that we can further reconstruct the nature of the over-arching rivalry between the Pahlav and the Pārsīg, the effect of this rivalry on the defensive war efforts of the Iranians against the encroaching Arab armies, and what we believe to be the chronology of this first phase of the Arab

\textsuperscript{1042}See page 154.
\textsuperscript{1043}See page 212 below.
\textsuperscript{1044}This struggle culminated in the sacking of the Mihrāns’ capital Rayy with the complicity of the Ispahbudhān; see §3.4.4, page 250ff, and page 264ff.
conquest of Iraq. The value of Sayf’s futūḥ narratives, the precise relationship of Farrukh Hormozd to Azarmidukht and Būrāndukht, as well as a host of other crucial dimensions of this juncture of Sasanian history, will only become fully explicated once we have undertaken this investigation. The reader must bear with us, however, for all of this will require that we go back to an earlier point, namely, the events that transpired during the reign of Shirūyih Qubād, for it is at this juncture that the the narratives in the futūḥ literature begin.

### 3.3.2 Analepsis: Arab conquest of Iraq

Sayf’s account of the initial phase of the conquest of Iraq begins with a very significant chronological and symbolic indicator: when “Khālid b. Walid was done with the business of Yamāmah”, Abū Bakr (632–634) wrote to him: “Go onward toward Iraq until you enter it. Begin with the gateway to India, which is Ubullah [i.e., Baṣrah, the port city near the Persian Gulf]. Render the people of Persia (Fārs) and those nations under their rule peaceable.” Now Yamāmah was where Khālid had defeated the pseudo-prophet Musaylimah. The signifier, at the very inception of Sayf’s account, therefore, is the ridda wars conducted under the direction of Abū Bakr. The accepted hijra chronology provided by Sayf, moreover, puts the start of these wars in 12 AH, conventionally dated to 633 CE.

**The battle of Ubullah**

The battle of Ubullah, one of the first wars reported during this phase of the conquest under Khālid b. Walid’s command has raised questions. Donner, for example, has maintained that the conquest of Ubullah was probably undertaken somewhat later than 634 under the command of ʿUtbah b. Ghażwān. Blankinship, on the other hand, notes that Khalīfat b. Khayyāt. records Khālid’s campaigns in the vicinity of Baṣrah during this period, while Baladhurī also notes Khālid’s presence around Baṣrah. All this suggests, Blankinship argues, that “Khālid at least may have led a raid there although ʿUtbah actually reduced the area.” Controversy surrounds, therefore, the chronology of the inception of these wars. Who were the Persian commanders participating in the battle of Ubullah, however? And what are the Sasanian chronological indicators for this battle?

The Persian commanders mentioned in the course of this campaign are Jābān (Arabicized form of Middle Persian gāwān), the governor of Ullays; Azādbih, the governor (marzbān) of Ḥira and the commander of the Sasanian

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1046See footnote 900.
1047This theme is reiterated a number of times in Sayf’s account. See, for example, Ṭabarī 1993, pp. 4, 7 and 8, among others, de Goeje, 2018, 2020.
cavalry;\textsuperscript{1051} and the general Hurmuz (Hormozd), who might have been the commander of the Gateway to India, although it has been suggested that the appearance of this individual was Sayf’s fabrication.\textsuperscript{1052} During the course of this war, Khalid wrote to Hormozd and urged him to become a Muslim or opt to pay the jizya. Now these raids, as they are called, are described under the year 12 of hijra (633 CE) and are said to have been directed by Abu Bakr after the defeat of Musaylamah.

For our purposes, however, another significant chronological indicator is given here by Sayf. At the receipt of Khalid’s letter, Hormozd sent the news to Shiruyih Qubad and to Ardashir III, after which he mobilized his forces.\textsuperscript{1053} Unlike Sayf’s account, where there is a confusion as to whether this war took place during Shiruyih Qubad’s reign (628) or during Ardashir III’s reign (628–630), however, Ibn al-Athir maintains that the battle of Ubullah took place during the reign of Ardashir III.\textsuperscript{1054} The anachronism in Sayf’s mention of these Sasanian kings was caught by Blankinship,\textsuperscript{1055} who noted that, while Shiruyih Qubad and Ardashir III ruled in 7–9 AH/628–630 CE, these wars reportedly took place in 12 AH/633 CE, a year after the death of the Prophet and the inception of the rule of the Sasanian king Yazdgird III.\textsuperscript{1056} If we continue to uphold the accepted hijra dating of these events, this objection would be valid. What would happen, however, if, as we suggested at the beginning of this chapter, we choose to ignore the hijra date altogether, and—even if we admit the participation of Khalid b. Walid in these raids—presume that these raids in fact did take place around the time when Shiruyih Qubad died and the seven-year old child Ardashir III was enthroned? After all, why would the early traditionalist have connected this war to the rule of Ardashir III when Yazdgird III was ruling? Would this alternative chronological scheme make sense if we compare it to the information that we have now garnered about Ardashir III’s reign from the X\textsuperscript{e}ad\textsuperscript{d}ay-N\textsuperscript{a}mag tradition and other sources?

It can be readily observed that Sayf’s information about the paramount Sasanian figures involved in the battle of Ubullah betrays a highly reasonable internal logic when considered in isolation from the remaining information on Arab generals and figures and when we disregard the hijra dating. According to Sayf, when Hormozd organized his army, he gave the command of the two wings to two brothers called Qubad and Anushjân. Qubad and Anushjân were of Sasanian descent through the Sasanian kings Shiruyih Qubad and Ardashir III.\textsuperscript{1057}

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{1051}Tabari 1993, p. 5, de Goeje, 2019.
\textsuperscript{1052}Tabari 1993, p. 9, n. 62.
\textsuperscript{1053}Tabari 1993, pp. 11, 16, de Goeje, 2023, 2027.
\textsuperscript{1054}Ibn al-Athir 1862, vol. 2, p. 141.
\textsuperscript{1055}Blankinship’s assessment, needless to say, is here given only as an example of the paradigmatic methodology relied upon in the field, which ultimately disregards the Sasanian chronological indicators in favor of the accepted hijra dating.
\textsuperscript{1056}Tabari 1993, p. 11, n. 73 and 74.
\textsuperscript{1057}Tabari 1993, p. 12, de Goeje, 2023.
\end{footnotes}
Anūshjān is further identified as the son of Jushnasmāh.¹⁰⁵⁸ Who are these figures? Can we in fact establish any connection between these and the rule of Shirūyiḥ Qubād or Ardashīr III? We must start with an onomastic observation: the name Jushnasmāh is an abbreviated form of Jushnas Māb Ādhar, where the final suffix ādhar (fire) has been dropped,¹⁰⁵⁹ and hence in its inverted form, the name becomes Mābādharjushnas. As we recall, Mābādharjushnas (Jushnasmāh) was the minister of the child Ardashīr III “in charge of his upbringing and carrying the administration of the kingdom.”¹⁰⁶⁰ He undertook to protect the child Ardashīr III and his capital, when the Nimrūzī faction together with Shahrvarāz were conspiring to topple the king. And so we can expect the minister’s sons Anūshjān and Qubād to have taken part in the battle of Ubullah. The executive powers under the command of Anūshjān were in fact so great that he undersigned a peace treaty with the Arabs after the battle.¹⁰⁶¹ Now, Ardashīr III ruled for about one year and seven months, until Shahrvarāz usurped the Sasanian throne on 27 April 630. Based on our alternative chronology, therefore, the battle of Ubullah would have taken place anytime between September 628 CE and April 630 CE, that is 7–9 AH. However, since some of the accounts still mention Shirūyiḥ Qubād, we should conclude that this battle probably took place sometime in 7 AH/628 CE.

The battle of Dhāt al-Salāsīl

A series of other battles, also placed by Sayf in the year 12 of hijra, follow this same internal logic. The battle that subsequently took place between Khālid and Hormozd is called the battle of Dhāt al-Salāsīl. Significantly, Blankinship notes that this battle, which is reported only by Sayf, “has the same name as the expedition of ‘Amr b. al-Āṣ in the year 8/629, where it refers to a place.” This war

¹⁰⁵⁸Baladhūrī, Ahmad b. Yahyā, Futūḥ al-Buldān, Leiden, 1968, edited by M.J. de Goeje (Baladhūrī 1968), p. 340; Ţabarī 1993, p. 12, n. 78. The name of Anūshjān, therefore, might in fact be the abbreviated form of Anūsh Jushnasp, just as the name of his brother would be Qubād Jushnasp.

¹⁰⁵⁹This name is formed on the same scheme as, for instance, a name attested on the seals: Bahrām-i Māb Ādhar; see §2.6.1.


¹⁰⁶¹His name is here given as Nūshjān b. Jusnāsmā. This information is provided by Baladhūrī in the following context, although, naturally, he also puts these events in the year 12 of hijra: “They say that Suwayd b. Qutbah, or according to some Qutb b. Qatādah, was constantly looting the ajam in the vicinity of Khuraybah in Baṣrah, as Muthannā ... was looting the environs of ... Hirā ... In the year 12 of hijra, when Khālid b. Wālid came to Baṣrah, and set out for Kuﬀa, he helped Suwayd [b. Muqarrin] in the battle of Ubullah. Others maintain that Khālid did not leave Baṣrah until he conquered Khuraybah. The arms depot (zinistān) of the Persians was there ... They also say that he went to Nahr al-Marāt and conquered the palace there through a peace treaty with Nūshjān b. Jusnāsmā.” The owner of the palace in Nahr al-Marāt, Kāmīnādār, the daughter of Nersī (Narsi), was the paternal cousin of Nūshjān. Baladhūrī 1968, p. 340. Also see Khayyāt, Khalifāt b., Tarīkh, Beirut, 1977 (Khayyāt 1977), pp. 117–118. This Anūshjān is probably related to Anūshnād b. Hash-n-sh-bandīh, whose name is a clear corruption of Anūsh Jushnasp, mentioned by Ḥamza ʿIsfahānī among the Iranians who held the governorship over various Arab territories during the reign of Khusrow I and part of that of Hormozd IV. Ḥamza ʿIsfahānī 1961, p. 116, Ḥamza ʿIsfahānī 1988, pp. 141–142.
has also been reported by Ibn Hishām, Wāqidī, and Ibn Saʿd in the Sīrah, Kitāb al-Maghāzī, and Ṭabaqāt al-Kabīr respectively, as having taken place during the year 8 of hijra, that is, 629 CE. In other words, if we follow the Sasanian chronology, and compare it to the events described for the year 8 of hijra in other Arabic sources, then this war took place probably in 629. Hormozd, who was from “the highest nobility among the Persians . . . [and] from [one of] the seven houses,” was killed in the battle of Dhāt al-Salāsil, whereas Anūshjān and Qubād escaped. Toward the end of this narrative, furthermore, Ṭabarī takes “the rare and unusual step of denouncing Sayf’s story,” observing that the narrative as we have it is “different from what the true traditions have brought us. For the battle of Ubullah was only in the days of ʿUmar, when it was accomplished at the hands of ʿUtbah in the year 14 of the hijra [i.e., 635–636 CE].” Blankinship takes issue with Ṭabarī’s observation and notes that “some of the points of Sayf’s story are related by Ibn Khayyāt . . . with isnāds from others than Sayf.”

The battle of Madhār
Sayf then narrates the battle of Madhār and claims that it, too, took place in 12 AH/633 CE. What, however, are the Sasanian chronological indicators provided by Sayf? According to Sayf, when Khālid b. Walīd had written to Hormozd urging him to become a Muslim or pay the jīzāya, Hormozd had in turn written to Shirūyah Qubād and Ardashīr III and informed them of the content of the letter and the fact that Khālid “had set out from al-Yamāmah against him.” The child Ardashīr III allegedly responded to Hormozd’s warning of impending warfare by sending one Qārīn to his aid. While the exact genealogy of this Qārīn cannot be reconstructed with the information at our disposal, there is no doubt that he belonged to the Parthian dynastic family of the ʿKarīns. Qārīn put Qubād and Anūshjān, the sons of Jushnasmāh (Māhādharjushnas), the prime minister of Ardashīr III, once more in charge of the two wings of his


\[1063\] Ṭabarī 1993, p. 14, and n. 87, de Goeje, 2025.

\[1064\] Ṭabarī 1993, p. 13, de Goeje, 2025.

\[1065\] Ṭabarī 1993, p. 14, de Goeje, 2026.

\[1066\] Among the raids that Muḥammad ordered in 7 AH/628 CE, Khayyāt lists that of ʿAmr b. al-ʿĀṣ and Zayd b. Ḥārithah to Dhāt al-Salāsil, in the direction of the regions in Iraq. Khayyāt 1977, p. 85; Ṭabarī 1993, p. 14, de Goeje, 2025. For the year 6 AH/627 CE, he mentions the message of Muhammad to Khusrow II, the king’s murder by Shirūyah Qubād, and the death of the latter through pestilence. Khayyāt 1977, p. 79.

\[1067\] Blankinship again notes that this battle was actually fought by ʿUtbah b. Ghazwān later, “so that Sayf’s report here is chronologically improbable.” Blankinship gives reference to Morony 1984, pp. 127 (map), 160, and Donner 1981, p. 329, n. 66.

\[1068\] Ṭabarī 1993, p. 16, de Goeje, 2027. Note the ridda indicator again.

\[1069\] The actual name of this Qārīn, according to Sayf, is Qārīn b. Qaryānīs. Blankinship notes that the vocalization that he has given is conjectural. Ṭabarī 1993, p. 16, n. 104.
army. In other words, a predominantly Pahlav army was sent to Hormozd’s aid. The internal evidence provided by Sayf on both of the major figures involved in the battle of Madhâr, and his contention that these were active during the regency of Ardashîr III (628–630), continues to tally with the course of events transpiring in Iran as we have reconstructed these based on the Xwâdîy-Nâmag tradition.

Presumably before reaching Hormozd, however, Qârîn and his forces hear of his defeat and death. Since Hormozd had been killed in the battle of Dhât al-Salâsîl, which took place prior to the battle of Madhâr, the army commanded by Hormozd needed indeed a new commander, hence the dispatch of the Parthian general Qârîn. Qârîn arrived at the scene only to intercept the remnants of the fleeing army of Hormozd. Faced with the withdrawal of Sasanian forces they “encouraged each other [to return to the] fight once more.” Who were these people encouraging each other? Sayf provides crucial evidence: The “remnants of the forces of al-Ahvâz and Fârs [said] . . . to the remnants of al-Sawâd and al-Jabal, ‘If you split up, you will never join together afterward. Therefore join together to go back [to fight once more].’”\(^{1070}\) Two groups of people are here distinguished: 1) the forces of Ahvâz and Fârs, and 2) the forces of Sawâd and Jîbâl. As the regional power of the Pahlav was partly in the north, here identified with Sawâd and Jîbâl, under the leadership of Mâhâdharjushnas and Qârîn, it follows that the forces of Hormozd must have hailed from Ahvâz and Fârs, that is, from the Pârsîg domains. Hence, we are dealing here with a regional distinction, north versus south, on to which a different sort of division is superimposed, the Pahlav versus the Pârsîg.\(^{1071}\) For the moment we can summarize our narrative. We are still dealing with the reign of the child king Ardashîr III (628–630). A certain Hormozd was in command of the forces that were brought to the war against the Arabs. Two of the important commanders who were dispatched to serve under Hormozd, Qubâd and Anûshjîn, were the sons of the minister who was in charge of affairs during Ardashîr III’s regency, Mâhâdharjushnas (Jushnasmâh). Hormozd, however, was defeated and killed in the battle of Dhât al-Salâsîl, which according to some sources took place during the year 8 of hijra (629 CE), precisely during the rule of Ardashîr III. When Hormozd died and his army was on the verge of withdrawing, however, the regional armies warned each other that to disperse would mean disaster. The command of the forces was then taken over by the Parthian general Qârîn. In the subsequent battle of Madhâr, Qârîn, Qubâd, and Anûshjîn were all killed.\(^{1072}\) For our purposes we should note here another piece of information provided by Sayf: “Qârîn’s nobility had lapsed. After him the Muslims did not fight anyone whose nobility had lapsed among the Persians.”\(^{1073}\)

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\(^{1070}\)Tabari 1993, p. 16, de Goeje, 2027.

\(^{1071}\)We should recall here that according to Masûdî, Fârs was the domain of the Pârsîg, while “Mâhât [Media] and other regions” belonged to the Pahlav. See footnote 145.

\(^{1072}\)Tabari 1993, p. 17, de Goeje, 2027.

\(^{1073}\)Tabari 1993, p. 17, de Goeje, 2028.
The battle of Walajah

In the battle of Walajah, described next, and placed among the wars taking place in 12 AH/633 CE, the news of the defeat and murder of Qārīn reached Ardashīr III. The child Ardashīr III reportedly sent a figure called Andarzghar, who “was a Persian from among the mixed-bloods of al-Sawād and one of its inhabitants, to the war front.” Prior to this, he had been “in charge of the frontier of Khurāsān.”1074 This Andarzghar, however, Sayf informs us, “was not among those who had been born at al-Madā’in, nor had he grown up there. So Ardashīr III . . . sent Bahman Jādhūyīh after him with an army.”1075 There was, in other words, something wrong with Andarzghar, namely that he was of mixed blood and not from Ctesiphon. Andarzghar, it must be noted, is a title, not a name, made up of andarz (council) and gar, the Persian suffix denoting one who has a profession, in this case, a councillor.1076 We can now recapitulate: Once Hormozd and Qārīn were dead, Ardashīr III—or rather, the factions in control of the child Ardashīr III—sent a figure called Andarzghar to the war front. The command of Andarzghar, however, was not accepted and Bahman Jādhūyīh was sent in his stead. People then joined Andarzghar and Bahman Jādhūyīh to engage the Arabs at the battle of Walajah.1077 As we recall from the Xwaday-Nāmag tradition, however, Ardashīr III’s reign was thoroughly tumultuous.1078 The Persians were, therefore, yet again defeated at the battle of Walajah.1079

The battle of Ullays

With the narrative of the war of the battle of Ullays, which is still taking place in the year 12 of hijra according to Sayf, we are given further significant internal Sasanian chronological indicators. Sayf’s narrative connects in a continuous fashion to that given for the battle of Walajah. Bahman Jādhūyīh, Sayf informs us, “was the spokesman of Persia on one day out of their month. They divided their months so that each month consisted of thirty days. On each day the Persians had a [different] spokesman, who was appointed to speak for them before the king. Their spokesman was Bahman Jādhūyīh on the second day of the month.”1080 The child Ardashīr III supposedly wrote to this spokesman for the Persians and ordered him to go forth in order to engage the Arabs. Bahman Jādhūyīh, however, disobeyed Ardashīr III’s orders and sent Jābān in his stead.

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1074Tabarî 1993, p. 19, de Goeje, 2030.
1075Tabarî 1993, p. 19, de Goeje, 2029.
1076According to Khurshudian, the title andarzgar was carried as a name by some Mazdakites, suggesting perhaps that this general Andarzghar was one of the allegedly illegitimate offspring from the noble houses during the Mazdakite uprising (§2.4.5). Khurshudian 1998, p. 92.
1078See §3.2.2.
1079It must be noted that in this war there were still Arabs who aided the Persians. Tabarî 1993, p. 21, de Goeje, 2031.
1080Tabarî 1993, p. 22, de Goeje, 2032. Emphasis added. See footnote 1092 for a conjecture about the jādhūyīh office which explains the peculiarities of this passage.
§3.3: Burandukht and Azarmidukht  Chapter 3: Arab Conquest

ordering him to not engage the enemy until he returned. This, according to Sayf, he did because he wanted to go to Ardashir III “to see him in person and consult with him about what he wanted to command.” Bahman Jadhuyih, we are led to believe, wanted to seek the advice of a child king in power. The real reason why Bahman Jadhuyih was forced to leave the war front and go back to the capital, however, is subsequently given by Sayf. When Bahman Jadhuyih left the war zone to go to the capital, in Ctesiphon he found Ardashir III sick! We recall now the turmoil which had engulfed Iran when the Mihhranid Shahrvaraz under Heraclius’ instigation moved toward the capital in order to topple Ardashir III from power and declare himself king. The coconspirators of Shahrvaraz, moreover, were the army of Persia and the East, the Nimruz faction, under the command of the spâbed of Nimruz, Namdar Jushnas. Bahman Jadhuyih, in other words, was forced to leave the war arena because Ardashir III was in the midst of being deposed through the collaboration of the army of Shahrvaraz and the army of Persia and the East. While Bahman Jadhuyih returned to the capital to take part in the strife that was unfolding, Jabân was forced to man the war front alone.

In the battle of Ullays, meanwhile, Sayf informs us, “the polytheists [i.e., the Iranians] were increased in rabidity and ferocity because they expected” Bahman Jadhuyih to return. With the forces of Jabân manning the war front on their own, with the chaos that must have been ongoing with the movement of Shahrvaraz’s army toward the capital, and with the turmoil in Ctesiphon, the Arabs were once again victorious in their skirmishes in the battle of Ullays. We must now turn our attention to this Bahman Jadhuyih, who after the defeat and murder of Hormozd and Qar’in took up the command of the army. Yet another brief onomastic diversion is necessary here before we can proceed with the rest of our examination.

Pârsig leaders: Bahman Jadhuyih, Dhu ’l-Ḥājib, Mardânsâhâ, and Firûzân

The figure of Bahman Jadhuyih also bears the epithet Dhu ’l-Ḥājib. There is no doubt that Dhu ’l-Ḥājib is really an epithet, and not a name, some traditions giving what seems to be a popular etymology for it. The precise identity of this figure, however, remains unsettled. For at different historical junctures, at least three other names or epithets appear in the sources referring to a Pârsig leader:

1081Tabari 1993, pp. 22–23, de Goeje, 2032. For Jabân, see footnote 1050.
1082Tabari 1993, pp. 22–23, de Goeje, 2032.
1083See §3.2.3.
1086See, for example, Baladhuri 1968, p. 251, where the epithet is given to Mardânsâhâ, whom we shall discuss shortly. Dhu ’l-Ḥājib is here described to mean the eye-browed, for his eye-brows were so long that he was forced to “lift them above his eyes.”
Firūzān, Hormozd Jādhūyiḥ, and Mardāns̄hāh, with various traditions having substituted one name for the other. It should be remarked at the outset that whatever the confusion surrounding these figures, it is clear that they all belonged to the Pārsīg faction and functioned as the leader (or leaders) of this faction at different junctures.

The epithet jādhūyiḥ is given not only to Bahman but also to Hormozd Jādhūyiḥ. This epithet too can be explained. As sigillographic evidence bears witness, one of the important administrative offices of the Sasanian empire, possibly in the post-reform period (550–650), was the office of the driyōšān jādaggōw ud dādvar, the defender of the poor and judge. This seems to have been a judiciary office possibly with religious overtones. The title jādhūyiḥ, then, is most probably the Arabicized and abbreviated version of the term jādaggōw given to the holder of the office of driyōšān jādaggōw ud dādvar, in this case, the important Pārsīg leader, Bahman Jādhūyiḥ.

There remains, however, the issue that some traditions maintain Bahman Jādhūyiḥ to have been one of the leading figures of the Sasanian war efforts, whereas, other traditions maintain this to have been Firūzān or Mardāns̄hāh. For example, while some sources call the leader of the Pārsīg in the battle of

1087 Justi 1895, pp. 250, 374.
1088 Clearly, Mardāns̄hāh cannot be the same person as Mardāns̄hāh, the pādīhūspān of Nimrūz, discussed on page 157, as the latter was killed by Khusrow II.
1089 See page 202f. At least two other figures at this juncture of Sasanian history bore this epithet: Shahrvarāz Jādhūyiḥ and Abān Jādhūyiḥ, see respectively page 247 and footnotes 1490 and 1528 below.
1091 Justi 1895, p. 107.
1092 I am indebted to my husband Hans Schoutens for the following conjectural observation about the title jādhūyiḥ. We recall that according to Sayf, the Persians had spokesmen who were appointed to speak on their behalf before the king, one for each day of the month. Bahman Jādhūyiḥ was their spokesman on the second day of the month. Ţabarī 1993, p. 22, de Goeje, 2032. Now, jādhūyiḥ, from Persian jādaggōw, means advocate, intercessor, whence spokesman; see MacKenzie 1971, p. 46. Moreover, in the Zoroastrian calendar, the second day of the month is called Vohuman (Bahman). Bahman Jādhūyiḥ therefore is the advocate (jādhūyiḥ) on the second day of the month (Bahman). Similarly, Hormozd Jādhūyiḥ must have been the jādhūyiḥ on the first day of the month (Hormozd) and Abān Jādhūyiḥ on the tenth day (Abān). We may even go further and suggest that the name of the general Shahrvārāz Jādhūyiḥ—who participated in the battle of Isfahān (see page 247) and is not to be confused with the towering Mihranīd general Shahrvarāz under Khusrow II—is a corrupted version of Shahrvār jādhūyiḥ, that is, the jādhūyiḥ on the fourth day (Shahrewar). Bāmī, in fact, renders the name of this general as Shahriyār. Bāmī 1959, p. 328, n. 3. In particular, when dealing with a name composed with jādhūyiḥ, the first part should be considered as the name of a day, like Bahman in Bahman Jādhūyiḥ. As we shall argue shortly, Bahman Jādhūyiḥ’s actual name was most likely Mardāns̄hāh. A Rustam Jādhūyiḥ, who fell at the battle of Qādiriya, is mentioned in Yaqt al-Hamawī, Kitab Miṣ′am al-Buldān, Leipzig, 1866, edited by F. Wüstenfeld as Jacut’s Geographisches Wörterbuch (Yaqt al-Hamawi 1866) apud Justi 1895, p. 263. As there is no day named Rustam in the Zoroastrian calendar, this time Rustam must be the actual name of this jādhūyiḥ, namely, the Isphahbudhān supreme commander Rustam, on whom see §3.4.1.
Bridge, Fīruzān, others refer to him as Mardānshāh Dhu ’l-Ḥājib. In all probability, the substitution of Mardānshāh for Fīruzān here is a simple case of scribal error, the orthography of both names being very close. On the other hand, some traditions substitute the figure of Mardānshāh for Bahman Jādhūyih, calling both Dhu ’l-Ḥājib, such as Baladhuri’s contention that Mardānshāh Dhu ’l-Ḥājib, whom he lists as one of the main commanders of the battle of Bridge, also had the epithet Bahman. However, whereas Bahman Jādhūyih, Mardānshāh, and Dhu ’l-Ḥājib all seem to refer to the same person in the sources, their identity with Fīruzān is more problematic: in the midst of the battle of Bridge, as we shall see, queen Būrāndukht recalled Bahman Jādhūyih and appointed in his stead Fīruzān, but asked the latter to cooperate with the former; and after Fīruzān died at the battle of Nīhāvand, Bahman Jādhūyih was appointed in his stead. Based on this analysis, we therefore will proceed from the assumptions that Bahman Jādhūyih, Dhu ’l-Ḥājib, and Mardānshāh all refer to one and the same figure, distinct, however, from Fīruzān. These Pārsīg dynastic leaders, nonetheless, either had a close familial relationship, or most certainly, closely collaborated with each other.

Returning to our narrative, we recall that Ardashīr III’s deposition was effected by the cooperative efforts of the armies of Shahrvarāz and Nīmrūz. When Bahman Jādhūyih Dhu ’l-Ḥājib hurried back to the capital because the news had reached him that Ardashīr III was sick, therefore, as one of the leaders of the Pārsīg, he was in fact returning to the capital to aid Shahrvarāz and the Nīmrūzī faction in toppling the child king. Hence, based on the Sasanian chronological indicators, the battle of Ullays took place at the time when Shahrvarāz had mutinied and was about to take over Ctesiphon in his bid for power, that is around April 630.

The battle of Maqr

In the battle of Maqr, or the Day of al-Maqr, which according to Sayf took place subsequent to the battle of Ullays, Āzādbīh, the marzbān of Hīra, who also fought at the battle of Ubulluh, set out to dam the Euphrates. According to Sayf, “they used not to support each other except by permission of the king.” Blankinshıp comments that they apparently meant the governors. 1993, pp. 26–27 and

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1094 Baladhuri 1968, p. 251.


1097 Balami 1959, pp. 290–291. For more details, see page 218.


1099 See §3.2.3.

1100 See page 190.

1101 According to Sayf, “they used not to support each other except by permission of the king.” Blankinshıp comments that they apparently meant the governors. Ṭabarī 1993, pp. 26–27 and
however, “was [also] impelled to flee by the news that reached him about the death of Ardashir III, as well as the defeat of his own son.” The mutiny of Shahrvaráz with the collaboration of the Pārsig against Ardashir III in 630 CE, therefore, seriously interrupted the Iranian defense against the encroaching Arabs. The series of defenses put up by Bahman Jādhūyiḥ, Jābān, and Azādbih were disrupted by the factionalism engulfing the Sasanian domains, pre-occupying the three armies of the realm: the army of Atrapatkan (Azarbāyjān), of Shahrvarāz, and of Nimrūz. This allowed the Arabs to take the region of Ḥira through skirmishes and negotiations.\footnote{Tabarī 1993, pp. 30–31, de Goeje, 2040–2041.} As the piecemeal affairs against Ḥira were taking place, and Khālid had conquered one side of the Sawād, Sayf informs us, he sent a “letter to the Persians, who were then at al-Madā’in [Ctesiphon] disputing and supporting [different parties] because of the death of Ardashir III.”\footnote{Tabarī 1993, p. 43, de Goeje, 2053.}

The battle of Veh Ardashir

While pre-occupied with their disputes in the capital, the Persians, nevertheless, “did send Bahman Jādhūyiḥ to Bahurasir (Veh Ardashir),” accompanied by the forces of Azādbih.\footnote{Tabarī 1993, pp. 43–44, de Goeje, 2053.} It is the Pārsig leader Bahman Jādhūyiḥ, therefore, who nevertheless returned to the war front to engage the Arabs. Significantly, in the letter that Khālid sent to the kings of Persia he urged these to “enter [his] faith.” If they would accept this, then the Arabs would leave them as well as their land alone and pass beyond them “to others different from [their].” If the kings of Persia did not accept the Arabs’ conditions, then “they must engage the Arabs . . ., even though [they] loath [it].”\footnote{Tabarī 1993, p. 44, de Goeje, 2053.}

The chronology of the internal events as they transpired in the Sasanian domains is once again followed by Sayf. What is more, this chronology continues to corroborate the procession of events in Iran as reconstructed through other sources. The Persians, Sayf continues, “were left split after the death of Ardashir III regarding the kingship but in agreement on fighting Khālid and supporting each other.”\footnote{Tabarī 1993, p. 45, de Goeje, 2054.} This state of affairs continued “for a year, while the Muslims were penetrating up to the Tigris. The Persians held nothing between al-Ḥira and the Tigris.”\footnote{Tabarī 1993, p. 45, de Goeje, 2054.} If indeed the Persians were pre-occupied with this state of affairs for a year, this then takes us to the time that Būrāndukht became queen. Sayf confirms this: after a year of warfare, Khālid left Iraq and went to Syria at around the same time that Būrāndukht had come to power. As we saw earlier,\footnote{See the beginning of §3.3.} this was sometime in July 630/early 9 AH. According to the bijna dating provided by Sayf, however, Khālid would have departed on 13 January 634

\footnote{Tabarī 1993, p. 30, de Goeje, 2037. As we shall see, however, they in fact is a reference to factions.}
ce/4 Dhul-Qadah 12 AH.¹¹⁰⁹ Let us point out once more the discrepancy of more than three years that is at work here, if we would trust Sayf’s *hijarra* dating.

What, however, was happening during this year according to Sayf? While “Khalid stayed in office for a year . . . before his departure for Syria, . . . [the] Persians were overthrowing kings and enthroning others, there being no defensive effort except at Bahurasir [Veh Ardashir].”¹¹¹⁰ And how did this state of affairs come about? “That was because Shiruhy Qubad had slain all his [male] relatives descended” from Khusrow II, and “the people of Persia had risen after Shiruhy Qubad and after Ardashir III.”¹¹¹¹ Khalid, therefore, had remained in command for a year before his departure for Syria. During this period he had written a letter to the kings of Persia. However, because there were no Sasanian kings during this period with any real power, there is no doubt that the *kings* referred to here were, in fact, the dynastic leaders in charge of the regional armies vying for power. What then happened to Khalid’s correspondence with the kings of Persia? When his dispatch “fell into the hands of the people of al-Madain, the women of Kisra’s family spoke up.” They put none other than “al-Farrukhzadh b. al-Bindawân . . . in charge until such time as Kisra’s family agreed on a man [to make king], if they could find him.”¹¹¹² Here then we have finally come to the appointment of the Prince of the Medes, Farrukh Hormozd, as the prime minister of Burandukht, the Sasanian queen. This, however, is one of those instances where the name of Farrukh Hormozd is mistakenly rendered as al-Farrukhzâdh.¹¹¹³

We should recapitulate. Through the reign of the child king Ardashir III, the Persians tried to put up a defense against the Arab armies. The last commander sent to the war front was the Parsi leader Bahman Jadhuyih. For a whole year after the deposition of Ardashir III, the Iranian realm was then in turmoil. For at least three months during this period, the Parthian Shahrvaraz in fact usurped the Sasanian throne.¹¹¹⁴ Sayf subsequently follows the course of the events, filling in the lacunae for this one year, for not only was Khalid still in charge on the Arab side, and hence had not yet left for Syria, but also on the Persian side the participants remained the same.

*The battle of Anbâr*

During this period, when the Persians were occupied with their internal concerns, a certain Shirzâd was unsuccessfully expending his efforts at defending Anbâr. The lack of manpower at his disposal is highlighted when Sayf maintains that the people of Anbâr had fortified themselves, and Khalid observed that he saw “groups of people . . . who had no knowledge of warfare,” fighting for

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¹¹⁰⁹Tabârî 1993, p. 68, de Goeje, 2075.
¹¹¹⁰Tabârî 1993, p. 47, de Goeje, 2056.
¹¹¹¹Tabârî 1993, p. 47, de Goeje, 2056.
¹¹¹³See our discussion on page 187.
¹¹¹⁴See §3.2.3.
the Persians. The commander, Shīržād, sued for peace and even requested to be allowed to retreat. Khālid granted his request. As Sayf’s prior report had insisted, during this time Bahman Jādhūyih continued to lead the isolated war efforts of the Sasanians against the Arabs. It is to this chief commander, Bahman Jādhūyih therefore, that Shīržād returned only to be reprimanded by him for his cowardice.

The battle of ‘Ayn Tamr

The context of the subsequent battle of ‘Ayn Tamr tallies best with the short period during which Shahrvarāz was in power (Muharram–Safar 9 AH/ April–June 630). After the battle of Anbār, Khālid proceeded to ‘Ayn Tamr, which was defended by a Parthian Mihrānid, called Mihrān b. Bahrām Jūbīn, clearly a descendent of Bahrām-i Chūbīn. Blankinship notes that this “would be a son of Bahrām-i Chūbin,” but objects that “in view of the fact the rebellion was put down and its adherents executed, it is unlikely that anyone from this family would reemerge as a commander of a frontier garrison at this late date[!]”. He therefore dismisses this as “another case of Sayf’s adorning his reports with invented personages of illustrious ancestry.” Enough has been said here about the agnatic structure of the dynastic families to put Blankinship’s remark in its proper context: Mihrān-i Bahrām-i Chūbīn was in all probability a direct descendent of the Parthian dynastic rebel Bahrām-i Chūbīn. The Arab tribes of Namir, the Christian Taghlīb, and the Iyād reportedly encouraged Mihrān to leave this war to them, to which he agreed. But Mihrān together with his Arab allies were defeated at the battle of ‘Ayn Tamr. Since Mihrāns were now commanding the war front, it is very likely that it was, in fact, Shahrvarāz who had sent them.

The battle of Fīrād

The next significant Sasanian chronological indicator comes in the account of the battle of Fīrād, where the Persian, Byzantines, and some Arab tribes joined

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1115Tabari 1993, p. 50, de Goeje, 2060.
1116Tabari 1993, pp. 50–51, de Goeje, 2060. Ibn al-Athīr, however, lists Shīržād’s activities under the battle of Kaskar (see page 212 below). Ibn al-Athīr 1862, p. 256.
1117As we have seen, Heraclius and Shahrvarāz met in July 629, but Shahrvarāz’s forces had already begun evacuation of the occupied territories in June 629. Sebok 1999, p. 223. The Byzantines defeated the Muslims in September 629 CE, at the battle of Mutrah in Syria. Kaegi 1992, p. 67. How this fits into the schema of affairs remains to be assessed.
1119Tabari 1993, pp. 291–292, de Goeje, 2062. See also footnote 928.
1120Not much more can be said about the wars that are said to have taken place next, for very few Sasanian indicators are given. Although further research into the agnatic background of individuals appearing in these wars will probably clarify much. At the battle of Dūmat al-Jandal, the Persian commanders Rūzbīh and Zarmihr were again joined by Arab tribes, while another Persian commander, Mahbūdān, took part in the battle of Ḫuṣayd. In this latter war, both Zarmihr and Rūzbīh were reportedly killed. Tabari 1993, pp. 57–62, de Goeje, 2065–2069.
forces. Although traditionally believed to have been in 12 AH/633 CE, based on Sayf’s *hijra* dating, we propose that it actually took place during Shahrvarāz’s short reign. An attempted cooperation between the Byzantines and the Persians at this juncture of history is quite plausible. for Heraclius, we recall, had instigated the Mihrānīd Shahrvarāz to usurp the throne, and had promised him manpower as well.

Sayf then recounts the battle of Yarmūk (in Syria) against the Byzantines, which he is said to have pushed two years earlier to the year 13 of *hijra* (634). We shall not be concerned with the ways in which our newly constructed chronology of events affect our knowledge of the conquest of Syria. We turn, instead, to the continuation of Sayf’s account on the early conquest of Iraq. The Sasanian chronological indicators in Sayf’s narrative continue to fill in the gaps of the accounts that he has recently given: “The Persians . . . found order, one year after Khālid had come to al-Hira, a little after Khālid’s departure, under the rule of Shahrvarāz b. Ardashīr b. Shahrīyār, one of the relatives of Kisrā, and then under Sābūr.” Here, Sayf is actually referring to events during Shahrvarāz’s reign, except that we are thrown off by the *hijra* dating interjection that Khālid had departed in 12 AH/634 CE. Significantly, when Sayf picks up his narrative here, the Arab commander in charge is not Khālid b. Walīd, but Muthannā b. Hārītha. Ibn al-Athīr notes that Muthannā came to Hira after Khālid had left for Iraq.

Now Shahrvarāz sent a huge army against Muthannā, this time commanded by Hormozd Jādhūyih. The character of Hormozd Jādhūyih’s army is quite significant: it was made up of mere “keepers of chickens and swine.” The names of the putative commanders given are al-Kawkabādh and al-Khūbkādh, which are emended to al-Kurrubādh and al-Kharubādh by Tabarī’s editor. The whole point of the story, however, is that Shahrvarāz’s army was made up of mostly plebeian soldiers, as Muthannā observes, the rabble, who were “nothing but keepers of chickens and swine.” *Kawkab* and *khuk* are in fact the Persian terms for chicken and swine respectively, and the suffix *badh* means a guardian.

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1121 Among the tribes joining the Persian–Byzantine coalition, Tabari mentions the Taghlib, the Iyād, and the Namir. Tabari 1993, pp. 57–62, de Goeje, 2065–2068.
1122 Because of the sorry state of the Byzantine armed forces at this juncture, it is likely that their aid could not have amounted to much, see Kaegi 1992, passim.
1123 See footnote 961.
1124 Tabari 1993, p. 117, de Goeje, 2116. This Sābūr was most likely Shāpūr-i Shahrvarāz, the son of Shahrvarāz, whom we will discuss on page 204 below.
1126 Tabari 1993, p. 118, de Goeje, 2116. Ibn al-Athīr notes that the Iranian forces totaled 10,000 men. Ibn al-Athīr 1862, vol. 2, p. 415. It is possible that this Hormozd Jādhūyih is the father of Bahman Jādhūyih: according to Khayyāt, Bahman Jādhūyih was the son of Khorhormuzmān Dhu`l-Hājib, and according to Dinawarī, Mardāshshāh was the son of Hormoz. Khayyāt 1977, p. 124. Fred M. Donner in fact suggested in a private correspondence that the substitution of Bahman Jādhūyih for Hormozd Jādhūyih could also involve a scribal error, the orthography of the names being very close in Arabic script. For an alternative conjecture, see footnote 1092.
or a keeper. No need to emend here! Some knowledge of Persian, however, would have helped in distinguishing names of genuine historical figures from fictional or symbolic names, as is the case here. Now the meaning of this passage in the context of the factional rivalries becomes clear. Once he assumed power, and especially since he usurped power, Shahrvarāz was left with very little support, as is evidenced by his short rule of three months. Apparently he was not able to bring to the war front enough manpower to put up a defense against the Arab armies; hence his use of the rabble and “groups of people . . . who [had] no knowledge of warfare.”

Muthannā b. Ḥāritha and Shahrvarāz reportedly exchanged letters at this juncture. Shahrvarāz boasted to Muthannā: “I have sent against you an army consisting of the rabble of the Persians who are nothing but keepers of chickens and swine. I am not going to fight you except with them.” Sayf then provides us with further significant internal indicators of factionalism. The Persians admonished Shahrvarāz: “You have encouraged our enemy against us by what you wrote to them. When you write to anyone, consult [us first].” Sayf informs us that Shahrvarāz was killed around the same time that Hormozd Jādhūyih was defeated, in June 630. Sayf’s subsequent remark that after Shahrvarāz had died, “the Persians quarreled amongst themselves. The lands of the Sawād between the Tigris and Burs remained in the hand of the Muslims,” indicates that he is here filling in the lacuna left in his previous accounts.

**Būrāndukht’s first regency**

Then, Sayf maintains, after Shahrvarāz, “the Persians agreed . . . on Dukht-i Zabān, the daughter of Kisrā, but no order of hers was carried out.” This Dukht-i Zabān is of course Būrāndukht, the first queen of the Persians. Two aspects of the Sasanian queens’ regency will occupy us next, before we will return to the conquests: First we need to establish the sequence of the rules of Būrāndukht and Azarmidukht, and next, we need to investigate what precisely transpired between the Pārsig and the Pahlav factions. As we shall see, these two queries are related. Moreover, we need to assess the manner in which these internal processes affected the war efforts against the Arabs. Does Sayf’s narrative on the processes unfolding in the Sasanian domains continue to betray an internal logic? Why would the Persians choose Būrāndukht but then refuse to obey her orders?

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1130 Tabarī 1993, p. 118, de Goeje, 2117.
1131 Tabarī 1993, p. 120, de Goeje, 2119. According to Ibn al-Athir, Hormozd Jādhūyih left the war front when Shahrvarāz was killed. Ibn al-Athir 1862, vol. 2, p. 415.
1132 According to Khalīfat b. Khayyāṭ, after the battle of Ullays, Khālid conquered Hurmusjīrd and Bārumā, after which he sent Muthannā toward the market of Baghdād [probably Abnār] in the year 10 AH. It is at this point that Khālid was sent to Syria where he attacked (aghāra) the Ghassanids in Marj al-Rahīṭ. Khayyāṭ 1977, p. 119.
1133 Tabarī 1993, p. 120, de Goeje, 2119.
Shāpūr-i Shahrvarāz

The continuation of Sayf’s narrative provides crucial information that clarifies the situation: When Būrāndukht’s orders were rejected, she was “deposed, and Sābūr b. Shahrbarāz was made king.”1134 Even more significant information is provided next. When Shāpūr-i Shahrvarāz became king, “al-Farrukhzād b. al-Bindawān took charge of the affairs.” It was from this Shāpūr-i Shahrvarāz that al-Farrukhzād b. al-Bindawān asked for the hand of Azarmidukht. Without doubt, al-Farrukhzād b. al-Bindawān is actually Farrukh Hormozd, this being another one of the many instances that his name is confused with his son Farrukhzhād’s.1135 We recall that all of our accounts agree that Farrukh Hormozd was the minister of Būrāndukht. He was the same figure who claimed to be the “leader of the people and the pillar of the country of Iran,” and the same figure about whom our sources claim that “there was none greater . . . [than him] among the Persians.” As Būrāndukht held very little power, it is certain that she was promoted to the throne by Farrukh Hormozd and his faction, the Pahlav faction. While we do not have any coinage for Shāpūr-i Shahrvarāz, who vied for kingship after Būrāndukht’s deposition, we can confirm nevertheless that he was a historical figure. Nonetheless, the Pārsīg, while willing to collaborate with the Mihrāns, had no intention of promoting once again one of them to Sasanian kingship, as is clear from Shahrvarāz’s fate after usurping the throne. Therefore, if Shāpūr-i Shahrvarāz aspired to Sasanian kingship, he must have done so with very little support.

3.3.3 Azarmidukht and the Pārsīg

Shāpūr-i Shahrvarāz’s aspirations, however, were cut short and Azarmidukht was raised to the throne with the aid of the Pārsīg faction. Numismatic evidence confirms her reign, sometime in 630–631 CE. According to Ṭabarī, Farrukh Hormozd then asked Shāpūr-i Shahrvarāz “to marry him to Azarmidukht.” Shāpūr-i Shahrvarāz obliged, but Azarmidukht became angry, saying: “O cousin, would you marry me to my slave?” Whether the complicity of Shāpūr-i Shahrvarāz in Farrukh Hormozd’s attempt at marrying Azarmidukht is a spurious tradition or not, in folkloric garb Ṭabarī’s narrative highlights a significant dimension of the dynastic struggles that were transpiring at this juncture: the dynastic faction of the late Shahrvarāz and his former army lent their support to Azarmidukht,1136 against the army of Azarbāyjān and its leaders, Farrukh Hormozd and his sons, who had supported Būrāndukht.

We must yet again recapitulate: after Shahrvarāz, Būrāndukht was promoted to the throne in 630 CE. Because her promotion was not agreed upon by all factions, however, she was deposed. The Mihrānīd Shāpūr-i Shahrvarāz,

1134 Ṭabarī 1993, p. 120, de Goeje, 2119.
1135 However, the gentilitial connection to the Ispahbūdān Vindūyī is legitimate, as we have argued on page 187.
1136 Thomson is therefore absolutely on the target when he makes this very assertion. Sebeos 1999, p. 225.
with or without the help of the Pārsig, then attempted to fill in the vacant slot after Būrāndukht’s deposition. But the Pahlav faction did not agree to this. So Azarmidukht was made queen, sometime later in 630 CE. Then comes a crucial aspect of the regency of the Sasanian queens, Būrāndukht and Azarmidukht. Here we finally realize why all our traditions, except for that of Sebeos, who is clearly in the wrong here, maintain that Farrukh Hormozd asked the hand of Azarmidukht in marriage. Because Azarmidukht was a Pārsig candidate, the Pahlav leader Farrukh Hormozd, in asking for her hand, was trying to effect a modus vivendi with the Pārsig faction. By marrying Azarmidukht, he would have brought the two factions together. Our anecdotal tradition of Sayf also maintains that he sought to effect this union through the intermediary of the Mihrānīd Shāpūr-i Shahrvarāz. Azarmidukht, however, declined.

That Shāpūr-i Shahrvarāz was the cousin of Azarmidukht is borne out by our evidence, underscoring the fact that, as the Ispahbudhān family had long-established familial ties with the Sasanians, so too did the Mihrāns, following an age-old tradition of marrying into the ruling Sasanian dynasty. A sister of Khusrow II carried the name Mihrān because she married into the Parthian Mihrān dynasty. The name of her husband is not given in the sources. However, if Shāpūr-i Shahrvarāz was the offspring of this marriage, thus making Azarmidukht and Shāpūr-i Shahrvarāz cousins, then this sister of Khusrow II had actually married the powerful Parthian Mihrānīd dynastic leader Shahrvarāz. In establishing Shahrvarāz as the ērān-spābed of Nīmrūz, therefore, Khusrow II had promoted his son-in-law to this important post.

Farrukh Hormozd as Hormozd V

After Azarmidukht’s refusal to marry Farrukh Hormozd, the latter no longer shied away from the throne itself. “Today I am the leader of the people and the pillar of the country of Iran,” he claimed. And so, while Shāpūr-i Shahrvarāz’s assumption of Sasanian kingship is subject to doubt, that of the Prince of the Medes, Farrukh Hormozd, is certain. All the evidence corroborates that the coinage of Hormozd V, minted in Stakhr in Fārs and Nīhāvand in Media, belongs to Farrukh Hormozd, the Prince of the Medes. Furthermore, Farrukh Hormozd’s attempt to co-opt Azarmidukht in order to enhance his own

\[1137\] Christensen 1944, p. 109–110, n. 2 and p. 104 respectively. She is denoted by \(\delta\) in the genealogical tree on page 471.

\[1138\] Justi 1895, p. 420.

\[1139\] Sebeos maintains that Queen Bor (Būrāndukht), that is to say, Khusrow II’s daughter, rather than his sister, was Khoream’s (Shahrvarāz’s) wife. Sebeos 1999, p. 89. Since our Arabic or Persian sources do not confirm this and, considering Sebeos’ general confusion about the identities of the Sasanian queens, this account may be merely an echo of the marital relationships between the Sasanians and the Mihrāns.


\[1141\] Göbl, Robert, Sasanian Numismatics, New York, 1971 (Göbl 1971), p. 81. Incidentally, recall (see page 145) that Farrukhān, that is, Farrukh Hormozd himself, allegedly prognosticated this very feat: “I had a dream, and it was as if I saw myself on Kisrā’s throne.” Taʿbarī 1999, Taʿbarī 1999, pp. 327–328, de Goeje, 1008.
power—following the long established tradition of marriage alliance between the Ispahbudhân family and the Sasanians—\(^{1142}\)—is also reflected in numismatic evidence. For, among the coins of Azarmidukht, who, according to various sources, ruled for a period ranging from four to six to sixteen months in 630–631, there is one, struck in the first regnal year, bearing the effigy of a man. Moshiri, who discovered and studied the coin, argued that the effigy belongs to Farrukh Hormozd, who came to power bearing the name Hormozd V and ruled \(^{1143}\) simultaneously with Azarmidukht for more than a year. All of our contextual evidence emphasizes that this was, indeed, the case. To the illustrious list of the Parthian dynasts who ascended the Sasanian throne, all during the last half century of Sasanian rule, therefore, the name of Farrukh Hormozd must be added. Like his predecessors, however, Farrukh Hormozd’s attempt at usurping the Sasanian throne proved fatal, as is clear from Sayf’s subsequent narrative.

This narrative bears out the complicity of another branch of the Mihrâns with the Pârsîg candidate, Azarmidukht, against the Pahlav leader Farrukh Hormozd. Faced with the obduracy of the Prince of the Medes, Azarmidukht allegedly solicited the aid of Siyâvakhsh-i Râzî from the house of Mihrân. The dynamic, needless to say, was probably the reverse of what is portrayed in our accounts. More likely it was Azarmidukht who was under the control of the Mihrâns. According to Ṣâbâ, this Siyâvakhsh-i Râzî, “who was one of the treacherous killers among the Persians,” was the grandson of our famous Mihrânid rebel Bahrâm-i Chûbîn.\(^{1144}\) With the aid of Siyâvakhsh-i Râzî, Azarmidukht subsequently killed Farrukh Hormozd.\(^{1145}\) In search of a crown, therefore, the leader of the Pahlav lost his head, and thus ended the long career of the towering Parthian figure of Farrukh Hormozd, the Prince of the Medes, at the hand of the Mihrâns, who had joined the Pârsîg faction.

\(^{1142}\) See page 110.


\(^{1144}\) According to Blankinship, Sîyâvakhsh was “allegedly the grandson of the usurper Bahrâm VI (590–591 CE) [i.e., Bahrâm-i Chûbîn]. He probably is yet another imaginary scion of a pre-Islamic house said to have been conquered by the Muslims in the early campaigns. Sayf improbably claims that he was the king of al-Rayy in 22/643 . . . His alleged father is mentioned above.” Ṣâbâ 1993, p. 120, n. 652. Emphasis added. We saw that his father, Mihrân-i Bahrâm-i Chûbîn, was the Iranian commander during the battle of ‘Ayn Tamr; see page 201. Below, during the conquest of Rayy in 651, we will encounter another progeny of Bahrâm-i Chûbîn, called Sîyâvakhsh-i Mihrân-i Chûbîn, who was the ruler of Rayy; see §3.4.4. Sayf seems to imply that this is the same person as Sîyâvakhsh-i Râzî (literally, Sîyâvakhsh from Rayy), but he then apparently contradicts himself by saying that the latter was killed by Rustam in 631. Justi also views these two figures as one and the same. Justi 1895, p. 300, n. 12.

\(^{1145}\) Ṣâbâ 1993, p. 120, de Goeje, 2119. This episode is also reported almost verbatim by Ibn al-Athîr 1862, vol. 2, pp. 415–416. Bâlami calls Sîyâvakhsh-i Râzî the commander of the army (amîr-i ēhâras). Bâlami 1959, p. 259.
### 3.3.4 Būrāndukht and the Pahlav

The order of regency of the Sasanian queens that we have thus far established follows our conventional understanding of their chronology: after the murder of Shahrvarāz, Būrāndukht was placed on the throne, and once she was deposed and succeeded by the ephemeral interlude of Shāpūr-i Shahrvarāz, Azarmīdukht assumed power. In the process, Azarmīdukht’s faction killed Farrukh Hormozd, the Pahlav leader. This is all fine and well. Except that this is not the end of the story of neither Azarmīdukht nor Būrāndukht, nor, for that matter, of the Ispahbudhān family of Farrukh Hormozd. For one thing, as was the case with other Parthian dynastic families, the murder of the scion of the Ispahbudhān house did not denote this Parthian dynastic family’s loss of power. When the Pārsīg faction killed Farrukh Hormozd, his son Rustam in retribution killed the queen Azarmīdukht. Būrāndukht, meanwhile, *reappeared on the scene*. Indeed, all of our sources, except Sebeos, systematically connect the regency of Būrāndukht both to Farrukh Hormozd, whom she made her minister, and to his son, Rustam. We should recall, moreover, that while all of our sources emphasize the deposition of Būrāndukht and the murder of Azarmīdukht, none of them informs us of the fate of Būrāndukht after her initial deposition. In search of an answer, we continue our investigation of Sayf.

Sayf interrupts his account on the early conquest of Iraq, narrating the last days of the caliphate of Abū Bakr (634), the death of the latter, and other events pertaining to the first caliph, once more throwing us off with his Islamic chronological indicators. After a report on Muthannā b. Ḥāritha and Abū ʿUbayd, Sayf finally continues his narrative on the conquest of the Sawād with the battle of Namāriq under Muthanna, interposing almost forty-four pages, before the Persian narrative is picked up again.

Sayf’s accounts of the wars in Hīra and the battle of Namāriq, as reported both in Ṭabarī and Ibn al-Athir, coincide with the death of Abū Bakr and fall two years after the inception of Yazdgird III’s rule, that is to say, in the year 13 AH/634 CE. Sayf, however, is reverting back to internal conditions in the Sasanian realm, which must be discussed before we deal with his conquest narrative. We stress, however, that the Sasanian chronological indicators are not referring to 13 AH/634 CE and the reign of Yazdgird III, but to the events after

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1146 Ṭabarī 1993, pp. 129–132, de Goeje, 2127–2129. Among the topics covered here we get, the ceremonies for Abū Bakr’s burial, Ṭabarī 1993, pp. 133–138, de Goeje, 2129–2132; his appearances, Ṭabarī 1993, pp. 138–139, de Goeje, 2132–2133; his genealogy, Ṭabarī 1993, pp. 139–140, de Goeje, 2133–2134; his wives, Ṭabarī 1993, pp. 140–141, de Goeje, 2134–2135; his appointment of ʿUmar as successor, Ṭabarī 1993, pp. 145–153, de Goeje, 2137–2144; the caliphate of the latter, Ṭabarī 1993, pp. 157–158, de Goeje, 2144–2145; the expedition of Fihl, and finally, the conquest of Damascus and other regions, Ṭabarī 1993, pp. 159–173, de Goeje, 2145–2159.


1148 Ṭabarī 1993, p. 176, de Goeje, 2163.

1149 In the translated version, and thirty-four in the de Goeje’s edition.

1150 Ṭabarī 1993, p. 177, de Goeje, 2163.

1151 We will pick up the narrative with the battle of Namāriq on page 211 below.
Azarmidukht’s murder at the hand of Rustam in 631: “As often as the people would quarrel among themselves, Būrān bt. Kisra would act as an honest arbiter until they composed their differences.” The context of this sudden reappearance of Būrandukht is further elaborated: When “Farukhzād b. al-Binduwān [i.e., Farruk Hormozd] was slain, and Rustam came forward to kill Azarmidukht, . . . [Būrandukht] acted as an arbiter until she brought forth Yazdgird III.” The significant information that Sayf provides for us here, therefore, is that Būrandukht was still alive after Azarmidukht was killed by Rustam and that she acted as an arbiter among the quarreling parties. In other words, Būrandukht, who had been put forward by the Pahlav faction under the leadership of the Isphahbudhān, eventually retrieved her status after overcoming the momentary ascension of her sister Azarmidukht, who was supported by the Pārsīg faction. We therefore propose the following succession of the two queens: Būrandukht—Azarmidukht—Būrandukht.

Būrandukht’s coinage during her first regency

A recent reassessment of the numismatic evidence for Būrandukht’s rule confirms our analysis. Malek and Curtis have argued that while “various traditions differ as to the length of her [i.e., Būrandukht’s] reign, ranging from six months to two years, . . . it is likely that she reigned for a little more than a year and perhaps the 1 year and 4 months referred to in a number of texts.” This, they argue, “is consistent with numismatic evidence.” To support their argument, Malek and Curtis analyze the coinage of Būrandukht struck for years 1 to 3 of her rule. The Sasanians “dated their coins in accordance with regnal and not calendar years. Regnal years were [. . .] based on the New Year, . . . [since] the New Year in AD 629 fell on 17 June 629 this is likely to have been before Būrān came to the throne. Her coins from regnal year 1 would [therefore] cover the period up to 16 June 630 and those of regnal year 2 would cover 17 June 630 to 16 June 631. Regnal year 3 would have started on 17 June 631.” Significantly, they conclude that while the “numismatic evidence cannot definitively assist in considering the precise dates of Būrān’s reign, . . . it points to her reign as having started in the year 17 June 629 to 16 June 630 . . . [Būrandukht’s reign] in all probability . . . spanned 629 and 630
and it is conceivable that it went into 631.” Contrary to the assumption of the late Nöldeke, during whose time most of these coins had not yet been discovered, this recent numismatic evidence indicates that Būrāndukht started minting coins sometime between June 629 and June 630. However, we need to amend Malek and Curtis’s argument here slightly. We recall that Ardashīr III was killed on 17 April 630 and Shahrvarāz on 6 June 630, and so Būrāndukht’s regency was only accepted by all parties in late June 630. Hence the coins she had been minting in the year 1 were already in opposition to Ardashīr III, before she was officially ruling. This is confirmed by Sayf’s remark that Būrāndukht “was an opponent of Shirā [i.e., Ardashīr III] for a year.” Her opposition to Ardashīr III also makes sense in view of the factional struggle during this period, when the Nimrūzī faction had abandoned the Pārsīg–Pahlav alliance that had brought Ardashīr III to power and conspired with Shahrvarāz to topple the child king. In response, the Pahlav must have started promoting her regency already during that period. This is remarkably confirmed by her coinage, as almost all of the identifiable mints belong to Pahlav regions: six from Amul (AM), one from Nīshāpur (APL), two from Gurgān or Qum (GW), and two from Rayy (LD). As we will establish below, Būrāndukht’s second regency, after the murder of Azarmīdukht by Rustam, lasted until Yazdgīrd III came to the throne in June 632. This, too, is in perfect accord with the findings of Malek and Curtis: Būrāndukht’s regnal year 3 was from June 631 to June 632.

1160 Ardashīr III was also known as Ardashīr-i Shīrūyīh Qubād, whence Sayf’s mention of his name as simply Shirā. It is unlikely that he actually meant Shīrūyīh Qubād here, for the latter died sometime in 628.
1161 Tabarī 1993, p. 177, de Goeje, 2163.
1162 See §3.2.3.
1163 We also have 18 coins of a mint called WYHC. As Malek and Curtis have argued, the WYHC mint “represents a major mint in the late Sasanian period, but its attribution is still to be conclusively established.” Numismatists have proposed various places: Veh-az-Amid-Kavād (Arrajān, in Fārs); Veh Ardashīr (Southern Iraq); Visp-shad-Husrav (Medīa); Nishābūr (Nishāpur, in Khurāsān). “The importance of this mint” under Būrāndukht, Malek and Curtis argue, “is reinforced by the number of drachms of regnal year 1 and the fact that the only bronze coins of Būrān are from this mint.” Curtis and Malek 1998, pp. 119–125. In view of what has been argued in this work, the location of this mint would most likely be found in the Pahlav territories, and so we suggest reading WYHC as Visp-shad-Husrav in Medīa. I cannot explain the existence of the two mints from Kirmān (KL). The two from Herāt (HL), however, might be explained by the fact that the Kārins seem to have had a base there (recall that the Kārinid Zarmīhr was given control over Zābulistān by Khusrow I as reward for the Kārin’s aid in the war against the Khāqān of the Turks; see page 113). At any rate, these anomalies could also be explained by the existence of petty factions that had joined the ranks of the Pahlav in their support of Būrāndukht.
1164 See pages 210ff and 218ff.
1165 For the continuation of our discussion of Būrāndukht’s coinage, see page 217ff below.
Azarmidukht’s deposition and murder
Sayf maintains that after Azarmidukht had become queen and after Siyāvakhsh-i Rāzī had killed Farrukh Hormozd, “the Persians disputed amongst themselves and were diverted from the Muslims, during the whole absence of Muthannā b. Ḥāritha, until he came back from Medina.” The deposed queen Būrāndukht then reappears in Sayf’s account: when Muthannā returned from Medina, Būrāndukht sent “the news to Rustam and urged him to set out.” At this point, Rustam “was in charge of the Khurāsān frontier and advanced until he stopped at al-Madā’in.” On his way back from Khurāsān, Rustam “defeated every army of Azarmidukht that he met.” He then besieged Ctesiphon, where he defeated and killed Siyāvakhsh. After capturing the capital, he blinded Azarmidukht and established Būrāndukht in her stead.

Būrāndukht’s second regency
Rustam’s rise to power occurred during the rule of Būrāndukht, after the murder of Azarmidukht. He took the place of his father, Farrukh Hormozd, and became the most important figure in Būrāndukht’s realm—more important even than the queen herself, who is referred to as a mere arbiter. According to Sayf, Būrāndukht invited Rustam “to manage the affairs of the Persians, whose weakness and decline she complained about to him.” Befitting the pretensions of his father, Rustam set up conditions for his family’s continued collaboration with the Sasanian queen Būrāndukht: the queen should “entrust him [i.e., Rustam] with the rule for ten years,” at which point sovereignty would return “to the family of Kiswa if they found any of their male offspring, and if not, then to their women.” Būrāndukht accepted these conditions. She summoned the governors (marāzibah), that is, the other factions involved, the most important of which was the Pārsīg umbrella faction, and declared that Rustam would be “in charge of the armed forces of Persia . . . There [would be] no one above you save God . . . Your judgment is applicable to them [i.e., the marāzibah] as long as it leads to the protection of their land and their being united rather than divided.” Persia, therefore, Sayf concludes, submitted to Rustam after the coming of Abū Ubayd.

Finally, under the sovereignty of Rustam, after he had killed Azarmidukht, with Būrāndukht as the arbiter, the Pahlav and all the other factions agreed to cooperate. That the Pārsīg comprised the most important other faction is corroborated by other sources. Yaqūbī specifically confirms this: when

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1166Tabarī 1993, p. 177, de Goeje, 2163.
1168Tabarī 1993, p. 177, de Goeje, 2163–2164.
1169Tabarī 1993, p. 177, de Goeje, 2164. Tabarī also contains a variant narrative about Azarmidukht, Shāpūr-i Shahrvarāz, Farrukhzād, and Rustam: after Shahrvarāz, Būrāndukht, rendered as Shah-i Zanān in the text, “held sovereign power until they agreed on Shāpūr-i Shahrvarāz.” Azarmidukht then rose in opposition to the Mihrānid contender Shāpūr-i Shahrvarāz, and killed him as well as Farrukh Hormozd. The news of this was given to Rustam, who was in charge of the Khurāsān frontier, by Būrāndukht. Tabarī 1993, p. 178, de Goeje, 2165.
“Umar—naturally we shall ignore the Islamic signifier here—sent Abū Ubayd . . ., together with an army to the aid of Mūthannā b. Hāritha, . . . Būrāndukht had assumed kingship and had installed Rustam and Fīrūzān . . . in charge of the affairs of the kingdom.” Fīrūzān, we recall, was one of the leaders of the Pārsīg faction. The agreement of the Pārsīg to collaborate with the Pahlav, moreover, was precipitated not only by the fact that, in Būrāndukht’s words, Persia was in a state of weakness and decline,1172 when already during the rule of Shahrvarāz “from the Arab [regions] strong winds were blowing,”1173 but also as a result of the fact that, temporarily at least, their Mihrānīd accomplices had been defeated by Rustam. As Sayf’s account underscores and as the subsequent course of the war efforts of the Sasanians betrays, however, this collaboration of the Pārsīg with the Pahlav was effected under unequal conditions, because Rustam had assumed a substantial share of power in the Sasanian–Parthian confederacy under the arbitership of Būrāndukht.

We have therefore answered our initial questions regarding the two Sasanian queens. The order of rule of these queens was: Būrāndukht, Azarmīdukht, Būrāndukht—and for part of their candidacy they might have ruled in fact contemporaneously. Each was promoted by a different faction: Būrāndukht by the Pahlav, and Azarmīdukht by the Pārsīg. During the second term of Būrāndukht’s regency, the Pahlav and the Pārsīg, under the respective leadership of Rustam and Fīrūzān, began to cooperate. It is time, therefore, to turn our attention again to the war front.

The battle of Namāriq

The immediate subsequent accounts given by Sayf have some points of interest for us, even though they are provided in a disjointed fashion. We will not be concerned with establishing a detailed sequence of these events.1174 According to Sayf, when Mūthannā b. Hāritha arrived in al-Hīra, he stayed there for fifteen nights. Rustam, meanwhile, summoned the dihqāns of al-Sawād. Most of the Iranian commanders appearing in the battle of Namāriq and the subsequent battle of Kaskar, however, belong to the Pahlav faction. Rustam sent Jābān1175 and Narsī1176 to the region. Jābān’s two wings were under the command of

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و كان عمر قد بَعِثَ ابا عِيسِي بن مسعود الثقفي في جيش مع الملك بن حارثة الشهباني إلى العراق و كان
کسرى قد تولى و قامت بوران ابنه بالملك و صدر و الفدوان الفقيه بامر الملك

1171See pages 174ff and 196ff.
1172Tabarī 1993, p. 177, de Goeje, 2164.
1174As Donner notes the “exact sequence of these raids cannot . . . be reconstructed with any precision.” Donner 1981, p. 192. But see nevertheless our provisional reconstructed chronological table on page 468.
1175The general who also fought at battle of Ullays and the battle of Maqr; see pages 195ff and 198ff.
1176The brother of the Ardashīr III’s minister Māhādharjūshnas; see footnotes 1061 and 1183.
Jushnasmāh,1177 and Mardānsīhāh.1178 In the battle of Namāriq, Jushnasmāh is killed and Jābān defeated. Ibn al-Aṭhir maintains that Mardānsīhāh also fell at this battle.1179

The battle of Kaskar

In the battle of Kaskar, which is reported next, the defeated Persians took refuge with Narsī. At the news of the defeat at the battle of Namāriq, Rustam and Būrāndukht ordered Narsī: “[go] off to your estate and protect it from your enemy and our enemy. Be a man.”1180 In the battle of Kaskar, Narsī’s two flanks were “commanded by the two sons of his maternal uncle, who were the two sons of the uncle of Kisrā, Bindūyah [i.e., Vindūyiḥ] and Tīrūyah [i.e., Tīrūyiḥ], the two sons of Bistām [i.e., Vistāhm].”1181 This, therefore, was an Ispahbudhān dynastic army, which was, quite appropriately, brought into the field by the Parthian Rustam.1182 Moreover, Narsī, as Sayf informs us, “was the son of Kisrā’s maternal aunt and Kaskar was [in fact] an estate of his.”1183 The powers of Narsī are described next. Narsī would protect his estates, “neither did humanity eat [of] it, nor did anyone plant it besides them or the king of Persia . . . for this property was a protected reserve (himā).”1184 The generals leading Narsī’s two flanks, Vistāhm’s sons Vindūyiḥ and Tīrūyiḥ, were the two “sons of his [Narsī’s] maternal uncle, who were [in turn] the two sons of the uncle of Kisrā [i.e., Khusrow II].”1185 Māhādharjushnas, Ardashīr III’s minister, furthermore, was a brother of Narsī, and was already killed by Shahrvaraz in 630.1186 The close association that the names of the members of a dynastic family must have had, explains probably his posthumous presence on the battlefield in Sayf’s narrative.1187 Although Blankinship recognized these familial connections, he

1177 See page 212 below, explaining this posthumous appearance of Jushnasmāh, i.e., Māhādharjushnas.
1178 It is quite unlikely that this Mardānsīhāh is the Pārsīg leader Bahman Jādūyiḥ; see page 213 below. Also see Blankinship’s notes on these, Ṭabarī 1993, nn. 903–904.
1180 Ṭabarī 1993, p. 182, de Goeje, 2168.
1181 Ṭabarī 1993, p. 183, n. 923, de Goeje, 2169.
1182 See §3.3.1 for the Ispahbudhān, and page 471 for a genealogical tree of this family.
1183 This maternal aunt is a sister of Vistāhm and Vindūyiḥ, marked γ in our reconstructed genealogical tree on page 471.
1184 In an interesting side note in Balḵamī’s narrative, the author informs us that it was Khusrow II Parviz who had given the villages of Kaskar to Narsī as a fief (iqtā‘), and that Narsī had been ruling these for 10 years. Balḵamī 1959, p. 286. Because these wars were being fought during the second term of Būrāndukht, probably in 631, Khusrow II’s grant of Kaskar to Narsī must have been around 621 at the height of Khusrow II’s victory against the Byzantines. Morony, however, dates this to 624 CE. Morony 1984, p. 186.
1185 See footnote 1183 above.
1186 See page 181.
1187 Morony notes that the Parthian dynastic family under Narsī also had royal lineage. Morony 1984, pp. 185–186, n. 27. In any case, the familial ties of the Ispahbudhān to the Sasanians had a long history. Recall to this effect for instance Qubād’s marriage with Aspebedes’ sister discussed on page 110. For a reconstruction of Narsī’s family, see also the family tree on page 471.
objected: “As this Bistām [Vistāhm] fought against Khusrow II for ten years (circa 591–601 CE) in a devastating civil war for the Persian crown, [however,] it is not likely that any of Bistām’s relatives would enjoy later prominence, least of all his sons, especially as there is no mention of this family after 601 CE, except in the reports of Sayf b. Umar\textsuperscript{1188}... this is another instance of Sayf adorning his reports with claimed descendants of defunct pre-Islamic noble houses.”\textsuperscript{1189}

In line with their earlier cooperation with the Pahlav and the Pārsīg in toppling Khusrow II, an Armenian contingent also joined Rustam’s war efforts. For, as Sayf maintains, when the news of Jābān and Narsī’s imminent defeat was brought to Rustam and Būrāndukht, they sent Jālinūs to their aid.\textsuperscript{1190} Jālinūs “was commanded to begin by Narsī [, i.e., presumably aiding Narsī] and then to fight Abū ʿUbayd.” Narsī and his followers hoped that Jālinūs would “get to them before the battle.”\textsuperscript{1191} But Abū ʿUbayd “hastened against him [i.e., Narsī], leading his army off before al-Jālinūs had drawn near ... [and so] God defeated the Persians [and] Narsī fled.”\textsuperscript{1192} In the engagement that followed, the Muslims defeated Jālinūs as well, and the latter fled.\textsuperscript{1193} How wholeheartedly Jālinūs sought to engage the Arabs is not clear, but Sayf’s subsequent remarks indicate that Jālinūs’s efforts were reserved. The numbers under his command might have also been exaggerated. What finally led to the defeat of the Pahlav forces that Rustam had sent to the war front, therefore, cannot be ascertained with any degree of certainty. Perhaps, as Donner puts it, the fact that the Arab forces had fanned out in the agricultural heartland of central Iraq had something to do with this.\textsuperscript{1194} It is equally important to note, however, that, except for the Armenian contingent of Jālinūs, who arrived too late, at any rate, the forces that were brought to bear in these wars comprised only the Pahlav faction. Without a doubt, the general Mardānshāh in Narsī’s army was not the Pārsīg leader Bahman Jādhūyih Dhu ʿl-Ḥājib,\textsuperscript{1195} for it was only after Jālinūs, too, was defeated, that Rustam brought in the Pārsīg faction, and cemented his collaboration with the Pārsīg forces under the leadership of Bahman Jādhūyih and Fīrūzān, leading to one of the only Persian victories against the Arabs: the battle of Bridge.

\textsuperscript{1188}For a rebuttal of this particular objection of Blankinship, see page 462 below.
\textsuperscript{1189}Tabari 1993, p. 183, n. 923.
\textsuperscript{1190}For Jālinūs’ possible identity, see footnote 846.
\textsuperscript{1191}Tabari 1993, p. 183, de Goeje, 2169. Jālinūs is said to have brought to the front 20,000 men. Ibid., p. 183, n. 923; Bağamı 1959, p. 287 and pp. 185–186.
\textsuperscript{1192}Tabari 1993, p. 183, de Goeje, 2169.
\textsuperscript{1193}Tabari 1993, p. 186, de Goeje, 2172.
\textsuperscript{1194}Donner 1981, p. 192.
\textsuperscript{1195}See page 196ff. Recall that according to Sayf, this general Mardānshāh died at the battle of Namāriq, whereas Bahman Jādhūyih only died in 642, at the battle of Iṣfahān; see page 247ff.
The battle of Bridge

The battle of Bridge\(^{1196}\) may serve as the quintessential episode of Sasanian history illustrating both the strengths and weaknesses of the dynasty’s four centuries of rule. While the failure of the Iranian war efforts thus far can be attributed to many factors, one of the most important of which was the Pārsīg–Pahlav debacle, there is no doubt that a paramount cause of the Iranian victory over the Arabs in the battle of Bridge—a victory that was never again repeated—was the unprecedented agreement between the Pārsīg and the Pahlav to forge an alliance under queen Būrāndukht, the arbiter.

The Pārsīg and the Pahlav

The unique articulation of this paradigmatic dimension of Sasanian history, that is, the crucial centrality of the Pahlav and Pārsīg terms of identity, is only explicitly stated by Sayf and, based on Sayf, by Ibn al-Athīr. Recounting the conquest of the Sawād, Ibn al-Athīr pauses to inform the reader about the internal turmoil that had swallowed up Iran during this period. “At this time, the people [of Iran] had divided into two groups: The fahlawaj [Pahlav] were supporting Rustam, while the inhabitants of Fārs (ahl-i fārs) were backing Fīrūzān.”\(^{1197}\) What we have here, therefore, is a direct confirmation of one of the central theses of this study: the over-arching Pārsīg–Pahlav dimension of the Sasanian polity throughout their reign, and especially during the period examined in the course of this investigation. Sayf and Ibn al-Athīr, however, continue to maintain the untenable hijra–Sasanian chronological indicators, claiming that the battle of Bridge took place during Būrāndukht’s regency (630–632), but maintaining at the same time that this was the year 13 of hijra (634). The chronology of the battle of Bridge, therefore, is one of the many examples of the chronological discrepancies which we have mentioned before, and all, including Blankinship, have remarked on.

We also find the above account in Ṭabarī’s description of the battle of Bridge.\(^{1198}\) Based on a faulty reading, however, this incredible piece of information on late Sasanian history is rendered meaningless in the recent translation of Ṭabarī’s opus. To begin with, in two different translations, the term fahlawaj, the obvious Arabicized version of the Middle Persian term Pahlav, has been rendered as al-Fahlūjī. Under the account of the battle of Bridge, therefore, we get the following translation, which curiously and, as we shall see, justifiably,

\(^{1196}\) Also called the battle of Quss, al-Qarqūs, Quss al-Nātif, or al-Mawahah.

\(^{1197}\) Ibn al-Athīr 1862, vol. 2, p. 440:

\(^{1198}\) Ṭabarī 1993, p. 188, de Goeje, 2174–2176:
includes a twist that appears in Sayf’s narrative, but not in Ibn al-Athîr’s version: “When the Persians were trying to cross [the Euphrates during the battle of Bridge], the news came to them that the people of Madâ’in had revolted against Rustam, breaking that which was between them and him. They became two parties, al-Fahlûj [sic] against Rustam and the Persians against al-Fayrûzân.” In Sayf’s narrative, therefore, we also get the dichotomous division of the people of Madâ’in into two parties, the fablawaj and the Persians. Why, however, does Sayf here maintain that the Pahlav had revolted against Rustam, their leader, and that the abl-i fârs had gathered in opposition to Fîrûzân? We shall attempt an answer to this later in this section. For now we should note the following:

In the index to the translation of Ṭabarî the term al-Fahlûj (i.e., fablawaj) is described as a party or ethnic group. A note explains that the term is “[d]efined in Ṭabarî, I, 2608,1199 as the people from between al-Bâb [Darband] and Hûlûwân in the region of al-Jîbîl in western Iran.” As we know by now, of course, the term Pahlav denotes a considerably larger territory than that delimited here by Ṭabarî. The only reason Ṭabarî restricts his definition to the inhabitants of the Jîbîl in the aforementioned section is that, in this case, he is relating the account of the future battle of Nihâvand1200 squarely within the Jîbîl region.1201 The correct reading of this term, once again, is not Fablûj but fablawaj (Pahlav).1202 Blankinship, however, is correct in considering the term as a party or ethnic group. For in fact Pahlav, as we have argued extensively through the course of this study, refers to the ethnicon of the Parthians who, through the course of the Sasanian history, consciously maintained their identity.

There is very little doubt, although the precise details await further research, that the Persîs–Parthian (abl-i fârs–fablawaj) division, unique to Sayf’s accounts as reconstructed both in Ṭabarî and Ibn al-Athîr, comprised, on a very broad level, a regional division as well: the quarters of the south and west versus the quarters of the north and east. This regional division comes across quite clearly in Ṭabarî’s account on the battle of Nihâvand, to be discussed in more detail shortly. When the Sasanian monarch, here correctly maintained to be Yazdgîrd III, is said to have issued a call for making a stance vis-à-vis the Arab armies in Nihâvand, Ṭabarî maintains that thus, “one after the other, there arrived those living in the territory between Khûrâsân and Hûlûwân, those living in the territory between al-Bâb [i.e., Darband] and Hûlûwân, and those living in the territory between Sijistân [i.e., Sîstân] and Hûlûwân.” Ṭabarî’s account goes on to summarize these groupings: “The cavalry of Fârs and of the Fablûj [sic], the inhabitants of al-Jîbîl joined forces.”1203 In a second configuration, immediately

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1199 de Goeje, 2608.
1200 See page 241ff.
1201 Ṭabarî 1993, p. 189, n. 945, de Goeje, 2176.
1203 Ṭabarî 1989a, p. 193, de Goeje, 2608.
following this, Ṭabarî makes this dichotomous territorial division even more lucid: “Those hailing from [1a] the territory between Bāb (al-Abwāb) and Ḥulwān numbered thirty thousand troops, those hailing from [1b] the territory between Khurāsān and Ḥulwān numbered sixty thousand, and those hailing from [2a] the territory between Sījistān and Fārs and [2b] Ḥulwān, numbered sixty thousand.”

If one were to conceptualize this division schematically, one would see that it roughly corresponds to the quadripartition into kūsts implemented during the rule of Khosrow I Nowshīrvān. A corrective to the four-fold territorial division given here by Ṭabarî is that the first area [1a], between Darband (Bāb) and Ḥulwān, naturally included Armenia with a number of its dynastic factions which were fighting the Arabs alongside the Iranians. Furthermore, because this is a description of the battle of Nihāvand, it naturally excludes the Sawād and Mesopotamian territories of the Sasanian empire, which had already been conquered by the Arabs in the battle of Qadisiya. As we shall see later on as well—and we are jumping ahead of our narrative here—by the time the battle of Nihāvand took place the Parthian general Rustam had already died at the battle of Qadisiya. Thus the army command at this point was taken over by the Pārsīg leader, Firūzān: “[and] they all set out to him [Firūzān], one after the other.”

It is a testimony to the reliability of the secondary and tertiary sources for Sasanian studies, that this incredible, crucial, piece of information provided by Sayf, that is, the existence of a split between the Pahlav and the Pārsīg factions, is corroborated by our primary sources, namely by the recently discovered seals examined in this study, where, as we have seen, some of the ērān-spāhbeds on these seals insist on their affiliation as a Parthian aspbed, aspbed-i pahlaw, while others identify themselves as aspbed-i Pārsīg, that is, Persian aspbed. The terminology that they adopt for rendering this ethnic division, furthermore, is Pahlav, fahlaw or fahlawaj, and Pārsīg, what in Sayf’s narrative has been rendered as ahl-i fārs (the people of Fārs).

The battle of Bridge

Let us return to our narrative on the battle of Bridge. Rustam’s recognition of the Pārsīg’s prowess is reflected in Sayf’s subsequent narrative. After Jālīnūs was defeated at the battle of Kaskar and had returned to Rustam, the latter

1204 With the numbers given here we are naturally not concerned, although as a ratio of the forces brought to the field by the two factions, these too might be revealing. Ṭabarî 1989a, p. 193, de Goeje, 2608.
1205 So with these amendments, the above regional division roughly corresponds to the Pahlav regions [1a] of the kūst-i ādurbadagān and [1b] of the kūst-i khwarāsān, and the Pārsīg regions [2a] of the kūst-i nēmrūz and [2b] of the kūst-i khwarbarān.
1206 See §3.4.3.
1207 Ṭabarî 1989a, p. 193, de Goeje, 2608.
1208 Gyselen 2001a, seal 1b of a figure called Dād-Burz-Mihr, p. 36, and the personal seal of this same figure, seal A, p. 46. See also the table on page 470.
1209 Gyselen 2001a, seal 2c, p. 39, and the personal seal of this same figure, seal B, p. 46.
asked: “which of the Persians is the strongest in fighting the Arabs in your opinion?” He was directed to the Parsig leader Bahman Jadhuyih, whom he then put in charge of the Armenian faction. The chain of command that he established, moreover, reveals the friction between him and the Armenian dynasts. For Rustam ordered Bahman Jadhuyih thusly: if Jalinus “returns to the like of his defeat, then cut off his head.” Befitting his status, Bahman Jadhuyih was given the Great Standard (derafsh-i Kaviyân). In giving us a folkloric etymology for this general’s epithet Dhu ‘l-Ḥajib, Ibn al-Athir highlights the seniority of Bahman Jadhuyih, maintaining that he was such an old man that he was forced to keep his eyebrows somehow maintained upwards in order to see in front of his own steps.

Thus, the Parsig leader Bahman Jadhuyih, under the tacitly acknowledged leadership of the Pahlav leader Rustam, commanded 30,000 of the grandees of the ajam at the battle of Bridge, defeating the Arab armies in battle. Although Ṭabarî dates this event to 13 AH/634 CE, in a flagrant chronological invention, there is little doubt that the battle of Bridge was, in fact, fought during the second term of Burandukht’s regency, after the murder of Azarmidukht, when the Pahlav and the Parsig factions finally joined forces under the supreme command of Rustam sometime in 630–631, and not, as hitherto believed, in 634–635 CE.

**Burandukht’s coinage during her second regency**

Significantly, Burandukht’s coinage of the second and third year of her reign, and not of the first year, when most of the mints are from Pahlav lands, reflects the Parsig acceptance of her regency. For it is only for the second and third year that we have found numerous coins minted in Sistân, Khuzistân, and Fārs, regions under the control of the Parsig. The number of coins found for Burandukht minted in Sistân (SK) during these two years is amazing: 44 for her second regnal year and 59 for her third. There is no doubt, therefore, that once Burandukht assumed power after the murder of Azarmidukht, the Parsig of the quarters of the south recognized her authority and joined forces with the Pahlav, the original faction to promote the queen, at the battle of Bridge, an engagement that could have potentially saved the Sasanian empire.

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1210 As argued on page 196ff, he is also referred to as Mardâns-hâh or Dhu ’l-Ḥajib.
1211 Ṭabarî 1993, p. 188, de Goeje, 2174.
1212 Ṭabarî 1993, p. 188, de Goeje, 2174–2175.
1215 As Burandukht was only the candidate of the Pahlav faction during her first regnal year, it is improbable that such a united opposition could have happened during her first regency.
1216 See page 208.
1218 Others include one coin from Ardashir Khurrah (ART) in Fârs, five from Hormozd Ardashir (AW) in Khuzistân and five from Stakhr (ST) in Fârs. The latter, as well as Kirmân, for which we have one coin from the second year, also minted coins in her first year. Curtis and Malek 1998, pp. 124–128.
and averted the subsequent disaster. For the cooperation of the Pārsīg with the Pahlav finally payed off: they “inflicted a disastrous defeat on the Muslim forces.”

A victory interrupted

In the midst of their victory at the battle of Bridge, however, something went terribly amiss. And as Morony maintains, that something was the resurgence of the factional strife in the Sasanian capital Ctesiphon. The Pahlav and the Pārsīg had, once again, broken ranks. For, “as the Persians were trying to cross [the bridge], the news came to them that the people of al-Madā’in [Ctesiphon] had revolted against Rustam.” Ibn al-Athir’s narrative informs us, significantly, that, at this time, “the people had divided into two camps: The fahlawaj were supporting Rustam and the parsīg were supporting Firūzān.” Balami’s narrative, furthermore, lends tremendous support to our contention that something in the successful cooperation of the Pahlav with the Pārsīg had gone awry in the midst of the battle of Bridge. In the midst of the Iranian triumph, while Bahman Jādhūyih was about to cross the bridge in pursuit of the fleeing Arab army, “news reached Muthannā that the army of the ajam has risen against Turān [i.e., Būrāndukht] and they do not accept her in power and they have become fed up (bīzār) with the rule (sipahsālāri) of Rustam.” There was, in other words, once again a revolt against Rustam’s leadership. There is no doubt that the Pārsīg led the rebellion in the capital. For, as Sayf informs us, the insurgents were asking for Bahman Jādhūyih, who had been recalled by Būrāndukht. Moreover, after the uprising, the Sasanian queen Būrāndukht was killed, presumably strangled by the Pārsīg leader Firūzān.

The battle of Buwayb

The battle of Buwayb (near Kūfa), reported next and depicted as leading to a major victory for the forces of Muthannā b. Hāritha, is most probably part of a Muthannā lore, added to the accounts of the battle of Bridge and intended to “enhance the reputation of al-Muthannā and of his tribe . . . [in order] to counter the disgrace of his humiliating defeat at the battle of Bridge.” And
indeed the Sasanian account looses its internal cohesion here. For, while toward the end of the battle of Bridge it is made clear that the Pârsî–Pahlav alliance had failed, in the accounts of the battle of Buwayb, and without further explanation, Firûzân and Rustam are depicted as working side by side again.\textsuperscript{1228} So, if at all historic, we must date this battle as having taken place earlier than the battle of Bridge.\textsuperscript{1229} The subsequent thick-headed refusal of the Pârsig and the Pahlav to continue to cooperate is highlighted by the queen’s presumed protest to Rustam and Firûzân: “Why will the Persians not go forth against the Arabs as they used to go forth before today.” The Persians responded to her that fear “was with our enemy at that time but is among us today.”\textsuperscript{1230}

### 3.4 Yazdgird III: Arab conquest of Iran

Sayf then starts narrating “what stirred up the matter of al-Qâdisiyah.”\textsuperscript{1231} The Persians reprimanded Rustam and Firûzân:\textsuperscript{1232} “To where are you being carried? Dispute has not left you alone, so that you have weakened the Persians and made their enemies greedy.” The imminent mutiny of the whole constituency of the two factions against their respective leaders is further highlighted in Sayf’s subsequent account: The “two of you have not reached such a rank that Persia will concur with you in this opinion and that you expose it to perdition. After Baghdād, Sābāt, and Tikrīt, there is only Madā‘īn. By God, either the two of you unite, or else we will indeed begin with you.”\textsuperscript{1233} Threatened by rebellion against them, Firûzân and Rustam agreed to cooperate yet again.\textsuperscript{1234}
So, right after their victory at the battle of Bridge and after Būrāndukht was deposed and finally killed, the debilitating rivalry of the interregnum 628–632 between the Pahlav and the Pārsīg over the control of the Sasanian monarchy ended. Under the respective leadership of Rustam and Firūzān, the Pahlav and the Pārsīg agreed to support Yazdgird III’s ascendancy. Some time after his accession occurred the putative watershed of the Sasanian demise: the battle of Qādisiyya. When Muthannā b. Ḥarīthā sent the news of Yazdgird III’s election to kingship to ʿUmar, Sayf continues, the “letter did not reach ʿUmar before the people of al-Sawād had rebelled (kafara), both those who had an agreement [with the Muslims] and those who had no agreement.”

Muthannā led his own garrison until they stopped at Dhū Qār. Here ʿUmar’s response came to the Arabs: “regroup and become earnest, as the Persians have now become earnest.” This, Ṣayf maintains, “was in Dhū ʿl-Qaḍah of the year 13 (early 635).” This chronology provided by Ṣayf is the most plausible among all the dates provided by our sources for the battle of Qādisiyya. As we shall see, not only did the Pahlav take their time before coming to terms with the Pārsīg’s slaying of their candidate, Būrāndukht, and subsequently accepting the kingship of the Pārsīg nominee, Yazdgird III, but throughout this time their leader, Rustam, was also averse to engaging the Arab armies. Rustam, the immortal hero of Qādisiyya, was, in fact, reluctant to fight. He followed a policy of procrastination through diplomatic correspondences with the Arabs before he was actually forced into battle. All of this took time. Numismatic evidence confirms the date of the battle of Qādisiyya as 634–635 CE or, perhaps, a year afterwards. Were it not for this evidence and in view of the all too blatant problems with the hijra chronology for the previous battles, we would have continued to have difficulties in determining an exact date for the battle of Qādisiyya. Unlike the data at our disposal for the previous period, the Sasanian chronological indicators from here on can no longer aid us in our analysis: all the subsequent engagements of the Arabs against the Iranians took place during the reign of the last Sasanian monarch Yazdgird III (632–651), so that we can no longer rely on the accession and deposition of various monarchs in order to trace the chronology of the Sasanian efforts against the Arab armies. Nevertheless, until the murder of the last Sasanian king Yazdgird III sometime in 651, we can still continue to trace the general contours of the Pārsīg–Pahlav dynamic and its effects on the Arab conquest of Iran.

**Yazdgird III’s coinage**

Before we proceed, however, a word needs to be said about the numismatic evidence pertaining to the initial years of the kingship of Yazdgird III. For this evidence helps not only to delimit the chronology of the battle of Qādisiyya,
but also, and perhaps more significantly, to disentangle the sequence in which Yazdgird III’s rule was eventually accepted by the Pahlav and the Pārsīg. To begin with the latter first.

The Pahlav did not wholeheartedly accept Yazdgird III’s kingship. As Tyler-Smith observed, only seventeen mints are known “to have minted in the name of Yazdgird III, a small number for a Sasanian king reigning 20 years.”\(^\text{1238}\) While the characteristics of this coinage present various problems limiting somewhat our interpretation of them, they do provide us with crucial information pertaining to Yazdgird III’s rule. As Tyler-Smith remarks, if “one wishes to use the coins to help elucidate the literary sources and vice versa, the first essential step is to decide whether all coins struck in Yazdgird III’s name, but without an Arabic inscription, were minted in towns he controlled at the material time.”\(^\text{1239}\) Significantly for our purposes, and as far as the number of mints are concerned, Tyler-Smith notes that of the sixteen mints other than Sakastān (Sīstān), one “would expect his early years to be represented by the most mints, the number diminishing as he was driven east, and by the year 20, a period of only 3 months, very few would be minting in his name.” This, however, did not happen. For, while in year 1 (632–633 CE) only seven mints are recorded and in the middle years anywhere between “none to six in any given year,” for the year 20 (651–652 CE) there are not only “a comparatively large number of mints, . . . [but also a] large number of specimens/dies.”\(^\text{1240}\)

According to Tyler-Smith, Yazdgird III’s coinage can be divided into “four major groups of closely allied coins with a fifth group of more diverse coins.” The first group, dating to the years 1–3 of his reign (632–634), came from eight different mints. What is significant for our purposes is that most of the identifiable mints are located in the southwest of Iran, in Fārs or Khuzistān, that is to say, in Pārsīg domains. The principal exception is Sīstān, known for years 1 and 3. Sīstān, however, as we have noted, while under Śūren control, closely collaborated with the Pārsīg factions.\(^\text{1241}\) According to Tyler-Smith, the fact that these early mints “were so restricted is curious, one possible explanation being that Yazdgird III did not in fact fully control the whole of Iran.”\(^\text{1242}\) In other words, all the coins from the first three years of Yazdgird III’s rule are minted in Pārsīg territories: Sīstān, Fārs, and Khuzistān, roughly corresponding to the quarters

\(^\text{1238}\)Tyler-Smith, Susan, ‘Coinage in the Name of Yazdgerd III (AD 632–651) and the Arab Conquest of Iran’, *Numismatic Chronicle* 160, (2000), pp. 135–170 (Tyler-Smith 2000), p. 138. Emphasis added. The Sīstān mint takes an exceptional place in Yazdgird III’s coinage, as we shall see shortly. Of the remaining sixteen mints, only 194 specimens have thus far been identified. Tyler-Smith 2000, p. 137.

\(^\text{1239}\)Tyler-Smith 2000, p. 137. For references to works on the Arab–Sasanian coins, see ibid., nn. 6, 7 and 8. For Sīstān’s drachm coinage during the late Sasanian period, testifying to the predominant independence of this Śūrenid territory, also see Sears, Stuart D., ‘The Sasanian Style Drachms of Sīstān’, *Yarmouk Numismatics* 11, (1999), pp. 18–28 (Sears 1999), here pp. 18–19.

\(^\text{1240}\)Tyler-Smith 2000, pp. 138–139. All emphasis mine.

\(^\text{1241}\)See for instance our discussion on page 155ff.

\(^\text{1242}\)Tyler-Smith 2000, pp. 138–140.
of the south and west. Significantly, the important mint of WYHC of Būrnādūkht’s reign—the most favorable reading of which must be the one proposing Visp-shad-Husrav in Media—appears only in the second group of Yazdgird III’s coins, those for the years 6 and 7 (637–639), and in the fifth category of mints, those belonging to the year 20 (651–652) of Yazdgird III’s reign. What is even more remarkable is that unlike Būrnādūkht’s coins, no other coins of Yazdgird III have been found belonging to the Pahlav territories, the quarters of the north and the east. The one significant conclusion that this numismatic data afford us, therefore, is that while the Pahlav eventually did fight on behalf of Yazdgird III, throughout his rule, they did not mint any coins on his behalf in their territories, except for the rare issues of the WYHC mints. This observation becomes even more significant considering the following.

The mints of the first group, in Fārs and Khuzistān, stop striking coins from year 4 onward (636–637). This date tallies quite well with the chronology that we will establish for the conquest of Khuzistān in 636–637. In fact, the great majority of issues belong only to year 1 (632–633) of Yazdgird III’s kingship, while from the year 10 through year 20 (642–652), there is an almost continuous production in the mints of Kirmān and, presumably, of Sīstān.

One last remark is crucial in this connection. As Tyler–Smith observes, “no coins appear to have been struck between YE [i.e., Yazdgird Era] 3 (AD 634–635) and YE 10 (AD 641–642).” The absence of any coins from this period underscores a crucial observation: “a major shock [seems to have affected] … the administration of the Sasanian empire in year 3 or 4.” If so, and if “the absence of coins does really indicate the collapse of central administration it would strongly suggest that an early date [i.e., 635–636] for the battle of Qādisiya is correct.” The numismatic evidence therefore corroborates the chronology that we have favored in this study: those traditions that put the date of the battle of Qādisiya between the years 13–15 AH/634–636 CE, that is during the first three years of Yazdgird III’s reign, are the most reliable. Two more remarks are warranted here. Firstly, the absence of any coins from the mint of WYHC, from the year 7 (638–639), soon after this mint had begun to struck coins in the name of Yazdgird III, until the year 20 (651–652), can very well be explained as the consequence of a major thrust of Arab armies into Media proper following the battle of Nihāvand, the battle of Jalūlā, and the conquest of Rayy, after

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1243 See footnote 1163.
1244 Tyler-Smith 2000, p. 140.
1245 Nöldeke already realized this, and referring to Sebeos, argued that the east, as well as Azarbāyjān, initially refused to accept Yazdgird III’s regency. In spite of this observation, he continued to maintain that Rustam and Farrukhzād, immediately or almost immediately lent their support to Yazdgird III. Nöldeke 1879, pp. 307–308, n. 5, Nöldeke 1979, p. 594, n. 183.
1246 See §3.4.2.
1247 As we shall discuss below on page 244ff, Yazdgird III probably stayed in Kirmān and Sīstān from 642–648.
1248 Tyler-Smith 2000, p. 140.
1249 Tyler-Smith 2000, pp. 146–147.
which the Arabs had penetrated these Pahlav territories. Furthermore, the provinces of Iraq, Khuzestan, and Fars had to be subdued before the Arab armies could head east, and, while the province of Kirmān may have been raided in 643–645, Kirmān was “protected for most of Yazgerd’s reign by the western provinces.” Secondly, while “we do not know why the three Kirmān mints were not in use at the beginning of Yazgerd’s reign . . . presumably the Arab invasions changed circumstances dramatically enough to make it worth while for the three towns [of Kirmān] to start minting, though output, . . . appears always to have been low.” Thanks to Tyler-Smith’s study, we will also be able now to realize Gobl’s hope, expressed decades ago, that an investigation of Yazgerd III’s mints “will one day put us in a position to trace the withdrawal route of the dynasty’s last monarch.”

We cannot reconstruct Yazgerd III’s narrative, however, without addressing the controversy surrounding the age that he assumed the throne, for naturally, the younger the age of the king, the less validity to the presumption that he played a consequential role in the exigent course of affairs. Although the reverse does not necessarily follow, that is, even if not a child, Yazgerd III was certainly quite young when he was promoted to the Sasanian throne and was almost thoroughly controlled by the factions supporting him. According to Sa’id b. Bāṭrīq and Ibn Qutaybah, Yazgerd III was fifteen years old when he was placed on the throne, while according to Dinawari, he was sixteen. Tābarī noted, however, that Yazgerd III (632–651) lived for a total of twenty-eight years. If this latter tradition is correct, Yazgerd III must in fact have been only eight years old when he assumed kingship. Nöldeke already pointed out that the coinage for the tenth year of Yazgerd III’s rule still portrays the king without a beard. Nöldeke therefore opted for a very young monarch, an eight-year old child. Whatever his age, however, it was not Yazgerd III who steered affairs, but the two most important factions, the Pahlav and the Pārsig, under the respective leadership of Rustam and Firūzān. What then is our narrative?

1250 For these three conquests, see respectively page 241, page 234, and §3.4.4 below. The usage of the WYHC mint in the year 20 remains, however, a mystery.
1252 Göbl 1971, p. 54. Yazgerd III’s flight will be discussed on pages 244ff and 257ff below.
1253 Nöldeke 1879, p. 397, n. 4, Nöldeke 1979, p. 593, n. 182.
1255 Nöldeke 1879, p. 399, Nöldeke 1979, p. 551.
3.4.1 The conquest of Ctesiphon

The people of Sawād informed Yazdgird III that the Arabs had encamped at Qādisiyah and “in a warlike manner . . . ruined everything between them and the Euphrates.” Encamped in their forts, they warned Yazdgird III that “should help be slow in coming, we shall surrender.” Yazdgird III then sent for Rustam in order to entrust the mission of subduing the Arabs to the son of the Prince of the Medes. At his inauguration, he addressed Rustam: “Today you are the [most prominent] man among the Persians. You see that the people of Persia have not faced a situation like this since the family of Ardashīr I assumed power.”

Incidentally, it is significant that the situation on the eve of the Arab conquest and at the time of the imminent demise of the Sasanians should be compared to what had transpired at the inception of the Sasanian rise to power. As with the rise of the Sasanians, so too on the eve of their destruction, the cooperation of the two polities, the houses of Ardavān and Ardashīr I, the Pahlav and the Pārsig, was required.

From the onset of events that led to the battle of Qādisiyah, all of our traditions depict what seems to have been a major disagreement between Rustam and Yazdgird III. Because, as we have argued above, Yazdgird III was too young to steer policy, any decisive action projected onto him in our narratives must be attributed to the faction that originally promoted him: the Pārsig faction. It is with this caveat in mind, therefore, that we shall proceed. In anticipation of the battle, Yazdgird III and Rustam engaged in a discussion. Ībārī highlights this in the form of a parable that betrays the nature of the disagreement. When Yazdgird III put Rustam in command of the forces, he presumably also asked his commander to describe to him “the Arabs and their exploits since they have camped at Qādisiyah and . . . what the Persians have suffered at their hands.” Rustam replied that he believed the Arabs to be “a pack of wolves, falling upon unsuspecting shepherds and annihilating them.”

Significantly, however, Yazdgird III objected: “It is not like that . . . I put the question to you in the expectation that you would describe them clearly and that then I would be able to reinforce you so that you might act according to the [real situation]. But you did not say the right thing.” The nature of the disagreement is not yet disclosed in Sayf’s narrative, but from what follows, it is amply clear that at least some form of discord had come to exist between a king who owed his very crown to the agreement of the major factions and a dynastic commander who was in charge of one of the most powerful armies of the realm.

Yazdgird III then proceeded to give his own assessment of the situation. He compared the Arabs to an eagle who “looked upon a mountain where birds take shelter at night and stay in their nests at the foot of it.” In the morning the birds recognized that the eagle is preying upon them. Whenever “a bird

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1257 Tabari 1992, p. 43, de Goeje, 2247.
1258 Tabari 1992, p. 43, de Goeje, 2248.
1259 Tabari 1992, p. 43, de Goeje, 2248.
became separated from the rest, the eagle snatched him. When the birds saw him [doing this], they did not take off out of fear . . . If they had taken off all at once, they would have repelled him. The worst thing that could happen to them would be that all would escape save one. But if each group acted in turn and took off separately, they all perished. This was the similarity between them and the Persians. Act according to this.”

What Yazdgird III was describing for Rustam in this parable was in fact the plight of the Persian armies: division and lack of collaboration among the factions. Clearly, Yazdgird III was urging Rustam into collective action. Rustam, however, was in favor of a different course of action. “O king, let me [act in my own way]. The Arabs still dread the Persians as long as you do not arouse them against me. It is to be hoped that my good fortune will last and that God will save us the trouble.”

Sayf then provides a crucial piece of information. Rustam allegedly believed that the king was inciting the Arabs against him. Clearly, this could not be the real reason for his fear. Instead, he must have been afraid of the harm that the Pārsīg faction might place in his way through their actions. Tabari’s subsequent account makes it clear that there was a substantial dispute between the Pahlav and the Pārsīg over the best strategy for engaging the Arabs encamped at Qādisiya.

Rustam favored patience and protracted warfare: We should “employ the right ruse,” he insisted. “In war, patience is superior to haste, and the order of the day is now patience. To fight one army after another is better than a single [and total] defeat and is also harder on our enemy.” Yazdgird III, however, was obdurate. What is being exchanged here is of course not a correspondence between a puppet child king and his powerful commander, but a dialogue between the Parthians (fablawaj) and the Pārsīg (ahl-i Fārs). Rustam pushed for isolated warfare, for biding their time to ascertain the true nature of the Arabs’ intentions. But the situation had become desperate for the people of Sawād. Yazdgird III, that is, the Pārsīg, lost patience and pushed Rustam to engage the enemy. Rustam, however, refused to succumb to pressure, suggesting to send the Armenian Jālinūs or another commander instead. Once these had “made them [i.e., the Arabs] weak and tired,” Rustam argued, he could then proceed himself.

No agreement, however, was reached, and Rustam was forced to prepare for battle.

Just prior to the battle, Rustam became again heavy-hearted, presumably on account of a dream. Now, it is true that apocalyptic dreams, like that of Rustam, are a later concoction, inserted in Ferdowsi’s opus. As such they constitute nothing but a literary topos. For our purposes, however, they do contain significant information. Once again Rustam asked Yazdgird III (read, the Pārsīg)

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for permission to send Jālīnūs first. “The ability of Jālīnūs is similar to mine, though they [i.e., the Arabs] dread my name more than his. [If Jālīnūs fails,] I shall send someone like him, and we shall ward these people off for some time. The People of Persia still look up to me. As long as I am not defeated, they will act eagerly. I am also at this time dreaded by the Arabs; they dread to move forward as long as I do not confront them. But once I do confront them, they will, at last, take heart, and the people of Persia will, in the end be defeated.”

Arab trade interests

What has never been underlined apropos the battle of Qādisiyya is that the Parthian general Rustam not only argued for procrastination and isolated warfare, being intent on deploying other commanders into action, but that he maintained this position while corresponding and negotiating with the Arabs. In the many pages ofṬabarī that follow this is made clear. In the months that ultimately lead to the battle, Rustam sent a message to Zuhrah b. Ḥawiyah with the intention of making peace. Rustam “wanted to make peace with Muslims and give Zuhrah a stipend on condition that they should depart.” Rustam and Zuhrah then engaged in correspondence. Besides the heavy dose of rhetoric that infuses the narrative, significant information is interpolated into the text. Rustam reminded Zuhrah of the history of Persian behavior toward the Arabs, of the protection that they had given the latter, of how they gave them access to pasture land, and provided them with supplies, and finally of how they allowed the Arabs to trade in any part of the land. Zuhrah, acknowledging the veracity of Rustam’s contentions, retorted that after the appearance of the Prophet and his religion of the truth, the Arabs were no longer seeking worldly gains. As we shall shortly see, this denunciation ought to be considered Muslim rhetoric, interpolated in the account by later traditionalists. Rustam now asked Zuhrah about their new religion. Zuhrah then enumerated the essential pillars of his newly found religion. Rustam then responded: “How excellent is this! . . . [And if] I agree to this matter and respond to you, together with my people, what will you do? Will you return [to your country]?” In Zuhrah’s final response, however, we are provided with a fascinating piece of information: “By God, if the Persians were to agree to all of these declarations, the Muslims would indeed never draw near . . . [to their] land except for [purposes] of trade or some

1265 One of the commanders of Sa’d b. Abī Waqqāṣ’s army, who in the pre-Islamic period allegedly was made a tribal chieftain by the king of Hajar (in Bahrayn) and sent to the Prophet. Ṭabarī 1992, p. 17, and n. 65, de Goeje, 2224.
1267 There “is no god except Allāh and . . . Muhammad is His messenger.” “Excellent,” Rustam responded, and “what else?” “To extricate people from servitude to [other] people and to make them servants of God,” Zuhrah replied. “Good,” Rustam retorted, “and what else?” “Men are sons of Adam and Eve, brothers born of the same father and mother,” Zuhrah continued. Ṭabarī 1992, p. 64, de Goeje, 2268.
The Arab intent therefore was not conquest for the sake of assuming power, but trade. The pre-occupation of the Arab conquerors with trade is also highlighted in a narrative of Baladhuri, where ʿAbbās b. ʿAbdalmuṭṭalib warned ʿUmar that if the latter established a ṣāḥib al-ḥāmāl (army registry), the Arabs would “be content with the ḏīwān [i.e., army stipend] and stop trading.”

Returning to our account, after some further discussions, Rustam went away, summoned the Persians, and communicated the Arabs’ message to them. Here, we are finally apprised of the true identity of the party against whom Rustam maintained his position: once Rustam communicated the Arabs’ message to the Persians, “they went into a rage and scornfully rejected [Zuhrah’s proposals].”

Rustam then cursed the Persians. A second tradition, also reported by Sayf, but through a different chain, has a certain Ribābī b. ʿAmīr as a messenger to Rustam. This narrative insists that it was Rustam who wished to engage in a dialogue with the Arabs. As in the previous narrative, again the classic three choices—tribute, conversion, or war—were offered. Rustam demanded time for consultation, a “delay [of] this matter until both parties consider it[s]” implications. Ribābī offered one or two days. Rustam, however, asked for a longer delay: “until we could exchange letters with our men of judgment and with the leaders of our people.”

Tabari’s accounts make it amply clear that negotiations were contingent on the collective agreement of the factions who had by now implicitly agreed to Rustam’s command. The collectivity, however, did not agree with Rustam’s course of action. In the second narrative, after hearing Ribābī’s offer of the classic three, Rustam went “into private consultation with the Persian chieftains,” and argued for the lucidity and honorable nature of their offer. Tabari’s sources for this narrative even imply that Rustam was prepared to convert. The Persian

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1269 ʿUmar replied, “there is no option but this. The booty of the Muslims has become substantial indeed.” Baladhuri 1968, p. 211. A tradition contained in Dinawari also highlights this crucial aspect of the agenda of the Arab conquerors. For according to Dinawari, when Mihrān-i Hamadānī and other grandees of Iran were defeated (see page 218) and the control of various regions of Sawād became feasible for the Arabs, the population of Ḥira informed Muthannā that in their vicinity there was a village (qariyā) with a grand bazār in it. “Once every month, people from Fārs and Ahvāz and various other cities of Iran came there in order to trade in goods.” The wealth attained by the Arabs after the conquest of Anbār is then highlighted by Dinawari. Concerning the conquest of Ubullah a similar observation is made. After the battle of Ubullah (see page 190), ʿUtba b. Ghazwān wrote to ʿUmar: “Thank God that we have conquered Ubullah [Bayṣrah] for this is the port city of the ships that come hither from ʿUmān, Bahrayn, Fārs and Hind o Chīn.” Dinawari 1960, p. 117, Dinawari 1967, p. 127. Note, once more, the anachronism of the mention of ʿUmar, presumably as caliph.
1272 Noth studied the theme of negotiation in the futūḥ literature, and remarked on the many topoi that can be found in them. Noth, Albrecht, ‘Īṣāfān-Nihāwānd. Eine quellenkritische Studie zur frühislamischen Historiographie’, Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft 118, (1968), pp. 274–296 (Noth 1968), p. 284. The information provided here about Iranian factionalism, however, should not be considered a topos.
chiefs warned Rustam: “May God save you from inclining toward . . . abandoning your religion to this dog.”1273 This rhetorical exchange we can confidently disregard, for an agreement to conversion would have been all but impossible, given the context, for the son of the Prince of the Medes. The round of negotiations between Rustam and other factions “continued until Rustam and his companions enraged each other.”1274 Rustam then asked for another messenger, and Mughirah b. Shu’bah was sent.1275 Here, finally, Rustam’s negotiations with the Arabs reached a dead-end. Rustam declared to Mughirah: “We are firmly established in the land, victorious over our enemies, and noble among nations. None of the kings has our power, honor, dominion.”1276 Mughirah interjected: “if you need our protection, then be our slave, and pay the poll tax out of hand while being humiliated; otherwise it is the sword.” At this Rustam “flew into a rage, and swore by the sun: ‘Dawn will not break upon you tomorrow before I kill you all.’”

Much has been said of the paramount role of Rustam in what is portrayed as one of the grand finales of Sasanian history, the battle of Qâdisiya. It is to this foremost general of the Sasanian realm that the defense of Sasanian rule in Iran was entrusted, allegedly by a young puppet king, who himself owed his throne to the scheming of the factions to begin with. It is probably no exaggeration to argue that the death of no other figure in the long course of Sasanian history has acquired such poignant symbolism. Rustam’s death at the battle of Qâdisiya signals the end of Sasanian history. The Shãhnãma, together with the Iranian national historical memory, mourns the defeat and murder of this heroic figure. An apocryphal letter at the end of Ferdowsî’s opus even prognosticates the end of Iranian national sovereignty through the mouth of Rustam, here depicted as having the Mithraic epithets of Justice and Mihr (sitãrib sbomar bûd b dûd o mibr), before his fateful confrontation with the Arabs.1277

With all the fanfare around the heroic posture and tragic death of Rustam, however, little attention has been paid to the fact that, in defending the Sasanians at this important juncture of Iranian history, Rustam, like his brother, Farrukhzâd and their father, Farruhk Hormozd, was not merely pitching his last efforts on behalf of the Sasanians—whose legitimacy his ancestral family, the Ispahbudhân, had questioned again and again in late Sasanian period, after

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1275The continuation of this narrative is reported on the authority of Sayf with only one other transmitter listed after him. In this version, Mughirah does not reiterate the classic three terms of surrender. In fact, it is only Rustam who speaks here.
1276Tabari 1992, p. 73, de Goeje, 2277.
1277In a letter to his brother Farrukhzâd, he predicted this end resorting to astrological signs. Ferdowsî 1935, p. 2965, Ferdowsî 1971, vol. IX, p. 314:

ناشید گذشش ر چرخ بلند
عطاد به برخ دو پیگرد شدست
ز هرام و رهه است ما را گردد
همان تبر و کیوان برادر شدست

We will discuss Mithraic symbolism below in §5.3.
all—but, more importantly, was defending the rights of his family and their fiefdoms in the east and west of the Sasanian territory. Even less is known about the likelihood that the family was probably the most significant player in accommodating the conquering army and betraying the Sasanians.

According to the *Shâhnâma*, in the process of preparing an army to face the Arabs, Rustam wrote a letter to his brother, Farrukhzâd, instructing him to gather the army of Iran and Zâbulistân, as well as anyone coming to him in refuge (*zînhâr khâh*), and to go to Azarbâyjân. Rustam encouraged Farrukhzâd as well as all those who were from their agnatic group (*dûdih-i mā*), young or old, to pray for what was about to transpire, and he reminded them all that Yazdgird III was the only legacy left from the Sasanians.

The continuation of the letter as it appears in the *Shâhnâma* corroborates Sayf’s account that the Arabs’ aim in invading Iran was gaining direct access to trade entrepôts. Rustam informed Farrukhzâd that the Arabs had assured him that the aim of their aggression was not the destruction of the monarchy and the assumption of power, but rather trade. They promised that they would leave the Iranians in control over the regions stretching from Qâdisiya to Rûdbâr. Now, while many rivers, villages, and districts in Iran are called Rûdbâr, the context as well as topographical logic makes it amply clear that this Rûdbâr is without doubt the Persian nomenclature for the Oxus. In other words, the Arabs pledged to go beyond the Oxus (*vazân sū*) to the cities where there is trade. The Arabs’ sole purpose, in other words, was trade and nothing else. They even agreed to pay heavy tariffs and taxation and to respect the Sasanian king and the “crowns of the warriors”, and even to provide hostages as insurance against their good conduct. Rustam, however, warned his brother: all this seemed to be their *rhetoric* and not their *intent*.  

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tebây hârke ar domûd mà bûd  

Ágak pêr; a gêrêrê rûnà bôm  


1280 It is extremely important to note that Tabari also highlights the role of trade. de Goeje, 1049; Nöldeke 1979, p. 529. This, however, is differently rendered both in Nöldeke’s and in the English translation of Tabari. In the English version, in the course of a prognostication that Khusrow II uttered when the famous list of grievances is given to him, the king informed the messenger that all “this happening indicates a bad omen, that the glory of the monarchs has passed into the hands of the common masses, that we have been deprived of royal power, and that it will not remain long in the hands of our successors before it passes to persons who are not of royal stock (*min abîl mâmlûkâb*).” Tabari 1999, p. 386. The actual phrase for the “glory of the monarchs has passed into the hands of the common masses” in Arabic, however, reads:  

ان محى الدواد قد صار عند السوق.  

that is to say, “… has passed to the bazar [i.e., the traders].” de Goeje, 1049. For some reason, Nöldeke, too, has rendered this phrase as “dass die Herrlichkeit der Könige an den Pöbel gekommen ist.” Nöldeke 1879, p. 368.  

1281 Ferdowsi 1935, p. 2966:  

mên rêft hêr gûnû bêr êmêm  

az irânshân varastiad amêd bê mên
It is important to underline the tremendous value of this piece of information provided by Ferdowsī. No other source, not even Sayf, gives this unique exchange of Rustam with the Arabs. To be sure, a substantial part of Ṭabarī’s account details the futile negotiations that ultimately led to the battle of Qâdisiya. And, as we have seen, the theme of trade is hinted at even in these narratives. In keeping with the classical Arab histories’ Islamic rhetoric, however, Ṭabarī’s accounts, while significant, highlight—probably post facto—the religious locomotive of the wars of conquest. Nowhere in the many pages of Ṭabarī,1282 is the theme of trade so explicitly and in detail highlighted as in the poetic couplets of Ferdowsī.

Ferdowsī’s narrative also underlines the forced final agreement of the Pahlav leader, Rustam, into the strategic policies and concerns of the Pārsīg and other factions. In the letter to his brother Farrukhzād, Rustam emphasized that it was they who had finally coerced him into engaging the enemy. The forces of Ṭabaristān, under the leadership of Mīrūy, those of Armenia and those under the control of the Sürenid Kalbūy (Kalbūy-i Sūrī) were all unanimous in one opinion and one course of action, according to Rustam: “The Arabs are not to be trusted … They are not even worthy of consideration. Why have they come to Iran and Māzandarān? If they want access, they have to obtain it through war.”1283

Ṭabarī also mentions Rustam’s letter to Farrukhzād. Here, we also are told

"A messenger came to me from them. Many subjects were discussed in the course of this assembly. [They promised] that from Qâdisiya to Rūdbār, we shall leave the land to the king. Beyond that [i.e., Rūdbār, they promised] we will go to the cities where there are trade entrepôts [bāzārgāh], so that we could buy and sell. Besides this [they claimed] we pursue nothing. We shall even accept heavy tariffs. We do not seek the crowns of the elite. We shall also obey the king. If he desires, we shall even furnish him with hostages."

1282 As Friedmann observes, many themes are highlighted in this section of Ṭabarī’s narrative. These include the contemptuous treatment of the Arabs by the Persians, underlining their poverty and primitive way of life, and deriding their military prowess. These themes might very well reflect “anachronistic echoes of Shurūbī” controversy. The Persians’ “repeated attempts to dissuade the Muslims from embarking on war by promises of material gain,” however, fall short of the insights given by Ferdowsī. Tabari 1992, p. xv.

of the reasons why this other important scion of the Pahlav did not take part in the battle of Qādisiya. Rustam’s letter was addressed to al-Binduwân and those who followed him. Al-Binduwân of course refers to Farrukhzâd, who was indeed the grandson of Vindûyih, and is called here the “arrow of the people of Persia . . . equal to every event, . . . [through him] God will break every powerful army and conquer every impregnable fortress.” Rustam warned his brother to strengthen himself “as if the Arabs have already arrived in your country to fight for your land and for your sons.” He told Farrukhzâd that he had “suggested [to the king] that we should ward them off and thus gain time until their auspicious stars become unlucky.” The king, however, had refused this. As Ţabarî informs us, Farrukhzâd was the marzbân of al-Ṭâb, on the western coasts of the Caspian Sea, and he continued to be engaged in the Caucasus.

As both Ţabarî’s and Ferdowsî’s narrative underline, therefore, the hero of the battle of Qādisiya participated in the fateful battle quite reluctantly and in spite of his preferred stratagems. In fact, according to Ţabarî, between “the departure of Rustam from al-Madâ’in, his camping at Sâbât, his departure from there, and his confrontation with Sâd b. Abî Waqṣâ’s army, four months elapsed. During this time he did not move forward and did not fight.” Rustam is portrayed as “hoping that the Arabs would become disgusted with the place, [and] would become exhausted, and . . . leave.” So long-lasting Rustam’s procrastination is said to have been that the Arabs, realizing his strategy, followed suit and “made up their minds to be patient and to temporize with the Persians indefinitely, in order to throw them off balance,” raiding meanwhile the Sawâd and plundering “the area around them.” Once the Persians realized “that the Arabs were not going to desist,” however, they are said to have commenced their war efforts.

In all our narratives the theme of Rustam’s procrastination, his insistence on having an isolated warfare strategy, and his initial refusal to start the war efforts, reflects his stance, not vis-à-vis the child king Yazdgird III, but vis-à-vis the other factions, most importantly the Pârsîg. The correspondence of Rustam with his brother Farrukhzâd bears witness to this. The exhaustion of the Sasanian empire in the wake of the thirty-year Byzantine–Sasanian wars, which

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1284 See page 187 and the Ispahbudhân family tree on page 471. Ibn al-Athir maintains that at the battle of Qādisiya, when Qarqâ supposedly slew Firûzân, Hârîth also killed al-Binduwân. This, however, is most probably one of those forged traditions attributed to Qarqâ (see page 233 below). Ibn al-Athîr 1862, vol. 2, p. 474.


1286 Al-Ṭâb is the older name for the city of Darband, where successive Sasanian kings, most of all Khusrow I, are credited with constructing heavy fortifications against nomadic invasions. Ţabarî 1992, p. 46, n. 183 and the sources cited therein, de Goeje, 2251. As we shall see on page 279f, in the future course of the conquest, the Arabs encountered in precisely this same region a Mihrânid by the name of Shahrvarzâr, leading the homeless soldiers under his command against the Khazars.

1287 Ţabarî 1992, p. 52, de Goeje, 2257.

1288 Ţabarî 1992, p. 52, de Goeje, 2257.

1289 Ţabarî 1992, pp. 52–53, de Goeje, 2257.
had only recently been brought to an end, perhaps helps explain Rustam’s inclination toward placating the Arab armies. The Arab insistence on trade interests, was probably also responsible for the creation of those narratives that depict Rustam arguing for the lucidity and honorable nature of the Arab stance. All the traditions concerning Rustam’s correspondence with the Arab armies, with his brother Farrukhzād, and with other factions bear witness, however, that the Pārsīg were bent on all-out war. Perhaps their promotion of this strategy was itself predicated upon their knowledge that, indeed, the latter did dread Rustam and his power more than they did that of the Pārsīg.

The battle of Qādisiya

Whatever the case, the list of commanders engaged in the battle of Qādisiya reflects the final participation of all parties who had gathered under the command of Rustam. Sebeos gives us the significant information that the “army of the land of the Medes gathered under the command of their general ṭRostom,” numbering 80,000 armed men. Sebeos then provides a breakdown of this number in order to underline the Armenian participation in the battle of Qādisiya: from among the forces that had gathered under Rustam, 3,000 fully armed men participated in the battle under the command of the the Armenian general, Mušēl Mamikonean, son of Dawit. Prince Grigor, lord of Siwnik, came with a force of 1,000. Sayf’s account adds other contingents. Mušēl Mamikonean, possibly the figure rendered as Jālinūs in our Arabic sources, was put in charge of the vanguard. He was ordered not to “rush [into battle]” without Rustam’s permission. One Hurmuzān was put in charge of the right wing of the army. Mihrān-i Bahram-i Rāzī, a Pahlav of the famous Mihrān family, took charge of the left wing, and finally Firūzān, the Pārsīg leader, commanded the rear guard.

Significantly, a figure named Kanāra was commanding the light cavalry. This Kanāra, whose son Shahriyār b. Kanāra also participated in the battle, was most probably the same Kanārāng who played a major role in the deposition of Khusrow II, and who went on to play an even more significant role in the conquest of Khurāsān. Besides the contingents listed, and in true dynastic fashion, moreover, Rustam’s next of kin were also heavily involved in all this. His cousins, Vindūyih and Tirūyih, the sons of Vistāhm, were charged with commanding contingents from the Sawād.

1290 Sebeos 1999, p. 98.
1291 Sebeos 1999, p. 98.
1292 See footnote 846.
1293 As we shall see shortly on page 236 below, Hurmuzān belonged to the Pārsīg faction.
1296 Tabarī 1992, p. 131, de Goeje, 2346.
1297 See page 154ff.
1298 See §3.4.7.
1299 See the genealogical tree on page 471.
Perhaps one of the single most important causes of the Sasanian defeat at the battle of Qādisiyah, besides the general exhaustion of the populace and the armies after years of warfare with Byzantium, the plague that had decimated the realm, and the atmosphere of distrust and factionalism that prevailed among the dynastic factions, was the fact that during the war “all the leading nobles were killed, and the general Rostom was also killed.”\textsuperscript{1300} Having long recognized the debilitating factionalism engulfing the Sasanian polity—where armies had gathered around their respective leaders—the Arabs also had realized that the best possible strategy was targeting these very leaders. For without these, the coalition of the Persians would crumble and their armies scatter. This strategy, perhaps, also explains the detailed narratives of the battle of Qādisiyah which dramatize the capture, defeat, and murder of these leaders. Although these embellished accounts doubtless have little concrete historical value, recalling more the ayyām narratives,\textsuperscript{1301} and qisās, rather than accurate renditions of events, they portray emotionally the various climaxes of the battle. They also elucidate the controversy over whether ʿUmar should participate in the wars of conquest in person.\textsuperscript{1302} In any event, whether targeting dynastic leaders was the strategic intention of Arabs or not, these were either first to fall in the course of the battle or first to flee. And a good number of dynastic leaders fell at Qādisiyah: Muṣṭaṣ Mamikonean, and two of his nephews, together with Grigor and his sons were among the casualties.\textsuperscript{1303} Shahrīyār b. Kanārā, a member of the important Kanārāngīyān family, “courageously courted death.”\textsuperscript{1304} Hurmuẓān and Firūzān were among the first to flee the scene.\textsuperscript{1305} A Sayf tradition maintains that Qaʿqā killed the Pārsīg leader Firūzān (al-Bayrūzān).\textsuperscript{1306} This, without a doubt, is one of those traditions that Sayf is regularly accused of fabricating, this time with justification. For as Blankinship maintains, the role of this Qaʿqā—an alleged Companion of the Prophet, and a member of Sayf’s own Usayyid tribe—in the accounts of the futūḥ of Sayf is “one of the most outstanding [examples]
of . . . fabrications” of this traditionalist.\textsuperscript{1307} In fact, Qa'qā is said to have killed Firūzān not once, but twice: at the battle of Qādisiya as well as at the battle of Nihāvand.\textsuperscript{1308} The dramatic and fabricated accounts of the murder of these dynastic leaders at the hands of particular Arabs, nonetheless, prove our point. The demise of important Pārsīg and Pahlav leaders was of such urgency and significance for the armies of conquest, that traditions portraying their actual demise might have been invented. Luckily for the Pārsīg, Firūzān was in fact able to flee.\textsuperscript{1309} The most important Pahlav leader, Rustam, the one whom the Arabs were said to have feared the most, was not so lucky. The downfall of this towering dynast, together with the demise and flight of the other leaders, disheartened the various armies that had gathered around them, leading these, in turn, to flee from the battle scene.

As fortune would have it, however, the brother of Rustam, Farrukhzād, absent from the battle due to his engagement in the Caucasus, came to take over the leadership of the Pahlav, playing, as we shall see shortly, a crucial role in the subsequent fateful course of events. Initially, however, the dissolution of the armies that had gathered under the command of Rustam created a substantial power vacuum in Iran. The Arab recognition of this fact is reflected in most of our narratives. In Balamī’s account, after the battle of Qādisiya, ʿUmar told Saʿd that if the Persians remained inactive, he should proceed. Saʿd realized in turn that after the death of Rustam “no-one ha[d] remained who would be capable of leading the Persians (sipahsālārī rā shâyad).”\textsuperscript{1310} In fact, upon the death of Rustam, the two factions seemed for a while not to have been able to agree on a candidate for the supreme command of the army.\textsuperscript{1311}

The battle of Qādisiya, and the heroic but fatal fight of Rustam at the scene, have at times been portrayed as a watershed of Iranian defeat at the hands of the Arab armies. This, however, was far from the case, for the battle of Qādisiya in fact functioned as a wake-up call for the Iranian armies, creating an awareness that continued factionalism could mean imminent destruction. With the defeat at the battle of Qādisiya, nonetheless, the way to the capital of the Sasanians was opened and Ctesiphon was taken by the armies of the Arab conquerors.

\textit{The battle of Jalūlā}  

After the capture of Madāʾin (Ctesiphon), according to Ṭabarī, when “the people . . . were about to go their separate ways, they started to incite one another:  

\textsuperscript{1307}This, therefore, is one of those instances where Sayf either invented, or glorified the deeds of certain Arabs precisely “in order to glorify further the exploits of the Arab conquerors.” Ṭabarī 1993, p. xxiii.  

\textsuperscript{1308}Ṭabarī 1989a, p. 209, de Goeje, 2626.  

\textsuperscript{1309}As we shall see, with Rustam out of the picture, Firūzān not only participated in the next important battle, the battle of Jalūlā, but later also came to lead the Persian armies in the next most important battle that took place after battle of Qādisiya, the battle of Nihāvand. See respectively pages 234ff and 241ff below.  

\textsuperscript{1310}Balamī 1959, p. 303.  

\textsuperscript{1311}Balamī 1959, p. 303.
‘If you disperse now, you will never get together again; this is a spot that sends us in different directions.’\textsuperscript{1312} A new army was eventually formed. Gathering in Atrpatakan (Azarbāyjān), they installed Khorokhazat (Farrukhzād) as their general.\textsuperscript{1313} All the major groups that had participated in the battle of Qādisiyya came together, once again, in the next important battle, the battle of Jalūlā. Some of the jūtūḥ accounts date this important battle to the year 16 AH/637 CE. The date of the battle of Jalūlā, however, is likewise debated in the tradition. While Ṭabarī lists this war among the wars that took place in the year 16 of hijrā (637), he points out that according to a number of traditionalists, including Wāqīdī, the conquest of Jalūlā occurred in the year 19 AH/640 CE.\textsuperscript{1314} If the battle of Qādisiyya is to be put around 635 CE, however, the earlier date 637 for Jalūlā seems to be the most accurate.\textsuperscript{1315} Whatever the exact chronology of the battle, the Parthian Mihrān-i Bahram-i Rāzi was in command.\textsuperscript{1316} With the death of his brother Rustam, the Parthian dynast Farrukhzād, whose name has now been rendered correctly in Ṭabarī as Khurraḍād b. Khurrahurmuz, that is, Farrukhzād, son of Farrukh Hormozd, assumed the leadership of the Pahlav in the battle. The most important section of the Sasanian forces, the cavalry, was under his command.\textsuperscript{1317} The Pārsīg leader Firūzān also participated in the battle, as did the Armenian contingents, under their new leader Khusrow Shenūm (Khusrov-Shum), that is to say, Varaztirots’ Bagratuni.\textsuperscript{1318} A host of factors, including low morale and exhaustion, basically incapacitated the Persians, however. The Persian forces were yet again defeated by the Arab armies under command of Hāshim b. ‘Utbah. Mihrān-i Bahram-i Rāzi was killed and Firūzān fled, although Qaqā is said to have initially caught up with this commander whom he previously is said to have slain.\textsuperscript{1319} The Armenian Khusrow Shenūm put up a resistance at Hulwān for a while, but was likewise forced to flee.\textsuperscript{1320} As for the battle of Qādisiyya, the logistics of a war where, in spite of the cooperation of the Pahlav and the Pārsīg, the Iranians were defeated, need to be reassessed.\textsuperscript{1321} Exhaustion after at least four decades of warfare, low morale, and the sense of desperation after the murder of many dynastic leaders, surely were among the primary causes of the Iranian defeat. After the battle of Jalūlā, Yazdgird III is said to have first gone from Ḥulwān in the direction of Jībāl,\textsuperscript{1322}
§3.4: YAZDGIRD III

Chapter 3: Arab Conquest

and subsequently, and probably incorrectly here, in the direction of Rayy. The itinerary of Yazdgird III’s flight, as we shall see, is very significant because it underscores the likelihood that the Pārsīg and the Pahlav took turns in protecting, for a while at least, the Sasanian king Yazdgird III.

3.4.2 The conquest of Khuzistān

In his accounts of the conquest of Iran, the next important battles that Sayf covers after the battle of Jalūlā are the battle of Ahvāz, the raid into Fārs, and the conquest of Rām Hurmurz, al-Sūs and Tustar. All these he dates to 17 AH/638 CE.

_Hurmuzān the Mede_

The central commander in defense of Khuzistān was Hurmuzān, who fled to his own territory after the battle of Qādisiya. From his home territories, probably in Ahvāz, this important dynastic leader conducted raids against the people, that is, the Arabs, of Maysān and Dastimaysān. While we cannot identify unfortunately the gentilitial background of Hurmuzān, he belonged to one of the seven noble families. The _Khuzistan Chronicle_ refers to him, significantly, as a Mede. That his fiefdom covered the districts of Ahvāz and Mihrijān Qadhaq, however, makes it probable that Hurmuzān belonged to the Pārsīg faction. At any rate, according to Sayf, Hurmuzān’s family was “higher in rank than anybody in Fārs.”

The absence of Hurmuzān at the battle of Jalūlā, and what must have been a substantial force under his command, is surely significant, and indicates several possibilities: a lack of coordinated action, a continuous disagreement among the factions on proper strategy, or the likelihood that Hurmuzān’s armies were elsewhere engaging the Arabs. It is remarkable, therefore, that in the defense

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1326Although he acknowledges that some traditions put these wars in 16 AH/637 CE. Tabari 1989a, p. 114, de Goeje, 2534.
1327Tabari 1989a, p. 115, de Goeje, 2534.
1330Tabari 1989a, p. 140, de Goeje, 2560.
1332Although we cannot be unequivocal in this claim, for there is also the possibility that he was a Pahlav with long roots in important Pārsīg territories. Tabari 1989a, p. 114–115, de Goeje, 2534. According to Dinawari, he was the maternal uncle of Shiruyih Qubād. Dinawari 1967, p. 141. This would make him the brother of Shiruyih Qubād’s mother, who, according to Ferdowsī, was the Byzantine emperor’s daughter Maryam, which is quite unlikely. Ferdowsī 1935, p. 2857.
1333Tabari 1989a, p. 115, de Goeje, 2534.
of Ahváz, Hurmuzān’s forces engaged the Arabs without the participation of the Pahlav forces. One might conjecture, based on his absence at the battle of Jalūlā, that the first phase of the invasion of Khuzistān was simultaneous with, or even prior to, the battle of Jalūlā, sometime during 636–637, thereby also explaining in turn the absence of the Pahlav at the defense of Khuzistān.\footnote{Robinson also proposes the “terminus ante quem of late August of 636/Rajab of AH 15 for the end of ‘Ashvārī’s campaigns [in Khuzistān]. That this dating is at severe variance with the consensus of Islamic sources [on the founding of Baṣrā] . . . [and might] force a redating of the founding of Baṣrā.” Robinson 2004, pp. 19–20. Emphasis mine. This of course tallies perfectly with the chronological scheme we have presented.}

How the first, presumably unauthorized, forays into the islands off the coast of southern Iran and subsequently into Fārs under al-ʿAlā b. Ḥadrāmī and ʿArafajah b. Harthāmah, conventionally dated to the years 13–14 AH/634–635 CE, relate to the Arab expeditions in Jalūlā and Khuzistān, might also need reconsideration.\footnote{The claims that al-ʿAlā b. Ḥadrāmī had to “respond to ridda” in Bahrayn in the years 11–12 AH/632–633, and that ʿArafajah b. Harthāmah was to reinforce ʿUtba b. Ghāzwān at the battle of Ubullah, traditionally put in 12 AH/633 CE, but in our new dating scheme in 628 (see page 190), for example, will certainly be affected by this reconsideration. For the chronological scheme of the conquests of Khuzistān and Fārs, see, respectively, Robinson 2004; and Hinds 1996, p. 202.}

Hurmuzān’s isolated warfare against the Arabs forced ʿUtba b. Ghāzwān to ask Saʿd b. ʿAbī Waqqāṣ for reinforcements. Hurmuzān initially put up a stiff resistance against the Arabs. After a number of defeats, however, he sued for peace, in exchange for maintaining control of a truncated part of his territory.\footnote{Tābarī 1989a, p. 119, de Goeje, 2538.} Meanwhile, the settlements in Basrā were proceeding apace.\footnote{The conventional date for the construction of Baṣrā is 17 AH/638 CE. Donner, Fred M., ‘Baṣrā’, in Ehsan Yarshater (ed.), Encyclopaedia Iranica, New York, 2007a (Donner 2007a). See, however, also footnote 1334.} In the course of this, a conflict over territorial boundaries developed between Hurmuzān and the Arabs. Hurmuzān, therefore, stopped paying the agreed tribute to the Arab conquerors.\footnote{Tābarī 1989a, p. 120–121, de Goeje, 2540–2541.} It is symptomatic of the absence of the Pahlav fraction in these conquests that, in anticipation of a second engagement with the Arabs, Hurmuzān was forced to ask for the aid of the Kurds, “whereupon his army grew in strength.”\footnote{Tābarī 1989a, p. 121, de Goeje, 2540.} War broke out and Hurmuzān was, once again, defeated, and fled to Rām Hurmurz.\footnote{Tābarī 1989a, p. 123, de Goeje, 2542.} As Ahvāz had already been overtaken and “had become crammed full of Muslims settling in it,” Hurmuzān sued for peace, once again. ʿUmar agreed to this and advised ʿUtba to follow suit. This time the Muslims asked for control over territories not yet conquered, to wit, Rām Hurmurz, Tustar, Susa, Jundaysābūr, Bunyān and Mihrijān Qadhaq.\footnote{Tābarī 1989a, p. 124, de Goeje, 2543.} Hurmuzān was left in charge of collecting the taxation, while the Muslims agreed to defend
him “in case the Kurds of Fars were to make raids on him.”\footnote{Tabari 1989a, p. 124, de Goeje, 2543.} The ambivalent part played by the Kurds in Hurmuzan’s affairs is made clear here. Meanwhile, al-\’Ala b. Ha\’drami conducted an unauthorized raid from Bahrayn into Fars. The resistance of the Persian Shahruk\footnote{Tabari 1989a, pp. 128–130, de Goeje, 2547–2549.} in the battle of Tawus came to nothing and the Persians were yet again defeated.\footnote{Tabari 1989a, pp. 128–130, de Goeje, 2547–2549.} While there is a hint in our accounts that, at one point at least, part of the Pahlav joined forces with the P\’arsig,\footnote{Tabari 1989a, pp. 128–130, de Goeje, 2547–2549.} yet again apparent is the lack of military coordination between the Pahlav and the P\’arsig. The P\’arsig were forced to coordinate their efforts among themselves. For, in the course of these engagements, we are informed that the people of Fars and those of Ahvaz entered into correspondence. Yazdgird III presumably encouraged these alliances through his correspondence from Marv.\footnote{Tabari 1989a, p. 134, de Goeje, 2553; Robinson 2004.} Hurmuzan, therefore, once again, prepared to engage the Arabs.\footnote{Tabari 1989a, p. 133, de Goeje, 2552.} In Tustar, Hurmuzan put up a stiff resistance.\footnote{Tabari 1989a, pp. 134–135, de Goeje, 2553–2554.} Yet again, however, he was forced, and this time for what was to be the last, to sue for peace with the Muslims.\footnote{Tabari 1989a, p. 136, de Goeje, 2556.} Captured, with all his royal paraphernalia and the crown of his kingdom on his head, the Muslims finally took this important P\’arsig leader to the Muslim caliph ‘Umar in Basrah.\footnote{Tabari 1989a, p. 136, de Goeje, 2556.} A long anecdotal narrative highlights Hurmuzan’s ruse in saving his life when confronted with the prospects of being executed by ‘Umar.\footnote{Tabari 1989a, pp. 138–139, de Goeje, 2558–2559.} Once he realized that “he had to choose between death and Islam,” however, the P\’arsig leader converted.\footnote{Tabari 1989a, p. 140, de Goeje, 2560.} With the ultimate defeat of the great dynastic figure of Hurmuzan, part of the power of the P\’arsig was also lost.

**Siyab’s conversion**

While southwestern Iran was engulfed in turmoil, and while the conquest of Susa (Sus) was taking place, as the tradition has it in 17 AH/638 CE, but in our revised scheme more likely around 637, Yazdgird III, from Isfahan on his way...
to Iṣṭakhr, sent a certain Siyāh, along with three hundred men, including seventy Persian aristocrats, against the Arabs. The numerical strength of what was meant to be a relief or possibly a reconnaissance force is worth notice. And here the tradition must be accepted for, if anything, our sources are prone to significant numerical exaggeration, as Juynboll argues, perhaps at times by a coefficient of a hundred. Much has been made of the story of the conversion of Siyāh and the total of three hundred men who followed suit and submitted to the Arabs. In the narrative of their defection, however, a number of important points have rarely been highlighted. We must briefly occupy ourselves with these points, for they are relevant to our concerns.

To begin with, none of the Sasanian kings after Khusrō II ever elicited a strong sense of loyalty from the cavalry (asāwira) in charge of their protection, because of the political turmoil in the land. We must also keep in mind that we are not dealing here with a vast army but a mere figure of three hundred. These characterizations, however, do not even begin to describe the nature of Siyāh and his followers’ defection. The prelude to their defection is noteworthy. Before going over to the Arabs, Siyāh reminded his comrades that these “invaders . . . [have brought] misery and suffering . . . [to] our kingdom . . . [that their] animals [have] shat all over the courtyards of Iṣṭakhr.” Most importantly, however, Siyāh reminded his comrades that the Arabs “have subjugated our territory.” Siyāh and his collaborators, in other words, had become homeless, and hence the agreement into which they were forced to enter. The conditions that Siyāh and his men set for the Arabs before their defection and supposed conversion are also significant.

According to Ṭabarī, they agreed to become Muslims with the understanding that they would fight the Persians, but not the Arabs, that they would settle wherever they pleased, and that they would be given maximum stipends. The Arabs agreed to these conditions. So Siyāh and his cohorts converted. But in the siege of Tustar under ‘Ashʿarī, they exhibited “no application or military efforts.” When admonished and asked for an explanation, the leader of this group of asāwira retorted: “[w]e are not as attached to your religion as you are . . . we lack the enthusiasm that you have and, living among you, we have no wives to protect, while you have not assigned the most generous stipend to us [i.e., as we stipulated]. And whereas we have weapons and animals, you face the enemy not even wearing helmets!” Having been informed of Siyāh’s sentiments, Umar

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1353 Ṭabarī 1989a, pp. 142–144, de Goeje, 2562–2564. For Yazdīd III’s whereabouts, see page 244 below.
1355 Crone is one of the few scholars who actually argues against mass conversion of Iranian elite and their clientage. “Had the Iranian aristocracy converted in large numbers, the Marwanid evolution would certainly have taken a very different course. But the nature of the Arab conquest was such that aristocratic renegades were few and far between.” Crone 1980, p. 50.
1356 Ṭabarī 1989a, p. 143, de Goeje, 2562.
1357 Ṭabarī 1989a, pp. 143–144, de Goeje, 2563.
then ordered that “the highest possible stipends [be allocated to them] according to their military record, in fact the largest amount [paid to] any Arab tribesman [was] paid [to them:] . . . one hundred of the as¯awira were to receive stipends of two thousand [dirhams], while six of them were even given two thousand five hundred.”

It is rather certain that Siyāh and his comrades were originally fighting alongside the Pārsīg faction. Crone notes that while the “sources are unanimous that the [as¯awira] converted in joining the Arabs, when they appear in the second civil war almost fifty years later, their leader is called Māh Afri-

3.4.3 The conquest of Media

Once the conquest of southwestern Iran was over, news reached ʿUmar that the Persians were assembling at Nihāvand. ʿAhnaf advised ʿUmar that as long as “the king of the Persians is still alive among them, . . . they will not seize to contend with us for the control of the region.” ʿUmar was also informed “that the people of Mihrījān Qadhaq, [i.e., the home region of Hurmuzān] and those of the districts of al-Ahwāz gravitated toward the point of view and the erstwhile ambitions of al-Hurmuzān.” According to Sayf, these were the reasons that “prompted ʿUmar to give the Muslims permission to venture out into Persian territory,” but Hurmuzān’s defeat must also have encouraged them. Whatever the cause, having conquered most of Iraq, the capital of the Sasanians and, finally, southwestern Iran, and having recognized that the only integrative force, however nominal, among the Persians was a Sasanian monarch on the throne, the Arabs set out on the trail of the last Sasanian king, Yazdgird III. If the ultimate goal of the Arabs was to reach the source of trade beyond the Oxus in order to do away with their hitherto middleman position in the east–west trade, there was certainly good logic in this decision.

1358Ṭabarī 1989a, p. 143, de Goeje, 2563.
1359According to Avtham al-Kūfī and the Khuzistan Chronicle, the as¯awira were actually aiding Hurmuzān at Tustar. Robinson 2004, p. 27.
1361As Robinson has put it in a slightly different manner, for “the early Muslim traditionalists it was probably not so much conversion that was at issue as the stipends that they were awarded.” Robinson 2004.
1362Ṭabarī 1989a, p. 141, de Goeje, 2561.
The battle of Nihavand
While significant, the defeat of Hurmuzân did not bring about the total collapse of the Pârsig or the Pahlav faction. The next major encounter with the Arabs under the command of Muqarrin took place in the battle of Nihavand, which according to Ṭabarî was in 21 AH/641–642 CE. One of the most important features of the decisive battle of Nihavand was, without a doubt, the fact that, although located in Media, in Parthian territory, the Pârsig, and not the Pahlav, were leading the battle. For it was Firûzân, our famous Pârsig dynast, who commanded the army that ultimately regrouped in Nihavand in Median territory.-balami implies the absence of the Pahlav leaders when he maintains that at the battle of Nihavand, except for Firûzân, no one fit for assuming the command had remained. Why the Pârsig rather than the Pahlav led this battle we shall shortly ascertain. For now it should be remarked that the absence of the leader of the Pahlav, Farrukhzâd, from this important battle, with the substantial forces under his command, can be explained by determining the whereabouts at that point in time of the Sasanian king Yazdgird III.

The head and the wings of the bird
The interesting dialogue between Ṣūfî and Hurmuzân regarding the choice of the battlefield, instead of being dismissed as a mere topos, should be read for the role of the Pahlav and the Pârsig factional armies in their defense of the realm. In the course of this dialogue, Ṣūfî asked Hurmuzân’s advice as to where he should strike first. Hurmuzân answered with another question: “Where is the head?” Ṣūfî replied that the head was Nihavand under the “command of Bundar, [who] had the royal brigade of asâwîra and troops from Isbâhân [along] with him.” De Goeje proposed that Bundar was a corruption of Mardânshâh Dhū’l-Hajibayn, that is to say, the Pârsig leader Mardânshâh Dhū’l-Hajib (Bahman Jâdhuyih). Nihavand was chosen as head, not only on account of its important strategic and political location in Median territory, but also because the Iranian army had now gathered there. In this tradition provided by Ṭabarî the transmitter is said to have forgotten the regional identifications of the wings, but other traditions identify the wings with Fârs and Azarbâiyân.

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1365 Ṭabarî 1989a, p. 193, de Goeje, 2608.
1366 Ṭabarî 1959, p. 317, n. 4.
1367 See page 244ff below.
1368 It should be remarked at the outset that Noth’s argument regarding the existence of topoi which appear in the accounts of both the battle of Nihavand and the battle of Isfahân, confirms our earlier assessment of his analysis. For in fact all of the topoi which he enumerates are Islamic or Arab topoi and do not affect the information that Sayf provides regarding the Iranian side. An exception is this dialogue between Ṣūfî and Hurmuzân, which appears to contain an echo of Sebeos’ three armies. Noth 1968; see also footnote 1414.
1369 Ṭabarî 1989a, p. 184, n. 629, de Goeje, DCXXII.
1370 See our discussion of these epithets on page 196ff.
1371 Another variant has the Persian king (Kislâ) as the head, and Fârs and Byzantium forming its wings. Noth 1968, pp. 283–284.
Hurmužān nevertheless pressed on the caliph to “cut off the wings” of the empire. Umar, however, realizing Hurmužān’s duplicity and ill-placed intentions retorted: “you speak lies … I shall go for the head first.”\textsuperscript{1372} The repetition of this theme in the conquest accounts of both Nihāvand and Isfahān might give the appearance of a concocted literary device, but should not, however, detract from the germ of the narrative. Otherwise, the same narrative could very well have appeared in the accounts of the battle of Qādisiyya or the battle of Jalūlā, for example.

At any rate, Sayf reiterates the regrouping of the Persians after the defeat of Hurmužān and the conquest of Khuzistān: “What precipitated the fighting at Nihāvand was that, after the fighters from al-BAṣrah had overpowered al-Hurmuzān and had forestalled the people of Fārs by preventing them from annihilating the army force of al-Alā, … the people of Fārs wrote to their king … [and he rallied] the inhabitants of al-Jibāl, namely those of al-Bāb, al-Sind,\textsuperscript{1373} Khurāsān, and Ḥulwān who were duly roused.”\textsuperscript{1374} The Armenian faction was also represented, under their leader Khusrōw Shenūm (Varaztirot’s). After Hurmužān’s defeat, in other words, Yazdgird III is said to have appealed to the forces of the Pahlav. Continued discord emerges clearly in this narrative: “They agreed that they would show up at Nihāvand and sort out their matters there.”\textsuperscript{1375} Here then we are given the aforementioned south–north, Pārsīg–Pahlav territorial division.\textsuperscript{1376} Thus, “one after the other, there arrived those living in the territory between Khurāsān and Ḥulwān, those living in the territory between al-Bāb and Ḥulwān, and those living in the territory between Sijistān and Ḥulwān … The cavalry of Fārs and of the Fahlūj [sic, i.e., fahlaway] … joined forces … [and they] assembled under the command of al-Fayrūzān, and they all set out to him, one after the other.”\textsuperscript{1377} Whereas sometime during the rule of Būransukht the Pahlav and the Pārsīg had joined forces only to divide again, in the battle of Nihāvand during the reign of Yazdgird III, they yet again joined forces. This is the second time, therefore, that Sayf has informed us of the over-arching Pahlav and Pārsīg factions coming under the command of Firūzān.\textsuperscript{1378} And it is curious that while Yazdgird III sent a general appeal to all forces, Farrukhzād’s were nevertheless missing from action in Nihāvand.

In spite of their coalition, the Persians were once again defeated at the battle of Nihāvand. The Pārsīg leader Firūzān was finally, and this time for real, killed.\textsuperscript{1379} After Firūzān’s death, Bahman Jādhūyih was appointed in

\textsuperscript{1372}Tabari 1989a, p. 184–185, de Goeje, 2601.
\textsuperscript{1373}Who these might have been I have no idea.
\textsuperscript{1374}Tabari 1989a, pp. 189–190, de Goeje, 2605.
\textsuperscript{1375}Tabari 1989a, p. 190, de Goeje, 2605. Emphasis mine.
\textsuperscript{1376}See our discussion on page 214ff.
\textsuperscript{1377}Tabari 1989a, p. 193, de Goeje, 2608. In our revised chronology, there will be a five year hiatus between the battle of Jalālā (637–638) and the regrouping of the forces at Nihāvand, if the conventional dating of the latter in 641–642 is assumed.
\textsuperscript{1378}See our discussion on page 214ff.
\textsuperscript{1379}Tabari 1989a, p. 209, de Goeje, 2626.
his stead.\textsuperscript{1382} Presumably, however, his appointment came too late to effect a change in the direction of the war, and part of the Persian army fled to Hamadān.\textsuperscript{1381} Under the command of the Armenian Khusrow Shenūm (Varaṭzirots‘), the Persians “sought immunity from the Muslims . . . [and accepted to] surrender Hamadān and Dastābā [to the conquerors].”\textsuperscript{1382} With Firūzān dead and Farrukhzād nowhere to be found, the Bagratuni dynast Varaṭzirots‘ sued for peace. The whereabouts of the treasury maintained by Varaṭzirots‘ was allegedly disclosed by a treacherous \textit{herbad}, a tradition that might indicate signs of religious animosity between the two.\textsuperscript{1383}

\textit{Dinār’s expropriation of Kārinid domains}

In the wake of the defeat at the battle of Nihāvand and Varaṭzirots‘ peace agreement with the Arabs, through which he relinquished the important Pahlav stronghold Hamadān to the conquering forces, the people in charge of the territories that eventually came to be called the Māh of Baṣrah and the Māh of Kūfā\textsuperscript{1384} “followed Khusrawshunūm’s [i.e., Khusrow Shenūm, Varaṭzirots‘] example and corresponded with Hūdhayfah.” But in the course of these negotiations an unprecedented transformation took place. The Kārins, whose original homeland seems to have been the region of Nihāvand,\textsuperscript{1385} were disenfranchised from the lands that had still remained in their possession. As our account puts it, “the people in charge of these territories . . . were deceived by one of them, a man called Dinār.”\textsuperscript{1386} This Dinār, we are told, “was a king [in his own right] but of lesser nobility than the others, all of them being more exalted than he, with Qārin the noblest of them all.”\textsuperscript{1387} Significantly, Qārin (Kārin) was from “the ruling family in those days.”\textsuperscript{1388} The end result of Dinār’s ruse,\textsuperscript{1389} advising the other noble families that it would not be prudent to approach the Arabs with their full regalia,\textsuperscript{1390} was that the “Muslims concluded a treaty with him while disregarding his [fellow aristocrats, the outcome of this being that] . . .

\textsuperscript{1380}Bal’amī 1959, p. 317, n. 4; Ţabarî 1989a, p. 203, de Goeje, 2618:

\textit{بین جادویه الّذی جعل مکان دوالفاحب}

\textsuperscript{1381}Ţabarî 1989a, p. 210, de Goeje, 2626.

\textsuperscript{1382}Ţabarî 1989a, p. 210, de Goeje, 2626.

\textsuperscript{1383}Ţabarî 1989a, p. 210, de Goeje, 2627. Varaṭzirots’ (Khusrow Shenūm) is here identified as Nakhīrjān, the Arabicized form of Armenian \textit{naxanar}; see also footnote 943.

\textsuperscript{1384}See footnote 146.

\textsuperscript{1385}That is, prior to their relocation to Khurāsān during Khusrow I’s reign; see page 114. The nature and extent of the Kārins’ identification with Nihāvand must be subjected to future research, for in the course of this study we have not been able to establish the \textit{original} homeland of the Kārins with any certainty.

\textsuperscript{1386}Ţabarî 1989a, p. 211, de Goeje, 2628.

\textsuperscript{1387}Ţabarî 1989a, p. 211, de Goeje, 2628.

\textsuperscript{1388}Ţabarî 1989a, p. 215, de Goeje, 2631.

\textsuperscript{1389}The theme of \textit{traitor} in the accounts of conquest is also considered a \textit{topos} by Noth. As we shall see, this observation cannot be applied as a general rule; see footnote 1447.

\textsuperscript{1390}Ţabarî 1989a, p. 211, de Goeje, 2628.
the latter saw no other way than to yield to Dīnār and to accept his authority.” That is why, Ṭabarî explains, Nihāvand “came to be called Māḥ [i.e., Media] Dīnār.”

We have not been able to ascertain the true identity of Dīnār, who allegedly duped the rest of the nobility, including the Kārins. Clearly, in the wake of the defeat at the battle of Nihāvand, and analogous to the events that will transpire in Rayy, the Arabs were able to take advantage of factionalism in the Iranian ranks.

As we already pointed out, perhaps the most curious feature of the battle of Nihāvand was the conspicuous absence of Farrukhzād, the leader of the Pahlav, and his army. We recall that after his correspondence with Rustam prior to the battle of Qādisiya, the next and last thing that we hear about Farrukhzād is that he participated in the battle of Jalūlā. As we have seen, the presence of almost all of the important dynastic leaders has been meticulously followed in our sources. But, from the subsequent engagements between the Arabs and the Persians after the battle of Jalūlā, Farrukhzād was patently missing. What happened then to this towering scion of the family of the Prince of the Medes? The answers to this crucial question must engage us in a discussion of the whereabouts of the Sasanian king, Yazdgird III, after the battle of Qādisiya. So, yet again, we briefly pause our war narratives to discuss the king’s flight southwards.

Yazdgird III’s flight southwards

The itinerary of the flight of Yazdgird III after the battle of Qādisiya has been the source of confusion. Sebeos’ account aids us in reconstructing it. According to Sebeos, after the defeat of the Persians at the battle of Qādisiya and following the death of Rustam, when the “survivors of the Persian army reached Atrpatakan [Azarbāyjān], they gathered together in one place and installed Khorōkhazat, [Farrukhzād] as their general.” With the two important scions of the Ispahbudhān house of the Prince of the Medes, Farrukhof Hormozd and Rustam, dead, Farrukhzād was appointed as the leader of the Pahlav faction. Instead of participating in the subsequent crucial battles, however, Farrukhzād took up an even more momentous responsibility: the safety of the last Sasanian king Yazdgird III. According to Sebeos, from Azarbāyjān, Farrukhzād “hastened to Ctesiphon, took all the treasures of the kingdom, the inhabitants of the cities, and their king, and made haste to bring them to

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1391 Ṭabarî 1989a, p. 212, de Goeje, 2628. For the use of Māḥ, see footnote 146.
1392 Incidentally, Dīnār cannot have been the original Persian name of this dynast.
1393 See §3.4.4.
1394 Yaqūbī maintains that Yazdgird III first went to Iṣfahān before going to some other region where he met the ruler of Ṭabaristān, who informed him of the sturdiness of his cities. Yaqūbī 1983, p. 38. Bālamī mistakenly maintains that Yazdgird III set out from Rayy to Khurāsān. Bālamī 1959, p. 325.
1395 Sebeos 1999, p. 99. Thomson notes that in Marquart 1931, the above passage is rendered as “when the survivors of the Persian troops from Atrpatakan gathered.” Thomson argues, however, that “the text is clear as it stands.” Ibid., p. 99, n. 611.

244
The flight of Farrukhzād and the king, together with the treasures of the kingdom, toward Azarbāyjān, however, was intercepted by the Arabs, called here Ismaelites by Sebeos. As Sebeos puts it, “after they had set out and had gone some distance, unexpectedly the Ismaelite army attacked them.” The interception, or imminent interception of the Arab army, led Farrukhzād to “abandon . . . the treasures and the inhabitants of the city.” This unexpected arrival of the Arab army most probably refers to the battle of Jalūlā (around 637). Farrukhzād’s concern with the safety of Yazdgird III and the Sasanian treasury probably also explains the fact that the Pahlav leader was able to take charge only of the cavalry, and not of the entire army, in this battle. For in the battle of Jalūlā, we recall, Mihrān-i Bahrām-i Rāzī was in command.

Upon this terrifying turn of events, Yazdgird III “fled and took refuge with the army of the south.” The Arabs reportedly took all the treasures, returned to Ctesiphon, and “ravaged the whole land.” Sometime after the sacking of Ctesiphon (around 635), therefore, Yazdgird III set out toward the south. Considering his absence, it is quite probable that Farrukhzād continued to follow the king, at least for a while, even when the latter took refuge with the army of the south (Nimruz). The flight of the king to the south is corroborated by our Arabic sources. According to Ṭabarī, sometime after the battle of Jalūlā, Yazdgird III, who was then in Ḫulwān, was advised to go to Iṣṭakhr, “for that is the center of the kingdom.” While he was further advised to “send . . . [his] soldiers away” and keep his treasures, however, it is almost certain that the latter could not have been accomplished without the former. The treasury of the king must have required a strong force to safeguard, for it was to cause tremendous contention between the king and his protector Farrukhzād in the near future. It was at this point, when Yazdgird III began his arduous flight, from Ḫulwān via Iṣfahān to Iṣṭakhr, that he sent Siyāh to lead the way. Siyāh arrived at Iṣṭakhr at the same time that Abū Mūsā al-Ashwari was laying siege to Sūs (Susa). After he was sent to Susa, Siyāh then mutinied. At this point Hurmūzān was in Tustar, and the people of Sūs, having heard about the news of Jalūlā and the flight of their king to Iṣṭakhr, sued for peace with the Arabs.

Yazdgird III’s flight took him first to the protective custody of the Pārsig
in the south. Ḥamza Iṣfahānī corroborates that Farrukhzād\textsuperscript{1406} accompanied Yazdgird III in his flight south, then southeast and finally northeast, “to Iṣfahān... Kirmān and finally to Marv.”\textsuperscript{1407} Other sources confirm this as well. An authority in Ṭabarī has it, for example, that Yazdgird III went first to Fārs, and thence to Kirmān and Sīstān, where he remained for five years. From Sīstān, Yazdgird III then went to Khurāsān, and finally to Marv. It seems likely that on his way to the northeast, Yazdgird III was also confronted with the unsettled situation in Ṭabaristān.\textsuperscript{1408} Those traditions that claim that Yazdgird III went from Rayy to Khurāsān, therefore, might have a germ of truth in them.\textsuperscript{1409} At any rate, Ṭabarī informs us that Farrukhzād was Yazdgird III’s escort all the way to Khurāsān.\textsuperscript{1410} That the Arab armies intended to follow Yazdgird III’s trail is corroborated by the identical itinerary that they took northeast. Leading the way for the pursuing the Arabs, Yazdgird III went from Kirmān, via Ṭabasayn and Qūhistān, to Khurāsān.\textsuperscript{1411}

Numismatic evidence confirms that Yazdgird III stayed for a somewhat extended period of time in the vicinity of Kirmān and Sīstān before heading northeast, sometime in the late 640s.\textsuperscript{1412} In Kirmān and Sīstān, he was for a long while protected by the regions to the west. The authority in Ṭabarī who holds that Yazdgird III stayed for about five years in that region, provides the most trustworthy tradition. If our chronology for the battle of Nihāvand in or about 642 is correct, and if we accept the fact that Yazdgird III remained in the Kirmān and Sīstān regions for about five years, we can conjecture that Yazdgird III stayed in said regions from about 642 until around 648, after which he went northeast. It is not clear whether Farrukhzād remained with Yazdgird III throughout his stay in the southeast. What is clear is that after a long interlude, it was in the company of Farrukhzād and a substantial army under his command, that the last Sasanian king arrived in Khurāsān in search of protection. In Khurāsān the king’s stay was very eventful, and we shall follow this saga in its appropriate place.\textsuperscript{1413} For now, we proceed with the events after the battle of Nihāvand.

\textsuperscript{1406}His name is correctly rendered here as Khurzād b. Khur Hurmuz, the brother of Rustam.
\textsuperscript{1408}For the political situation in Ṭabaristān around this time, see Chapter 4, especially page 302ff.
\textsuperscript{1409}See footnotes 1394 and 1528.
\textsuperscript{1412}See page 220.
\textsuperscript{1413}For the continuation of Yazdgird III’s flight to the east, see page 257ff.
The battle of Isfahān

After the battle of Nihāvand the Persians made a stand at the battle of Isfahān (641–642). The commander of the army at the battle of Isfahān was a certain Shahrvarāz Jādūyih, “an important leader at the head of a large force.” His name seems to suggest that this general was a member of Shahrvarāz’s family, in other words, a Mihrān. A second figure introduced in the account of Isfahān is a certain al-Fādhūsfān, who was the ruler of the region. Fādhūsfān, that is, pādhsūpān, clearly refers to an administrative title and not to the name of this figure. In Ṭabarī’s account, the title of this general who commanded a grand army is given as ustāndār (ōstāndār or governor). The command structure of the Sasanian army in the battle of Isfahān, therefore, was quite distinct from that in the battle of Nihāvand, which had been under the command of Firūzān, containing not only Pārsig, but also Pahlav and Armenian contingents. The congregation of the Pārsig in Isfahān after the defeat at the battle of Nihāvand is clear in Sayf’s account. According to Balʿamī, when the pādhsūpān heard about the defeat at Nihāvand, he came to Isfahān, together with Shahrvarāz Jādūyih, to confront the Arabs. Shahhrvarāz Jādūyih, however, was defeated and killed in this battle. Another Pārsig leader who participated in the battle of Isfahān was Mardānshāh (Bahman Jādūyih?). Mardānshāh and Shahhrvarāz Jādūyih are said to have alternated command. This confusion probably reflects isolated khabars concerning different episodes of the war. Whatever the case, it is quite clear that the commanders participating in the battle of Isfahān were predominantly of the Pārsig faction, who had to confront the enemy without the participation of the Pahlav. After the defeat and death of Shahrvarāz Jādūyih, the (unnamed) pādhsūpān made peace in lieu of paying the jīzya, on the condition that the Arabs let whosoever wanted to

1414 According to Noth, there are grounds to argue that the account of the battle of Isfahān replicates some of the motifs of the battle of Nihāvand. Noth 1968. For instance, we find the same exchange between 'Umar and Hurmūzān about the head and the wings of the bird. Ṭabarī 1994, p. 10, de Goeje, 2642; for the parable of the bird, see page 241. Interestingly enough, this account does not belong to Sayf. Another common motif between the two accounts is the meeting of Mughirāth with Dhu ’l-Ḥājjāb. Ṭabarī 1994, p. 11, de Goeje, 2642–2643. As already mentioned, since almost all of the topoi investigated by Noth are Islamic and most probably inserted in the traditions of the two battles in later periods, his analysis does not detract from the conclusions that we shall arrive at: The internal Sasanian indicators clearly testify to the retention of two separate episodes of conquest in the historical memory of its respective transmitters.

1415 Balʿamī 1959, p. 328.


1417 Balʿamī calls him Shahriyar, which could be a scribal error for Shahrvarāz. Balʿamī 1959, p. 328, n. 3. However, in footnote 1092 we offer an alternative reading, which no longer implies that he had to be a Mihrān.

1418 See footnote 411.


1420 See page 241ff.

1421 See page 196ff.
leave Isfahān free to depart.1422 Abdallāh b. Abdallāh b. Ḥtibān, who had been joined by Abū Muṣā Ashvārī, accepted. Some traditions maintain that many people left the city upon the conclusion of the peace agreements.1423 Others depict this migration as a minority who “opposed their people.”1424 Dhu ’l-Ḥajīb (Mardānshāh, Bahman Jādhuķīyīh) was also killed in this battle.

The battle of Wāj Rūdḥ

The sequence of conquests that follows in the accounts of Sayf is: Hamadān, Rayy, Gurgān, Ṭabaristān, and finally Azarbāyjān, all of which he puts in the year 18 of hijra (638), while most others put these conquests in the years 22 AH/642 CE, or 23 AH/643 CE. According to Sayf, after the battle of Nihāvand, Nuʿaym b. Muqarrin and Qaṣā b. ʿAmr set out for Hamadān. In charge of Hamadān was the Armenian Bagratunid dynast Khusrow Shenūm (Varaztīrots’).1425 Significantly, we are informed here that Varaztīrots’ had broken the peace treaty that he had previously signed with Ḥudhayfah, and had gathered an enormous army around himself.1426 In anticipation of Nuʿaym’s arrival, Varaztīrots’ requested the aid of the army of Azarbāyjān. Once a substantial enough force had gathered around him,1427 he engaged the Arabs in one of the villages of Hamadān called Wāj Rūdḥ.1428 As the accounts of this battle make clear, after the battle of Nihāvand, the battle of Wāj Rūdḥ became one of the most important battles in the north. The army of Daylam, under the command of one Mūtā, came to the aid of the Armenian dynast Varaztīrots’. Significantly, a member of the family of the Prince of the Medes, Isfandiyār, “did the same at the head of the Azerbaijan army.”1429

Most of the commanders participating in the battle of Wāj Rūdḥ belong this time to the Pahlav faction, in collaboration with the Armenian contingent under the command of Varaztīrots’. The dynastic Pahlav leader, Farrukhzād, however, is still nowhere to be found! A new figure of substantial importance, however, is introduced. Bearing the enigmatic name al-Zīnābī Abū ʿl-Farrukkhān, he arrived “at the head of the Rayy army.” That he too belonged to the

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1422Balʿami 1959, pp. 328–329. In Ṭabarī’s version, the treaty that the pāḥdāḥspān made with the Arabs is also reproduced, but its contents are of no consequence to our concerns. Ṭabarī 1994, pp. 8–9, de Goeje, 2640–2641.
1423Balʿami 1959, p. 329.
1424Ṭabarī claims these to be thirty in number. Ṭabarī 1994, p. 8, de Goeje, 2640.
1425Ṭabarī 1994, p. 19, de Goeje, 2648.
1426Ṭabarī 1994, p. 19, de Goeje, 2649. For the circumstances under which the previous peace treaty was effected, see page 243.
1427Balʿami 1959, p. 331.
1428Ṭabarī 1994, p. 21, de Goeje, 2650.
1429Ṭabarī 1994, p. 21, de Goeje, 2650. Ṭabarī calls him mistakenly a brother of Rustam, but as will become clear later (see §3.4.8), he was a son of Farrukhzād. The editor, referring us to Zarrinkub 1975, observes that Isfandiyād “was the brother of Rustam b. Farrukhzād, the Persian general defeated at Qādisīya.” Ibid., n. 115. This, needless to reiterate, is yet another example of the scholarly confusion surrounding the genealogy of the Ispahbudhān. We should also recall that already during the Byzantine wars the army of Azarbāyjān was under the command of the Ispahbudhān family; see §2.7.5.
CHAPTER 3: ARAB CONQUEST

§3.4: YAZDGIRD III

Pahlav faction will become amply clear once we have revealed his true identity.\textsuperscript{1430} Considering the number of high-caliber dignitaries present in this battle, it is no wonder that Sayf claims the battle of Wāj Rūdūh to be “a great battle like Nihāvand, not at all inferior, … [where] great, incalculable numbers were killed.”\textsuperscript{1431} The Persians lost, yet again, and the great Bagratunid dynast Khusrūw Shenūm (Varazirot's) was killed.\textsuperscript{1432} It is important to reiterate once again that the Iranian names contained in the \textit{futūḥ} were not callously and haphazardly invented by the tradition. For, once identified, the names of these commanders become an important index for determining the chronology of events. In this case, for example, we can now ascertain that the battle of Wāj Rūdūh took place prior to the conquest of Azarbāyjān, for it was only during the latter episode that the Ispahbudhān Isfandiyār made peace with the Arabs.\textsuperscript{1433}

3.4.4 The conquest of Rayy

After the battle of Wāj Rūdūh, when ʿUmar was finally informed of the Arab victory at the battle of Wāj Rūdūh and the conquest of Hamadān,\textsuperscript{1434} he was also told that yet again a great army had gathered, this time in Rayy, under the command of the grandson of Bahrām-i Chūbīn.\textsuperscript{1435} The conquest of Rayy and Ṭabaristān and, as we shall see, Khurasān and Azarbāyjān, connect together in a highly intricate fashion, in such a manner that, once the nuances in the narratives are deciphered and once the nature of the dynastic dynamics operating within these regions are disentangled, they clarify the histories of the \textit{kūst-i ādurbādagān} and \textit{kūst-i khwarāsān} in the two centuries following the conquest. For as we shall attempt to show in the pages that follow, the conquests of the quarters of the north and east of the Sasanian domains, which formed the hereditary territory of the Parthian dynastic families, actually led to the final collapse of the Sasanian–Parthian confederacy, to the demise of the house of the Sāsān, and most importantly, to the continued independence of these regions under the \textit{de facto} rule of Parthian dynasts and under the \textit{nominal} suzerainty of the caliphate. In the process, some Parthian dynasts did lose their long-held dominion of these territories, while others continued to rule with little change.\textsuperscript{1436}

\textit{Sīyāvakhsh Mihrān}

According to Ṭabarī, the ruler in Rayy at this juncture was one Sīyāvakhsh b. Mihrān b. Shūbīn.\textsuperscript{1437} Now by way of context we should recall that Rayy and its vicinity had for a long time been the stronghold of the Parthian dynastic

\textsuperscript{1430} However, a long tale still needs to be told before on page 264 we can finally identify this figure. See also page 250ff.
\textsuperscript{1431} Tabari 1994, p. 22, de Goeje, 2651.
\textsuperscript{1432} Balʿamī 1959, p. 332.
\textsuperscript{1433} See §3.4.8.
\textsuperscript{1434} Balʿamī here notes that the news was delayed as the distance was great. Balʿamī 1959, p. 331.
\textsuperscript{1435} Balʿamī 1959, p. 331.
\textsuperscript{1436} We will elaborate this point further in Chapters 4 and 6.
\textsuperscript{1437} Tabari 1994, p. 24, de Goeje, 2653.
family of the Mihrāns. The Mihrāns, we recall, held the important office of the ērān-spāhbedi of the quarter of the north from at least Khusrow I’s rule onward. The exception to this rule was the period of the rebellion and independence of Vistāhm in the quarters of the north and the east, when the office of the ērān-spāhbed was most likely meaningless in these regions. The rebellion of the Mihrānid Bahrām-i Chūbin had set the precedent, even prior to Vistāhm’s rebellion, for galvanizing these quarters against Hormozd IV and Khusrow II. There is, therefore, absolutely no reason to question the historicity of the figure of Siyāvakhsh, the grandson of Bahrām-i Chūbin, at this period.

By way of context we should also recall that while these regions had led uprisings against the Sasanians, and while the Parthian dynasts had at times come to collaborate against the latter, there had also long existed a strong antipathy between the Mihrāns and the Ispahbudhān, an antipathy that had reached its apex in the course of Bahrām-i Chūbin’s rebellion. During the latter episode, we remember, the Ispahbudhān family had ensured the destruction of the Mihrānid rebel. In the context of inter-Parthian dynastic struggles, in other words, the Mihrāns and the Ispahbudhāns were age-old rivals.

When Siyāvakhsh heard that Nuaym b. Muqarrin was heading toward Rayy from Wāji Rūdh, he sent a messenger to the ajam (i.e., the Persians) and all the armies who were in the vicinity of Rayy and made an appeal to them: “The Arab army has set out toward Rayy, and the Arabs have spread elsewhere. None can stand up to them. And Yazdgird III is far from us.” Siyāvakhsh then proceeded to warn them of their imminent destruction, were they not to take action: “When the Arabs finally arrive at Rayy, you cannot remain where you are. If you come to my aid, we can put up a fight against them. If you don’t aid me, you will all be destroyed.” All, Balami maintains, answered Siyāvakhsh’s call for aid. According to Ṭabarī, Siyāvakhsh had “asked the people of Dunbawand, Ṭabaristān, Qūmis, and Jurjān for their help.”

Zinabī Abū ‘l-Farrukhān

The Mihrānid Siyāvakhsh, however, faced a serious rival. Balami discloses the identity of this rival in a semi-folkloric account. In Rayy, there was in Siyāvakhsh’s army one of the “elite of the ajam, from among the dihqāns of Rayy,” whose name was Rāmi. The father of this Rāmi, Balami further maintains, “was the grandee of Ray. And between him and Siyāvakhsh there had [always] been a struggle over the territories of Rayy.” Now Balami’s editor justifiably notes that in other recensions, the name of this figure is given either as Vabi,

1438 See §2.5.4, especially page 103ff, as well as the table on page 470.
1439 See §2.7.1.
1440 See §2.6.3.
1441 For the likelihood of his identification with Siyāvakhsh-i Rāzi, see footnote 1144.
1442 See page 128ff.
1443 Balami 1959, pp. 331–332.
1444 Ṭabarī 1994, p. 25, de Goeje, 2654.
the son of Farrukhān, or alternatively, as Zinābī Abū ’l-Farrukhān. Who was this figure Rāmī, Vābī the son of Farrukhān, or Zinābī Abū ’l-Farrukhān, and what was his role in the conquest of Rayy? According to Ṭabarī, when Siyāvakhsh made an appeal for aid, in defiance of him, al-Zinābī Abū ’l-Farrukhān, who “had seen what the Muslims were like, [comparing their attitude] with the envy of Siyāvakhsh and his family,” came and met Nuraym in a place near Qazvīn called Qīhā and made peace with him. Zinābī proposed to Nuraym that the “enemy is numerous, whereas you are at the head of a small army. Send some cavalry with me. I shall take them into their town, [Rayy,] by a way that [even] (the locals) do not know.” According to Ṭabarī, Zinābī then collaborated with the Arabs and they engaged the army that had gathered around Siyāvakhsh. With the aid of Zinābī, Nuraym’s army was victorious. After their victory, those who were among the original inhabitants of Rayy took refuge in Qūmis and Dāmghān. The Arab army then entered Rayy, looted the city and gained substantial booty. According to Sayf, “God gave the Muslims at al-Rayy about the same amount of spoils as those at Madā’in.” The wealth of the capital of the Mihrān is thus compared to the wealth of the capital of the Sasanians themselves. Once again, there is no reason to consider the extent of this wealth as a topos created by the tradition.

In the account that follows we are apprised of one of the most important transformations that took place in the political structure of this important region of the Sasanian domains in the wake of the Arab conquest. The Arabs, we are informed, then gave Zinābī and his followers promise of safety (zinḥār), made Zinābī the marzbān of Rayy, and made peace with him. As a result, Zinābī gained a substantial treasury as well. With the conquest of Rayy, therefore, the Arab conquerors toppled one of the most powerful and ancient Parthian dynastic families of the region, the Mihrāns, from its seat of power in Rayy. In this, however, they had the aid of one very able collaborator, our enigmatic figure Zinābī Abū ’l-Farrukhān, who thenceforth assumed power, and as we shall see, not only in Rayy but also elsewhere. According to Sayf, thereafter the “honor of al-Rayy continued to be greatest among the family of al-Zinābī, including Shahrām and Farrukhān. The family of Babrām [Chábīn] fell from grace, and Nuraym destroyed their town, which was called al-Ātiqah (the Old Town)... Al-Zinābī [,however,] gave orders for the building of the new town

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1445Balāmī 1959, p. 332, and n. 2.
1446Ṭabarī 1994, p. 24, de Goeje, 2654. Ṭabarī maintains that Shahrām and Farrukhān were the sons of Zinābī. This is a new piece of information, with which we should reckon in our analysis of Zinābī’s identity on page 264ff. Ṭabarī 1994, p. 25, de Goeje, 2655. Justi repeats this information. Justi 1895, p. 276.
1447Ṭabarī 1994, p. 25, de Goeje, 2654. Here then is an example of the ruse of a traitor, which although couched in a folkloric tale, is thoroughly historical, as we shall presently argue.
1448Ṭabarī 1994, p. 25, de Goeje, 2654.
1450In Balāmī’s account we also get the curious passage that Zinābī and his family had “the same religion as the ajam (va ʾišān ham bar din-i ajam mibūndand).” Balāmī 1959, p. 333.
of al-Rayy.\footnote{Tabari 1994, p. 25, de Goeje, 2655.} Nuaym’s peace agreement was addressed to al-Zinabī b. Qūlah and others with him.\footnote{Tabari 1994, p. 26, de Goeje, 2655.} Zinabī’s nisba of Qūlah, or Kūlah, is important for our future purposes and we shall deal with it later.\footnote{See pages 293 and 308.} This then became a truly substantive transformation, somewhat analogous to the change in power in Khurāsān effected by Khusrow I’s appointment of the Kārīns as the new spāhbeds of the region.\footnote{See §2.5.6.} In keeping with the tradition of political rule in this important domain of the northern quarter, the region of Rayy, the Mīhrāns were officially toppled and another family, the family of Zinabī, was installed in their stead. What this might have meant in terms of the actual domains that had once been the property of the Mīhrāns and how their tremendous social power was affected by this transformation, considering the nature of agnatic land-ownership and religious practices, must be left open for future research.\footnote{As with all other significant upheavals in the histories of the dynastic families, however, it is reasonable to assume that these transformations could not have totally destroyed the actual land-ownership, wealth, and power of the Mīhrān family. Pending further research on precisely how land ownership from those who controlled these lands during the Sasanian period transferred to those who came to control the land under Muslim rule, this assertion remains a conjecture. The histories of Ṭabaristān and Qum suggest two ways in which such a transfer might have been effected. In the case of Ṭabaristān, by the late eighth century when the caliphate finally conquered parts of the land, at least for some period, people began to convert in order to maintain their wealth and power. In the case of Qum, where Arab settlement actually took place, there was a gradual forced take-over of the land by the Arabs. For Qum, see Pourshariati, Parvaneh, ‘Local Histories of Khurāsān and the Pattern of Arab Settlement’, Studia Iranica 27, (1998), pp. 41–81 (Pourshariati 1998). We hope to deal with the case of Ṭabaristān in our forthcoming work.} What is clear, however, is that the de facto and age-old tradition of Mīhrānīd rule in Rayy came to an end in the wake of the conquests with, significantly, the aid of a faction that was likely an age-old rival, the family of Abū ’l-Farrukhān. This transformation in Rayy was altogether not dissimilar to what had transpired after the battle of Nihāvand, when Dinār, who was of low nobility, allegedly duped the Arabs into accepting him as the ruler of the region, at the expense of the Kārīns’ status.\footnote{See page 243.} For the transfer of power from one important dynastic family to another, as we witness here in Rayy, or the loss of status of an important dynastic family, as in Nihāvand, was of such a momentous nature that the details were highlighted in the traditions. By the same token we ought to have been given more information about the party to whom the power of the Mīhrāns in Rayy was transferred. This, however, was not the case and the figure of Zinabī, in spite of his importance, remains quite obscure.\footnote{Once more we must entreat upon the reader’s patience until we can establish the identity of this figure and his family on page 264 below.}

Once the Mīhrāns were defeated by the Arabs with Abū ’l-Farrukhān’s collaboration, the petty rulers of the regions who had come to Siyāvakhsh’s aid also made peace with the Arabs. So, we are told, that after the conquest of

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\begin{enumerate}
  \item \footnote{Tabari 1994, p. 25, de Goeje, 2655.}
  \item \footnote{Tabari 1994, p. 26, de Goeje, 2655.}
  \item \footnote{See pages 293 and 308.}
  \item \footnote{See §2.5.6.}
  \item \footnote{As with all other significant upheavals in the histories of the dynastic families, however, it is reasonable to assume that these transformations could not have totally destroyed the actual land-ownership, wealth, and power of the Mīhrān family. Pending further research on precisely how land ownership from those who controlled these lands during the Sasanian period transferred to those who came to control the land under Muslim rule, this assertion remains a conjecture. The histories of Ṭabaristān and Qum suggest two ways in which such a transfer might have been effected. In the case of Ṭabaristān, by the late eight century when the caliphate finally conquered parts of the land, at least for some period, people began to convert in order to maintain their wealth and power. In the case of Qum, where Arab settlement actually took place, there was a gradual forced take-over of the land by the Arabs. For Qum, see Pourshariati, Parvaneh, ‘Local Histories of Khurāsān and the Pattern of Arab Settlement’, Studia Iranica 27, (1998), pp. 41–81 (Pourshariati 1998). We hope to deal with the case of Ṭabaristān in our forthcoming work.}
  \item \footnote{See page 243.}
  \item \footnote{Once more we must entreat upon the reader’s patience until we can establish the identity of this figure and his family on page 264 below.}
\end{enumerate}
Rayy, Mardānshāh, the ruler of Dunbāwand (Damāvand), Khūwār, Lāriz, and Shirriz, whose title was Ḍaṣmughān, sued for peace with the Arabs, and promised to “refrain [from hostile acts against them] . . . [and] restrain the people of . . . [his] territory.” In return for an annual payment, Nuʿaym promised Mardānshāh that he “will not be attacked, nor . . . approached save by permission.” Suwayd b. Muqarrin subsequently conquered Qūmis, whose inhabitants had also come to the aid of the Mihrāns of Rayy, without any resistance on the part of its population. It is significant for our purposes to take note, moreover, that while the conquest of Rayy is narrated under the year 22 of hijra (643 CE), the actual account of the conquest gives no precise date.

3.4.5 The conquest of Gurgān and Ṭabaristān

The subsequent conquests of Gurgān and Ṭabaristān are extremely important, for it is through these, as well as through the conquest of Khurāsān, that the contours of the political conditions in northern and northeastern Iran in the next two centuries become clear. Moreover, these conquests, together with the conquest of Rayy, with its unprecedented transfer of power from the house of Mihrān to that of our enigmatic figure, Zinābī Abū ‘l-Farrukhān, must naturally be considered in the context of the history of Ṭabaristān and Khurāsān in the late Sasanian period, as well as in the context of the political events taking place once Yazdgird III reached Khurāsān during his flight from the encroaching Arab armies.

The Turkic leader Șūl

After he had conquered Rayy and concluded treaties with the ruler of Damāvand and the people of Qūmis, Suwayd b. Muqarrin moved east. Encamping in Bistām, he wrote to the “ruler of Jurjān [i.e., Gurgān], a figure called Rūzbān Șūl,” who hastened to make peace with him “[with the provision] that he [i.e., Șūl] should pay tribute and that he would save [Suwayd] the trouble of making war on Jurjān. If [he] were being defeated,” Șūl promised Suwayd that he “would give him assistance.” Suwayd then went to Gurgān, and stayed there until the taxes had been collected, and until he “had [specified] the various

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1458 Tabari 1994, pp. 26–27, de Goeje, 2656. This Mardānshāh cannot be the Pārsīg leader Mardānshāh Dhu ‘l-Ḥajib, as he had died already around 642 at the battle of Isfahān, see page 247ff. It is more likely that, being called a Maṣmughān (chief Magian?), he was a Kārinid; see footnote 1750.
1459 Tabari 1994, p. 27, de Goeje, 2656.
1460 Significantly, the treaty with Qūmis was made with the people of Qūmis. Tabari 1994, pp. 27–28, de Goeje, 2657.
1461 Once we have identified our mysterious figure Zinābī, we will be able to infer that the conquest of Rayy (and Gurgān, see below on page 255) must actually have taken place sometime in 650–652; see Table 6.2 on page 469.
1462 See §3.4.4, especially page 250ff.
1463 For a detailed account of this, see Chapter 4.
1464 See page 257ff.
frontier regions of Jurjān by name.” Suwayd then “allocated the Turks of Dihistān [to look after] them, removing the tribute from those who remained to defend them and taking taxes from the remainder of the people of Jurjān.” Who this Šūl was, and what precisely was being negotiated, is clarified by the terms of the treaty that was subsequently drawn up between the two parties. In the treaty itself Šūl is no longer recognized as the ruler of Gurgān. Rather the treaty is addressed to “Rūzbān Šūl b. Rūzbān and the people of Dihistān and all of those of Jurjān.” This Šūl was one of the Turkic leaders who in the post-Bagratuni period of Khurāsān had managed to carve for himself a domain, from where he imposed his rule on Gurgān and adjacent territories, such as Dihistān. Tangentially, we should mention a significant chronological issue before we proceed. While Sayf’s narrative maintains that the conquest of Gurgān took place in 18 AH/639 CE, 1468 Ṭabarī also informs us that, according to al-Madāʿīnī, the conquest of Gurgān took place in 30 AH/650–651 CE, more than a decade later. There is absolutely no indication, however, that the Arabs could have reached Gurgān at this early stage in 639 CE. To this important chronological dispute we will get shortly.

The treaty between Suwayd and Šūl stipulated that the tribute imposed on Šūl and his followers would not be in the form of monetary arrangements but “in the form of assistance.” These treaty terms were analogous, as we shall see, to those the Arabs made with the Mihrānid Shahrvarāz in the Caucasus, where the tribute due from the conquered population was calculated in terms of the military assistance rendered. In Balāmī’s account, however, the terms of the agreement between Šūl and Suwayd were even more advantageous for Šūl: he entered into an agreement with Suwayd on the condition that the Arabs agreed to pay him a portion of the kharāj of Gurgān, as well as a portion of the dues given by “those who refuse to accept Islam.” Another significant chronological indicator is provided by Balāmī: Šūl persuaded Suwayd that this arrangement would also benefit the Arabs, for “once the ispahbudān [i.e., the plural of spābed] of Ṭabaristān realize that he, [i.e., Šūl,] has made peace, they will not engage in war with the Arabs.” If they did nevertheless elect war, Šūl promised that he would come forth with the army of Gurgān, and wage war until Ṭabaristān was likewise conquered. 1472

The ispahbud Farrukhān

Balāmī then adds, significantly, that when the ispahbudhān (pl.), that is to say, the collectivity of the ispahbuds of Ṭabaristān, heard that Šūl had made peace

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1466 Ṭabarī 1994, p. 29, de Goeje, 2658.
1467 Ṭabarī 1994, p. 29, de Goeje, 2658.
1469 Ṭabarī 1994, p. 29, de Goeje, 2658.
1470 See page 279.
1471 Balāmī 1959, p. 334.
1472 Balāmī 1959, p. 334.
with Suwayd b. Muqarrin, they gathered around their ruler. This ruler’s name was Farrukhān, “and he was the ispabbud of all of the ispahbuds. And they [i.e., the other ispahbuds] were all under his rule. And the ispahbud was the commander of his army . . . [Farrukhān] was [also] called the Gil of all of Gilān (Jīl-i Jīlān). And when he wrote letters, he would [address himself as the] ‘ispahbud of all Ispahbudān’. And today, [i.e., presumably in Balʿamī’s time,] they write the [name of the] ispahbudān of Khurāsān in this manner [as well].”

Once they realized that Suḥūl had made peace with Suwayd b. Muqarrin, Balʿamī proceeds, “all of the ispahbudān gathered around Farrukhān and asked: ‘what solution do you propose for us?’” Farrukhān, the Gil-i Gilān,1474 Balʿamī continues, replied to the other ispahbudān that peace seems to be the only option (salāh ān ast kih šulh kunīm). For the affairs of the ajam were in disarray (kār-i ajam tār o pār shud) and “the religion of Muḥammad was a new religion,” so that it was prudent to make peace and pay the jizya.1475 Farrukhān then wrote to Suwayd and asked for peace terms, and agreed to pay 500,000 dirhams per year for all of Ṭabaristān, and consented that in case the Muslims would engage in war, and asked for aid from Ṭabaristān, this would be rendered. Suwayd, who was in Gurgān, then informed ʿUmar that he had conquered Qūmis, Gurgān, and Ṭabaristān.1476 Significantly, therefore, Farrukhān, too, made peace on behalf of Gurgān. What of Suḥūl, however? Here comes a further significant piece of chronological information. While according to Ṭabarī the conquest of Gurgān through Suḥūl was accomplished in 18 AH/639 CE by one account,1477 Balʿamī maintains that Suwayd’s peace with Farrukhān for Qūmis, Gurgān, and Ṭabaristān took place in 22 AH/643 CE.

Several chronologies for the conquests involving Gurgān therefore are provided. In the first, the treaty was allegedly put into effect through Suḥūl and deals only with the conquest of Gurgān. One tradition gives this conquest the improbable date of 18 AH/639 CE—when most of the battles discussed above still had to be fought in regions far to the west of Gurgān—while another tradition puts that conquest in the year 30 AH/650–651 CE.1478 A second chronology given by Balʿamī for the year 22 AH/642–643 CE, claims that the peace treaty went into effect through Farrukhān and Gīl-i Gilān, and involved Gurgān plus all of Ṭabaristān and Qūmis. There is another tradition which mentions no names or the extent of the territories involved, and which is dated to 30 AH/650–651 CE. Among the proposed dates, the latter is in all probability the correct one. However, our argument for this depends on our identification

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1473 Balʿamī 1959, p. 334.
1474 The reader should be warned that the identification of Farrukhān with Gīl-i Gilān (Jīl-i Jīlān-shāh) will prove to be unwarranted, as we will argue shortly on page 256 below, and in more detail in §4.4.1.
1475 Balʿamī 1959, p. 334.
1476 Balʿamī 1959, p. 335.
1478 See next note.
of Farrukhân, and ultimately of Zînâbî Abû ‘l-Farrukhân, which we will give below.\footnote{See page 264ff, as well as page 291ff and §4.4.1 in the next chapter.}

Now, in Bal'ami’s account of the conquest of Gurgân and Ṭabaristân—reportedly in 22 AH/642–643 CE, but in our reconstructed chronology actually around 650–651\footnote{See §4.4.1.}—there occur so many ispahbudhân that, on the face of it, it would appear impossible to disentangle them. What is clear from the account is that the most powerful of the lot, the ispahbud-i ispahbudhân, was called Farrukhân, or Jîl-i Jîlân, and that he held authority over all the ispahbuds. To figure out Farrukhân’s jurisdiction, we must turn to Ṭabari’s account of the conquest of Ṭabaristân. According to Ṭabari, the ruler of Ṭabaristân, Farrukhân, wrote to Suwayd and sued for peace. The treaty as a whole, however, was addressed to Farrukhân, the ruler of Khurâsan, in authority over Ṭabaristân, and to the ruler Jîl-i Jîlânshâh, our previous enemy. Farrukhân therefore was the ruler of Khurâsan, but he also had authority over Ṭabaristân. As the syntax of Ṭabari’s passage indicates, moreover, and contrary to Bal’ami’s narrative, Farrukhân and Jîl-i Jîlânshâh were not one and the same figure.\footnote{For further background on Jîl-i Jîlânshâh, see §4.3.3 below.}

The combined powers of Farrukhân and Jîl-i Jîlânshâh vis-à-vis the Arabs was reflected in the peace treaty. Farrukhân, who was the first addressee of the treaty, promised not to harbor or aid any potential resistance coalition. Whereas Bal’ami maintains that Farrukhân agreed to aid the Arabs in case of military need, moreover, Ṭabari maintains that one of the conditions that the rulers of Khurâsan and Ṭabaristân, Farrukhân and Jîl-i Jîlânshâh, stipulated in their peace agreement was that they would not be “obliged to render help or assistance against anyone.”\footnote{Ṭabari 1994, p. 30, de Goeje, 2659. As we have seen thus far, and shall continue to see, the practice of seeking the support and aid of one dynastic faction, or a branch of a dynastic faction, against another, was, in fact, one of the crucial ways in which the Arabs were able to effect the conquests and gradually move east. So, the Iranians’ request to be left out these dynastic bargains fits in quite well with the scheme of things.} In other words, in exchange for peace, Farrukhân and Jîl-i Jîlânshâh demanded to be left alone. In return, the Arabs requested them to restrain their robbers, and the people on their borders: “You will harbor nobody or nothing we are seeking and you will ensure yourself [against military action against you] by [paying] anyone governing your border territory 500,000 dirhams.” In conclusion, Farrukhân, the ispahbud-i ispahbudhân, the ruler of Khurâsan, in authority over Ṭabaristân, under whose rule all the other spâhbeds had now gathered, and Jîl-i Jîlânshâh, were required to ensure the calm around their borders by buying the cooperation of potentially insurgent governors of these territories. The Arabs agreed that they would not have a right to attack Farrukhân or invade the domains under his control, “or even to approach [him] without [his] permission.”\footnote{Ṭabari 1994, p. 30–31, de Goeje, 2659.} In order to further clarify the nature of the events that took place in Rayy, Ṭabaristân, and Khurâsan, we
must turn our attention once more to the fateful saga of the last Sasanian king, Yazdgird III, as he turned to Khurāsān. For, it was only after the destruction of the leadership of the Pārsīg faction, with Firūzān dead and Hurmuzān in captivity, that Yazdgird III came to lose the most important source of support left to him, that of the Pahlav faction under Farrukhzād’s leadership.\footnote{\textsuperscript{1484}}

\textit{Yazdgird III’s flight eastwards}

We recall that after the battle of Qādisiya and the battle of Jalālā, Yazdgird III’s flight first carried him south, then southeast, where he probably stayed in Sīstān, possibly for five years.\footnote{\textsuperscript{1485}} We can now follow his trail as he turned finally to Khurāsān around 650. Some of our sources maintain that during his flight, Yazdgird III either went to the proximity of Ṭabaristān, or was at least invited to take refuge there. In any case, perhaps on his way to Khurāsān, Yazdgird III learned about the events in Ṭabaristān and Gurgān\footnote{\textsuperscript{1486}} before he finally proceeded to Khurāsān, to Marv. We recall that most of our sources emphasize that the protection of the Sasanian king during his flight was undertaken by the most important scion of the Ispahbudhān family, Farrukhzād, the brother of Rustam, and the son of the Prince of the Medes, Farrukh Hormozd.

Whereas none of the anecdotal narratives that describe Yazdgird III’s fate in Khurāsān and his presumed murder at the hands of a miller, rings of historical veracity, we do have substantive information that helps us clarify the course of events. The initial conquest of Khuzistān and Fārs by ‘Ashārī, we recall, took place sometime around 636–637 CE, according to our dating scheme,\footnote{\textsuperscript{1487}} although some traditions maintain that this was shortly before Abū Bakr died, in 634 CE. The “real conquest of Fārs and the remainder of the Sasanian empire to the east,” however, was undertaken by ‘Abdallāh b. ʿAmir, the governor of Baṣrāh, under ʿUthmān (23–35 AH/644–656 CE),\footnote{\textsuperscript{1488}} when the latter sent Ṭāhnhāf at the vanguard of an army to conquer Khurāsān from Ṭabasayn. According to Morony, it was after the second conquest of Fārs that Yazdgird III moved to Kirmān and thence, just ahead of the Arab forces, to Sīstān and Khurāsān.\footnote{\textsuperscript{1489}} Yazdgird III, therefore, arrived in Khurāsān sometime in 650–651 CE. If Yazdgird III was eight years old when he ascended the throne in 632, moreover, by the time of his arrival in Khurāsān in 650–651, he was about twenty-six years old. From here on, the sources that depict the youthful Sasanian king as stubborn and thick-headed may carry some truth.

\footnote{\textsuperscript{1484}}The conquest of Khurāsān will be discussed in §3.4.7 below, and the Arab peace treaty with Farrukhān and Jīl-i Jīlānshāh, in §4.4.1. 
\footnote{\textsuperscript{1485}}See page 244ff. A tentative chronology for his whereabouts is given in Table 6.2 on page 469. 
\footnote{\textsuperscript{1486}}See §3.4.5. 
\footnote{\textsuperscript{1487}}See §3.4.2 and Table 6.2. 
\footnote{\textsuperscript{1488}}Morony 1991, p. 207. 
\footnote{\textsuperscript{1489}}Morony 1991, p. 207. However, as we established on page 244ff, his stay in Kirmān and Sīstān was more likely during the years 642–648.
According to Ṭabarī, “historians are in disagreement” over Yazdgird III’s journey to Khurāsān, and “how the whole affair happened.”\footnote{Ṭabarī 1994, p. 51, de Goeje, 2680. Here Sayf mentions Yazdgird III’s flight to Rayy and his dispute with a figure called Abān Jādhyūyih, which quarrel led him to leave Rayy for Isfahān. Ṭabarī 1994, p. 52, de Goeje, 2681. For the office of jādhyūyih, see page 197 and footnote 1092. For a conjectural identification of Abān Jādhyūyih, see footnote 1528.} According to one tradition, once he arrived in Khurāsān, Yazdgird III “intended to join the ruler of the Turks, and the Persians asked him what he intended to do.”\footnote{Ṭabarī 1994, p. 59, de Goeje, 2688.} Yazdgird III replied that “he wanted to join the ruler of the Turks and remain with him or [go] to China.” Who were these Persians quarreling with the king? In this version of Ṭabarī’s narrative the name of the figure(s) (or parties) is not disclosed. What is disclosed, however, is that a violent disagreement took place between the king and a faction whom Ṭabarī’s source calls the Khurāsānīs. When Yazdgird III articulated his intentions, according to Ṭabarī, “they told him to tread warily, for this was a bad idea, going to a people in their own country, while abandoning his own land and people.”\footnote{Ṭabarī 1994, p. 59, de Goeje, 2689–2690.} They argued that he must go back to Iran and make peace with the Arabs, for having an “enemy ruling over Persians in their own land . . . was a better political arrangement than an enemy ruling over them in his own land.”\footnote{Ṭabarī 1994, p. 59, de Goeje, 2689.} Yazdgird III, however, refused to accept their arguments. The Khurāsānīs, likewise, “refused to give in to him.”

The substantial treasury of the king and the issue of its ownership also complicated matters. The Khurāsānīs “told [Yazdgird III] to leave their treasures alone, . . . [for they would] return them to their own territory and to its ruler.”\footnote{Ṭabarī 1994, p. 59, de Goeje, 2689.} This seemed logical enough. But the young king refused to yield to pressure once again. Ṭabarī’s narrative still does not disclose the precise identity of this collective Persians, except that they were Khurāsānīs. The dispute, however, got out of hand. For once Yazdgird III refused to relinquish the treasury, the Khurāsānīs “told him that they would not let him go . . . [they then] drew on one side and left him alone with his followers.” Finally the Khurāsānīs took over “the treasures and assuming complete control over them, abandon[ed] him completely.”\footnote{Ṭabarī 1994, p. 59, de Goeje, 2689.}

According to this version of Ṭabarī’s narrative, the Khurāsānī “polytheists [then] wrote to al-Aḥnaf”, while driving Yazdgird III to Farghānah.\footnote{Ṭabarī 1994, p. 59, de Goeje, 2689.} Having made peace with Aḥnaf and “exchanging agreements with him,” they handed over Yazdgird III’s treasury to the Arabs and “gradually returned to their lands and wealth in as good a state as they had been at the time of the Sasanian emperors. It was as if they were [still] under their rule except for the fact that the Muslims
were more worthy of their confidence and acted justly toward them.”

While the tradition that the advent of the Arab army was the cause of Yazdgird III’s withdrawal to Farghānah might or might not be valid, all evidence corroborates the rest of Ţabari’s narrative, from which we receive yet another significant piece of information. Throughout the rule of ʿUmar (634–644), we are told, Yazdgird III maintained some form of correspondence with at least some of the Persians. “So the people of Khurāsān rebelled”, it is interjected, “during the time of ʿUthmān [’s caliphate (644–656)].”

It was at this point then that “the Khurāsānīs threw off their allegiance.” Other sources clarify just who exactly these Khurāsānīs were.

According to Madā’inī, when Yazdgird III arrived in Khurāsān, he was accompanied by “Khurrazād Mihr, the brother of Rustam.” There is, therefore, no doubt about what our sources had originally informed us: Yazdgird III was still in the company of Farrukhzād, the Ispahbudhān scion with claims to the spāḥbedi of both Khurāsān and Azarbāyjān. In Marv, Farrukhzād reportedly reminded Māhūy, the marzbān of Marv, that he was entrusting the king to his protection and then “[he] left for Iraq.” The tradition highlighting Yazdgird III’s attempt at deposing Māhūy and the well-circulated traditions that the king was murdered at the hands of the latter or at his instigation, all betray the turmoil that engulfed the region as a result of the divergent policies of the young king and the supporters left to him, the marzbān of Marv and the Turks, in the face of the imminent arrival of the Arabs. Ibn al-Kalbī’s tradition found in Ţabari adds a further point: after fleeing to Isfahān and then to Rayy, Yazdgird III entered into correspondence with the overlord (sahib) of ʿTabaristān. This overlord, who remains unidentified in Ibn al-Kalbī’s transmission, then “described his lands for [Yazdgird III] and informed him of their impregnability,” and asked the king to take refuge in his land. The overlord also cautioned the king that promptness was required in the king’s decision, for otherwise he would not “receive . . . [him] or give . . . [him] refuge.” Yazdgird III refused to take refuge in ʿTabaristān, but, as a gesture of appreciation, appointed the overlord (sahib) as the spāḥbed of ʿTabaristān, where the latter “had previously held a humbler rank.”

Following this narrative on the situation in ʿTabaristān, we receive another account where, once again, we are informed that the escort of Yazdgird III in his flight to Khurāsān was the Parthian dynast, Farrukhzād. The substantial power of Farrukhzād and the almost total dependency of Yazdgird

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1497 Ţabari 1994, p. 59, de Goeje, 2689.
1498 Ţabari 1994, p. 59, de Goeje, 2689.
1499 Ţabari 1994, p. 60, de Goeje, 2690.
1500 Ţabari 1990, p. 79, de Goeje, 2873.
1501 According to Thalāḥi, the regions under the control of Māhūy included Marv, Marv al-Rūd, Tālīqān, Jūzjān, and others. Thalāḥi 1900, p. 744.
1502 Ţabari 1990, p. 82, de Goeje, 2875. To properly identify this overlord and spāḥbed of ʿTabaristān, we need to analyze the political situation in ʿTabaristān in more detail, which we postpone to the next chapter; see page 302ff.
1503 Ţabari 1990, p. 82, de Goeje, 2876.
III on his protection comes across clearly in a subsequent account transmitted through an unidentified source in Ṭabarī.

### 3.4.6 The mutiny of Farrukhzād

According to Ṭabarī, Yazdgird III “had appointed Farrukhzād as governor of Marv and ordered Barāz, [the son of Māhūy] to turn the citadel and the city over to him.” Māhūy, however, had opposed this. Farrukhzād knelt down before Yazdgird III, and proclaimed: “Marw has proved an intractable problem for you, and these Arabs have caught up with you.” He advised Yazdgird III to go to the country of the Turks in refuge. Yazdgird III, however, “opposed [Farrukhzād] and did not accept his advice.” The details of the discord that had been caused in Marv by Yazdgird III’s arrival need not concern us here. The upshot of it was that Māhūy decided to mutiny. What becomes clear through the rest of the narrative, however, is that the army under the command of Farrukhzād was a central player in the dispute. According to this narrative, Māhūy wrote to the Turkic leader Nizak Tarkhān, encouraging him to use a ruse and write to Yazdgird III “in order to separate him from the main body of his soldiers, thereby leaving him with a weak and powerless segment of his army and personal retinue.” Specifically, Māhūy prompted Nizak to tell Yazdgird III “that . . . [he] will not come to meet him until Farrukhzād parts from him.” Nizak followed Māhūy’s instructions. When the letter reached Yazdgird III and he sought advice, no consensus was reached on the course to follow. One faction argued that it was not “wise to dismiss your army and Farrukhzād for any reason.” The other faction enjoined him to relieve himself of the Parthian dynast and his army. Yazdgird III accepted the latter’s advice and “order[ed] . . . Farrukhzād to go to the reed beds of Sarakhs.” Farrukhzād allegedly was heart-wrenched. He “crie[d] . . . out and rent the neck hole [of his garment].” Yet he did not leave until Yazdgird III had written the following letter to him: “This is a letter to Farrukhzād. Verily you have turned Yazdagird, his household and his children, his retinue, and his possessions over safe and secure to Māhawayh [Māhūy], the dihqān of Marw. And I hereby bear witness to this.” In view of what will transpire, there is little doubt that this version was a history patronized by the Parthian Ispahbudhān family.

The Xwadāy-Nāmag tradition corroborates important details of various traditions provided by Ṭabarī, while adding other significant information. According to the Shāhnāma, it was Farrukhzād who urged Yazdgird III to go north to Ṭabaristān in the midst of his flight east, arguing that the population in

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1504 Ṭabarī 1990, p. 83, de Goeje, 2877. While Yazdgird III’s disagreement with Farrukhzād is here correctly underlined, the stances of the two parties have been reversed. That is, it was actually Yazdgird III’s idea to take refuge with the Turks and not Farrukhzād’s.

1505 Ṭabarī 1990, p. 84, de Goeje, 2878.

1506 Ṭabarī 1990, p. 84, de Goeje, 2878.

1507 Ṭabarī 1990, p. 85, de Goeje, 2879.

1508 The narrative concerning Yazdgird III’s appointment of the ruler of Ṭabaristān to the rank of spāḥbed, however, is in all likelihood a Kārinid tradition; see page 302 below.
Chapter 3: Arab Conquest

§3.4: Yazdgird III

Among the king’s supporters, Yazdgird III, however, rejected Farrukhzād’s advice, and opted for Khurāsān instead. In Khurāsān, Yazdgird III argued, he was assured of the protection of the marzbāns of the region, who had a reputation for bravery and warring, as well as the aid of the Turks and the Khāqān of China. Chief among these marzbāns, Yazdgird III told Farrukhzād, was Māhūy, the kanārang of Marv.

According to the Shāhnāma, while Farrukhzād disagreed sternly with Yazdgird III’s decision to go to Khurāsān and take refuge with Māhūy and the Turks, he did not abandon the king just yet. Leading the way with his substantial army, the Pahlav dynast proceeded toward Gurgān and thence to Büst (Bisṭām). Somewhere between Tūs and Marv, Māhūy came to greet the last Sasanian king. It was here, Ferdowsī informs us, that Farrukhzād left the king in Māhūy’s custody and returned. And now, we are given a significant piece of information by Ferdowsī. After leaving the king, Farrukhzād set out for Rayy. In the meantime he adopted a new posture vis-à-vis Yazdgird III: he had a change of heart (jodā shod zī magbāz-i bad andish mihr) and the “shepherd” came to covet the throne (shabān rā bami kard takht ārūzī). Pretending to be ill, Farrukhzād renounced his allegiance to Yazdgird III. And so the last Sasanian king lost his last and most formidable source of support: the Pahlav Farrukhzād mutinied. While leaving the king to the care of Māhūy, Farrukhzād revealed his intent: “I have to leave for Rayy, for I do not know any longer whom I shall

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1510 Ferdowsī 1971, vol. IX, p. 337, Ferdowsī 1935, p. 2983:

consider the king” of this realm.\textsuperscript{1512} Here, therefore, another part of the puzzle is finally solved. The Khurāsānis of Ṭabarī were none other than Farrukhzād and his contingent. We recall, after all, that the family was not only dubbed the princes of Azarbāyjān, but also the spāhbeds of Khurāsān.\textsuperscript{1513}

Sebeos corroborates the information on the Pahlav leader’s mutiny provided by the Arabic sources and the \textit{Xwādāy-Nāmag} tradition, although his source might, in fact, have also been Persian. According to Sebeos, in the twentieth year of the reign of Yazdgird III, that is 651/652, the Arab armies that were “in the land of Persia [Fārs] and of Khuzhastan [Khuzistān] marched eastwards to the regions of the land called Pahlaw, which is the land of the Parthians, against Yaztkert king of Persia.”\textsuperscript{1514} Yazdgird III had already fled before them. After going east, however, the “Prince of the Medes [i.e., Farrukhzād]—of whom I said above that he had gone to the east to their king and, having rebelled had fortified himself in some place—sought an oath from the Ismaelites [i.e., Arabs] and went into the desert in submission to the Ismaelites.”\textsuperscript{1515} As Howard–Johnston, Sebeos’ editor, remarks, nowhere in his account does Sebeos mention the rebellion of the Prince of the Medes and his fortification somewhere. He suggests, therefore, that “either a passage has dropped out of Sebeos’ text in its long transmission and the cross-reference is his, or, possibly the cross-reference was lifted together with the notice in which it was embedded, from Sebeos’ source, probably the Persian Source.”\textsuperscript{1516} In all probability it is Howard–Johnston’s second conjecture that is valid. For, as we shall see, not only are the details of Farrukhzād’s rebellion against the Sasanian king generally hidden or implicit in our sources but, in almost all of them, this important Pahlav leader also disappeared from the scene altogether once he had left Yazdgird III behind. This, we shall propose, is one of the many instances of the editorial force that the Ispahbudhān exerted on the \textit{Xwādāy-Nāmag} tradition and, by extension, on other sources supplied by this tradition.\textsuperscript{1517}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1512}Ferdowsī 1971, vol. IX, p. 347:
\begin{center}

dānām kā kā dānām ān tāhā kā
\end{center}
\begin{center}

\textit{Mar fīt bāy’d-so’ī māzīrī}
\end{center}

In Tharālībi’s version, it was Yazdgird III who ordered Farrukhzād to go to Iraq and make peace with the Arabs. Farrukhzād accepted the king’s orders, warned him of Māhūy’s malicious intentions, and left in distress. Tharālībi 1900, p. 744, Tharālībi 1989, p. 475. According to Ḥamza Isfahānī, the letter that Farrukhzād obtained from the king was not one that confirmed the safe transfer of the king to Māhūy’s hand, but a contract through which the last Sasanian undertook to \textit{relinquish his kingship} to the Parthian dynast Farrukhzād of the Ispahbudhān family. Ḥamza Isfahānī 1961, p. 55, Ḥamza Isfahānī 1988, pp. 59–60.
\item \textsuperscript{1513}We should also reiterate that the Ispahbudhān were the spāhbeds of the \textit{kūst-i khvarrāsān} for an extended period; see pages 107ff and 188ff.
\item \textsuperscript{1514}Sebeos 1999, p. 135.
\item \textsuperscript{1515}Sebeos 1999, p. 135.
\item \textsuperscript{1516}Sebeos 1999, pp. 135, 265.
\item \textsuperscript{1517}For a more detailed discussion of their redactional efforts, see page 462ff below. For another example, see the two versions about Khusrow II’s murder on page 158.
\end{itemize}
What is of crucial importance in the narratives just discussed is that until the end of Yazdgird III’s flight to Khurāsān, it was the Pahlav leader, Farrukhzād, who continued to protect the king. Moreover, the aforementioned Khurāsānī rebellion\textsuperscript{1518} was in fact a substantive disagreement over strategy and policy between Farrukhzād and Yazdgird, leading ultimately to Farrukhzād’s mutiny. In line with the policies promoted by his brother Rustam,\textsuperscript{1519} Farrukhzād even proposed to the king that making peace with the Arabs was a more prudent option, while Yazdgird III, in all likelihood fearful of Farrukhzād’s power, opted for taking refuge with someone over whom he believed to have power, namely, Māhūy, the marzbān of Marv.\textsuperscript{1520} It is important to note that in the last crucial months of Yazdgird III’s life, when the Arabs had already reached the environs of Khurāsān, Farrukhzād still commanded a substantial army, whose withdrawal from Yazdgird III would expedite the king’s demise.

With the quarters of the north and east in disarray at this juncture, Farrukhzād, \textit{with a substantial army under his command}, headed west with the intention of making peace with the Arabs. Significantly, as Ferdowsi informs us, Farrukhzād set out for Rayy. The mutiny of Farrukhzād was momentous for the fate of the Sasanian empire. It conveniently explains the course of events in the \textit{kūst-i khwarāsān} and the \textit{kūst-i ādurbādagan}, the land of the Pahlav. It is to be noted that the \textit{Xᵛᵛadāy-Nāmag} tradition does not follow what transpired in the wake of Farrukhzād’s mutiny and his westbound departure in the direction of Rayy. This omission is partly due to the fact that this tradition ends with the death of Yazdgird III. On the face of it then, we are left in the dark about Farrukhzād’s negotiations with the Arabs. The leader of the Pahlav, the progeny of the Ispahbudhān, the \textit{spāḥbed} of Khurāsān and Azarbājān, Farrukhzād, son of Farrukh Hormozd, seemingly vanishes from the accounts of our sources. That is, if we choose to neglect Sayf’s traditions and the narratives of the conquests.

It is now time to recall\textsuperscript{1521} that in the conquest of Rayy, the one who is said to have “seen what the Muslims were like, [comparing their attitude] with the envy of Sīyāvakhsh and his family,” was a figure bearing the curious name Zīnabī Abū ‘l-Farrukhān.\textsuperscript{1522} We have, therefore, come full circle to our original question. Who was this Zinabi Abū ’l-Farrukhān who on account of his age-old enmity with the Parthian Mihrāns, aided the Arabs in toppling this important family from their seat of power, and took over the control of their realm? It is here that the histories of Ṭabaristān and Gilan tie in with the account of Yazdgird III’s flight to Khurāsān, to provide a more coherent picture than had hitherto been possible.

\textsuperscript{1518}See page 258ff.
\textsuperscript{1519}See §3.4.1.
\textsuperscript{1520}According to Yazdgird III, the Māhūy owed his position to the Sasanian monarchy and not, like the \textit{Kanārang} (on whom below), to gentilitial claims. See our discussion at the beginning of §3.4.7.
\textsuperscript{1521}See page 250ff.
\textsuperscript{1522}Ṭabari 1994, p. 25, de Goeje, 2654.
A hero unveiled: Zinābī

We should start with an onomastic question: what is the meaning of the name Zinābī? For on the face of it, the term seems neither to be Arabic nor Persian. Zinābī, occurring in other sources as Zināvand, is, in fact, the Arabicized, contracted form of the Persian term zināvand, meaning one who is wellarmed. The Zand-i Vahuman Yasn, for example, speaks of a large, well-armed (zināvand) army that is responsible for bestowing kingship to the Kayānids. The Fārsnāma also uses the term in this same sense. Zinābī then is an epithet, not a name. It is an adjective describing the holder of the epithet as one who is wellarmed, in this case Abū ’l-Farrukhān. Baladhūrī specifically maintains that Zinābī was the nomenclature given by the Arabs to this figure.

The abrupt disappearance of the powerful figure of the Isphahbūdān Farrukhzād from our accounts, and the sudden appearance of the mysterious but equally powerful Zinābī Abū ’l-Farrukhān at the exact juncture in our narratives is hardly coincidental. A closer examination of the latter’s name leaves therefore very little doubt that Zinābī Abū ’l-Farrukhān is none other than the Isphahbūdān Farrukhzād: Zinābī Abū ’l-Farrukhān, the wellarmed, who with his large army mysteriously materialized to assist the Arabs in the conquest of Rayy and, as a result, gained supremacy over this important Mihrānīd domain. Zinābī, moreover, we notice, arrived on the scene at the precise moment when Farrukhzād had abandoned Yazdgird III in Khurāsān and, with his large army, was on his way to Rayy, the ancestral domain of his family’s nemeses, the Mihrāns. Furthermore, in anticipation of our detailed study of the

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1523 Baladhūrī 1968, p. 317.
1524 Vahuman 1883, Zand-i Vahuman Yasn, Tehran, 1963, translated by Sadegh Hedayat (Vahuman 1883), p. 58, n. 9:

ٌضَفَرَتْ بِقِيَامَةِ رَآئِفٍ أَفْرَاهِمُ بِيَابَنَدَ وَإِضَاشَهِيَ بِهِ كِرَضَ.

1525 Ibn Balkhī 1995, p. 95. Significantly, this army appears after the account of Bahram-i Chūbīn and might in fact be a description of Bahram-i Chūbīn’s own army. See page 406ff. Zināvand was also the epithet of Tahrūrath. Ibn Balkhī maintains that he “was called Tahrūrath-i zināvand and zināvand was his epithet and [it] means well-armed.” Ibn Balkhī 1995, p. 95 and n. 1. Bundahishn 1990, Bundahish, Tehran, 1990, translated by Mihrdad Bahar (Bundahishn 1990), n. 58.

1526Baladhūrī 1968, p. 318.
1527 In this respect, we should also recall the confusion in some of our sources between Farrukhzād and his father Farrukh Hormozd, who at times is called Farrukhān; see page 143ff. The Arabic kunya-prefix Abū (father of) when used in Iranian names is also notoriously unreliable, to the extent that it could even mean son of, so that we may interpret Abū ’l-Farrukhān here as the son of Farrukhān, that is to say, of Farrukh Hormozd (see §2.7.5). Indeed, some of our sources, we recall, refer to Zinābī as the son of Farrukhān (i.e., Farrukh Hormozd); see footnote 1445.
1528 We can now also shed some light on an enigmatic passage in Tabarī about the altercation between Yazdgird III and a certain Abān Jādūhīyih. When Yazdgird III on his flight eastwards arrived in Rayy, he was imprisoned by its ruler, called Abān Jādūhīyih. The king accused him of mutiny, to which Abān Jādūhīyih replied: “No, rather you have abandoned your empire, and it has fallen into the hands of someone else. I [only] want to record everything that is mine and nothing else”. Tabarī 1994, p. 52, de Goeje, 2681. In other words, the dispute was over Rayy’s treasury. Once the king agreed to grant Abān Jādūhīyih his properties, he left Rayy. His subsequent itinerary
political situation in Ṭabaristān, we shall further see that Farrukhzād was also the same figure who appeared in our accounts of the conquest of Ṭabaristān as Farrukhān, the ispahbud-i ispahbudhān, with authority over Ṭabaristān, and who signed, in collaboration with Jil-i Jilānshāh, a peace treaty with the Arabs. Who, however, are the other players on the scene? What else is transpiring in the Parthian domains at this juncture? We have left out thus far one last, crucial figure in the final saga of the Sasanian king: the Kanārang of Ṭūs.

3.4.7 The conquest of Khurāsān and the mutiny of the Kanārangyān

According to Ferdowsī, during his eastward flight, Yazdgird III wrote two letters to the kanārangs of his choice in the east, Māhūy and the Kanārang-i Ṭūs. Faced with Farrukhzād’s insistence that he should take refuge in Ṭabaristān, the king argued that he preferred to go under the protection of Māhūy, because of the latter’s reputation as a warmonger and a slanderer. Yazdgird III further argued that since Māhūy owed his title (nām), land (ard), frontier (marz), and the rest of his possessions to the king, his loyalty to the Sasanians was guaranteed. That he was lowborn, was all the more to the king’s advantage, since raising the ignoble to nobility would insure loyalty to the Sasanians. In Ferdowsī’s rendition, there follows a didactic passage in which the king set forth the mutual benefits of forming a patron–client relationship, while the Parthian dynast Farrukhzād enumerated the evils of relying on non-nobility. Given the status of our current knowledge, we cannot ascertain the precise identity of this Māhūy-i Sūrī. As Ferdowsī’s narrative unfolds, however, it becomes quite clear that the author’s slander of Māhūy is meant to be juxtaposed with his praise for another marzbān of Khurāsān, the Kanārang of Ṭūs. The Kanārang’s title, according to Ferdowsī, was deservedly bestowed, and he bore it in a normative fashion. These normative dimensions are enumerated in detail in the letter of Yazdgird III to the Kanārang of Ṭūs. The finale of this correspondence—

was Isfahān, Kirmān, and finally Khurāsān. Now, as Rayy was the capital of the Mihrāns, our first guess would be that its ruler Abān Jādūyih was a Mihrān, possibly Siyāvakhsh. Tabari 1994, p. 24, de Goeje, 2653. However, as we can readily see, this narrative is reminiscent of the treasury dispute between the king and Farrukhzād (see §3.4.6). As Farrukhzād, under the alias Zinābī Abū ’l-Farrukhān, did become the ruler of Rayy with the aid of the Arabs (see §3.4.4, pages 250 and 254), we may conjecture that Abān Jādūyih is really Farrukhzād. We can link this conjectural identification also to our previous conjecture about the office of jādūyih, in which Abān, rather than being a proper name, stands for the tenth day of the month (see footnote 1092).

See §4.4.1. See page 254. The reader should be forewarned that yet another enigmatic figure will appear in these accounts, which yet again turns out to be our notorious Farrukhzād; see page 291ff.

As this names suggests, it is possible that he actually belonged to the Sūren family.

Ferdowsī’s narrative discredits Māhūy explicitly, questioning his loyalty and stressing his humble origins. Ferdowsī’s debasing of the kanārang of Marv might of course have been formed by the poet’s post-facto knowledge of Māhūy’s complicity in the death of the king. According to Ḥamza Isfahānī, “down to his day in Marv and its vicinity people called the descendants of Mahoe… king killers (khudūa-kushān).” Ḥamza Isfahānī 1988, p. 43, as quoted in Yarshater, Yarshater 1983b, p. 404.

The first letter, as we have seen, was addressed to Māhūy-i Sūrī, the kanārang of Marv. All that the poet informs us of here is that the king described his plight, requested Māhūy to prepare
articulated, significantly, not in the Shāhnāma, but in the Ghwar of Thāālībī—reveals that Farrukhz̄ad was not alone in his mutiny against Yazdgird III. As opposed to the curt letter written to Māhūy, Ferdowsī furnishes us with a lengthy—eighty three couplets in total—version of the contents of the second letter, written to the Kanārang of Tūs from the Kanārangiyān family.

The Kanārangiyān

The Kanārangiyān were in possession of “Kingly Glory,” farr, land (ard), justice (dād) and law (rāḥ) in Ferdowsī’s rendition. Their high lineage was well established and acknowledged. Ferdowsī then provides us with detailed information on the regional extent of the Kanārangiyān’s power. Toward the end of Sasanian rule—and, yet again, the post-Bagratuni situation in Khurāsān needs to be kept in mind—the Kanārangiyān ruled over an extensive territory that included Shemīrān, Rūyīn Dīzh, Rādīh Kūh, and Kalāt. Now Shemīrān is most likely the fortress of Shāmilān in Tūs mentioned by Yaqūt, and not the famous village and fortress of Shemīrān located in Herāt, nor the fortress of the same name located in Balkh. For the topography of the region as well as the political situation of the realm on the eve of the conquests, would have precluded the Kanārangiyān’s power over such a dispersed region. Rādīh Kūh is part of a series of mountains located in the region of Tūs, Rādīhkān being the name of a district in the environs of Tūs. Kalāt evidently refers to what in the later period came to be identified with the Kalāt-i Nāderī, one of the natural wonders and fortresses of Khurāsān, on the road to Nīsā. The Islamic narratives, betraying a separate source, confirm Ferdowsī’s delimitation of the territorial control of the Kanārangiyān. Who, however, were the Kanārangiyān, and what was their position in Sasanian history? We recall that in a number of significant episodes which we have recounted, they took their place among the important policy makers and military commanders of the realm. It is appropriate, therefore, to suspend temporarily the chronological order of our narrative for an examination of the Kanārangiyān’s history during the Sasanian period.

We have information on the Kanārangiyān family as the rulers in the east going as far back as Yazdgird I’s reign (399–420). As we shall see, the Kanārangiyān were a dynastic family, and there is little doubt that they were from Parthian ancestry. According to the Shāhnāma, the Kanārang was one of the central...
figures to conspire against the tyrannical rule of Yazdgird I the Sinner and to bring about the murder of the king. We recall, that Yazdgird I is said to have been kicked to death by a horse, specifically in Tus. Two aspects of the Kanārangīyan’s power are clearly established from the fourth century onward. Firstly, their office was of such great importance and its occupant so high in the ranks of the Parthian dynastic families, that they were directly involved in the dynastic struggles against the Sasanians from the late fourth century onward. Secondly and related to the first, the office was of such importance that it remained hereditary. Of both of these facts, Procopius informs us directly. After the nobility had put Bilash (484–488) in power and “after the expression of many opinions . . . there came forward a certain man of repute among the Persians, whose name was Gousanastades (Gushnaspādād), and whose office was that of chanaranges . . . His official province lay on the very frontier of the Persian territory, in a district which adjoins the land of the Hephthalites.” The chanaranges was one of the main parties advocating the murder of Qubād, Bilash’s (484–488) rival. Holding up his knife, the chanaranges Gushnaspādād declared to the other factions: “You see this knife, how extremely small it is; nevertheless it is able at present time to accomplish a deed which, be assured, my dear Persians, a little later two myriads of mail clad men could not bring to pass.” However, Gushnaspādād’s opinion was overridden and Qubād was instead imprisoned. Under unclear circumstances, however, the king was able to escape from prison, flee, and take refuge with the Hephthalites. He was then able to return and assume power. On his way back west from the Hephthalites, Qubād had to cross the territory of the chanaranges, Gushnaspādād, in Khurāsān. Here Procopius furnishes us with further significant information about the office of kanārang. Qubād informed his supporters “that he would appoint as chanaranges the first man of the Persians who should on that day come to his presence.” No sooner had he declared his intention, however, Qubād realized the impossibility of bringing it to fruition. For “even as he said this, he repented his speech, for there came to his mind a law of the Persians which ordained that offices among the Persians shall not be conferred upon others than those to whom each particular honour belongs by right of birth.” Qubād’s apprehension was subsequently articulated in no uncertain terms by Procopius. For, the king feared lest “someone should come to him first who was not a kinsman of the present chanaranges, and that he would be compelled to set aside the law in order to keep his word.” As luck would have it, the first man to approach the Sasanian king was none other than Adergoudounbades (Adhargulbād), “a young man

1541See §2.4.1.
1542For the office of kanārang, see for instance Khurshudian 1998, §1.4.
1543For the name, see Khurshudian 1998, p. 74.
1544Procopius 1914, v. 1–7, p. 33.
1545We are trusting Khurshudian’s reconstruction of Procopius’ Adergoudounbades as the equiv-
who was a relative of Gousanastades [Gushnāspdād] and an especially capable warrior.  

Qubād was thus presented with an opportunity, so that after returning to the capital and assuming the throne, Gushnāspdād was put to death and “Adergoudounbades [Ādharulgūbād] was established in his place in the office of chanaranges.”  

Throughout the reign of Qubād (488–531), the Kanārangīyān continued to hold substantial powers. In Qubād’s last war against Byzantium, chanaranges, that is, Ādharulgūbād, was one of the three commanders that led the Persian army into Mesopotamia, the others being, Mermeroæs, our famous Mihrānid Shāpur Rāzī, the supreme commander of the land (īshbāhbad al-bilād), and Aspebedes from the Ispahbūdūn family. In the early years of Khusrow I’s reign, the Kanārangīyān partook in a mutiny mentioned by Procopius but rarely in other sources. “In vexation over Khusrow I’s unruly turn of mind and strange fond[ness] of innovation,” the Persians decided to bring Qubād, a child of Khusrow I’s brother Jāmāsp, to power. Discovering the conspiracy, Khusrow I had the parties involved executed, including his uncle Aspebedes. Here comes the most interesting information, for as Procopius informs us, Khusrow I was “unable to kill [the child Qubād] for he was still being reared under the chanaranges, Adergoudounbades [Ādharulgūbād].” By virtue of their power, therefore, the Kanārangīyān were directly tied to the Sasanian court, in this case by raising a potential rival to the throne. Their agnatic descent must have been of such high pedigree that they could engage in a practice similar to dayēakordi, or foster brother-ship. So Khusrow I sent a “message to the chanaranges, Adergoudounbades [Ādharulgūbād], bidding him to kill the boy himself; for he neither thought it well to show mistrust, nor yet had the power to compel him [i.e., Ādharulgūbād].” In consultation with his wife, however, Ādharulgūbād decided to forego the king’s orders, and hid the child “in the most secure concealment.” He subsequently informed Khusrow I that they had in fact obeyed his orders and murdered the child. The whole affair was kept in such secrecy that no one came to suspect it except Varrames (Bahrām), one of the Sasanians’ trustworthy servants. As the child Qubād became of age, however, Ādharulgūbād bid him to flee and save himself lest his identity become known to Khusrow I. This state of affairs remained hidden from Khusrow I until later when he was invading the land of the Colchis and Bahrām was accompanying him. On this occasion, Bahrām betrayed his father and,
through an elaborate scheme, forced upon the king by his inability to directly harm the Kanārangiyān, Khusrō I finally had Adhargulbād killed.\footnote{The king informed Adhargulbād that he had decided to invade the Byzantine territory on two fronts and that he was giving the kanārang the honor of accompanying him on one of these fronts. Adhargulbād obliged. It was in the course of this affair that the kanārang was put to death by Khusrō I. Procopius 1914, xxi. 15–21, p. 215.} According to Procopius, Adhargulbād was “a man who was in fact as well as in name an invincible general among the Persians, who had marched against twelve nations of barbarians and subjected them all to King Cabades. After Adergoudounbād had been removed from the world, Varrames [Bahrām], his son, received the office of chanaranges.”\footnote{Procopius’ fascinating narrative underscores three important issues. One is the fact that the Kanārangiyān held their exalted position in the east, in Parthava, a region that was the traditional homeland of the Ispahbudhān family, as Sebeos had previously informed us. Secondly, the office of the kanārang was an extremely important office in the Sasanian realm, an office that by law and tradition remained hereditary in the Kanārangiyān family. Finally, while their agnatic family is not specified in Procopius’ nor in any other narrative, the Kanārangiyān are invariably associated with the Parthian Ispahbudhān family. Thus we might conjecture that the Kanārangiyān family was a branch of the Ispahbudhān family. Even Christensen admits that the Kanārangiyān must have belonged to one of the seven great feudal families of the realm. The Kanārangiyān continued to be centrally involved in Sasanian affairs in subsequent decades. In the coalition that had formed to depose Khusrō II,\footnote{Christensen 1944, pp. 107–108, n. 3 and p. 351, n. 2.} when Farrukhzād informed the Armenian dynast Varaztirotʃ that they had decided on Shirūyih Qubād’s kingship, the latter replied that the choice was acceptable not only to his party, but also to the Kanārangiyān family.\footnote{See §2.7.6.} At the battle of Qādisiyah, we recall that a Kanāra commanded the light cavalry of Rustam’s army, together with his son Shahriyar b. Kanāra who fell at that battle.} It is in light of what we know of the exalted position of the Kanārangiyān family in Sasanian history, then, that we should consider Ferdowsi’s narrative of Yazgird III’s correspondence with the Kanārag of Tūs on the eve of the Arab conquest. While the Shāhnama informs us of Yazgird III’s correspondence with the Kanārag on his eastward flight, it remains, however, silent on the family’s response to the last Sasanian king. There is no doubt that we are dealing

\[\text{گرامی بدر کبارگ و هم پیالوی} \]

\[\text{به نزد کبارگ و هم پیالوی} \]

\[\text{ب در کبارگ و هم پیالوی} \]

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\[\text{ب در کبارگ و هم پیالوی} \]
here, yet again, with a case of Parthian editorial rewriting of the X^a daday-Namag tradition. For as the secessionist movement of Vistahm and the mutiny of Farrukhzad were deleted from some recensions of this tradition, so too was the Kanarang’s response to Yazdgird III deleted from the pages of the Shahnama, for reasons that will become clear shortly. For the Kanarangiyân’s reply to Yazdgird III, therefore, we are forced to turn to the accounts of Thaâlibî, a near contemporary of Ferdowsî, whose report at times, as in this instance, differs from that of the Shahnama. According to Thaâlibî, when Yazdgird III reached the environ of Nishapur “he was, on the one hand, fearful of the Arabs, and on the other, apprehensive of the Turks. He did not trust the walls (âisâr) of Nishapur and its fortification (dizh).” In search of a strategically sound refuge, Yazdgird III, who had heard the description of the strength and sturdiness of the fortifications of Tus, “sent someone to acquaint himself with the situation there.” The important information that Thaâlibî’s account provides is that the Kanarang of Tus rejected Yazdgird III’s request for protection: not pleased with the possibility of the king’s arrival, the Kanarang “gave directions to a remote fortress and, together with presents, sent the envoy back.” He asked the messenger to inform Yazdgird III that Tus had “a small fortress that did not meet the needs of [the king] and his entourage.” In this hour of need, therefore, the Kanarang, like Farrukhzad and his army, abandoned and betrayed Yazdgird III.

The contours of the events in Khurasan have now been clarified. Upon the arrival of Yazdgird III in Khurasan, there ensued a crisis: possibly in opposition to Yazdgird III’s policies, the people of Khurasan rebelled and Farrukhzad mutinied. Certainly simultaneously, the Kanarangiyân also refused to lend support to Yazdgird III. Yet there is more to what was transpiring in Khurasan on the eve of the conquest of the region. While extremely partial to Arab affairs—and precisely because of this—the futuh narratives follow the course of events in the region just before the conquest. They invariably begin with the conquest of Tus and Nishapur and highlight the crucial role played by the Kanarangyan. Interestingly enough, while the X^a daday-Namag tradition highlights the

\[1561\text{As we have argued elsewhere, Yazdgird III’s strategic considerations were in fact quite sound. Nishapur was sheltered to its north by a chain of mountains that ran on a northwest–southeastern axis. To its immediate south and southwest, however, the city opened up to the plateau. While the mountains could have provided protection from the Turks, the plain could not offer any protection from the Arabs on his trail. Such was not the case with Tus. Tus was situated in the midst of two mountain chains. It was, so to speak, clasped between them. In the turmoil that had engulfed the Sasanian realm, therefore, and in his flight east, the last Sasanian king Yazdgird III could have had protection from both enemies on either flank were he to position himself in the sturdy fortresses under the control of the Kanarangiyân in Tus. Ferdowsî is explicit about this: “Verily in those high mountains and soaring peaks, from the Turk and Arab there shan’t be injury.” Ferdowsî 1971, vol. IX, p. 345:}

ز تارك و تازر يناداگرند

\[1562\text{Thaâlibî 1900, p. 743.} \]
correspondence of Yazgird III with the Kanārang, the futūḥ narratives underline the complicity of the Kanārangiyān with the Arabs. Almost all of the narratives at our disposal inform us of what is purported to be some form of correspondence between the Kanārang and the Arab conquerors. In the Islamic sources, the Kanārang, as we shall call him henceforth, is variously identified as kanārang, Kanādbak, the ruler (amīr) of Tūs, Kanārī b. ‘Āmir, marzbān, king (malik) of Tūs, or the governor of Khurāsān. His letter, in which he invited the Arabs to conquer the region, according to some was addressed to ‘Uthmān, the third Muslim caliph, or, according to others, to ‘Abdallāh b. ‘Amīr, the Arab general who initially overcame the region.

**Dynastic struggles in Nīshāpur**

The futūḥ narratives on the conquest of Khurāsān make it unclear whether the conquest of Nīshāpur took place peacefully (sulḥan) or through war (anwatan). The theme of sulḥan/anwatan is often, but not always, a reflection of legal discussions in later centuries. In this case, however, the controversy over the nature of the conquest of Khurāsān actually betrays a historical reality: dynastic factionalism on the eve of the Arab conquest of the region. One of the paramount reasons behind the confusion has to do with the fact that not all of the dynastic families with a stake in the region chose to cooperate with the Arabs. Specifically, the control over Nīshāpur was in dispute at this juncture. Mā‘mārī’s narrative underscores this situation. According to the Shāhnāma-i Abū Maḥṣūrī, when “ʿUmar . . . sent ‘Abdallāh b. ‘Amīr to call people to the religion of Muḥammad (Peace be upon Him and his Family), the Kanārang sent his son to Nīshāpur to welcome him; [but] people [who] were in the old fortress did not obey. He [. . .] asked his [i.e., the Kanārang’s son’s] help. He helped so affairs were set in order.” According to the Shāhnāma-i Abū Maḥṣūrī, in exchange for their aid against the “people in the old fortress,” ‘Abdallāh b. ‘Amīr added the governorship over all of Nīshāpur to the jurisdiction of the Kanārangiyān.

1564 Nöldeke 1979, pp. 2156–2157, de Goeje, 2886. See footnote 1596.
1568 Baladhuri 1968, p. 405.
1569 Nīshāpūrī 1965, folio 60–61.
1570 See Robinson 2003 and the sources cited therein.
1571 Then he [. . .] asked for a loan of a thousand dirhams. Then he [. . .] asked for hostages (girowgān); [Kanārang] said that he didn’t have any. So he [. . .] asked for Nīshāpur. He [Kanārang] gave him Nīshāpur. When he [. . .] took the money, he [. . .] gave it [Nīshāpur] back. [. . .] gave him the war (an ḫarb u ṭā dād) and Kanārang fought him(?). And the story remains that Tūs belongs to
Initially, the Kanârang’s control over Nîshâpûr was disputed. At least one segment of Nîshâpûr’s population was fighting against the Arabs and the Kanârangîyan’s complicity with the latter. They, therefore, rebelled. Most sources at our disposal highlight the problematic nature of the Kanârang’s control over Nîshâpûr, for, according to some of these, he promised to aid the Arabs in exchange for being appointed governor of Khurâsân,\(^{1572}\) whereas according to others, it was the governorship of Nîshâpûr that was at stake. According to Yaqûbî, for example, in his letter to ʿAbdallâh b. ʿAmir, the Kanârang proposed: “I will [help] make you the first to reach Khurâsân if you promise the governorship of Nîshâpûr to me.” Having fulfilled his promise, ʿAbdallâh gave the king of Tûs a letter which “to this day is with his offspring.”\(^{1573}\) Now Yaqûbî, who wrote in the last decades of the ninth century, was working at the Tâhirid court in Khurâsân, and probably in Nîshâpûr. He was, in other words, in a position to be well acquainted with the family in the nearby city of Tûs who claimed lineage, two and a half centuries back, to the ruler of Tûs from the Kanârangîyan family. The implications of this extremely significant piece of information, will be discussed elsewhere. For now it should be noted that the rendition of those accounts that refer to the Kanârang as the governor of Khurâsân,\(^{1574}\) should be juxtaposed with those that refer to Farrukhzâd as the spâhbed of Khurâsân.\(^{1575}\)

That on the eve of the conquest, the Kanârang was no longer in complete control of Nîshâpûr is also borne out by a number of other sources, all of which seem to have a native Khurâsânî purview. The Tarîkh-i Nîshâpûr, for example, so-and-so who holds Nîshâpûr as a hostage.” In light of other sources at our disposal (see below), I offered here an alternative reading of the above passage than Minorsky, V., ‘The Older Preface to the Shâhnâmâ’, in Studi orientalistic i in onore de Giorgio Levi Della Vida, pp. 260–273, Rome, 1964 (Minorsky 1964), p. 273. It should be noted that Qazvini’s commentary on this passage agrees with my reading of the text: “[It was] ʿAbdallâh b. ʿAmir who asked kanârang or his son for a thousand dirhams, and gave Nîshâpûr, which ʿAbdallâh had apparently conquered before, … as a hostage to the kanârang, and not the other way around.” See Qazvini 1984, p. 89, n. 5.

\(^{1572}\) According to Baladhurî, for example, in his letters to both ʿAbdallâh b. ʿAmir and Sa’d b. ʿAs b. Umaya, the governor (wâlî) of Kûfû, the Kanârang invited them to conquer Khurâsân provided that whomever succeeded “would give him the governorship of Khurâsân.” Baladhuri 1968, p. 334:

Also see Hamadâni 1885, p. 307.

Also see Hamadâni 1885, p. 307.

\(^{1574}\) “Imâm Ḥâkim … said … that at the time of the rule of ʿAbdallâh b. ʿAmir … in Baṣrah and Sa’d b. ʿAs in Kûfû … the kanârang, who was the governor of Khurâsân and a Magian, wrote a letter to them. He invited them to Khurâsân and [illegible] promised [illegible] and said that the ruthless Yazdgird III has been killed in Marv.” Nîshâpûrî 1965, folio 60–61.

\(^{1575}\) We shall discuss the exact nature of the Kanârang’s relationship with Farrukhzâd further on page 276.
corroborates this information provided by Mâmarî. When ʿAbdallâh b. Āmir and his army reached Nishâpûr, they “came to the middle of the two gates of Jurjân and Fârs. The fractious people of Nishâpûr . . . [however] protested at the environs of the fortress and the ramparts [of the city].” The rebellion led to a stalemate that apparently lasted for nine months, after which peace ensued.1576

This local history provides further, extremely significant, information about the identity of the leader of the rebellion in Nishâpûr. When ʿAbdallâh b. Āmir reached the environs of Nishâpûr, “Barzân Jâh, the rebellious insurgent, who was . . . the governor of the territory,” put up a staunch resistance. Trying to secure himself against the offensive of the Arabs, Barzân Jâh set out for his “base [illegible] to the rampart and the qubandiz” with a group of other people. War ensued, and it was at this point and against Barzân Jâh, that the Kanârang aided the Arab army. Once the insurgents were defeated, the Kanârang came to ʿAbdallâh b. Āmir and accepted the kharâj (tax) of Abarshahr, that is of Nishâpûr and Tûs.1577 We shall postulate here that the name Barzân is in all likelihood a scribal error for Burzân, the famous Mithraic fire in the vicinity of Tûs and Nishâpûr. The term Jâh is less clear. If we may hazard a guess, it could be a corruption of shâh, king, and hence this figure’s name should be reconstructed as Burzân Shâh. According to the local history of Nishâpûr, therefore, Burzân Shâh was a governor of this territory. By juxtaposing the facts that the Kanârang coveted the governorship of Khurâsân and that Burzân Shâh claimed to be the governor of the territory, we can conclude that on the eve of the Arab conquest of the territory, a dynastic struggle was taking place in Khurâsân over the control of the region.

The futûḥ narratives corroborate the information provided by the native Khurâsânî tradition, adding other significant data. According to Aṭham al-Kûfî, the name of the leader of the opposition faction in Nishâpûr was Aswâr and it was against Aswâr’s stalwartness that the Kanârang came to ʿAbdallâh b. Āmir’s aid.1578 Information on the urban topography of Nishâpûr will clarify

1576Nishâpûr 1965, folio 60–61.
1577This was “for 700,000 dirhams, which amount[ed] to 500,000 mithqâls of silver, together with other things.” Nishâpûr 1965, folio 61.
1578“After conquering Fârs] ʿAbdallâh [b. Āmir] set out for Khurâsân. When . . . he reached Nishâpûr, there was a ruler (malik) there called Aswâr [sic]. ʿAbdallâh pillaged the village . . . and started a war with the people of the city. He killed whomever he found. His affair with the people of Nishâpûr took up a long time. Meanwhile Kanâdîbak [i.e., the Kanârang], who was the ruler (amîr) of Tûs, wrote a letter to ʿAbdallâh and asked for safe-conduct from him, provided that if he granted him amnesty he would come to his service and aid him in conquering Nishâpûr. ʿAbdallâh agreed and gave him safe conduct. Kanâdîbak came to ʿAbdallâh with a well-equipped army. ʿAbdallâh treated him kindly and gave him and the elite of his army robes of honor. He [then] set out for war with Nishâpûr and fought valiantly. The two sides fought heavily. ʿAbdallâh promised that he would not leave Nishâpûr until he had either conquered the city or had died in the process. When Aswâr heard of ʿAbdallâh’s pledge, he sent an envoy to the latter and asked for safe conduct, provided that if ʿAbdallâh granted him amnesty, he would open all the gates of the city for . . . [the Arab army to enter]. He [ʿAbdallâh] agreed and pardoned him [Aswâr]. The two sides then made up the stipulations of the agreement. The next day at sun-rise Aswâr opened the gate of the city.
the identity of these rebellious leaders, Burzín Shāh and Aswār, who on the eve of the conquest of Khurāsān contested the governorship of Khurāsān with the Kanārangīyān family.

We recall that according to Nīshāpūrī, the armies of ‘Abdallāh b. Āmir encountered the “fractious people of Nīshāpūr” near the two gates of Gurgān and Fārs.1579 Now, Maqdisī, enumerating the gates of Nīshāpūr, mentions the gate of Aswār Kārīn next to the gate of Fārs.1580 He also mentions, enumerating this time the qaṇāts (underground channels) of Khurāsān, a certain Sawār Kārīz.1581 Instead of the reading kārīz, translated as qaṇāt, de Goeje proposes the reading kārīn.1582 There existed in Maqdisī’s time, in other words, a gate, and possibly a qaṇāt, called Sawār or Aswār. Now aswār could be in fact an Arabic plural for the Persian word sawār (cavalry). The more common Arabic plural, however, is aswāira.1583 The gate or qaṇāt of Aswār or Sawār, therefore, was in all probability simply the gate or qaṇāt next to which a section of the army was settled in Nīshāpūr. There is, however, an added significance to this information. For the gate of Aswār was not simply named after any member of the aswāira, but after a Kārīn. We also recall that a second reading by de Goeje gives the name of a qaṇāt as Sawār Kārīn. We have by now become quite familiar with the Parthian dynastic families of Khurāsān and Ṭabaristān, among whom the Kārīn.1584 Barzān Jāh (Burzīn Shāh) of our previous narrative, therefore, was in all probability a descendant of the Kārīnid Sukhrā. It is apt to briefly recapitulate the history of the Kārins in Khurāsān, for it becomes extremely pertinent to what was transpiring in this region on the eve of the conquest.

We recall that Khusrow I had regretted his father’s treatment of the Kārins and installed them as spāḥbeds over Khurāsān and Ṭabaristān (kūst-i khwarāsān), the domains traditionally belonging to the Ispahbudhān family.1585 The Kārins, who retained their spāḥbedī of Khurāsān during Hormozd IV’s reign, were demoted after Bahrām-i Chūbīn’s rebellion by Khusrow II, who appointed in

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1579 Nīshāpūrī 1965, folio 60–61.
1581 Maqdisī 1877, p. 329.
1582 Maqdisī 1877, p. 329.
1583 Aswāira is “the plural of the Pahlavi [word] asvārān or asvāraghān.” Christensen 1944, p. 265. Aswāira also denotes one of the titles of the officers of the army. In hierarchical order Yaqūbī cites: spāḥbed (the governor), fāḍīshān (pādīshān), marzbān, shahrib (shahrig, shahrib, ruler of a canton), and finally the aswāira. Yaqūbī 1969, vol. 1, p. 203, Yaqūbī 1983, pp. 202–203. For the aswāira, see also Zakeri 1995.
1584 See §2.5.6. For Ṭabaristān, this will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4, especially §4.2.
1585 See §2.5.6.
their stead the Ispahbudhān Vistāhm as the spābed of the kūst-i khwārasān.\textsuperscript{1586} As we shall see the, Tārikh-i Ṭabaristan confirms the decline of the Kārīn’s power in Khurāsān and Ṭabaristan during this period.\textsuperscript{1587} This was followed by the revolt of Vistāhm through which the Ispahbudhān family was able to reestablish their authority not only over their traditional homelands, the land of Parthava, but also over Ṭabaristan—their domains probably covering at this point not only the said regions, but also Azarbāyjān—for a period of close to a decade.\textsuperscript{1588} The secessionist movement of the Ispahbudhān, however, was ended by the Armenian dynast, Smbat Bagratuni, who was delegated with this task by Khusrow II.\textsuperscript{1589} After Smbat’s tenure in Khurāsān,\textsuperscript{1590} the situation in the region became, once again, very unsettled. In this post-Bagratuni situation, Farrukh Hormozd and his sons, Rustam and Farrukhzād, were able to reestablish their control in their dynastic homeland of Khurāsān, while maintaining control over Azarbāyjān, which situation explains the confusion of the sources in referring alternatively to Farrukhzād and Rustam as the spābeds of Azarbāyjān or Khurāsān.\textsuperscript{1591} The Kārīns, meanwhile, must have taken advantage of this post-Bagratuni situation to reclaim some territory and authority in Khurāsān. This, then, was the Kārīn’s position on the eve of the Arab conquest of Khurāsān. They were bent on preserving their authority in Khurāsān, and Ṭabaristan, even more so since, through the machinations of Dīnār in the wake of the defeat at the battle of Nihāvand, they had lost their control over Nihāvand.\textsuperscript{1592}

In view of Farrukhzād’s mutiny, the complicity of the Ispahbudhān and Kanārangiyān with the Arabs, and their own defeat at the battle of Nihāvand, the Kārīns’ antagonism toward the foreign invaders must have been great. In fact, during the conquest period and for centuries afterwards, the Kārīns maintained a strong anti-Arab stance.\textsuperscript{1593} What transpired in Khurāsān on the eve of the conquests, in other words, was analogous to what transpired in Rayy and its adjacent territories, and somewhat similar to what transpired in Azarbāyjān, as we shall see: one Parthian dynastic family threw in its lot with the conquering Arab armies, in opposition to an age-old Parthian rival in the region.\textsuperscript{1594} With the Sasanians out of the picture, there remained the inter-Parthian rivalry. Like the Sasanians before them, the Arabs were quick to turn this situation to their own advantage. It is in this context, therefore, that the complicity of the Kanārang with the Arabs against the Kārīns in Khurāsān, and that of Farrukhzād against the Mihrāns of Rayy and Ṭabaristan, makes sense. Without a doubt,

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{1586}See page 107ff.
\textsuperscript{1587}See §4.2.
\textsuperscript{1588}See §2.7.1.
\textsuperscript{1589}See §2.7.2.
\textsuperscript{1590}See page 138ff.
\textsuperscript{1591}See our discussion on page 188ff.
\textsuperscript{1592}See page 241ff.
\textsuperscript{1593}One example is the revolt of the Kārinid Sunbād during the early ‘Abbāsid period, which we will discuss in §6.4 below.
\textsuperscript{1594}See §3.4.8 below.
\end{footnotesize}
the fractive people of Nishapûr under the leadership of Burzìn Shâh or Aswâr were none other than the Kârins taking a vigorous stand against the incoming foreign power in order to protect their interests in the region.\(^{1595}\) The spâbed seals which we have now discovered testify to the Kârins’ substantial control and presence in the region. How extensive, however, was the control of the Kanârangiyân over Khurâsân at this tumultuous juncture of the region’s history? Or, turning the question around, how much territory were the Kârins and the Kanârangiyân competing for?

Most of our sources agree that the Kanârang was in control of Tûs and parts of Nishâpûr, but that his dominion stopped somewhere to the east of Nishâpûr. In none of the sources is there any suggestion of the involvement of the Kanârangiyân in the occupation of other major cities in Khurâsân. Whether conquered by peace (sulhan), or through war (anwatan), every other city to the west of the Oxus, came to terms with the Arabs independently. Only Tûs and the rest of Abarshahr remained under the control of the Kanârang. This information is confirmed by Tabâri, who gives us the precise delimitation of the territory under the control of the Kanârangiyân. “[When ʿ Abdallâh b. ʿ Amir … reached in front of the city [Nishâpûr] … he conquered half of it with war. The other half was under the control of a kanâr, together with one half of Nisâ and Tûs.”\(^{1596}\) These then were the limits of the jurisdiction of the Kanârangiyân family over Khurâsân on the eve of the conquest. What of the relationship between the Kanârangiyân and Farrukh Hormozd and his sons, Rustam and Farrukhzhâd, however? Isfâzârî provides us with an answer.

The Ispâbudhân and the Kanârangiyân

According to Isfâzârî, when the Kanârang made peace for Tûs and Nishâpûr with ʿ Abdallâh b. ʿ Amir, he informed the latter that among “all of the Pârsîs, after the house of Kisrâ and Yazdgird III, there was no one [with the same status] as me (dar jumlíh-i Pârsîyân ba’d az ahl-i bayt-i Kisrâ va Yazdîrîd mânand-i man hích kas níst).” The veracity of his claim, as well as the affinity of his house and his policies with the family of Farrukhzhâd, comes across in the rest of the narrative. While the Parthian Kanârang was highlighting his illustrious pedigree for ʿ Abdallâh b. ʿ Amir, “Farrukhzhâd, who was the minister of Yazdgird III … reached there. Kanâz went to welcome Farrukhzhâd. When he saw Farrukhzhâd, he threw himself unto the ground from his horse and proceeded in front of the [latter’s] stirrup until [the reached] ʿ Abdallâh b. ʿ Amir.” Witnessing the Kanârang’s expressions of reverence in front of Farrukhzhâd, ʿ Abdallâh was

\(^{1595}\) Although Barzân Jâh (Burzín Shâh) and Aswâr were probably both Kârin dynasts, we can at present not ascertain whether they are in fact one and the same person.  

\(^{1596}\) Tabâri’s narrative, incidentally, confirms our reading of Ma’mâri’s text (see footnote 1571). For according to Tabâri, when ʿ Abdallâh b. ʿ Amir “made peace with the kanâr … [the latter] gave him his son, Abû Sîlt b. Kanârî, and the son of his brother Salîm as hostages … Ibn ʿ Amir took the two sons of the Kanârî and gave them to Nu’mân b. Afghâm Nâshîr,” who freed them, the implicit assumption here being that these two figures of the family, at least, converted and were manumitted. Nöldeke 1979, pp. 2156–2157, de Goeje, 2886.
Chapter 3: Arab Conquest §3.4: Yazdgird III

perplexed: “Have you not said that among all of the Persians there is none such as I,” he asked. The Kanārang clarified: This indeed was the case, but it applied to all other noble dynasts besides “Farrukhzād, whose status was higher and whose lineage more ancient than mine.” On the eve of the Arab conquests, the Kanārang and Farrukhzād were in fact coordinating their policies. When Farrukhzād mutinied and left Yazdgird III to his follies with Māhūy and the Turks in the east, he headed back west. His route to Rayy naturally took him through Khurāsān and through the center of the Kanārangiyān’s abode in Tūs.

It is quite probable even that the two agnatic dynasties had gentilitial affiliation. For a number of centuries, the Kanārangiyān had maintained a lofty position in Khurāsān, after all. The Ispahbudhān traced their heritage to this same region, and for a long period, as the spāhbeds of the kūst-i khwarāsān, they were the Kanārangiyāns’ overlords. And more often than not, their policies against or on behalf of the Sasanian kings, coincided. Like the Ispahbudhān, the Kanārangiyān had sued for peace, because the Arabs assured them that they only meant to go beyond their territories, to those region wherein resided different peoples: “they [i.e., the Arabs] . . . were not coveting the crowns (deyhīms) of Parthian kings.” Their intent was what they had promised Rustam: to go to the lands beyond Iran, where they could find the sources of the trade.

The Kārinsid Insurrection

The peace agreements of the Ispahbudhān and the Kanārangiyān with the Arab armies did not sit well with the Kārins. Not only did the Kārins make a staunch stand against the encroaching Arabs—a defensive posture that called for the collaboration of the Kanārangiyān with the Arabs—but there is ample evidence that the dynastic struggle between the two Parthian families continued long after the Arab conquest of their territories. There is no doubt either that the defeat of the Kārins in the course of the conquest of Khurāsān, did not lead to their acquiescence to the nominal lordship of the Arabs over their territories. For as Khalīfat b. Khayyāt informs us, shortly after the conquest of Tūs and Nishāpur by the Arab armies, the Kārins revolted sometime in 33 AH/654 CE. It is said—perhaps with some exaggeration—that a force of 40,000 gathered around them. Significantly, the Kārins led this revolt in Bādghis and Herāt. We recall the tradition contained in the Tārikh-i Šabristān that Khusrow I had given parts of Zābulistān to Zarmīhr, the eldest of the nine sons of the Kārinsid Sukhrā. The connection of the Kārins to Zābulistān is also maintained in other traditions, except that the son is called Dādbūrzīn and the king Bahrām

1598 This we cannot establish in reference to concrete information.
1600 Ibn Isfandīyār 1941, p. 151. See §2.5.6.
V Gür.1601 While the precise details of the Kārins’ association with Zābulistān subsequent to Khusrow I’s reforms must be subjected to further investigation, there is no doubt that shortly after the Arab conquest of Khurāsān, a Kārinid revolt did in fact transpire in the east. The Kārins’ rebellion was put down, and the Parthian dynasts were defeated by the Arab forces led by ʿAbdallāh b. Khāzim Sulāmī. Kārin himself was ostensibly killed.1602 This, however, is not the last we will hear of the Kārins, nor of their rivalry with the Ispahbudhān.1603 One thing is certain: the Arab conquest of Khurāsān further weakened the Parthian Kārin family.

3.4.8 The conquest of Azarbāyjān

To conclude our chapter on the Arab conquests, we must briefly discuss the events transpiring in Azarbāyjān. Before we proceed, we must recall that Azarbāyjān had also come under the control of the Ispahbudhān: both Farrukh Hormozd and Rustam, for example, are called the governors of the region in our sources. When Bukayr b. ʿAbdallāh set out toward Azarbāyjān, therefore, one of the first kings (mulāk) of the region to come forward to him was the Ispahbudhān Isfandiyār, who had participated in the battle of Wāj Rūdh and, after being defeated, had fled.1604 When Isfandiyār fell captive to Bukayr, he asked the latter: “which would you rather have, to conquer the region through war or through peace?” He then suggested that if Bukayr intended to conquer the territory through peace, his only option would be keeping him, Isfandiyār, alive, for “if you [were to] kill me all of Azarbāyjān [will] rise in avenging my blood, and will wage war against you.”1605 He further pointed out that if Bukayr intended to “make no peace treaty involving the people of Azerbaijan, nor join [them], they . . . will disperse into the surrounding Caucasus mountains and those of Asia Minor . . . Those who can fortify themselves [there] will [then] do so for some time.”1606 Having considered the situation, Bukayr subsequently followed Isfandiyār’s advice and made peace with the latter for all those regions in Azarbāyjān over which he had control. Ṭabarī calls Isfandiyār the son of al-Farrukhzār, that is to say, Farrukhzād.1607 This, too, explains his presence at the battle of Wāj Rūdh alongside Zinābī Abū ʿl-Farrukhān, that is to say, his father.1608

1601Ferdowsī 1971, vol. VII, p. 387, Ferdowsī 1935, p. 2196. This, probably, is yet another instance of the use of the Ctesian method in Ferdowsī’s sources, in this case, probably through Kārinid patronage.
1603See §4.2.
1604See page 248ff.
1605Balʿamī 1959, p. 335.
1606Ṭabarī 1994, p. 32, de Goeje, 2660.
1607Sayf calls him the brother of Rustam, in all probability another confusion replete in the sources. For, as we have seen, the two most important sons of Farrukh Hormozd of whom we are aware were Rustam and Farrukhzād. Whether Isfandiyār was a son of Farrukhzād or his brother, however, does not make any difference to the germ of our discussion, for he was in any case an Ispahbudhān. Ṭabarī 1994, p. 21, n. 115.
1608See page 248ff.
According to our sources, Farrukhzád had another son, called Bahram b. Farrukhzád. In the course of the conquest of Azarbāyjān, however, this Bahram chose not to submit to the Arab forces. Isfandiyār remarked to Bukayr, therefore, that for the conquest of Azarbāyjān to be complete, “all that . . . remained . . . was this one war.” This kind of intra-familial Parthian rivalry, we recall, was not uncommon in Sasanian history. Bahram then engaged the army of Utbah b. Farqad, but was defeated and was forced to flee. At the flight of his brother Bahram, Isfandiyār then exclaimed to Bukayr that “peace . . . [was now] complete and war ha[d] been brought to an end.” As Tābarī notes, however, “peace was only complete[d] after Utbah b. Farqad’s defeat of Bahram.” In the peace treaty that was subsequently drawn after the conquest of Azarbāyjān, there was no mention of a ruler of Azarbāyjān. It was addressed to “the people of Azerbaijan, mountains, and plains, borders and frontiers, all people of whatever religion.” Once again, the date given for this document, 18 AH/639–640 CE, is improbable in view of the progress of the conquest elsewhere on the plateau.

Shahrvarāz, the ruler of Darband

Having conquered all of Azarbāyjān, the Arab army then proceeded to the frontier regions of Darband, where for more than a century the Sasanians and the Byzantines had, on and off, cooperated against their mutual enemy the Khazars. In Bāb al-Abwāb (Darband), we are told, there was a king (malik) called Shahrīr or, in Balʿami’s narrative, Shahrīrāz. Tābarī calls him Shahrvarāz and confirms that he was “a Persian who was in control of this frontier area [i.e., Darband] and whose origins were from the family of Shahrbarāz, the ruler who had routed the Israelites and driven them out of al-Shām.” Shahrvarāz (Shahrīrāz), therefore, was a member of the Mihrān family. The treaty that Shahrvarāz drew up with the Arabs, according to Balʿami, was one that would thenceforth form the sunna (precedent) for the two frontier regions, Caucasia and Transoxiana. In their treaty with Shahrvarāz, the Arabs promised that they would have no armies stationed in the territories under his control and even pledged not to impose any jizya or kharāj. In exchange Shahrvarāz promised

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1609Smith states that he is an “unidentified Azerbaijani ruler.” Tābarī 1994, p. 32, n. 171.
1610In Tābarī’s narrative the name of Isfandiyār is first given as Jarmiḏhih b. al-Farrukhzād. Tābarī 1994, p. 31, de Goeje, 2660.
1611Tābarī 1994, p. 33, de Goeje, 2661.
1612Tābarī 1994, p. 33, de Goeje, 2662.
1613Tābarī 1994, p. 33, de Goeje, 2662. My emphasis. The document also guaranteed that those recruited for military service by the Arabs were “in any one year . . . exempt [from paying] the tribute of that year (wa-man hīshira min-hum fi sanatin).” Smith notes that this might “also be rendered as ‘those who suffer distress’; that is, drought, crop failure, etc.” Tābarī 1994, p. 33, n. 172.
1614Tābarī 1994, p. 34, de Goeje, 2662.
1615It must be noted that, the Khazars seem to have been also used as mercenaries by both sides. For a brief history of this region, see footnote 1725 below.
1616Balʿami 1959, p. 337.
to keep two enemies away from the Arabs: the Khazars and the Rûs. For, as he argued for Surâqah b. ‘Abdalrahmân, these two were “the enemies of the whole world, especially the Arabs.”

Ṭabarî gives us further insight about the peace arrangements between Shahrvaráz and the Arabs. Seeking safe conduct from the Arabs, Shahrvaráz informed them that he was “facing a rabid enemy and different communities who [were] not of noble descent.” He then advised the Arabs that it was not “fitting for noble and intelligent people to assist such people or to ask their help against those of noble descent and origins . . . [and that] noblemen [had to stick] close to noblemen, wherever they are . . . [and that his] inclinations [were] the same [as theirs].” He further explained to them that he was “not a Caucasian nor an Armenian, . . . [but the Arabs had] conquered [his] . . . land . . . [and his] community.” Shahrvaráz then negotiated with the Arabs: “Our tribute to you will be the military assistance we render you and our carrying out whatever you desire.” He, in turn, asked them that they should not “humiliate [them] . . . with tribute.” Ṭabarî then explains that as a result of the precedence set by the Arab treaty with Shahrvaráz and his followers, “it became a practice for those polytheists who made war on the enemy . . . to pay no tribute other than to be ready to fight and were thus exempt from tribute . . . of that particular year.”

The peace document that was subsequently drawn was addressed, significantly, to Shahrvaráz, “the inhabitants of Armenia, and the Armenians [in Darband], . . . [and also to] those coming from distant parts and those who are local and those around them who have joined them.” Ṭabarî then proceeds to enumerate in detail the tremendous wealth, in precious stones, of the region around Darband through the story of the ruby.

Significantly, in 653 CE, that is, shortly after Farrukhzâd’s complicity with the Arabs, a section of the Armenian nobility who had severed their allegiance from the Byzantines as well as from Farrukhzâd, also “submitted to the king of Ishmael. T’ēodoros . . . with all the Armenian princes made a pact with death.” And thus, at the expense of the Sasanians, one after another, the Parthian dynastic families of the kūst-i khwarasân and kūst-i ādurbādagān made peace with the conquering Arab armies. The Kanārangyiān, the Ispahbudhān,
a son of Farrukhzād in Azarbāyjān, and finally some of the Armenian princes, each made a pact with the enemy. Their motive: retaining de facto control over their territories. The Mihrāns and the Kārins were on the losing end of these deals made by their Parthian brethren. The saga of the Parthian dynastic families of the kūst-i khwarāsān and kūst-i ādurbādāgan will not be complete, however, until we examine their continued presence in Ṭabaristān in the subsequent centuries. To this, then, we must turn our attention in the next chapter.\footnote{Lack of space and time has forced us to defer a more detailed study of Azarbāyjān and Khurāsān to a future work.}

\section*{3.5 Epilogue: repercussions for early Islamic history}

Our investigation in this chapter of the early Arab conquest of Iran has been methodologically heretical, to say the least. In order to undertake it, we have totally disregarded its hijra dating. We had a perfectly justifiably reason for doing so: the futūḥ and “the history of Iran at the time of the first Islamic conquests” were primary themes of early Islamic tradition,\footnote{Noth 1994, p. 39.} whereas the hijra, annalistic, and caliphal chronological schemes of the early Arabic historical tradition were secondary themes.\footnote{See footnote 903.} These hijra, annalistic, and caliphal motifs for structuring the narratives of early Islamic history were superimposed post facto onto the accounts of the futūḥ narrative, hence the “sharp and irresolvable contradictions [which] prevail on not only the dating, but . . . [also] the order, of even the most central events in the history of the expansion of Islam.”\footnote{Noth 1994, p. 41. Hence also the conclusions reached by one of the foremost authorities on the topic who claimed that it “is virtually impossible to accept one sequential or chronological arrangement and to reject another except on grounds that are essentially arbitrary.” Donner 1981, p. 128.}

Uncritically accepting these secondary themes through which the futūḥ narratives have been structured, has thus far seriously obstructed scholarly efforts at reaching a satisfactory chronology for the early Arab conquest of the Middle East.\footnote{Our point of reference here is primarily the chronology of the futūḥ narratives, for as we know many other aspects of early Islamic history have come under serious critical scrutiny.} When faced with Sayf’s improbable chronology, scholarship regularly accused him of appalling anachronisms, but never attempted to solve the quandary posed by these anachronisms.\footnote{See Tābarī 1993, p. 11, nn. 73 and 74; p. 15, n. 97, among others.} Neither was there success in establishing a logical chronological relationship between the conquest of Iraq and Syria.\footnote{The problematic episode of Khālid b. Walīd’s desert march is only the most flagrant of these problems. Donner 1981, pp. 119–129, especially p. 120 and p. 311, n. 157; Crone 1991a. Sayf has also been accused of having pushed the conquest of Syria two years earlier to the year 13 of hijra (634). In fact, it might be that our newly proposed chronology of the conquest of Iraq will finally make sense of the utter confusion regarding the conquest of Syria.} The adoption of the conventional chronology, even after exhausting

\footnote{1623}{Lack of space and time has forced us to defer a more detailed study of Azarbāyjān and Khurāsān to a future work.}
\footnote{1624}{Noth 1994, p. 39.}
\footnote{1625}{See footnote 903.}
\footnote{1626}{Noth 1994, p. 41. Hence also the conclusions reached by one of the foremost authorities on the topic who claimed that it “is virtually impossible to accept one sequential or chronological arrangement and to reject another except on grounds that are essentially arbitrary.” Donner 1981, p. 128.}
\footnote{1627}{Our point of reference here is primarily the chronology of the futūḥ narratives, for as we know many other aspects of early Islamic history have come under serious critical scrutiny.}
\footnote{1628}{See Tābarī 1993, p. 11, nn. 73 and 74; p. 15, n. 97, among others.}
\footnote{1629}{The problematic episode of Khālid b. Walīd’s desert march is only the most flagrant of these problems. Donner 1981, pp. 119–129, especially p. 120 and p. 311, n. 157; Crone 1991a. Sayf has also been accused of having pushed the conquest of Syria two years earlier to the year 13 of hijra (634). In fact, it might be that our newly proposed chronology of the conquest of Iraq will finally make sense of the utter confusion regarding the conquest of Syria.}
all other foreign traditions at our disposal, therefore, had led to a stalemate in the field.\footnote{As Noth put it: “Such keen-witted sleuths as de Goeje, Wellhausen, Mednikov, and Caetani were thus unable to resolve this confusion completely, especially since the non-Arabic sources (Greek, Syriac, Armenian, Coptic) can provide further help only at a few points, and are in any case demonstrably dependent upon the emergent Arab-Islamic historical tradition for some of their information.” Noth 1994, p. 42.}

The failure in disentangling the puzzles surrounding the Arab conquest of Iran from the disjointed information provided by the futūḥ and other sources, however, was hitherto precipitated by the obdurate refusal to integrate the Sasanian dimension of this history into the picture. As our investigations in this chapter demonstrate, the information provided by Sayf on the conditions prevailing in Iran during this period are, in fact, so detailed that it is incredible that scholarship has dismissed them for as long as it did—all the more remarkable, given the paucity of our information for this crucial period of history. Here we hope to have finally proven that “a great many of the Persian traditions have [such] thoroughly individual traits . . . [that they] cannot be explained away as constructions out of Islamic futūḥ.”\footnote{Noth 1994, p. 39.}

We also hope to have shown that the majority of traditions concerning the early Arab conquest of Iraq, especially as they are found in the rich accounts of Sayf b. ʿUmar, were probably initially dated relative to the events that were transpiring in Iran during the period 628–632 CE.

Proceeding from a heretical methodology, however, has led us not only to equally heretical conclusions, but also to potentially startling implications. As the reader will have noticed, our reconstruction of the chronology of the early conquest of Iraq to the period 628–632 CE, based predominantly on Sasanian chronological indicators and numismatic evidence,\footnote{See our methodological procedures elaborated in §3.1.2.} will pose an altogether different set of even more serious chronological quandaries. If this reconstruction is valid, it will in fact have revolutionary implications for our understanding of early Islamic history. Once we accept the remarkable synchrony of the accounts of the early conquest of Iraq with the events that transpired in Iran during the period of 628–632,\footnote{See Table 6.1 on page 468.} our conventional chronological reckoning of dating the Arab conquests to the caliphate of Abū Bakr (12–13 AH/633–634 CE) has to be revised. Once we accept this revision, however, we are confronted with a new quandary: If the early conquest of Iraq did, in fact, take place in the years 7–11 AH/628–632 CE, how will this affect our conventional understanding of early Islamic history? What of the death of the Prophet in 11 AH/632 CE? If the Prophet was alive during the the Arab conquest of Iraq, what of his whereabouts? What was his role in this crucial juncture of history? What of the wars of apostacy (ridda), which are presumed to have taken place after the death of the Prophet, but before any major conquest? If Muḥammad was alive, what was his relationship to Abū Bakr and ʿUmar?

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{1630}}As Noth put it: “Such keen-witted sleuths as de Goeje, Wellhausen, Mednikov, and Caetani were thus unable to resolve this confusion completely, especially since the non-Arabic sources (Greek, Syriac, Armenian, Coptic) can provide further help only at a few points, and are in any case demonstrably dependent upon the emergent Arab-Islamic historical tradition for some of their information.” Noth 1994, p. 42.
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{1631}}Noth 1994, p. 39.
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{1632}}See our methodological procedures elaborated in §3.1.2.
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{1633}}See Table 6.1 on page 468.
It is the nature of scholarship that answering one set of questions often raises new, and perhaps even harder, ones. In our case, these new questions about early Islamic history are of such fundamental importance that satisfactorily answering these will require substantial further research, a feat beyond the scope of present study.\textsuperscript{1634} What we shall confine ourselves to in this epilogue, therefore, is simply to suggest one possible answer to these new complex sets of queries, in the hope that it will pave the way for further research.

We will proceed from the chronology of the early conquest of Iraq as established in this chapter.\textsuperscript{1635} We have established a new \textit{terminus ante quem} for the early Arab conquest of Iraq, which started with the battle of Ubullah (traditionally dated to 12 AH): this battle took place sometime around Shirūyih Qubād’s death and Ardashīr III’s ascension in September 628 CE.\textsuperscript{1636} The early conquest of Iraq, therefore, started sometime in the year 7 AH. We have also established that the the battle of Bridge, dated by Sayf to 13 AH, took place at the end of Būrāndukht’s second regency, just before Yazdgird III’s promotion to kingship in June 632 CE, when factionalism between the Pahlav and the Pārsīg prevented the Iranians from following up on their victories.\textsuperscript{1637} In the \textit{hijra} calendar, this corresponds to the year 11 AH. Based on these two chronological indicators, the early Arab conquest of Iraq \textit{spread over a period of almost four years}, from circa September 628 to June 632 CE. The \textit{futūḥ narratives} telescope these events into the two years 12–13 AH/633–634 CE., during the caliphate of Abū Bakr. This is the most basic observation that we can make on the basis of our analysis. This very basic observation, however, will have potentially revolutionary implications for early Islamic history.\textsuperscript{1638}

\textit{Abū Bakr’s caliphate}

At a minimum, the implication of this is that Abū Bakr could not have been the caliph for part of these four years in which the early conquests of Iraq took place.\textsuperscript{1639} The contention that Abū Bakr was not functioning as caliph, that is, as the \textit{successor to Muḥammad} during part of this period, however, in turn

\textsuperscript{1634}Primarily due to time-pressure, the author was forced to put a stop to her enquiry.
\textsuperscript{1635}See §3.3.2, and Table 6.1.
\textsuperscript{1636}See page 190ff.
\textsuperscript{1637}See §3.3.5, especially 218ff.
\textsuperscript{1638}Simply manipulating the date of the \textit{hijra} will not resolve this blatant chronological problem, for four years can never be squeezed into the span of two years, be they lunar or solar!
\textsuperscript{1639}Of course, conventional Islamic historiography puts his entire caliphate right after this period. However, we might have to reckon with Ḥamza Iṣfahānī’s contention that Būrāndukht’s regency “took place toward the end of the caliphate of Abū Bakr . . . [when] three months [remained from the caliphate of] Abū Bakr.” Ḥamza Iṣfahānī 1961, p. 97, Ḥamza Iṣfahānī 1988, p. 115. How helpful this piece of information is remains to be seen, for it is not clear to which part of Būrāndukht’s regency Ḥamza Iṣfahānī is referring. Based on numismatic evidence and our own reconstruction of her reign (see §3.3.4, especially page 208ff), the duration of her combined regencies is 630–632 CE. An additional problem raised by Ḥamza Iṣfahānī’s remark is that the Prophet would have already been dead for two years, because the office of caliph was installed only after his death, conventionally dated to 11 AH/632 CE.
§3.5: Epilogue

Chapter 3: Arab Conquest

raises the question of whether or not the Prophet was already dead when the early conquest of Iraq began.\footnote{Here we might have to reckon with Theophanes’ contention that Muhammad died in the year 629/630 CE. Theophanes 1997, pp. 463–464.} If the Prophet was indeed alive during at least part of the early conquest of Iraq, however, as the conventional date of 632 for his death would suggest, then what explains his absence from all of the futūh narratives? As the majority of the topoi in early Islamic narratives were Islamic topoi, which were added to the tradition post facto,\footnote{Noth 1968.} as indeed was also the case with the secondary theme of hijra, annalistic, and caliphal arrangement of the tradition, are we then to suppose that the early or later narrators or redactors of the tradition systematically deleted his name from the accounts of the futūh narratives?\footnote{I am hesitant to accuse them of deliberate forgery, for this in turn brings up the issue of their intent.} Or, alternatively, was he not significant enough to be included in these? The precise role of Abū Bakr in these wars, the duration of his caliphate, and his relationship to the Prophet would then remain thorny questions for future enquiry.\footnote{Here, for example, we will have to reckon with Dinawari’s contention that the deposition of Khusrow II Parviz and the accession of Shiruyih Qubād to the throne took place in the year 9 AH (instead of 7 AH/628 CE), and the Prophet died in the same year that Shiruyih Qubād ascended the throne and Abū Bakr became caliph. Dinawari 1960, p. 107, Dinawari 1967, p. 116 and p. 120, respectively. This chronology leaves the Prophet alive during the years 7–9 AH, the first two years of the conquest as we have reconstructed them. Dinawari’s subsequent assertion that Shahrvarz’s usurpation of power (Muharram 9 AH/April 630 CE) took place in the year 12 AH, then clearly involves hijra acrobatics. Dinawari 1960, p. 111, Dinawari 1967, p. 121.}

The nature of ridda

If the Prophet was alive during the early conquest of Iraq, moreover, how are we to perceive the nature of the ridda\footnote{See footnote 900.} as wars of apostasy. Since the early conquest of Iraq occurred in the period 628–632 CE while the Prophet was presumably alive, and for at least two years of which Abū Bakr was not caliph, then the ridda wars will acquire a very different meaning indeed. For, in this case, these wars would have taken place, not as the tradition would have us believe, after the death of the Prophet, as wars of apostasy, but during the lifetime of the Prophet. This would probably mean in turn that, contrary to what the tradition would have us believe, ridda had very little Islamic purport, a view articulated by Ferdowsi in his epic. Were the ridda a series of wars which were Islamicized postfacto, when the early traditionalist superimposed a hijra and a caliphal dating on these? In this scenario, the ridda might still retain their significance as primary theme, but their nature as wars of apostasy would no longer be valid. This, then, would give an added and crucial significance to Lecker’s contention that “in many cases the ridda is a misnomer ... [for] numerous tribes and communities had had no contact whatsoever with the Muslim state [to begin with] or had no formal agreements with it ...[other tribes] were [simply]
following chieftains who posed as prophets,” while still other tribes, previously under the domination of Medina, merely refused to pay the taxation, “while stating their readiness to continue practicing Islam.” So one possible scenario that we shall put on the table in light of our analysis is that Muhammad was alive during the early conquest of Iraq; Abū Bakr was not yet caliph, but simply a general who was leading the Arab armies; and the intention of the Arabs in launching their conquest was mostly not some ghāzī predisposition through which they sought to spread their creed, but simply the recognition that with the Sasanians and the Byzantines exhausted through three decades of warfare, with the Pārsīg–Pahlav factional strife debilitating the Sasanians, and with the confusing movement and dislocation of troops all over the region, the time was ripe to pursue their goal of gaining access to trade entrepôts and the riches afforded by these.

Many more unsettling questions about early Islamic history might proceed from our analysis. In fact, we may have thoroughly misplaced our emphasis by articulating the few that we did. We also may have opened, inadvertently, Pandora’s box by our analysis. One observation we can make with comfortable certainty: by the time our thesis is either accepted or rejected through future analysis, the field will have come out of its stasis and, hopefully, be willing, once again, to tackle the chronology of the early Arab conquest of Iran and the Middle East.

1646 See our discussion on page 226ff.
DYNASTIC POLITICS OF TABARISTĀN

The general trajectory of events in Tabaristān can be integrated into the course of Sasanian history from the reigns of Pirūz (459–484) and Qubād (488–531) onward. We must follow these to the extent that we can reconstruct them, for they set the stage for events that transpire in the region from the onset of the Arab conquest of Iran—when they overshadow the narrative of the flight of the last Sasanian king, Yazdgird III, to the east—and are pertinent to the later rebellions of Sunbād1647 (137 AH/755 CE) and Māziyār (224 AH/839 CE) against the Abbāsid caliphate. Any examination of the history of Tabaristān must begin with the region’s rich local historiographical tradition, from which we have a number of extant local histories, including, most importantly, the Tārikh-i Tabaristān of Ibn Isfandiyār.1648 While these sources have substantial and peculiar problems of chronology, are late sources, and clearly bear the marks of editorial reworking at the hands of powerful families, including the Parthian dynastic families, they are crucial in that they give us the broad outlines of the history of the region during the Sasanian period, information that is almost totally absent in universal histories such as that of Tābarī. Thus, these sources provide us with a context within which we can investigate the history of the region in the post-conquest centuries, and without which this history remains more or less inexplicable. Significantly, some of the information given to us by the Tārikh-i Tabaristān can be corroborated by Greek sources as well as numismatic evidence.1649 As a thorough source-critical approach to the local histories of Tabaristān is ideally needed before we can critically examine the history of Tabaristān based on them—a study that is beyond the scope of the present work given the confines of time—it is with extreme caution, and with the aid of a rudimentary source-critical approach, therefore, that we will examine the information contained in these. Even with this handicap, however, it is possible to cull valuable information from these sources, as we shall see.

1647 For a discussion of his rebellion, see §6.4.
1649 The contention of those scholars who dismiss these local histories based on their late provenance, therefore, can be put to rest.
4.1 The Āl-i Bāvand

4.1.1 Kayūs

According to the Tārikh-i Ţabaristān, the kingdom of Ţabaristān had remained in the hands of the family of Jushnasf until the time of Qubād (488–531). For reasons that Ibn Isfandiyār attributes to the workings of time, however, this family’s fortunes declined. Qubād, therefore, sent his oldest son Kayūs to Ţabaristān. The timing of this episode of Ţabaristān’s history would of course depend on the chronology that we choose to adopt about Qubād’s age when he ascended the throne.\(^{1650}\)

Kayūs’ rule in Ţabaristān is confirmed by other sources. Procopius, for instance, calls him Caoses and follows the events that led Qubād and the nobility to forgo appointing Kayūs as Qubād’s successor to the Sasanian throne.\(^{1651}\) Theophanes, who renders his name Phthasouarsan, reflecting Kayūs’ title as Padhashkhwārgar Shah, that is, the ruler of Ţabaristān, mentions him under the years 520/521, and 523/524.\(^{1652}\) Theophanes’ account, therefore, points to the second part of Qubād’s reign for Kayūs’ assumption of power in Ţabaristān. The arrival of Kayūs in Ţabaristān supposedly calmed the turbulent situation in the region. During this period Kayūs, presumably from his base in Ţabaristān, also aided Qubād in expelling the Turks who had invaded Khurāsān.\(^{1653}\)

When Qubād died and the Khāqān of the Turks attacked Iran once again, Khusrow I (531–579) asked for Kayūs’ aid against him. According to Ibn Isfandiyār, Kayūs defeated the Khāqān and set in his stead one of his relatives by the name of Hūshang. He then attacked Ghazna, put his own representative there, and returned to Ţabaristān with the kharaj (taxes) of Turkistān and India as well as a great amount of booty. According to Ibn Isfandiyār, Kayūs then claimed the throne from Khusrow I Nowshīrvān based on his own seniority.\(^{1654}\) Khusrow I naturally refused, arguing that, among other things, he had the confirmation of the mōbads in coming to the throne.\(^{1655}\) Kayūs then prepared an

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1650 If we accept the tradition that Qubād ascended the throne already at a mature age, that is, in his thirties, then Kayūs could have been installed in Ţabaristān during the first part of Qubād’s reign, that is sometime in 488–496. The adoption of a young age for Qubād’s assumption of the throne, however, would put the installation of Kayūs in Ţabaristān during the second part of his reign, that is in the period between 498 and 531. Ibn Isfandiyār 1941, p. 147; Marashi 1966, p. 89. Ibn Isfandiyār acknowledges that his information on Kayūs is an abridged version of that contained in Amuli, Mowlānā Owliyā, Tārikh-i Rayān, vol. 64 of Intishārāt-i bonyād-i farhang-i Iran, Tehran, 1969, edited by Manuchehr Sotudih (Amuli 1969), pp. 37–44. However, the extant version of Amuli’s work does not contain any additional information to that provided by Ibn Isfandiyār.

1651 Procopius 1914, xi. 3, p. 83; II, ix. 12, p. 341; I, xxi. 20, p. 201; I, xxi, 22, p. 201.

1652 Theophanes 1997.


1654 Ibn Isfandiyār 1941, pp. 147–148; Marashi 1966, pp. 91–92.

1655 Ibn Isfandiyār 1941, p. 149. Marashi 1966, p. 91. According to Procopius, when Qubād became seriously ill, fearful that at his death “the Persians would make a serious attempt to disregard some of the things which had been decided upon by him,” he consulted with one of his closest dynastic partners, Mebodes. The latter advised him to leave a written testament appointing his successor.
army and set out to Ctesiphon in war against his brother. In the process, he was defeated, however.\footnote{Procopius 1914, xxi. 17–22, pp. 200–201.} Having captured Kayūs, Khusrow I assembled the mōbadīs and suggested Kayūs to ask for penitence, and confess to his sins so that he could order his release.\footnote{Marashi 1966, pp. 91–92; Ibn Isfandiyar 1941, p. 150.} Kayūs responded that he preferred death to the humiliation of confessing to sins, at which point Khusrow I cursed the fortunes for “forcing him to kill a brother like Kayūs.”

It is important to highlight the fact that the narrative of Kayūs in Ibn Isfandiyar’s version actually starts with an account of the appearance of Mazdak at the time of Qubād.\footnote{Ibn Isfandiyar 1941, p. 147–148. Ibn Isfandiyar’s depiction of Mazdak’s uprising is quite ambivalent. While Mazdak is accused of donning the garb of Iblīs (the devil) and leading Qubād astray, when Qubād, at the instigation of Khusrow I Nowshirvān, massacred Mazdak and his followers, the author accuses Qubād of committing unspeakable injustices, for which he lost his Divine Glory, farr. Ibid., pp. 147–148.} Ibn Isfandiyar juxtaposes Kayūs’ rebellion next to the Mazdakite proclivity of his father and, in doing so, lends credence to the theory that, if not a Mazdakite, Kayūs probably had a strong dose of Mazdakite sympathy. Theophanes explicitly states that Kayūs (Caoses), the Padhashkhwāgar Shah (Phthasouarsan), was a Manichean, who was used by his father Qubād—by means of a promise that he would be appointed as his successor—to lure the Manicheans into an audience, at which point he proceeded to massacre all of them.\footnote{Theophanes 1997, pp. 259–260.} If we accept Kayūs’ Mazdakite sympathies, then we must assume that the Mazdakite heresy was tolerated in Ṭabaristān during his rule.\footnote{In Chapter 5, we will have more to say about the prevalence of Mazdakite (§5.2.7) and Mithraic (see §5.4.1) currents in the quarter of the north.}

\subsection{Bāv}

From the end of Kayūs’ reign onward, however, Ibn Isfandiyar’s rendition of the saga of Kayūs’ family, the Āl-i Kayūs, becomes very problematic. According to Ibn Isfandiyar, one of the sons of Kayūs was called Shāpūr. Once Khusrow I had killed Kayūs, he kept this Shāpūr, presumably as a hostage, in Mādāin (Ctesiphon), where he eventually died during Hormozd IV’s (579–590) reign.\footnote{Ibn Isfandiyar 1941, p. 150, 152; Marashi 1966, p. 92.} None of our other sources, however, so far as I can ascertain, provide us with any further information on a son of Kayūs called Shāpūr. Still according to Ibn Isfandiyar, Shāpūr, in turn, had left a son called Bāv. This Bāv allegedly continued to remain in Ctesiphon. From the very inception of Khusrow II Parviz’s

\begin{quote}
“\begin{quotation}
The document was written by Mebodes himself.” When Kayūs, “confident by reason of the law, tried to lay claim to the office . . . [, however,] Mebodes stood in his way, asserting that no one ought to assume the royal power by his own initiative but by vote of the Persian notables. As all the nobility, Mebodes included, came to be in agreement with Qubād’s choice of Khusrow I, the latter was chosen over Kayūs.” Procopius 1914, xxi. 17–22, pp. 200–201.
\end{quotation}
\end{quote}
reign, however, Bāv’s power grew substantially. To begin with, during Khusrow II’s reign, when the Sasanian monarch was forced to deal with the extensive rebellion of Bahrām-i Chūbin, Bāv was among those who remained loyal to Khusrow II, followed him to Byzantium, and left a legacy in aiding him against Bahrām-i Chūbin. When Khusrow II assumed kingship, furthermore, presumably in remuneration for the services of Bāv, he gave parts of “Azarbāyjān, Iraq, Ištakhr as well as Ṭabaristān to Bāv.” Presumably on Khusrow II’s orders, Bāv then went to Khurāsān and Khwārazm where he conquered an extensive territory.

The figure of Bāv in Ibn Isfandiyār’s narrative is quite enigmatic, however. For in none of our other sources do we come across a figure called Bāv (Bawi or Boe) with as extensive a power and as central a role as he is given in Ibn Isfandiyār’s narrative during the reign of Khusrow II Parvīz. Moreover, the domains supposedly allotted to Bāv by the king, namely, Azarbāyjān, Iraq and Ištakhr, more or less correspond to the territories under the command of the ārān-spābed of the west (kūst-i khwarbarān) from Khusrow I’s time onward. Add to this the fact that Ṭabaristān is also said to have been given to Bāv, and the power of Bāv during Khusrow II’s rule becomes tremendous. Yet, no trace of such an important persona is left in any of our other sources for this juncture of Sasanian history. The only ārān-spābeds of the west of whom we have any information, were Vistāhm of the Ispahbudhān family, and his father the Asparapet, whose name has been rendered by our sources variously as Khurrazād, and significantly, Boe, Bawi, or Shāpūr. There is, therefore, something extremely peculiar in Ibn Isfandiyār’s rendition of the figure of Bāv, as well as his presumed father Shāpūr.

Thus far the figure of Bāv during the reign of Khusrow II Parvīz bears an uncanny resemblance to a powerful figure of late Sasanian history, namely Vistāhm of the Ispahbudhān family. From his involvement in Khusrow II’s flight to Byzantium, to his crucial role in aiding Khusrow II against the Parthian dynasty Bahrām-i Chūbin, and finally to his assumption of a post that was tantamount to the spābedi of the west and part of the east, Bāv’s career mirrors almost exactly that of Vistāhm. The wars of Bāv in Khurāsān, moreover, as well as his control of Ṭabaristān, are also reminiscent of the power that Vistāhm assumed in the east and the north. We have further the curiosity that the name of Bāv himself, as well as that of his presumed father Shāpūr, are also the two names that have been attributed to Vistāhm’s father, Asparapet, the great Parthian and Pahlava aspet of the Ispahbudhān family, or possibly his

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1662 See §2.6.3 and §6.1.
1663 Marashī 1966, p. 92; Ibn Isfandiyār 1941, p. 152:

1664 See §2.7.1 and page 107.
1665 See page 106.
1666 See §2.7.1.
grandfather, Procopius’ Aspebedes. Even the incidental information that the presumed father of Bāv, Shāpūr, died during the rule of Hormozd IV closely parallels the saga of the Ispahbudhān family, when the king murdered the father of Vistāhm and Vindūyih, the powerful Asparapet. 1667 In the figure of Bāv, and onto his saga as depicted in Ibn Isfandīyār’s narrative, therefore, the information about three scions of the Ispahbudhān family, Boe, Shāpūr, and Vistāhm, appears to have been edited and superimposed. In the process, this persona seems then to have taken up the name of the original dynast, Boe, or Bāv.

The conflation of the sagas of Ispahbudhān dynasts in the figure of Bāv, however, does not end here in Ibn Isfandīyār’s narrative. For the relationships that Bāv came to establish with the ephemeral kings and queens who followed Khusrow II on the throne, form a curious parallel to the story of Farrukh Hormozd as well as Farrukhzād, two further Parthian dynasts of the Ispahbudhān family. In Ibn Isfandīyār’s narrative, during the short rule of Shirūyih Qubād (628), for example, the king reportedly usurped the properties and fortunes of Bāv in Ctesiphon and seized Bāv himself, 1668 putting him under arrest in Iṣṭakhr. When Azarmidukht ascended the throne (630–631), however, the elite advised her to recall Bāv from Iṣṭakhr to take control of the army. Bāv, however, refused, arguing that only the weak of nature agree to serve under a woman. Refusing Azarmidukht’s invitation to be the general commander of her army, Bāv retired to a fire-temple for a life of prayers. 1669 Here, we clearly have a replica of the story of Azarmidukht and Farrukh Hormozd, in which Farrukh Hormozd refused to acknowledge the suzerainty of Azarmidukht, the candidate of the Pārsīg and the Mihrān factions. 1670

*A hero unveiled, once more*

What increases our suspicion about Ibn Isfandīyār’s purported genealogy of the Ḥāl-i Kayūs is the saga that the author gives of Bāv’s activities in Tabaristān, at the end of Yazdgird III’s rule and the inception of the Arab conquest. For here, there is little doubt that the figure of Bāv is assuming the activities of, this time, Farrukhzād, the son of Farrukh Hormozd. At the onset of the Arab conquests and after the battle of Qadisiya, the last Sasanian king, “the powerful [sic] Yazdgird III,” according to Ibn Isfandīyār, recalled Bāv from Iṣṭakhr, and restored (radd) to him all his property. That this could not have been possibly the case, considering Yazdgird III’s young age and powerlessness, is clear from Ibn Isfandīyār’s subsequent remarks. Yazdgird III was in fact forced to recall Bāv, for “on account of the enmity of the Arabs, [the king] could not leave [Bāv] out of his sight.” 1671 This replicates the power of Farrukhzād, and

1667 See pages 105ff, especially page 106.
1668 It is not clear from where!
1670 See §3.3.3.
1671 Ibn Isfandīyār 1941, p. 153:
Yazdgird III’s reliance on this power for his protection from the pursuing Arab armies. In all the halting places of Yazdgird III, Ibn Isfandiyar narrates, the king was forced to be in the company of Bāv.1672 Here then we are given a potentially very significant, but not quite clear piece of information. In Tabaristān, Ibn Isfandiyar informs us, “Yazdgird III recalled Gāvbārih [i.e., the Cow Devotee, 1673 Jīl-i Jīlānshāh] with whom we shall deal shortly,”1674 and took over all the region.”1675 The further saga of Farrukhzād and Yazdgird III is then continued in the presumed relationship of Bāv and the king.

According to Ibn Isfandiyar, when the army of Islam was victorious against Yazdgird III, and the king, in flight, went to Rayy, Bāv accompanied the last Sasanian king. Significantly, from Rayy, Bāv got permission from the king to go through Tabaristān in order to pray at the fire-temple that his (putative) ancestor, Kayus, had built in the region, and to join the king later in Gurgān.1676 Curiously but expectedly, Bāv’s stay in Tabaristān was prolonged.1677 When the duration of Bāv’s sojourn was extended, he heard the news of the betrayal of Māhuī-yi Sūrī and the murder of Yazdgird III.1678 In summary, all the actions attributed to Bāv by Ibn Isfandiyar during Yazdgird III’s reign more or less replicate those undertaken by Farrukhzād: he accompanied Yazdgird III in his flight from Rayy to the east,1679 then mutinied against him—one of the reasons of which was Yazdgird III’s refusal to go to Tabaristān—and parted company from him.1680

What is most curious, however, is not only that in the career of Bāv we find conflated those of five generations of Ispabudhan dynasts, namely Boe (Aspebedes?), Shāpur (Asparapet), Vistāhm, Farrukh Hormozd, and Farrukhzād, which, incidentally, reinforces our argument that they do indeed belong to the same family, but also the remarkable fact that as the towering figure of Farrukhzād mysteriously disappears from the scene somewhere in the quarter of the east, after abandoning Yazdgird III, so, too, does the progenitor of the Āl-i Bāwand mysteriously appear in that same region. Indeed, after hearing of the

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1672 Ibn Isfandiyar 1941, p. 153:

در حمله مواقف با او بايست بود.

1673 For the importance of this epithet, see page 377.

1674 See §4.3.3.

1675 Ibn Isfandiyar 1941, p. 153:

بطشتنان گوپارا فرا خواست، جمله ولايت بگرفت.

1676 Ibn Isfandiyar 1941, p. 154.

1677 Ibn Isfandiyar 1941, p. 155:

مذت متام ومکت او دراز شد.

1678 Ibn Isfandiyar 1941, p. 155; Marashi 1966, p. 93.

1679 See page 257ff.

1680 See §3.4.6.
death of Yazdgird III, according to Ibn Isfandiyār, Bāv “shaved his hair” and took up a monastic life at the fire temple in Kūsān [i.e., Qūchān]. Recall that Sebeos likewise maintains that after his mutiny, Farrukhzād fortified himself someplace. Ibn Isfandiyār then briefly describes the conditions in Khurāsān and Ṭabaristān in the post-Bagratuni period just before the Arab conquest: the Turks had wreaked havoc in most of Ṭabaristān and Khurāsān, and “the armies of Islam, under the command of Imām Ḥasan b. ‘Alī and ‘Abdallāh b. ‘Umar . . . and Ḥudhayfah,” had come to Amul.\(^{1681}\) The population of Ṭabaristān therefore, desperate from hardship and adversity, decided that they must find a great king under whose command they could all gather. None, they reckoned, could take up this position except Bāv.\(^{1682}\) The people of Ṭabaristān, therefore, invited Bāv to become their king. The latter happily accepted their invitation, provided that they agreed that his rule would be absolute.\(^{1683}\) When they did, Bāv left his monastic life and “cleared the domains of the enemies.”\(^{1684}\) According to Ibn Isfandiyār, the army that attempted the first unsuccessful conquest of Ṭabaristān in 30 AH/650–651 CE was that of Sa’d b. ʿĀsh. Ibn Isfandiyār does not specify, however, how Bāv received this army or how he cleared the region of all the enemies. Once Bāv had secured the region, he ruled for 15 years, after which he was killed by a certain Valāsh, a figure who subsequently assumed the control of Ṭabaristān for another eight years (circa 665–674). After Bāv’s death, presumably around 665, when Ṭabaristān was again in disarray, his son Suhrāb carved out a small kingdom in Kūlā, where he maintained the family’s independence for many centuries.\(^{1685}\) We note here that the nisba of Zinābī Abū ‘l-Farrukhān in Ṭabarī’s narrative was also said to be Qūlah, i.e., Kūlā.\(^{1686}\)

All our evidence suggests that the figure named Bāv in this part of the story is none other than Zinābī Abū ‘l-Farrukhān, who in turn is none other than Farrukhzād, the son of Farrukh Hormozd, the dynast from the Ispahbudhān family.\(^{1687}\) As Farrukhzād mysteriously disappeared from the scene, so too Bāv in one tradition, the Ṭabaristānī tradition, and Zinābī Abū ‘l-Farrukhān in another tradition, the Islamic futūḥ narratives, mysteriously appeared on the scene. The disappearance of one and the appearance of the others, moreover, coincided exactly with one and the same juncture of history, that is to say, the point when Farrukhzād abandoned Yazdgird III and, as Zinābī Abū ‘l-Farrukhān, aided the Arabs in the conquest of Rayy and made peace with the conquering Arab army. All our evidence therefore points to the fact that the ancestry of the family of Bāv, and in fact the very name of this dynast,

\(^{1681}\) This is in all probability part of some Shi’ite popular histories circulating in the region.

\(^{1682}\) Ibn Isfandiyār 1941, p. 155; Marashi 1966, p. 93.

\(^{1683}\) Ibn Isfandiyār 1941, p. 155; Marashi 1966, p. 93.

\(^{1684}\) Ibn Isfandiyār 1941, p. 155; Marashi 1966, p. 93.

\(^{1685}\) Ibn Isfandiyār 1941, p. 155. For more on Suhrāb, see page 307 below.

\(^{1686}\) Tabarī 1994, p. 26, de Goeje, 2655. See page 250ff.

\(^{1687}\) For a discussion of the Ispahbudhān, see §3.3.1; for their family tree, see page 471; for Zinābī’s duplicity in the conquest of Rayy, see page 250ff; for his identity, see page 264ff.
has undergone substantial editorial transformation. Whether on purpose or inadvertently, somewhere along the line, the family of Bāv is taken to be the progeny of the Sasanian Kayūs. In view of the familial connection of the Isphahbūdān with the Sasanians there is even a possibility that through marriage such a connection actually did exist. Perhaps it is not incidental that the prevalent dynastic family name of this family later becomes the Āl-i Bāvand or the Bāvandīds, rather than the Āl-i Kayūs. By Ibn Isfandīyār’s account, Bāv himself was around throughout the reigns of Khusrow II (591–628) and Yazdgird III (632–651). Considering all the chivalry that he is supposed to have shown during Khusrow II’s rule, if one were to hypothetically assume that he was at least 18 years of age at the inception of the king’s rule (whence born around 573), then by the time he was murdered by Valāsh after 15 years of rule in Tabaristān (around 665), he was nearly a century old. Such a ripe age is a possibility of course, but all other indications seem to point to the fact that this genealogical tradition was forged. To uncover how Bāv is supposed to have dealt with the Arabs, we must first deal with the fortunes of other dynastic families in Tabaristān.

4.2 The Kārins in Tabaristān

A second important dynastic power that had come to have a substantial interest in Tabaristān, from at least the period of Khusrow I onward, when we can trace this,1688 was the Kārin dynasty. The connection of this family to Tabaristān, moreover, at least from this period onward, is contrary to the claim of some,1689 far from mythical. Ibn Isfandīyār follows the Xwaddāy-Nāmag tradition in recounting the fortunes of the Kārins and their dominion over the monarchy through the last decades of the fifth century,1690 ending in Qubād’s ousting of the Kārind Sukhrā with the aid of the Mihrāns,1691 and Sukhrā’s flight, together with his nine sons, to Tabaristān.1692 If Ibn Isfandīyār’s rendition of events is to be trusted, the departure of the Kārin family toward Tabaristān must have taken place during Qubād’s second regency, that is, 498/9–531, at the time that Kayūs held power over Tabaristān.1693 We recall that according to Ibn Isfandīyār, Khusrow I regretted the treatment that his father had inflicted on the Kārins and was keen on retrieving his sons. The Kārins, hearing about this, came together with their army clad in green to the aid of the Sasanian king in his

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1688 As we have seen the power of the Kārins in the Sasanian realm generally predates this.
1690 Ibn Isfandiyar 1941, p. 151. For the saga of the Kārins during this period, see §2.4, especially §2.4.2.
1691 See §2.4.4.
1692 For the conflicting information in our sources about Sukhrā’s final destiny, see footnotes 400 and 582.
1693 Recall that Theophanes mentions Kayūs as Padhashkhwārgar Shah under the years 520–523 CE; see §4.1.1.
war against the Khāqān. In compensation for their aid, Khusrow I gave the control of Zābulistān to Zarmīhr, the eldest son of the late Sukhrā, and parts of Ṭabaristān to a younger son called Kārin, who became the ispahbud of Ṭabaristān. For all the problems contained in Ibn Isfandiyār’s history, the chronological scheme that he presents here is in fact quite sound. For we recall that Kayūs, who had been appointed Padhashkhwārgar Shah by his father Qu-bād in Ṭabaristān, was in fact murdered by Khusrow I Nowshirvān when he came to claim the throne. We are here dealing, therefore, with the period in which Khusrow I initiated his military and administrative reforms of the land. If the ruler of Ṭabaristān, Kayūs, is killed by Khusrow I at the inception of his reign, and if his putative progenies Shāpūr and Bāv actually belong to Ispahbudhān family, it follows that after Kayūs’ murder in about 531, no one could take over the rule from him: there was, in other words, a power vacuum in Ṭabaristān. This version of events, needless to say, proceeds from our assumption that the presumed progenies of Kayūs, namely Shāpūr and Bāv, actually belong to a different family.

What is most significant about Ibn Isfandiyār’s narrative on the measures taken by Khusrow I in Ṭabaristān, however, is the fact that he partitioned the control of the region such that “he did not give the whole to one person, but divided it.” Who then were the other groups among whom Ṭabaristān was divided at the inception of Khusrow I’s reign? We should recall at this point one significant fact: As our seals testify, Khusrow I gave the ērān-spāḥbedī of the quarter of the north (kūst-i ādurbadagān) to the Parthian Mihrāns. Over parts of this region, the Mihrāns had ancestral claims at any rate. So having destroyed his brother Kayūs and having assigned the Mihrāns as the spāḥbeds of the quarter of the north, Khusrow I then gave, according to Ibn Isfandiyār, the Kārins the spāḥbedī of Ṭabaristān. However, we know of no such post, either prior to or after Khusrow I’s reforms. In fact, the very division of the realm into four quarters during Khusrow I’s rule, we recall, was an innovation where the former function of ērān-spāḥbed was divided into four. At any given point after Khusrow I’s reforms, therefore, there were supposed to have been only four spāḥbeds of the Sasanian domains and none of these was called the spāḥbed of Ṭabaristān.

As we examined in detail in Chapter 2, Khusrow I had in fact given the Kārins the ērān-spāḥbedī of the quarter of the east (kūst-i khwarsān)—a region which had originally been the traditional homeland of the Ispahbudhān family.

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1694 Ibn Isfandiyār 1941, p. 151; Marashi 1966, pp. 6–7. See pages 113 and 382.
1695 These parts included Vand Omid Kūh, Amul, Lafūr, and Kūh-i Kārin (Farım).
1697 Ibn Isfandiyār 1941, p. 151.
1698 See page 103.
1699 See the discussion in §2.5.3.
1700 For the boundaries of this quarter, see footnote 693; see also footnote 164.
1701 See page 95.
1702 See in particular §2.5.6.
This is remarkably confirmed by sigillographic evidence, where we have the seal of Dād-Burz-Mihr (Dādmihr of the Kārin family), “the Parthian aspbed, the ērān-spāḥbed of the side of the east.”

Both the Niḥāyat and Dīnawarī, we recall, confirm that the Kārins were the spāḥbeds of Khurāsān from the rule of Khusrow I onward. According to Dīnawarī, in Khurāsān the Kārins were in charge of “war and peace, collecting taxation and the administration.” Qūmis and Gurgān were also part of the Kārins’ governorship. According to both Dīnawarī and the Niḥāyat, moreover, Khusrow I’s son, Hormozd IV, continued to maintain the Kārins in this position. This assertion of the Xv-adāy-Nāmag tradition, is likewise corroborated by the second seal of Dād-Burz-Mihr, which belongs to the reign of Hormozd IV. In his short term of usurping kingship, even Bahram-i Chūbin (590–591) confirmed the Kārins’ status as the spāḥbeds of the east. So, Ibn Isfandiyār’s rendition of events, given in the context of the power of various families over Ţabaristān, is remarkably valid.

As the ērān-spāḥbeds of the east, therefore, the Kārins controlled not only Khurāsān, but also parts of Ţabaristān, through the reign of Khusrow I and Hormozd IV. So once Kayūs was out of the picture, in the wake of Khusrow I’s reforms, when the spāḥbedi of the north was given to the Mihrāns and that of the east to the Kārins, the Sasanian king did in fact, as Ibn Isfandiyār claims, “divide Ţabaristān in such a way that he did not give the whole to one person, but divided it.” Moreover, another region of the southern Caspian Sea, Gilān, came under the rule of yet another dynastic family, the Āl-i Jāmāsp, as we shall see shortly.

As part of the land of the Pahlav, however, Khurāsān had prior to this been the traditional homeland of the Ispahbudhān family. The Kārins’ claim to the spāḥbedi of the quarter of the east, therefore, flew in the face of the more ancient heritage of rule of the Ispahbudhān family in these regions. It is, therefore, no surprise that it is in the course of his narrative on the Āl-i Kayūs—whom we postulated to be the adopted progenitors of the Ispahbudhān family—that Ibn Isfandiyār goes into a significant tangent to detail the saga of the Kārīnid Sukhrā and the appointment of the family as the rulers in Ţabaristān by Khusrow I. In sum, Khurāsān and Ţabaristān were contested by the Parthian families of the Ispahbudhān and the Kārins, while the central and western parts of the region, that is to say, Rayy and the regions to the west of it, were the traditional homelands of the Mihrāns over which they were given the ērān-spāḥbedi of the north. Thus far the histories of three Parthian dynastic families are intimately connected with the history of Ţabaristān.

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1703 Gyselen 2001a, seal 1b, p. 36. See page 114 and the table on page 470.
1705 Gyselen 2001a, seal 1b, p. 36 and seal A, p. 46. See pages 114 and 470.
1707 Ibn Isfandiyār 1941, p. 151.
1708 See §4.3.1.
After Khusrow II’s assumption of power, however, when he gained his very throne thanks to the machinations of his uncles Vindūyih and Vistāhm, the king gave the spāḥbedi of Khurāsān back to the Ispahbudhān family and their scion Vistāhm. The formal power of the Kārins as the spāḥbeds of the quarter of the east, therefore, came to an end. Subsequently, as we have seen, the Ispahbudhān dynast Vistāhm led a significant rebellion against Khusrow II Parviz, when a long stretch of territory from Khurāsān to Gilān, including the territories under the Mihrān family, paid allegiance to the Ispahbudhān rebel. What was the position of the Kārins during the almost decade long secessionist revolt of Vistāhm, however? No definitive answer can be given to this question at the moment. In hindsight, the antagonism between the Kārins and the Ispahbudhān in Khurāsān and parts of Ṭabaristān in subsequent years underlines the significant fact that the Kārins’ relationship with the Ispahbudhān must have been an extremely contentious one, perhaps purposely aggravated by the Sasanian king Khusrow II when he discharged the Kārins of their office of ērān-spāḥbed of the east and promoted the Ispahbudhān in their stead.

The precise fate of the Kārins in Khurāsān and Ṭabaristān after Vistāhm’s rebellion and during the turbulent Bagramuni and post-Bagramuni history of the region is not clear either. In 596–602, we recall, Smbat Bagramuni was given the marzpanate of Vrkan, that is Gurgān, in order to quell Vistāhm’s rebellion. In this endeavor he was in fact successful: in the midst of Vistāhm’s preparation for a second major expedition against Khusrow II, the rebel was killed “with reasonable confidence” in 600. Smbat Bagramuni was also sent to Khurāsān on a second expedition from 614 to 616/617. The Kūshāns had asked for Turkish aid, and a great force of 300,000 had thereafter invaded Khurāsān and parts of Ṭabaristān, reaching as far as Rayy. Tangentially we recall that this havoc in the east was occurring precisely in the midst of the Sasanian–Byzantine wars of Khusrow II, which were ravaging the western Sasanian domains. It was in a second campaign a year after this that Smbat reorganized his army and attacked “the nation of Kushans and the Hephthalite king,” and, defeating the enemy far into their territory, finally settled in Marv.

In view of the later events and in view of the dynastic and agnatic nature of the power of various Parthian families over their realm, it seems rather certain that while at this juncture of the Sasanian history of the east and the north de facto power might have been taken out of the hands of the Kārins, and while the Ispahbudhān rebellion had been quashed by Smbat Bagramuni, de jure power continued to remain in the hands of these families; a situation which, in view

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1709 §2.7.1.
1710 See page 136ff.
1711 Sebeos 1999, pp. 43–44.
1712 Sebeos 1999, p. 181. See §2.7.2.
1713 Sebeos 1999, p. 50.
1714 Sebeos 1999, p. 52.
of the simultaneous claims of the Kārins and the Ispahbūdān to the spāḥbedī of the east—one presumably recent and one with a long ancestral claim to the region—must have continued to create conflict in the territory. Throughout this period turbulence and havoc must have been as much a part of the landscape of the Sasanian domains in the east, as they were in the west during the destructive Sasanian–Byzantine wars of the first three decades of the seventh century.\textsuperscript{1716} While Smbat Bagratuni died around 617 CE, both the continued association of the Bagratunis with the east and the ultimate cooperation of this Armenian Parthian dynastic family with the Ispahbūdān family is borne out by the fact that when the unanimous decision of the factions to depose Khusrow II was reached, and Farrukhzād informed Varaztirotš, the son of Smbat Bagratuni, of their choice for the Iranian throne, the latter responded that the choice of Shīrūyih Qubād as the king “will be pleasing as well to the Kanārangiyyān” in Khurāsān.\textsuperscript{1717}

We can therefore construct the general contours of the history of Khurāsān and Ṭabaristān by the end of Khusrow II’s reign and the inception of the factional strife that swallows the Sasanian kingdom with the murder of this king, during the period of 628–632. Through the first decades of the seventh century, and in fact from the inception of the rebellion of Bahrām-i Chūbīn onward, the north and the eastern parts of the Sasanian domains were struggling through a havoc in which four Parthian dynastic families, the Mihrāns, the Kārins, the Ispahbūdān, and the Kanārangiyyān\textsuperscript{1718} were the central players in the field. This continued to be the situation on the eve of the Arab conquests of the region, when, on the trail of the last Sasanian king, Yazdgird III, the Arab armies finally reached Khurāsān and Ṭabaristān in 650–651. This picture, however, would not be complete without the introduction of yet another important family on to the scene of Ṭabaristān and Khurāsān.

4.3 The Āl-i Jāmāsp

4.3.1 Jāmāsp

One of the fascinating episodes in the history of Gilān and Ṭabaristān in the late antique period is the saga of the Sasanian Jāmāsp, beginning with the death of the Sasanian king Pirūz in 484. In reconstructing this history Ibn Isfandiyār provides us with a unique narrative undoubtedly drawn from the local historical traditions and lore in circulation in the region. The significance of this history is the fact that it revolves around the person of Jāmāsp, one of the most enigmatic sons of Pirūz, for whom—except for the short period (497–499) when he assumed the crown—we have next to no information in our classical Arabic

\textsuperscript{1716}See §2.7.3.
\textsuperscript{1717}Ferdowsī 1971, vol. IX, p. 245, Ferdowsī 1935, p. 2901. However, the relationship of the Bagratuni house with the Ispahbūdān family once again deteriorated. Sebeos 1999, p. 92. For the connection of the Kanārangiyyān to the house of Farrukhzād, see page 266ff.
\textsuperscript{1718}See page 266ff.
sources. Jāmāsp seems to have vanished from the pages of history, precisely because, he met his fate in Ṭabaristān, the history of which is not incorporated in the accounts of the universal histories. Jāmāsp was put on the throne after Qubād’s Mazdakite phase with the complicity of the dynastic families. He remained on the throne for a short period during Qubād’s interregnum, that is from about 496 to 499. Most sources, however, are silent about the events that transpired during his short reign. Neither do we know what happened to Jāmāsp once Qubād came to reclaim his throne. Significantly, two sources maintain that Qubād had Jāmāsp expelled.

While most sources are silent about Jāmāsp’s fate, however, Ibn Isfandiyār provides a wealth of information about this transient king during one of the most important episodes in Sasanian history, the Mazdakite rebellion, connecting Jāmāsp directly, and significantly, with the history of Ṭabaristān. Ibn Isfandiyār’s narrative on Jāmāsp is introduced under the heading of “on the mention of the descendants of Jāmāsp and the story of Gāvbārih.” According to Ibn Isfandiyār, when Qubād is put back on the throne with the consent of the nobility, Jāmāsp objected and went to Armenia. From Darband, he then attacked the Khazars and the Slavs (Suqlāb), and conquering parts of these territories, settled in Armenia and married there. Jāmāsp’s activities during this period fit quite well with the international context of the times. The Sasanians, like the Parthians before them, had a long and involved connection with Albania and the rest of the Caucasus. The late fifth century was a period when, due to a number of factors, the predominantly peaceful Perso–Byzantine relations of the past century were becoming increasingly hostile, and would remain so for the next two centuries. One of the central factors shaping the Perso–Byzantine relations during this period was the appearance of new forces on the Eurasian steppes. While the emergence of the Chionites (Kidarites) in the northeast of the Sasanian territories from the 350s, and that of the Huns in the Ukraine on the eastern European territories of the Byzantine empire, had led the two empires to realize that they needed to join forces against nomadic enemies threatening them both, the disastrous defeat of Pirūz at the hands of the Hephthalites and the upheavals that this created in the Sasanian empire led Qubād to break the peaceful relations of the past century by attacking the Byzantine empire,

1719 See §2.4.3.
1720 Bosworth observes that the “fate of Z̄amāsp . . . is uncertain. Elias of Nisibis alone states that Kawād had him killed. More probable is the leniency toward his brother attributed to Kawād by the well-informed Agathias, that Z̄amāsp renounced the throne of his own accord, preferring a life of safe obscurity, and was pardoned . . .” Procopius in his The History of the Wars confuses Z̄amāsp with Fīrūz’s successor Balāsh/Blasēs.” Tabari 1999, pp. 136–137, n. 349, de Goeje, 887. Thāalibī and Ferdowsi confirm that Qubād pardoned Z̄amāsp, but have nothing to say about the ultimate fate of the latter. Thāalibī 1900, pp. 590–593, Thāalibī 1989, pp. 381–382, and 384; Ferdowsi 1971, vol. VIII, pp. 40–41, Ferdowsi 1935, p. 1739.
1721 Christensen 1944, p. 351.
1722 See §2.4.5.
1723 See page 302 below for the meaning of this epithet.
1724 See page 43.
probably in order to engage the disruptive feudal forces against a joint enemy abroad. The first theater of Qubād’s war in 502 was Armenia. By then, the Huns had amassed in northern Albania (Arrān). This was the context in which Jāmāsp went, or was exiled to Armenia, where he could have very likely joined an Armenian faction in the war arena. And indeed he seemed to have engaged the enemy at Darband, the famous Pass of Chor. Qubād in fact is also credited with rebuilding the Caspian Gates at Darband after 508.\textsuperscript{1725}

There also was a close connection among Armenia, Gīlān, and Ţabaristān in the previous centuries. This connection is highlighted in Khorenats’i’s account.\textsuperscript{1726} The Bagratunids’ involvement in Khurāsān and Ţabaristān in subduing the rebellion of Vistāhm gives further evidence of the close involvement of Armenia in Iranian affairs in general, and in Khurāsān and Ţabaristān in particular. As we have seen, the Armenians were also closely involved in the Parthian confederacy that was created in the quarters of the north and the east, and the turmoil that engulfed the region in the wake of the Arab conquest. The Sasanians, moreover, like the Parthian dynasts, had strong familial relationships with the ruling groups within Armenia. Considering the intimate connection of Iran and Armenia throughout Sasanian history, Ibn Isfandiyār’s assertion that Jāmāsp settled in Armenia, therefore, should be reckoned as trustworthy.

\textsuperscript{1725} For a succinct overview of Sasanian relations with the Byzantine Empire in late antiquity and the part played by Armenia therein see Howard–Johnston’s analysis in Sebeos 1999, pp. xi–xxv. Yazdgird II (438–457) constructed an impressive wall at the Caspian Gates at Darband along the 3 to 3.5 kilometer pass of Chor on the western shores of the Caspian Sea in order to prevent the penetration of the Transcaucasian Huns into his realm. The “Armenians and Albanians wrecked the walls in the rebellion of 450,” leading to the occupation of Darband by the Huns during Pīrūz’s (459–484) reign. In 464, the latter seems to have received tribute from the Byzantines in exchange for his upkeep of the wall, and the tribute that he was forced to pay to the Hephthalites. Joshua the Stylite 2000, pp. 9–10, n. 37–39 and pp. 82–83, n. 392. At the death of Yazdgird II in 457, the king of Albania was one Vachē, a nephew of the two sons of Yazdgird II, Hormozd III (457–459) and Pīrūz (459–484). Moses Daskhurants’i maintains that the daughter of Yazdgird II’s sister was the mother of Vachē whom he had married. Elīshē 1982, p. 241. The additional information by Moses Daskhurants’i is cited in Thomson’s note 5, ibid. During the monarchic dispute that engulfed Iran after the death of Yazdgird II, Vachē, who, according to Elīshē, was a Christian who had been forced to convert to Zoroastrianism by Yazdgird II, revolted. Even after the Mihrānid Rahām put his protégé Pīrūz in power (see §2.3), Vachē did not submit. The rebellion of Vachē pre-occupied the Sasanians in the Caucasus until 463/464. Pīrūz then asked Vachē to send back his sister and niece to Iran “for they were originally magi and you made them Christians.” Elīshē 1982, pp. 242–243.

\textsuperscript{1726} According to Khorenats’i, for example, after “the death of the last Arshak [Arsaces I (247–211 BCE)], king of Persia, our Artashes made his homonym, Arshak’s son Artashes, king over the land of Persia. The inhabitants of the mountain which is called in their own tongue the province of Patizhahar [Padhashkhwārār, i.e., Ţabaristān], that is, the mountain of Elmans’, did not wish to obey him, nor did those who dwelt by the sea and those beyond them. Similarly the land of the Caspians for that reason rebelled against our king. Therefore Artashēs sent Smbat [an Armenian general from the second century BCE] against them with the entire Armenian army, and the king himself accompanied them for seven days. So Smbat went and subdued them all; he ravaged the land of the Caspians and brought to Armenia more captives than those from Artaz, including their king Zardmanos.” Khorenats’i 1978, p. 195. Emphasis added.
4.3.2 Pîrûz

Now according to Ibn Isfandiyâr, Jâmâsp’s son Narsî had himself a son by the name of Pîrûz. This Pîrûz expanded the territories under his family’s rule and conquered the territory up to and presumably including parts of Gilân. The control of Pîrûz over Gilân at this juncture is corroborated by Sebeos. Qubâd died in 531. If we reckon a similar date for the death of Jâmâsp, the younger brother of Qubâd, and count around 35 years for each generation, then the control of Pîrûz over parts of Gilân can be dated to the late sixth century. It is apt to briefly recall the political situation in Armenia at the time.

The Byzantines, who had come under serious attack by the Avars and the Slavs, especially in the Balkans, began a policy of actively recruiting the Armenian nobility, partly also to rein in the unruly Armenian feudal nobility residing within the enlarged Armenia now under their control. This policy, presumably using some form of coercion, was pursued for three years, by which time the Armenian nobility seem to have had enough of it. The Persians adopted a different policy, seeking the support of the Armenian nobility with cash incentives. The arrival of a financial administrator with a large sum of money triggered, as we have seen, the Vahewunî incident of 594–595 CE, when a group of Armenian nobles rebelled against both the Byzantines and the Persians.1727 But the rebellion disintegrated shortly after being launched, partly on account of the cooperation of the two empires in putting it down. The Armenian faction that at the end of the conflict remained in the Persian camp were set up in Iṣfahān by Khusrow II Parviz, around 595.1728

As we have seen, in the midst of Vistâhm’s rebellion, these Armenian forces also rebelled against the Persian king and decided to join Vistâhm’s camp.1729 But, according to Sebeos, their route to join Vistâhm took them through Gilân, where they were intercepted by the army of one Pîrûz: “In the land of Gelam, [i.e., Gilân] Peroz’s army arrived in pursuit, and put some of them to the sword. [Others are said to have] committed suicide lest they be captured, while [still] others barely escaped and took refuge in the secure land of Gelam.”1730 In a note, Thomson points out that “Macler suspects that something is wrong and suggests Persian or victorious” in lieu of Pîrûz. Thomson himself maintains that it “would be simplest to suppose that this Peroz was a general who is not mentioned elsewhere in Sebeos.”1731 There is nothing wrong in this case, however, with Sebeos’ narrative. Nor do we need to identify this Pîrûz with an unknown Persian general. For the Pîrûz who intercepted the Armenian nobility who were fleeing into Gilân, is none other than the Al-i Jâmâsp Pîrûz, the grandson of the Sasanian Jâmâsp who, according to Ibn Isfandiyâr, had by then set up his authority over Gilân.

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1727 See page 133.
1729 See page 133.
1730 Sebeos 1999, p. 43.
4.3.3 Jīl-i Jīlānshāh

Gāvbārih

In Gilān, Pirūz married the daughter of one of the princes of Gilān. From this union was born a son called Jīlānshāh, who in turn had a son called Jīl-i Jīlānshāh.\(^{1732}\) According to Ibn Isfandiyār, Jīl-i Jīlānshāh became a great king and most of the Gil (that is, inhabitants of Gilān) and the Daylamites paid allegiance to him. If Pirūz of the Āl-i Jāmāsp was in power in Gilān at the time of Vistāhm’s rebellion,\(^{1733}\) after the Vahewuni incident of 594–595, then by the same reckoning of 35 years per generation, the rule of Jīl-i Jīlānshāh in Gilān would fall sometime around 630s–660s CE, that is to say, around the period of the attempted Arab conquest of the northern parts of Iran. And this is precisely what happens in Ibn Isfandiyār’s narrative.

At this point, Ibn Isfandiyār’s account becomes highly symbolic. Jīl-i Jīlānshāh’s astrologers told him that the kingdom of Tabaristan will one day be his. So Jīl-i Jīlānshāh appointed a regent in his place in Gilān, picked up two Gīlī cows and set out on foot to the east, toward Tabaristan. In fact, after Jīl-i Jīlānshāh had shown so much courage in calming the turbulent situation in Tabaristan, as we shall shortly see, the people, according to Ibn Isfandiyār, gave him the epithet Gāvbārih, the Cow Devotee.\(^{1734}\) Here then comes the account of conquest at which juncture the histories of the Kārins, the Āl-i Bāvand, or rather, the Ispahbudhān, and the Āl-i Jāmāsp all come together in Ibn Isfandiyār’s narrative.

Ādhar Valāsh Kārin

In his movement east, Jīl-i Jīlānshāh came across a figure called Ādhar Valāsh, who was the regent of Tabaristan. Who then was this Ādhar Valāsh? Once again, Ibn Isfandiyār’s narrative proves quite sound, for this Ādhar Valāsh was almost certainly a progeny of the Parthian spābed Dād-Burz-Mihr (Dādmīhr) from the Kārin family.\(^{1735}\) According to Ibn Isfandiyār and Marashi, shortly before Jīl-i Jīlānshāh’s takeover of Tabaristan, Yazgird III had given the control of the region, together with Gurgān, to this Ādhar Valāsh.\(^{1736}\) We recall that in our narrative of Yazgird III’s flight to the east, at one point we came across the information that while Yazgird III did not accept the invitation of the overlord of Tabaristan and Farrukhzād’s advice for taking refuge in Tabaristan, he had nonetheless appointed the overlord (sāhib) of Tabaristan as the ispahbud,
for the latter “had previously held a humbler rank than this.”\textsuperscript{1737} This overlord of humbler rank, we can now ascertain, was none other than the Kārinid ʿAdhar Valāsh.

We cannot ascertain whether the Kārins’ takeover of Ṭabaristān and Gurğan, prior to Jīl-i Jīlānshāh’s conquest of the region, was actually with the tacit consent of Yazdgird III, or whether, as is most likely, the Kārins’ resumption of power was due to the confusion that ensued in the region after Vistāhm’s rebellion,\textsuperscript{1738} Smbat Bagratuni’s governorship,\textsuperscript{1739} and the tumultuous post-Bagratuni period. For all we know, the Kārins might have helped Smbat Bagratuni in his efforts to bring some order back to the region in the aftermath of Vistāhm’s rebellion. When Jīl-i Jīlānshāh threatened to attack Ṭabaristān, ʿAdhar Valāsh is said to have written a letter to Yazdgird III for help. The king requested to be informed of the identity of the attacker. Upon further research into the background of this new figure in Ṭabaristān, the mobads of the king (mobadān-i ḥadrat) recognized Jīl-i Jīlānshāh and informed Yazdgird III that he was in fact a progeny of Jāmāsp. Reportedly, Yazdgird III thereupon found it prudent (ṣalāḥ ʿan dīdand) to write to ʿAdhar Valāsh and to communicate to him that as Jīl-i Jīlānshāh was a Sasanian, ʿAdhar Valāsh should forthwith give the rule over Ṭabaristān to this progeny of Jāmāsp. Yazdgird III, in other words, presumably ordered ʿAdhar Valāsh to accept the authority of Jīl-i Jīlānshāh of the Āl-i Jāmāsp over himself and his territory.

At any rate, Jīl-i Jīlānshāh assumed the control of the region at the inception of the Arab conquest. Having assumed authority over Ṭabaristān, the new ruler’s title became Gīl-i Gīlān Farshvādjar Shāh. According to Ibn Isfandiyār, he commenced construction from Gīlān to Gurğan—significantly when the rest of Iran was experiencing the destructive effects of conquest—but maintained his capital in Gīlān. We recall, however, Ibn Isfandiyār’s narrative on Bāv and the account of how, when Bāv found the region in turmoil, at the invitation of the people in the region, he assumed control, including that of Ṭabaristān, at this same turbulent period of the region’s history.

### 4.4 The Arab conquest of Ṭabaristān

Here then start the accounts of the Arab conquest and the peace treaty made between Suwayd b. Muqarrin, Zinābī Abū ʿl-Farrukhān and Jīl-i Jīlān, as contained in Ṭabarī. At this late juncture of Sasanian history, we recall, the five dynasts in power in the quarters of the north and the east (the kūst-i ādurba-dagān and kūst-i khwarāsān) were Farrukhzād from the Iṣpahbūdān family, in Khurāsān; Jīl-i Jīlānshāh, the progeny of the Sasanian cadet branch of the Āl-i Jāmāsp, in Gīlān; the Kārinid ʿAdhar Valāsh, in Ṭabaristān;\textsuperscript{1740} the Kanārangīyān,

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\textsuperscript{1737} Ṭabarī 1990, p. 82, de Goeje, 2875. See page 259.
\textsuperscript{1738} See page 132ff.
\textsuperscript{1739} See page 138ff.
\textsuperscript{1740} See page 302ff.
in Ṭūs and part of Nishāpūr, and finally the Mihrānid Siyāvakhsh, in Rayy and its environs. As Yazdgird III had fled to Khurāsān and had decided not to take refuge in Tabaristān, where, he was told, the rulers of the region would support him and provide him with a safe haven from his enemies, Farrukhzād abandoned him and together with his army headed west in order to make peace with the Arabs. As we have seen, however, most significantly, Farrukhzād suddenly disappears from the scene somewhere in the quarters of the east and the north, at the very same time when Bāv appears in Ibn Isfandiyār’s narrative and Zinābī Abū ‘l-Farrukhān in the futūḥ narratives. According to the futūḥ literature, Zinābī Abū ‘l-Farrukhān then aided the Arab army of Muqarrin, waged war against Siyāvakhsh-i Mihrān, toppled the Mihrāns from power, and, making peace with the Arabs, assumed the control of Rayy. As Jīl-i Jīlānshāh was moving east into the territories of the Ispahbudhān, the Kanārangiān, and the Kārins, Farrukhzād/Bāv/Abū ‘l-Farrukhān was moving west to meet the Arab armies. This is why some of our accounts maintain that Farrukhzād/Bāv/Abū ‘l-Farrukhān, the ispahbud-i ispahbudhān, was the ruler of Khurāsān but had authority over Tabaristān. We should also recall that the Turkish threat in Tabaristān did not subside during this period, so that when the Arabs first arrived in the environs of Gurgān—a region which was originally under the control of the Kārins and then the base of Smbat Bagratuni in the east—it is the Turkic ruler Šūl whom they found in control of this frontier region.

### 4.4.1 Peace treaty with Farrukhzād and Jīl-i Jīlānshāh

It is appropriate to pause here and consider the nature of the allegiances that are made among the dynastic families vis-à-vis each other, and vis-à-vis the Arab army of conquest. For this information sheds further light on the ways in which—with the Sasanian monarchy out of the way—the rivalry among the Parthian dynasts actually provided the most convenient venue for the success of the Arabs and their gradual movement further east. The pattern that emerges in the process of the Arab conquest and diplomacy on the plateau is that, invariably, the Arabs picked sides. They became fully cognizant of the deeply entrenched rivalries among the dynastic families, and they made full use of this. They surely had a lot to work with: vying for power in parts of Khurāsān, Tabaristān, and Azarbāyjān were the Sasanian cadet branch of the Āl-i Jāmāsāp, and the Parthian families of the Ispahbudhān, the Mihrān, the Kārin, and the Kanārangiān. This pattern is clearly reflected in Tabari’s conquest narratives. For all the disparagement of Sayf b. ‘Umar’s traditions, his is one of the most informative sources for precisely the light that it sheds on the Persian side of things.

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1741 See §3.4.7, especially page 271ff.
1742 See page 249ff.
1743 See §3.4.4, especially page 250ff.
1744 See page 136ff.
1745 See page 253ff.
After the Arab conquest of the quarters of the north and east in 650–651, and through the peace treaties that the Arabs implemented with the Parthian dynastic families, these latter were left free in the administration of their domains. From west to east, all the major dynastic families continued in power subsequent to the nominal conquest of the region. The one possible exception were the Mīhrāns, who were toppled in Rayy with the complicity of Zīnābī Abū ’l-Farrukhān, that is to say, Farrukhzād. Rayy, which must have been a longcoveted region for them, came under the control of the Ispahbudhān. To the west of Ṭabaristān, in Gilān, the Sasanian branch of the Āl-i Jāmāsp remained in power. The Āl-i Jāmāspid Jīl-i Jīlānshāh and the Ispahbudhān Farrukhzād, acting in chorus, signed a peace treaty with the Arabs. In exchange for restraining their “robbers and the people on their borders,” Farrukhzād, the ispahbud of all ispahbuds, the ruler of Khurāsān with authority over Ṭabaristān, under whose rule all the other spāḥbeds were now gathered, and Jīl-i Jīlān of the Āl-i Jāmāsp remained in power, the Arabs agreeing that they would not “have a right to attack” their territories or invade the domains under their control, “or even to approach [them] without [their] permission.”

The Parthian Kanārangīyān family, who in all likelihood were a branch of the Ispahbudhān family, likewise retained control over their traditional domains, the region of Tūs.

There they aided the Arabs in subduing the Kārins, and in return received full control over Nīshāpūr. In short, the Kanārangīyān remained in power in Inner Khurāsān. As a result, the Kārins’ territory in the northeast shrank. Nonetheless, a certain Mardānshāh, a Kārinid bearing the title Maṣmughān, was left in control of Damāvand, Khuwār, Lāriz, and Shirriz, being promised by the Arabs that “he will not be attacked, nor . . . approached save by [his] permission.” The Parthian Kanārangīyān family, who in all likelihood were a branch of the Ispahbudhān family, likewise retained control over their traditional domains, the region of Tūs.

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The Kārins also continued to hold power in the eastern parts of the region, ruling now under the authority of Āl-i Jāmāsp, and then under the Āl-i Bāvand, that is to say, under the Ispahbudhān, at subsequent junctures of the post-conquest history of the region.

\[\text{See pages 266ff and 276ff.}\]
\[\text{See page 271ff.}\]
\[\text{See page 271ff.}\]
\[\text{See pages 266ff and 276ff.}\]
\[\text{Justi 1895, p. 199.}\]
\[\text{For the possible meaning of the term (grand maγγ), see Marquart 1931, pp. 113–114. According to Justi, the Maṣmughān belong to the Kārin family, and they trace their ancestry to the righteous Armāyīl (see footnote 172).}\]
\[\text{See page 307 below, as well as the forthcoming work of the author.}\]
The status of Azarbāyjān at this time is less clear, but considering the sunna established as a result of the early conquest, it probably remained under the sovereignty of a cadet branch of the Ispahbudhān family, after Farrukhzād’s sons Isfandiyār and Bahram made peace with the Arabs. Meanwhile, Shahrvarāz, a progeny of the Mihrānid general Shahrvarāz, while foreign to the region, ended up collaborating with the Arabs in the frontier regions of the Caucasus. Considering the direction which the history of Iran took after the 650s—when the nobility had to have been in physical control of their agnatic lands and had to have come to terms with the Arab armies, if they were to continue to rule over their territories—and in view of the fact that the army of the Parthian Shahrvarāz had become landless, so to speak, it is rather likely that at least part of this family and the army under their control ended up settling in the frontier regions of the Caucasus.

In short, with the Parthian Āl-i Bāvand (Ispahbudhān) family, the Sasanian Āl-i Jāmāsp, the Kārin, and the Kanārāngiyān remaining in control of a truncated quarter of the east and a substantial part of the quarter of the north, no substantive transformation was effected in these territories. We are now in a position to add an actual schematic picture—sometimes, as in the case of Tabaristān and Inner Khurāsān more or less clear, and sometimes, as in the case of Azarbāyjān a very probable conjecture about the sociopolitical scene of these regions. As Balʿami’s account makes amply clear, and in view of the fragmentation of authority, especially in Khurāsān and Tabaristān, there was an inflationary trend toward the use of the title ispahbud in these regions, as each Parthian dynast, as well as the Āl-i Jāmāsp, the first rather justifiably one might add, came to claim the title. Contrary to Rekaya’s claims, this trend was not without historical basis, for by the 650s, the title had been in circulation for more than a century. The title ispahbud bestowed a legitimacy that all were keen to preserve and flaunt, for the consumption of their subjects as well as their rivals. How long, however, did these Parthian dynasts and the Āl-i Jāmāsp continue to rule in these territories in the post-conquest centuries? We shall begin to follow the ebb and flow of the rules of these families in what follows.

Dābūyīh

According to Ibn Isfandiyār, both Jīl-i Jilānshāh and Bāv, that is to say, Farrukhzād, ruled for 15 years before they died. Considering that the Arabs signed a peace treaty with these two dynasts around 650–651, their deaths may have occurred around 665. To determine the exact domains under their control, we continue to follow Ibn Isfandiyār’s account. Jīl-i Jilānshāh left two sons:
Dābūyih and Bādūspān. Without doubt, Bādūspān is actually a title and not a name, the Arabic form of pādhūspān. Dābūyih, who is said to have a horrific temper, assumed the throne after his father, but kept his seat of government in Gilān. Meanwhile, Bādūspān became the king of Rūyān. The manuscript history of the Tārīkh-i Tābaristān is not clear, but in the edited version of the manuscript currently at our disposal, it is after narrating the death of Jīl-i Jīlānshāh and the assumption of power of his sons Dābūyih and Bādūspān, that Ibn Isfandiyār starts his account by saying that “after Bāv, when the population of Tābaristān had divided into factions, Dābūyih [also] died.” Since Dābūyih remained in Gilān, it is very probable that his power did not extend much farther in the eastern parts of the region. Now Bāv, that is Farrukhzād, almost certainly controlled Khurāsān, and nominally at least, parts of Tābaristān during this period. In other words, if we follow Ibn Isfandiyār’s narrative closely, we realize that Jīl-i Jīlānshāh and Farrukhzād ruled contemporaneously, the former ruling over Gilān and the latter ruling over Khurāsān but having authority over Tābaristān.

Bāv (Farrukhzād), however, did not die a natural death, but was killed by Valāsh, a member of another age-old rival Parthian family, the Kārins. As the Kārins also launched a major revolt in south–western Khurāsān and Qūhistān at precisely this time, we are witnessing here a major civil war in the region between the Kārins and the Ispahbudhān, most probably a reflection of the Kārins’ attempt at regaining their lost power in the region. At any rate, after the murder of the Ispahbudhān Farrukhzād by the Kārinid Valāsh, the latter assumed control over the region and ruled for eight years, until roughly 673.

Suhrāb

Of all the possible progenies that one might suspect the Ispahbudhān family, specifically Farrukhzād, to have had in Tābaristān and Khurāsān itself, only a small child, a certain Suhrāb, is said to have remained. This might be explained by the intensity of the inter-Parthian rivalry prior to this period, when

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1759 See footnote 411.
1760 Ibn Isfandiyār 1941, p. 154.
1761 Melville 2000.
1762 Ibn Isfandiyār 1941, p. 156.
1763 Ibn Isfandiyār 1941, p. 156.
1764 Ibn Isfandiyār 1941, p. 156; Marashi 1966, p. 93. In Justi 1895, p. 346, Valāsh is called a grandson of Adhar Valāsh. So important had the by then legendary figure of Bāv become that, in a thoroughly different context, Ibn Isfandiyār gives a chronologically impossible and clearly legendary story about the murder of Bāv at the hands of the Al-i Jamsēpīd Farrukhnā-ī Bozorg—on whom see §4.4.2 below—when, presumably, the latter heard of the treachery of Bāv in building Sārī when in fact he had ordered him to construct a city in a different location. Ibn Isfandiyār 1941, p. 59. Significantly, this tradition highlights the fact that a variant of the local lore of the region attributed the construction of Sārī to the Al-i Bāvand as opposed to the Al-i Jamsāp.
1765 See page 277.
the Kārins might have been successful in more or less decimating the senior members of this family in the region. The defeat of the Ispahbudhān by the Kārins in the post-civil war period might, however, also be partly explained by the fact that part of the Ispahbudhān family was concentrating their efforts in Azarbāyjān at the time of the conquest of the region, and probably remained there in the post-conquest centuries.\textsuperscript{1767} In view of our lack of concrete information to this effect, however, this claim remains purely conjectural. After the murder of Bāv (Farrukhzād) by the Kārinid Valāsh, Suhrāb, who was only a young child, allegedly fled with his aged mother to a village near Sārī, thence to the region of Kūlā. Kūlā, we recall, formed in fact the nisba of Zinābi Abū ’l-Farrukhān (al-Zinābi b. Qulah).\textsuperscript{1768} This then might have been an Ispahbudhān home-base. The people of Kūlā, according to Ibn Isfandiyār, with the population of the mountain of Kārin, then gathered around this small child, and murdered the Kārinid Valāsh, and put the child Suhrāb on the throne of Tabaristān. The civil war between the Ispahbudhān and the Kārins, in other words, was by no means over. Now sometime prior to this period, Dābūyih, the son of Jīlī Jilānshāh had also died.\textsuperscript{1769} It is at this point then, that with a recent civil war wreaking havoc in the eastern parts of Tabaristān as well as Khurāsān, and with a child dynast of the Ispahbudhān family on the throne of Tabaristān, that according to Ibn Isfandiyār, Dhu ’l-Manāqib Farrukhān-i Bozorg, the son of Dābūyih, entered the scene of Tabaristān.

\subsection*{4.4.2 Farrukhān-i Bozorg Dhu ’l-Manāqib}

A close reading of Ibn Isfandiyār shows that the conquest of Tabaristān by Farrukhān-i Bozorg and the inception of his rule over this region do not date to the early Arab conquest, as hitherto believed,\textsuperscript{1770} but probably occurred some two decades later, around 673. For, as Ibn Isfandiyār relates, it was “after Bāv, [when] the people of Tabaristān had divided into factions, [and] Dābūyih had [also] died,” that Dhu ’l-Manāqib Farrukhān-i Bozorg, came with a great army and conquered Tabaristān “up to the borders of Nishāpūr.”\textsuperscript{1771} In fact, the first Arab or Persian attempt at breaking the treaty previously established with the rulers of the region, took place precisely during this period when the Arab general Maṣqalah b. Hubayrah al-Shaybānī attacked the region,\textsuperscript{1772} probably in 54 AH/674 CE,\textsuperscript{1773} precisely at the time when Farrukhān-i Bozorg conquered Tabaristān and installed himself as the ruler there on the wake of the civil war between the Ispahbudhān and the Kārins in the region. Maṣqalah, together with

\begin{footnotesize}
\bibitem{1767} Recall that two other sons of Farrukhzād, Isfandiyār and Bahram, ruled in Azarbāyjān after they had made peace with the Arabs; see §3.4.8.
\bibitem{1768} Tabari 1994, p. 26, de Goeje, 2655. See page 250ff.
\bibitem{1769} Ibn Isfandiyār 1941, p. 156; Marāši 1966, pp. 10–11, 157–158.
\bibitem{1771} Ibn Isfandiyār 1941, p. 156.
\bibitem{1772} Ibn Isfandiyār 1941, p. 157; Marāši 1966, p. 11.
\bibitem{1773} Madelung 2007a, p. 542.
\end{footnotesize}
4,000 men, struggled for two years against Farrukhân-i Bozorg at which point the Arab army was defeated and massacred and Maşqalah killed. The defeat of Maşqalah’s army was so disastrous and its destruction so total that “the expression until Maşqalah returns from Tabaristan, conveying the impossibility of completing a task, for many years afterwards circulated among the people.” According to Ibn Isfandîyâr, Maşqalah’s tomb still existed on the road from Kajû to Kandûsân and the commoners (avvam u ‘l-nass) still “slavishly and benightedly (bi taqlid o jabl) went on pilgrimage to it [thinking] that he was one of the Companions (saḥāba) of the Prophet!” 1774

In the process of conquering Tabaristan, Farrukhân-i Bozorg brought all the regional rulers under his control. Significantly, the only dynast whose territory he did not conquer was the “progeny of Bâv, whose respect he maintained and whose abode he did not invade.” 1775 Through an anecdotal narrative, Ibn Isfandîyâr informs us that the Kârînîd Maşmûghân Valâsh, the marzbân of Damâvand, 1776 was killed and his territory appended to that of Dhu ’l-Manâqib (Farrukhân-i Bozorg). 1777 With the power of the Kârins temporarily overshadowed, and with the shrunk power of the Isphahbudân respected, therefore, by the end of the seventh century the Sasanian Al-i Jâmâsp gained power over most of Tabaristan, the two other major Parthian dynastic families coming under their suzerainty in the region and the Kanârangiyan remaining in control over Inner Khurâsân. In a sense, by the end of the seventh century, the macrocosmic Sasanian–Parthian confederacy was recreated, in a microcosmic fashion, in the extensive regions of Gîlân and Tabaristan. Essentially, this picture did not change until the early ‘Abbâsid caliphate.

According to Ibn Isfandîyâr, the next major encounter of Farrukhân-i Bozorg, whom he calls the isphahbud of Tabaristan, with the Arabs 1778 took place when the schismatic Kharijite leader Qatârî b. al-Fujâh, the “rebel (gardankish) of the [period of] Ħâjjîj b. Yûsuf . . . together with the rest of the leaders of the Khawārij [Kharijites], may God curse them, took refuge with the isphahbud.” 1779

1774 Ibn Isfandîyâr 1941, p. 158; Marâashi 1966, p. 125. For the topos of the settlement or death of a Companion of the Prophet in a region, see Pourshariati 1995.

1775 Ibn Isfandîyâr 1941, p. 158.

1776 We postulate that this is the same Kârînîd Valâsh who killed Bâv (see page 307), and that he is related, or even identical to Maşmûghân Mardânishâh, who made peace with the Arabs (see page 252 and footnote 1750).

1777 Ibn Isfandîyâr 1941, p. 158.

1778 There were other attempts by the Arabs to subdue the region. One such attempt was made by Muhammad b. Ashrath, when he was appointed as nominal governor of Tabaristan by ‘Ubaydal-lâh b. Yazid, the governor of Kûfa (60–64 AH/679–684 CE). When Farrukhân-i Bozorg delayed forwarding the tribute of Tabaristan, Ibn Ashrath invaded the region, only to be defeated and lose his son in the process. Madelung 2007a, p. 542. This attempt of Muhammad b. Ashrath is not mentioned in the Târikh-i Tabaristan, however.

1779 Including ‘Umar-i Fannâq(?) and Sâlihâ Mîknaq(?). Ibn Isfandîyâr 1941, p. 158. Qatârî b. al-Fujâh took refuge in Tabaristan at a time when a split had occurred among the Khawârij, with Qatârî assuming the leadership of a small splinter group, while the opposing, larger camp was led by ‘Abd Rabb al-Kabîr. See Sadighi, Ghulam Husayn, Junbish-hâ-i Dinî-i Irânî, Tehran, 1996 (Sadighi
Throughout the winter Farrukhān-i Bozorg supplied the forces of Qaṭārī with provisions, fodder and gifts (noonzl o alaf o hadāyā o tuhaf).

Once “their horses became well fed and they themselves strengthened,” however, the Kharijites sent messages to the ispahbud urging him: “convert to our religion for otherwise we will take control of your region and commence war against you.” Meanwhile, Ḥajjāj sent Sufyān b. Abraṣ to Ṭabaristān in pursuit of Qaṭārī. When Sufyān reached Rayy, Farrukhān-i Bozorg had already taken his army to Damāvand in waiting. He sent a message to Sufyān proposing to him that he would aid him in defeating Qaṭārī in exchange for not being harassed thenceforth in his region. Sufyān agreed to these conditions. The war between Farrukhān-i Bozorg’s and Qaṭārī’s forces took place in the environs of Simnān, where the latter was defeated and the leaders of the Kharijites were killed.

Farrukhān-i Bozorg thereupon pardoned the weak and the captive (d. u afā o asīrān) from among Qaṭārī’s army and settled these in Amul, “their location (mowd. i) being to this day visible and called Qaṭrī Kalāda.”

In the late seventh century, in other words, a small group of Kharijites settled in Amul.

### 4.4.3 Yazīd b. Muhallab’s unsuccessful conquest of 716–718

Meanwhile in the rivalry between Qutaybah and Yazīd b. Muhallab, Farrukhān-i Bozorg—in Ibn Isfandīyar’s narrative now often referred to simply as the ispahbud—joined the camp of Qutaybah. So while Qutaybah continued his wars of expansion in Khūrāsān and Transoxiana, becoming notorious for his harsh rule, he continued to respect the suzerainty of Farrukhān-i Bozorg in Ṭabaristān. Qutaybah’s friendship with Farrukhān-i Bozorg and his

1996), p. 44.
1780 Ibn Isfandīyar 1941, p. 158.
1781 Ibn Isfandīyar 1941, p. 158:

جوون اسان فيه و ايفان تن ابادان شدن يام دادن ده تا به دين ما بگردو و آگر نه ولايت از تو بارگرم و یا تو حرب کنی.

In the interim, Ḥajjāj b. Yūsuf made further unsuccessful efforts to conquer Ṭabaristān. These, however, are not covered in Ibn Isfandīyar’s narrative. Madelung 2007a, p. 542.

1782 This is apparently reported by Ṭabarī with a different twist. Also see Ibn al-Athir 1862, vol. 5, pp. 29–36. In Ibn Isfandīyar’s narrative, the victory of the ispahbud over Qaṭārī is underlined and Ḥajjāj b. Yūsuf is portrayed as having recognized this, rewarding Sufyān b. Abraṣ for his failure by spreading dirt on his head. In Ṭabarī’s account, on the other hand, Sufyān remained in Ṭabaristān until 82 AH/701 CE in order to subdue the region, albeit unsuccessfully. Madelung 2007a, p. 542.

1783 Ibn Isfandīyar 1941, p. 160.


1785 Ibn Isfandīyar 1941, pp. 161–162. As Sadighi maintains, “none of the Arab governors who had come to Khūrāsān prior to this, were as oppressive or heavy handed toward the population or reneged on the pacts [that they had made] as much as Qutaybah.” Sadighi 1996, p. 47.
rivalry with Yazīd b. Muhallab are highlighted in Ibn Isfandiyār’s narrative: whenever Qutaybah would boast about one of his conquests in Khurāsān and Transoxiana, Yazīd b. Muhallab would retort by reminding him that he had not been able to do the same with Ṭabaristān.\textsuperscript{1786} As a result, according to Ibn Isfandiyār, Qutaybah recognized even more clearly “that Yazīd was his enemy and the ispahbud his friend.”\textsuperscript{1787} When Sulaymān b. ‘Abdalmalik (715–717) became caliph and ordered Qutaybah’s murder, he also encouraged Yazīd b. Muhallab “to undertake that which he had criticized Qutaybah for not fulfilling” and conquer Ṭabaristān himself.\textsuperscript{1788} Around this time then, in 98 AH/716 CE, the famous failed conquest of Ṭabaristān at the hands of Yazīd b. Muhallab took place.

In the two-year engagement of Muhallab’s forces with those of the ispahbud, both sides suffered tremendous loss.\textsuperscript{1789} When Muhallab had taken Gurgān and Tammīsha, according to Ibn Isfandiyār, the ispahbud retreated to the mountains, following the movement of Yazīd’s army to the west from the comfortable distance of the mountain highlands. Yazīd, therefore, was able to reach Sārī and take over the ispahbud’s palace. When the population of the region dispersed, the ispahbud himself contemplated fleeing to the Daylam in order to ask for aid. According to Ibn Isfandiyār, faced with the conquest of Muhallab’s army of his capital Sārī, which he himself had constructed,\textsuperscript{1790} the ispahbud went to his father in order to apprise him of his decision to go to the Daylam.\textsuperscript{1791} Here, therefore, we realize that by the time Yazīd b. Muhallab invaded Ṭabaristān, rule could have passed from one ispahbud, Dhu ‘l-Manāqib Farrukhān-i Bozorg, to his son Dādmihr, who also bore, naturally, the title of ispahbud. Alternatively, rule could simply have been shared between father and son during this period. From 673 to 716, therefore, we may be dealing with two generations of ispahbuds of the Āl-i Jāmāsp in control of Ṭabaristān. We shall further deal with this in a short while.\textsuperscript{1792} The ispahbud’s father, however, advised against taking refuge with the Daylam, for he argued to his son that at the moment he was still a great ruler with a strong army, and that this would all change were he to flee to the Daylam in despair. Besides, he argued, there was no guarantee of a positive reception on the part of the Daylam for greed might prompt them to side with the enemy as a result of the ispahbud’s weakness.\textsuperscript{1793} Instead, his father advised the ispahbud to ask the aid of the Daylam from a safe distance. The Daylam

\textsuperscript{1786}Ibn Isfandiyār 1941, p. 162.
\textsuperscript{1787}It is interesting to compare the pro-Muhallab account of Sahmī’s narrative in the Tārikh-i Jurjān wa Kītab Manṣaf ‘Ulmā ‘Abl Jurjān with the pro-Qutaybah tenor of that of Ibn Isfandiyār. See Pourshariati 1998.
\textsuperscript{1788}Ibn Isfandiyār 1941, p. 162.
\textsuperscript{1789}It is important to note that the army accompanying Muhallab also included contingents from Khurāsān and Transoxiana, and was, therefore, not a purely Arab army.
\textsuperscript{1790}Ibn Isfandiyār 1941, p. 77.
\textsuperscript{1791}Ibn Isfandiyār 1941, p. 162.
\textsuperscript{1792}See page 312ff.
\textsuperscript{1793}Ibn Isfandiyār 1941, p. 162.
responded favorably, and coming to the aid of the ispahbud, they surrounded the Arab army massacring 15,000 of them. On the promise of booty, the Turks on the eastern end of Tabaristan under the command of Sül also came to the aid of the ispahbud and attacked the Arab population of Gurgān, massacring all of them, including members of Muhallab’s family.

At the end of this period, therefore, Yazīd b. Muhallab complained to Hayyān al-Nabāṭī, a companion of his own tribe, that “it has been two years that we have been engaged in this ghazwa and jihād, and we cannot conquer the land single-handedly, and our people have lost their patience. No one accepts conversion. [Pray] seek a solution so that we can leave this region intact. We can take our vengeance on the population of Gurgān [in the future] and prepare ourselves for this on another occasion.” Hence, although Yazīd b. Muhallab established some settlements in Tabaristan and Gurgān during the two years of fighting between his forces and those of the ispahbud, he cannot be credited with establishing permanent settlements in Gurgān. So, while Sahmī claims that Muhallab established khitāt in Gurgān, Ibn Isfandīyār maintains that by the combined efforts of the ispahbud and his allies, at the end of this period, no Arab settlements were left in the region.

Chronology of Farrukhān-i Bozorg’s rule
A close reading of Ibn Isfandīyār can help clarify some chronological confusions. First of all, the rule of Farrukhān-i Bozorg does not commence at the inception of the Arab conquest of the region in 650–651 as hitherto believed, but, as we have seen, only around 673. Moreover, according Ibn Isfandīyār, a certain Farrukhān was the ispahbud of Tabaristan during the attack on the region by Yazīd b. Muhallab in 98 AH/716–717 CE. However, both a father and his son appear here as ispahbuds in the narrative, so that it is not clear whether we are dealing with Farrukhān-i Bozorg, or possibly his son Dādmihr. After Muhallab’s defeat, the ispahbud Farrukhān “once again reconstructed his realm and continued(?) (dar keshīd) to rule for seventeen years,” that is to say, until approximately 728 CE. After his death, his son Dādmihr then ruled for another

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1794 Ibn Isfandīyār 1941, p. 163:
دو سال گذشت تا بادن غزو و جهاد مشغول می‌شود. یک به دست ریست ما را مسلمان می‌کنند و مردم ما ستوت امده اند که مسلمانی قبیله می‌کند. هر طیفی از بادن و جاده به سلامتی از این ولایت بیرون شود و مکافایت‌های گران‌دنیادن سلامت و به نوبتی درگ می‌ناوت. این گرانخو رفته‌ام.

The rest of the story here is somewhat confused. The text clearly states that Yazīd b. Muhallab agreed to pay 300,000 dirhams in exchange for being given safe passage by the ispahbud, but then it maintains that the ispahbud returned the payment(?) (adā-i māl bikard). Ibid., p. 164. At any rate, Muhallab was not able to leave the territory with any booty. Ibid., p. 165.

1795 Note, in this connection, the author’s article Pourshariati 1998, where this claim was made.


1797 It is possible, of course, that the truth lies somewhere between these two traditions and that in fact a small colony of Arab settlers did end up settling in Gurgān.
twelve years, until about 740 CE. According to this chronology, Farrukhān-i Bozorg therefore ruled for 55 years, from circa 673 until 728.

We do in fact have coinage of the ispahbuds of Tabaristān commencing with the 60th year of Yazdgird III (93 AH/711 CE). The coins of the years 93–103 AH/711–721 CE carry the name Farrukh, while the coins of the period 103–110 AH/721–728 CE bear the name Farrukhān. Based on this numismatic evidence J. M. Unvala had suggested that we are probably dealing with two figures here. Madelung, siding with J. Walker, proposes that Unvala might have been mistaken, and that we are in fact dealing with one and the same person here, the 17 years of the totality of the coins corresponding to Ibn Isfandīyār’s contention that Farrukhān-i Bozorg ruled for seventeen years after Muhallab. Indeed, according to this chronology we just derived using the Tārīkh-i Tabaristān, these dates coincide remarkably well with the latter part of the reign of Farrukhān-i Bozorg.

Throughout Dādmihr’s twelve year long reign (circa 728–740), no soul coveted his realm according to Ibn Isfandīyār. That the author is referring to the Arabs here is clear from his subsequent remark: Until the end of the Umayyads no-one entered Tabaristān, for “the Muslims were preoccupied with revolts and the transfer of the caliphate.” For this Dādmihr, we also have coinage, corroborating once more our chronology based on Ibn Isfandīyār’s account: from the years 112 and 120–122 AH/730 and 738–740 CE. At his death in 741, Dādmihr’s son Khurshid was only a young child. Before his death therefore, Dādmihr entrusted his son to his brother Farrukhān-i Kūchak, making a contract with him that he should rule as a vice-regent until Khurshid became of age, at which time he should transfer the rule to the latter. Farrukhān-i Kūchak accepted and ruled as vice-regent for eight years, at which point, after a struggle with his cousins, Khurshid, the Sun-King, assumed the throne of Tabaristān, by Ibn Isfandīyār’s reckoning sometime in 749 CE.

1798 This, of course, is a rather unusually long reign, and so it might be the case that, as some part of Ibn Isfandīyār’s narrative seems to suggest, we are actually dealing with two generations during this period.

1799 Significantly the calendar of Tabaristān commences with the death of Yazdgird III, making the year one of the calendar 32 AH/652 CE. For this coinage see, Curiel, Raoul and Gyselen, Rika, Une collection de monnaies de cuivre Arabo-Sasanides, Paris, 1984 (Curiel and Gyselen 1984), pp. 49–56, as well as Madelung 2007a, and the sources cited therein.

1800 Madelung 2007a, p. 543.

1801 Madelung 2007a, p. 543.


1803 Ibn Isfandīyār 1941, p. 170.

1804 Madelung 2007a, p. 543.
4.5 Khurshid Shāh

The manner in which Khurshid regained his throne and subsequently ruled attests to the agnatic structure of rule that was the norm in the northern regions of the former Sasanian realm. In the face of his cousins' opposition to the transfer of rule to him, Khurshid obtained the aid of other members of his extended family, namely the three sons of Jushnas, the son of Sārūyih, the son of Farrukhān-i Bozorg, in other words, the sons of his paternal cousin. After taking the throne, Khurshid compensated the three brothers for their services: he gave Vandarand and Fahrān (Bahrām?) respectively the governorship of Āmul and Kuhistān (the highland), while keeping the third brother, Farrukhān, in his own service. A maternal cousin, one Shahrkhwāstān, was given the command of the army.

Through a long narrative Ibn Isfandīyār then details Khurshid's construction activities and the wealth of his realm. During Khurshid's reign, Tabaristān was heavily engaged in textile production, including silk, as well as in trade, for the Sun-King is said to have constructed bazaars, gathering therein all the tradesmen of Tabaristān, and caravansaries.

In fact, a burgeoning economy was already in place during the reign of Khurshid's grandfather, Farrukhān-i Bozorg, when among the products of Tabaristān there was silk, cotton, and wool textiles, besides the varied agricultural products of this rich and lush region of Iran. The bulk of the trade of Tabaristān, however, Ibn Isfandīyār informs us, was with the Bulghār and Saqasayn in Turkistān, most of it, it seems, being maritime trade via the Caspian Sea. It is rather certain, therefore, that a crucial dimension of Farrukhān-i Bozorg's friendship with Qutaybah was the mutual trade interests of the two parties in Transoxiana and Central Asia. Here then Ibn Isfandīyār provides us with further significant information about the saga of one of the Parthian dynastic families, the ambitious Kārins.

4.5.1 The spāhbed Kārīn

One of the spāhbeds of Khurshid's realm, according to Ibn Isfandīyār, was a certain Kārīn, who had enormous wealth and “four thousand soldiers, and who always sat on a golden throne and wore silk garments.” Kārīn's orders “were [also] incumbent upon the population under [the control of] the ispāhbūd [i.e., Khurshid].” His pretensions, however, grew over time, so much so that he became arrogant and did not pay the required deference to the other grandeses.

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1806 Ibn Isfandīyār 1941, p. 172. Fahrān is rendered Qahrān in Marashi 1966, p. 12. Madelung 2007a, p. 543. This Shahrkhwāstān was a much elder figure for already at the time of Farrukhān-i Bozorg, we see him, advanced in age, as an extremely powerful and wealthy figure who stood in opposition to the open door trade policies of Farrukhān-i Bozorg. Ibn Isfandīyār 1941, p. 77.
1807 Ibn Isfandīyār 1941, p. 172.
1808 The voyage of the ships to the latter location from Tabaristān is said to have taken three months and the return one week(!). Ibn Isfandīyār 1941, p. 81.
and elite of the realm. He became overbearing, oppressing people. 1809 “The population,” Ibn Isfandiyar recounts, “were awaiting an excuse for rebellion.” 1810 Here, significantly, during the reign of the Āl-i Jāmāsp Khurshid, the Sun-King, and immediately after the narrative on the power, wealth, and armed forces of the spahbed Kārin, when people were waiting an excuse for rebellion, begins Ibn Isfandiyar account of Sunbād’s rebellion. 1811

### 4.5.2 Sunbād’s murder

Ibn Isfandiyar narrates, that “as we have previously noted, 1812 the caliph Manṣūr killed Abū Muslim.” In Rayy, Sunbād heard of the news of the murder of Abū Muslim, and sending all of his treasury and cattle, together with six million dirhams as a personal gift, to Khurshid, rebelled against Manṣūr. 1813 After Sunbād’s defeat at the hands of Jawhar b. Marrār, so many of the followers of the rebel had been killed, according to Ibn Isfandiyar, that until the year 300 AH the remains of those slaughtered were still visible in the region of Rayy. In flight, Sunbād set out toward Tabaristān and took refuge with Khurshid. 1814

In an anecdotal story, Ibn Isfandiyar highlights the arrogance of Sunbād in dealing with one of the cousins of Khurshid, and indirectly therefore, with Khurshid himself. In this narrative, Khurshid sent a certain Tūs, his cousin on his father’s side, together with presents and gifts and horses, to the reception of Sunbād, somewhere between Tabaristān and Qūmis. 1815 When the two parties met, Tūs dismounted from his horse and paid his respects to Sunbād. In insolence, however, Sunbād did not reciprocate the respect, and continued to

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1809 Ibn Isfandiyar 1941, p. 173.
1810 Marashi 1966, pp. 12–14, Ibn Isfandiyar 1941, p. 173:

دل خلاص از او سرد و سواد شد و مردم برای عضبان بهبهان طلبیدند.

1811 For a more detailed account of this important rebellion, see §6.4.
1812 In a long exposition prior to this, Ibn Isfandiyar describes the caliph Manṣūr’s final move against Abū Muslim, the leader of the Abbāsid revolution (for more details see our discussion in §6.2). “I have never read,” Ibn Isfandiyar maintains, “a stranger story than that of Abū Muslim, for God almighty had given this peasant such submission (tamkīn) that he was able to fulfill such an arduous task which he had undertaken.” After he had overcome the Umayyads, Ibn Isfandiyar continues, Abū Muslim ordered his kātib, one ʿAbdalh. amīd, who was also his dabīr, to write a book narrating his exploits. The latter, who was a master of this art, accomplished the task, adding to it many fantastic elements (gharayib) and including all the shortcomings and internal and external states of affairs (ujr o bujr). Once finished, the book was so bulky that two men were needed in order to lift it. Abū Muslim, however, was not pleased with the account as ʿAbdalhamid had portrayed it, and so with an axe, he destroyed it and ordered the kātib to rewrite it. After swearing allegiance to Manṣūr, Ibn Isfandiyar continues, Abū Muslim was given permission to return to Khurāsān. Shortly thereafter, however, Manṣūr regretted this decision and ordered the latter to return. Abū Muslim had already passed Ḥulwān when the messenger of Manṣūr reached him in Rayy. He thus left his treasury, together with his representative (nāyīb) Sunbād in Rayy, and returned to the caliph. Ibn Isfandiyar 1941, pp. 166–167.

1813 We will discuss Sunbād’s revolt in greater detail in §6.4 below; for an elaboration on the significance of treasure in this context, see §6.4.1.
remain mounted on his horse. Tūs reminded Sunbād that he was a cousin of Khurshīd and that Sunbād’s behavior was unbecoming and disrespectful. Sunbād responded with even more arrogance, at which point Tūs beheaded him for all this arrogance.\footnote{Ibn Isfandīyār 1941, p. 174.} The ispahbūd Khurshīd is portrayed by Ibn Isfandīyār as being agitated and saddened over Tūs’s behavior and to have cursed the latter. Nevertheless, he conveniently seized the wealth that Sunbād had committed to his safe-keeping, and sent the head of Sunbād to the caliph Mansūr. Significantly, as we will see later,\footnote{Ibn Isfandīyār 1941, p. 175.} here Ibn Isfandīyār reiterates the story of the power and the arrogance of the spābbed Kārin.

### 4.5.3 Khurshīd’s death and the final conquest of Tabaristan

Manṣūr subsequently asked for the treasures of Abū Muslim and Sunbād, but Khurshīd denied possessing them. This, however, brought him into direct conflict with the caliphate.\footnote{Marashī 1966, pp. 12–14; Ibn Isfandīyār 1941, pp. 174–175.} In a series of correspondences with Manṣūr, Khurshīd finally agreed to pay the central administration the yearly kharāj (taxes) of Tabaristan, as it had been calculated in the period of the akāsīrih, that is to say, at the end of the Sasanian period. It is not clear what exactly had forced Khurshīd to have a turnabout in his dealings with the caliphate. Whatever it was, it was not deemed enough, for Manṣūr, having seen the kharāj of Tabaristan, became greedy and concocted a ruse to conquer Tabaristan.\footnote{Ibn Isfandīyār 1941, p. 175.} He had his son Mahdī, from his residence in Rayy, send a messenger to the ispahbūd Khurshīd to ask his aid in fighting Abū ‘l-Jabbār ‘Abdalrahmān, who had rebelled in Khurāsān. In his message, he asked permission for part of his army to pass through Tabaristan, under the excuse that, as that year was a year of drought, sustenance of the entire army could not be provided if they were all to proceed from a single road. Once the messenger, whose name is not given, but who is said to have been one of the sons of the ajam, had reached Khurshīd’s court, the zeal of the ajam (hāmiyat-i ajamiyat) forced him to warn Khurshīd of Manṣūr’s ruse. Khurshīd, however, was suspicious of the messenger and refused to give him an audience, at which point the messenger proclaimed that Fate had ordained that “all this pomp and bounty, together with the kingdom and edifice,” should be shattered.\footnote{Ibn Isfandīyār 1941, p. 175.}

Mahdī therefore sent an army under the command of Abū ‘l-Khāṣīb ‘Umar b. al-‘Alā,\footnote{Ibn Isfandīyār 1941, p. 175.} from the direction of Zārim and Abū ‘Awn b. ‘Abdalmalik from

\textit{اولمخصب عرب بن الاعناء را} كه وقفت دلاگان يكي را كشت بو د و ناه پا اش ته کرد. و مدتبا نمخت و دراين ولايت و قرفى يافت و مسالكا و مادر دانست و باز به لرک خلفه پيىست و قائد.}
the direction of Gurgan to the region. Khurshid, not suspecting the caliph, had withdrawn his forces and relocated the population so as to ensure that they would not be harmed by the Arab army passing through the region. Before he realized it, it was too late. Abū ’l-Khaṣib conquered Amul, made it his capital and called the population into submission. On account of the oppression that they ostensibly had experienced under Khurshid, and in order to maintain their property and possessions, one “group after another . . . the population accepted Islam.”

For two years and seven months the army of Islam stayed in the region and constructed houses, until Khurshid, together with 50,000 men set out against them. The spread of cholera at this point was apparently a major factor in the defeat of the forces of Khurshid. At the defeat of the Al-i Jāmāspid Khurshid, the Muslims were preoccupied with the transfer of booty for a whole week (haft shabānrūz māl naghl mikardand). Including in these were the daughters of Khurshid with beauty as “that of the moon.” One was given to ʿAbbās b. Muḥammad al-Hāshimi and named ʿUmmat al-Rahmān, and the other was given to the caliph. The sons of Khurshid were equally renamed from Hormozd, Vandād Hormozd, and Dādmihr, to Abū Hārūn Ḫisā, Mūsā, and ʿIbrāhim respectively. The rest of the haram was equally divided between the caliph’s sons and relatives. The ispābūd Khurshid, declaring that “after this there is no inclination to life and joy, and death is the very solace and respite itself,” allegedly committed suicide by taking poison. Thus ends the history of the house of the Sasanian Al-i Jāmāsp in Tabaristan. According to Ibn Isfandiyār, the “kingship of Jīl-i Jīlānshāh to that of Khurshid and his death was 119 years.”

“The first governor on behalf of the ʿAbbāsids,” Ibn Isfandiyār maintains, was Abū ’l-Khaṣib, and “the first construction that the Muslims made was the jāmī’-mosque of Sārī, in the year 144 of hijra.” Abū ’l-Khaṣib remained the governor of the region for two years. After him Abū Khuzaymah was sent, who also ruled for two years and “massacred many of the elite from among the Mazdeans (vujūh o aya’n-i gabrakān), until they sent Abū ’l-ʿAbbās Ṭūsī, who set up armed camps (masālīb) as follows.” Ibn Isfandiyār then proceeds to list 45 camps, together with the number of, presumably, armed men settled in them.
total of 29,100 men and (and women and children [?]) are listed here, the smallest armed camp having a population between two and three hundred, the average one 500, and the larger ones, between 1,000 and 1,500. It must be noted that there is no certainty that all of these settlers were of Arab ancestry or even Muslims. While some are specifically maintained to be Arabs, the population of other camps are called respectively Ṭūsās, Ṭabarīs, Khūrāsānis, Syrian, Khūrāsānis from Nisā and Abīvard, and men from Sughd, Khwārazm, Nisā and Abīvard. Other regional armies, the ethnic dimension of which is not specified, included those of Jazīra, Damascus and Nishāpūr, for example. Two camps belonging to Abū ‘l-Khašīb ʿUmar b. al-ʿAlā with no other population listed, are also mentioned. In one of these the governor is said to have resided, and “the population (avvām) visited it believing him to be a Companion of the Prophet.” This, therefore, constituted the beginning of a systematic colonization of Ṭabaristān by the Muslims.

Our narrative of the history of the Sasanians in the late antique period will not be complete, however, unless we turn our attention to a whole different dimension of this history, namely, the spiritual landscape of the Sasanians and their subjects. For as we shall see in this second part of our study, the agnatic structure of Sasanian society entailed that the Pārsīg–Pahlav dichotomy also replicated itself in the spiritual realm. Furthermore, the whole series of revolts that erupted in the Pahlav dominions at the inception of the ʿAbbāsid revolution cannot be properly understood before we have undertaken this analysis.

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1827 Ibn Isfandiyār 1941, p. 179.
1829 Ibn Isfandiyār 1941, p. 179.
1830 Ibn Isfandiyār 1941, pp. 179 and 180 respectively.
1831 For while during the past two decades, specialists in the field have made tremendous inroads in their assessment of Sasanian religious history, the non-specialist’s perspective on this history continues to be informed by the Christensenian thesis. In what follows we shall attempt not only to give a synopsis of recent research in the field, but also to put forth our own analysis.
1832 See Chapter 5, especially §5.3.3.
1833 See Chapter 6.
Part II

Religious Currents
CHAPTER 5

Sasanian religious landscape

5.1 Post-Avestan period

For a long period prior to the advent of the Sasanians, the Iranian religious landscape was characterized by a remarkably heterogeneous medley of beliefs and spiritual inclinations. During what Mary Boyce has termed the post-Avestan period, spanning from the end of the fourth century BCE to the early third century CE, and corresponding to the Seleucid and Arsacid dynasties, the authorities did not seek to impose centralized control over religious matters and so conditions were set for the development of regional variations in the spiritual landscape of Iran. While the Avestan communities seem to have retained only a vague memory of the birthplace of Zoroaster in some distant place in northeastern Iran, for example, it seems to have been during this post-Avestan period that local traditions concerning the birthplace of the prophet were advanced in the Zoroastrian communities of various regions in Iran. 

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1834 Unless otherwise noted the following discussion is indebted to Boyce, Mary, Zoroastrianism: Its Antiquity and Constant Vigour, Costa Mesa, 1992 (Boyce 1992), p. 10.

1835 For the Seleucids, see footnote 75; for the Arsacids, see §1.1.

1836 After Alexander’s conquest, “when the priests of each province rallied from the carnage and destruction of the conquest, they pursued, it seems, independent courses, maintaining only fraternal links with one another.” Boyce 1979, p. 79. The regionalism fostered during the Seleucid and Arsacid periods also affected the development of the regional Aramaic scripts in the courts of various provinces. This development, in turn, led to the formation of distinctive scripts in all of the main provinces. Some of the known versions of these scripts are Parthian, Middle Persian, Median, Sogdian and Khwarezmian. The reign of Narseh (293–302) seems to have been the last period in which the Sasanians used the Parthian language in their official inscriptions. Thereafter they presumably attempted to impose Persian “as the sole official language throughout Iran, and forbade altogether the use of written Parthian.” Nevertheless, the fact that “a few short private inscriptions in Parthian language and script have been found on rock-faces in southern Khorasan, that is, within the territory of Parthia proper” seems to indicate that this language was still patronized in territories under dynastic Parthian control, even though among the aforementioned inscriptions “it is thought that none is later than the fourth century.” Boyce 1979, pp. 80 and 116. See, however, our discussion on page 460.

1837 For the latest work on the ongoing controversy on the date of Zoroaster, see Kingsley, Peter, ‘The Greek Origin of the Sixth-Century Dating of Zoroaster’, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 37, (1990), pp. 245–265 (Kingsley 1990), who, by one reckoning, has put the notion of a sixth-century BCE date for Zoroaster to rest.
with other aspects of Iranian social history, the topographical landscape of Iran facilitated centrifugal tendencies in the Iranian religious landscape. Regional communities came to vie with each other over claims to precedence and sanctity in Zoroastrian history. The Atropateneans, the Sístánis, the Bactrians, and finally the Medes, each co-opted the long-forgotten legends of the birthplace of Zoroaster into the traditions of their localities.\footnote{Boyce 1992, p. 10.} There was besides these the religious tradition of Persis, which pitted itself sometimes against Atropatene (Azarbayjân), sometimes against Parthava.\footnote{Eddy 1961, pp. 79–80.} The post-Avestan period also gives testimony to religious practices that had remained outside the Mazdean fold. Chief among these was demon-worship (dev-worship), a practice that continued to haunt the coalescing Zoroastrian clergy well into the Sasanian period. The ancient Indo–Iranians believed both in beneficent gods and spirits and a number of hostile supernatural beings and malignant spirits. At some point in their history however, they parted ways, leading to the well-known inversion of the Indo–Iranian gods, the daêvas, into the “principal agents of evil … [whom Zoroaster conceived] as adverse gods” and target of his denunciation.\footnote{According to Yarshater, it is not possible to determine with certainty the phases of this development in terms of time, or to say how much of it was due to Zoroaster’s reform. From the Gáthás it appears that some Iranian tribes worshipped daêvas or practiced their propitiation. Yarshater, Ehsan, ‘Iranian Common Beliefs and World-View’, in Ehsan Yarshater (ed.), \textit{Cambridge History of Iran: The Seleucid, Parthian, and Sasanian Periods}, vol. 3(1), pp. 343–359, Cambridge University Press, 1983a (Yarshater 1983a), p. 347.} It was a hallmark of Zoroaster’s teaching, or those propagated by his followers, that demons and malignant creatures, as well as their worshippers, “all followers of Drug, falsehood, became ever more sharply contrasted with divine beings.” Angra Mainyu (Ahriman) became the creator of these demonic creatures.\footnote{Yarshater 1983a, p. 347.}

Despite this, the post-Avestan period continued to breed evil-worship. In the Zoroastrian confession of faith, the \textit{Fravarsânê}, the recantation of demons forms one of the central dogmas of the faith.\footnote{Yarshater 1983a, p. 347.} In the \textit{Videvdâd} (The Law against Demons, \textit{Vendidad}), besides Nasu, the Demon of Death, several other demons, including Indra, are listed.\footnote{See for instance \textit{Vendidad} 1880, \textit{Vendidad}, vol. 4 of \textit{Sacred Books of the East}, Oxford University Press, 1880, translated by James Darmesteter (\textit{Vendidad} 1880), §19, 43–47; Yarshater 1983a, p. 347.} Pahlavi literature, most of which reflects—besides its own milieu of production, that is, the late Sasanian and post-conquest period of Iranian history—ancient practices, is practically obsessed with these. The \textit{Dênkard}, the encyclopedia of Mazdean knowledge, dating to the ninth or tenth century,\footnote{While in its extant form the \textit{Dênkard} dates to the Islamic period, “it is apparent that the whole work, with the exception of Books III and V, represents the religious knowledge available to an educated Mazdean during the Sasanian era.” Containing about one quarter of copious summaries of the Avestan Nasks (books), as well as chapters on Mazdean theology, moral precepts, the legend} gives detailed evidence of the rites of dev-worshippers, of how they
“prowled around in great secrecy,” kept their abode, “body and clothes in a state of filthiness and stench,” and of their “chanting services to the demons.”

The post-Avestan period also saw the establishment of Jewish and Christian communities in Iran. The legacy of tolerance during the Arsacid period seems to have provided a very favorable situation for the Jewish communities, so much so that the rise of the Sasanians occasioned fear and apprehension among the rabbis. As for the Christian communities in Iran during the Arsacid period, it has been observed that “in view of the time necessary to establish even a fairly small community, Christian communities . . . [came to exist in Iran] from the beginning of the 2nd century [and that from this period onward] . . . these communities consolidated themselves by some form of organization.”

As “tolerance was used as a political principle, or merely because of religious indifference,” it has been argued furthermore that “the Parthian period was characterized by peace and quiet for non-Zoroastrian minorities.” All are in agreement that the Arsacids, of whose actual religious beliefs and practices we have scant knowledge, did little to impose an orthodoxy, whatever the nature of this might have been. And so in the post-Avestan period, the Iranian religious landscape came to be dominated by a bewildering array of religious beliefs and practices. This is a primary dimension of the post-Avestan religious landscape about which there is little disagreement in the scholarly community.


As Kreyenbroek maintains, “regional priesthoods enjoyed a large measure of independence during these [i.e., post-Avestan] periods.” Kreyenbroek, Philip G., ‘Spiritual Authority in Zoroastrianism’, Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 17, (1994), pp. 1–16 (Kreyenbroek 1994). While “the ideal of a hierarchically structured priesthood headed by a supreme pontiff was present in early Zoroastrianism, and while the local ratu presumably had extensive powers, there can have been no question [during the post-Avestan period] . . . of a Church united under an uninterrupted line of generally recognized authoritative pontiffs.” Kreyenbroek 1994, pp. 3–5. In the Pahlavi books of the Sasanian period the word dastwar (dastur) is used for rendering the Avestan ratu. Every believer was expected to have a dastwar who guided him or her. The dastwar could delegate his authority to a priest under him, but he himself “had to recognize the authority of a superior dastwar.” Ibid., pp. 7–8. Choosing the right dastwar seems to have been of crucial importance for the “the teachings and judgments of various dastwars could differ materially from one another.” Ibid., p. 9. Emphasis mine. Three accepted teachings (chāštāq) are mentioned in a number of Pahlavi books which the dastwar was expected to follow, but strong evidence suggests that “the limits of the dastwars’
5.2 Orthodoxy – Heterodoxy

5.2.1 Two pillars: the monarchy and the clergy?

The incredible variety of religious practices that constituted the religious landscape of Iran in the post-Avestan period needs to be kept in mind in any appreciation of the subject during the Sasanian period. Until recently, our efforts in this direction were hampered by the long-established paradigm of church-state collaboration in Sasanian studies, and the concomitant theory that the Zoroastrian church, as the orthodox creed, had entrenched itself in Sasanian society. Both aspects of this theory had their base in the ideology promoted by the Sasanians themselves, an ideology that forcefully articulated itself only late in the Sasanian period but which justified itself in reference to the presumed practices of the first Sasanian monarchs. A detailed articulation of it is contained in the famous late Sasanian document, the Testament of Ardashīr, but attributed to the first Sasanian king Ardāshīr I: “Know that kingship and religion are twins; one cannot exist without the other, for religion is the foundation of royalty and the king is the defender of religion.”

Up until recently, this image of a strong and forceful clerical tradition, which, in unison with the monarchy, and according to the ideology of the two pillars of the state, forced upon the believers a strict doctrinal spirituality, was received wisdom in Sasanian studies.

More recent scholarship, however, has argued that this image reflects more the propagandistic endeavors of the clergy and the monarchy, articulated late in the Sasanian and early in the post-conquest period, than the reality of the religious landscape in Iran during the Sasanian period. It has even been suggested that the notion that “the early Sasanian Church . . . was dominated by the supremacy of the King of Kings . . . [and that] the first steps for the foundation of a State Church” were taken during the reign of Ardāshīr I, was nothing but a conscious reconstruction of Sasanian history in later times. The very idea of royalty and religion as twins has been shown to be a literary theme of “regretted authority was not always clearly delineated and the existence of the Teachings of equal validity . . . gave lower-ranking dastwars a considerable degree of independence.”

What is of practical importance for us, however, is that as long as this system “was based predominantly on an oral tradition, the practical limitations of such a tradition made it impossible for the highest authorities to control the teachings of local or regional dastwars, except when these were felt to pose a serious threat to the integrity of the faith or the unity of the Church.”

This situation gave considerable authority to the local and regional dastwars over their followers. It is important to note that Kreyenbroek’s whole study is meant to argue the case for the influence that such a structure of religious authority, especially the roles of the dastwar and their disciples (hāwisht), might have had on the Muslim Iranian, especially Shi’ite Iranian attitude toward spiritual authority and the rise of the ulamā, who are “the Islamic counterparts of the Zoroastrian dastwars.”

happy bygone mythical times . . . or the aspiration of an eschatological future,” developed not during the Sasanian period but in the later Islamic periods.\footnote{Although the theme itself can be found in the ancient Indo–Iranian mythology of the twins, the first king (\textit{Yemo}) and the first priest (\textit{Manu}). Gnoli 1989, pp. 138–139, n. 13.} It has been argued convincingly, moreover, that the theories that seek to glorify “the task of the Sasanian kings in establishing a new Zoroastrian church structure and in creating a theocratic state adhering to the Zoroastrian faith” are but exaggerated views of a much more nuanced religio-political landscape.\footnote{Shaked, Shaul, \textit{Dualism in Transformation: Varieties of Religion in Sasanian Iran}, vol. 16 of \textit{Jordan Lectures in Comparative Religion}, London, 1994a (Shaked 1994a), p. 1.} The Sasanians did attempt to “gain control of the religious establishment by elevating certain priests to high positions, by using religious language and by making generous endowments for religious purposes, but the fusion of state and religion was probably a mere slogan, flaunted by the kings in one direction and by the priests in another, rather than a reality.”\footnote{Shaked 1994a, p. 2.}

Propaganda, of course, is precisely that: the effort to reconstruct reality so as to give an image of factuality. There are a number of problems with the late Sasanian \textit{topos} of the two pillars of the state. To begin with, and even granting some credibility to this \textit{topos}, it has been observed that the Sasanian effort at creating the image of a national church, and a political ideology that postulated the monarchy’s cooperation with the clergy, does not necessarily mean that the monarchical–clerical relationship was always characterized by harmony and close cooperation. On the contrary, the insistence upon an alliance between the throne and altar that infuses the Sasanian national ideology also gives “proof of the opposite: it states an ideal need, it is the reflection of an ideology and not of a historical reality.”\footnote{Gnoli 1989, p. 165.} Scholars of Sasanian history are generally unanimous in observing that political expediency and not adherence to any particular religious dogma dictated the Sasanian monarchs’ relationship vis-à-vis other faiths through most of their history. This can be observed in the Sasanian kings’ relationships toward the Jewish and Christian minorities within their realms.\footnote{Asmussen 1983, p. 933. See also §5.2.8 below.} As far as the state’s relationship with the national church was concerned, moreover, a close scrutiny of the sources reveals that it was as often, and perhaps more often, characterized by belligerence than congeniality. As Gnoli has observed, it is “in terms of forces not always allied and often opposed, that the question of relations between the Church and the State should be considered.”\footnote{Gnoli 1989, p. 169.} All this is evident in Shāpūr I’s (241–272) initial predilection toward Mānī,\footnote{According to the \textit{Dēnkard}, when Shāpūr I attempted to collect the “writings from the Religion which had been dispersed [presumably by Alexander]”, he also gathered treaties on “medicine, astronomy, movement, time, space, substance, creation, becoming, passing away, change in quality, growth (?), and other processes and organs. These he added to (?) the Avesta.” Boyce observes that} Yazdgird I’s (399–420) amicable relations with the Christians,
Qubād’s (488–531) initial support of Mazdak, and finally the belligerent relationship of Hormozd IV (579–590) with the Zoroastrian clergy, all of which are only the most acute examples of a volatile relationship. In assessing church-state relations during the Sasanian period it is also prudent to remember that the history of the Zoroastrian church as a monarchy-independent, hierarchically organized church dates only to the fifth century CE, a factor that brings us to the notion of a monolithic Mazdean orthodoxy.

As Bausani has observed, “recent studies have progressively complicated the religious panorama of pre-Islamic Iran, showing that we are not dealing—as some believed when these studies started in Europe—with one Iranian religion, but with various religions or types of religiosity characteristic of one or another branch of the Iranian family.” Besides the religious practices that fell outside the Mazdean fold during the Sasanian period, therefore, we have to reckon with the fact that as the names of the months and days, as well as on coins, crowns, and reliefs of the Sasanian kings bear witness, “Mazdaism was not restricted to the cult of Mazda and the beneficent immortals [Amahraspands].”

Besides Ahūra Mazdā (Ormuzd), one may mention three other important gods worshipped during the Sasanian period: Mihr (Mithra), Anāhītā, and Bahram (Wahrām). While many Sasanian kings were invested by Ahūra Mazdā, many others received their investiture from other gods. To give but one example, a new interpretation of the controversial investiture scene of Shāpūr II at Taq-i Bustān argues convincingly that not only Ahūra Mazdā but also Mithra is depicted in the relief bestowing Divine Glory on the king.

The notion that Sasanian Mazdeism was not a monolithic bloc is corroborated by the fact that it is precisely to non-Mazdean sources that we have to resort in order to get a sense of the complexity of the religious landscape of

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1862 See §5.3.1 below.
1864 For Bahram, the god of Victory, see page 411 below.
1865 Duchesne-Guillemin 1983, pp. 902–903. Also see Soudavar, Abolala, *The Aura of the Kings: Legitimacy and Divine Sanction in Iranian Kingship*, vol. 11 of *Bibliotheca Iranica, Intellectual Traditions Series*, 1980 (Soudavar 1980), pp. 48–66. The author would like to express her deep gratitude to Mr. Soudavar for providing her with a copy of his excellent work, although she does reserve judgment about some of his arguments.
1866 Soudavar 1980, pp. 49–52 and nn. 121–129, as well as fig. 46, p. 158.
Iran during the Sasanian period.\footnote{Gnoli 1989, pp. 166–167.} The Christian sources in fact often give us a picture of a Mazdeism more pre-occupied with what has been unfortunately termed nature worship, that of sun, fire, and water, with Mihr and Anāhītā as the foremost deities, than with a moralizing Ahūrā Mazdā as the sole object of worship. The worship of Mihr and Anāhītā in fact is even “documented by official iconography . . . which has no counterpart in subsequent Zoroastrian literature.” Add to this the worship of Nāna, Ba’al, and Nabu “or the bloody worship of Lady Anāhīd in Staxr . . . [and] compare all this with the picture of the Good Religion that is got, for instance, from the [Dēnkard, and] we become aware that there is quite a considerable discrepancy” between later mōbadic propaganda and actual practice.\footnote{Gnoli 1989, p. 165.}

5.2.2 Kirdīr

From the very beginnings of their reign the Sasanians had to contend with the multifarious religious landscape that they had inherited from the Arsacids. This much comes across clearly from the inscriptions of the Sasanian high priest Kirdīr,\footnote{For Kirdīr and a bibliography of the works on his inscriptions see Gignoux, Philippe, Les quatre inscriptions du mage Kirdīr: textes et concordances, vol. 9 of Studia Iranica, Fribourg-en-Brisgau, 1991c (Gignoux 1991c); and Malandra, W.W., ‘Review of Gignoux’s Les quatre inscriptions du mage Kirdīr’, Journal of the American Oriental Society 113, (1993), pp. 288–289, review of Gignoux 1991c (Malandra 1993).} which provide some of the earliest evidence at our disposal on the religious landscape of Sasanian society. Kirdīr, who seems to have functioned as a priest and eventually a high priest from the reign of the first Sasanian monarch, Ardashīr I (224–241 CE), through the reign of Bahram II (276–293), was also one of the most prolific Sasanian priests: he left his marks in four great inscriptions—more than most kings—intended for public display,\footnote{For the significance of Kirdīr’s attempt at prominently displaying his inscriptions at venues intended for public consumption, see page 329 below.} on rock carvings at Sar Mashhad (KSM), Naqsh-i Rostam (KNRm), Ka’ba-i Zartusht (KKZ), and Naqsh-i Rajab (KKRb). In these, he recorded the “deeds of a powerful career and the multitude of titles he received from a succession of appreciative monarchs.”\footnote{Russell 1990a, p. 181. The text of the Ka’ba-i Zartusht (KKZ) inscription is the best preserved and was the last to be discovered in 1936. With some variations, the inscriptions seem to consist of identical texts. For an attempt at dating these, see Gignoux 1983; Gignoux 1991c, pp. 45–48, 53–73.}

Kirdīr’s inscriptions are a testimony to the efforts that he presumably undertook to establish orthodoxy not only in Iran but also “in the land of non-Iran reached by the horses and men of the King of Kings.”\footnote{Duchesne-Guillemin 1983, p. 878.} In Iran, Kirdīr boasts of founding a number of Bahram (Wahrām) fires,\footnote{Three kinds of fires have been distinguished during the Sasanian period: the Atakhsh Warahrān (Bahram fires), a general category called Atakhsh without particularization, and a third kind named twrlwk. These are thought to resemble the categories of fires still existing among the Parsis in} and of bringing the “many
who held the doctrines of the demons” over to “the worship of gods.” He speaks of destroying images, which are the adversary of the Bahram fires, and establishing in their stead said fires.\textsuperscript{1874} As Boyce points out, however, the Sasanian campaign of active iconoclasm was long drawn out. For “cases involving the removal of statues still occur in the sixth-century law book, the M\={a}d\={i}g\={a}n-i Haz\={a}r D\={a}dest\={a}n.”\textsuperscript{1875} As for dev-worship, even Boyce admits that it appears “in fact to have persisted in certain remote regions (notably mountainous parts of Sogdiana) down to the time of the Islamic conquest.” One, therefore, is not entitled, argues Boyce, to infer from the evidence that “the early Sasanians succeeded all at once in sweeping an Aegean stable clean.”\textsuperscript{1876}

Besides subduing sectarians, Kirdir also boasts of persecuting members of minority religions such as the “Jews, Buddhists and Brahmans and Aramaic and Greek-speaking Christians and Baptizers and Manicheans.”\textsuperscript{1877} Kirdir’s words resemble those of another high priest of the early Sasanian period, Tansar (Tosar), whose testimonies have come down to us in a redacted form in a sixth century document known as the Letter of Tansar.\textsuperscript{1878} It has been cogently argued, however, that the generally held view of the Sasanians as the patrons of a systematizing and orthodox Zoroastrian church, the rigorous Sasanian political and religious propaganda, with its archaizing dimensions, in fact the very workings of this attempt at uniformity—as reflected for example in the testimonies of the high priest Kirdir and the Letter of Tansar—are perhaps more a reflection of the uncertainty of the times and the Sasanian struggle with religio-political issues than a genuine reflection of the actual state of affairs. As Shaked observes, “[t]he violence unleashed from time to time against . . . [Manicheism and Christianity] is proof enough of the feeling of insecurity on the part of the majority religion, and probably also of the fascination which these alternative modes of piety offered to many Zoroastrian believers.”\textsuperscript{1879}

\textsuperscript{1874} Duchesne-Guillemin 1983, pp. 878–879.

\textsuperscript{1875} The iconoclasm of the Sasanians, as Boyce points out, was only directed against the use of cult statues, “for they themselves continued to represent the yazatas of Zoroastrianism, including Ohrmuzd, in anthropomorphic fashion.” In fact, the iconography of the Arsacid period continued throughout the Sasanian reign. Boyce 1979, p. 107.

\textsuperscript{1876} “Iran was too vast a country, and open to too many currents of belief, for the state religion ever to obliterate all other creeds.” Boyce 1979, p. 115. Emphasis added.

\textsuperscript{1877} Boyce 1992, p. 142.

\textsuperscript{1878} See §2.5.2 for a more detailed discussion of the Letter of Tansar.

\textsuperscript{1879} Shaked, Shaul, ‘Quests and Visionary Journeys in Sasanian Iran’, in Jan Assmann and Guy G.
The literary topos of a religious and philosophical quest, which was current during this period, provides an apt reflection of the times. In this literature the central and recurring motif is that of an individual who travels the world and observes the tenets of different faiths in search of wisdom and the ability to ascertain the truth behind the plurality of creeds. The Dādīstān i Mēnog Khrad, the Shkand Gumānık Vizār, the works of Mānī, and finally the autobiographical sketch by Bozorg-Mehr contained in the introduction to the Arabic Kalīla wa Dimna, all exhibit an acute awareness of the plurality of faiths, and the admission that no single faith can be considered to have a monopoly on the ultimate spiritual Truth. Another phenomenon examined by Shaked is the popular currency of undertaking an internal journey, a journey undertaken to the other world to obtain firm faith.

Kirdır’s journey to the hereafter

Perhaps the most extraordinary testimony to the uncertainty of the times in spiritual matters is contained in the work of the same figure whose purported endeavors to establish Zoroastrian orthodoxy have gained him infamy in Sasanian studies, namely the high priest Kirdır. As Shaked observes, the contents of Kirdır’s journey, which appear on monuments placed on highways—and thus present personal reflections that are meant to serve a public aim—cannot be deciphered in detail, due to unfamiliar terminology as well as poor preservation. Nonetheless, they provide a fascinating clue to the doubt and anxiety felt about the hereafter by a figure who had achieved infamy as the persecutor of heterodoxy and minority faiths in the nascent Sasanian empire. In these inscriptions, Kirdır is depicted undertaking a journey to the hereafter in order to bring back reports concerning Heaven and Hell. He is represented by a figure in his likeness and is accompanied by a woman, “probably representing his own self (an idea that in other texts is known by the term Den).” Along the way Kirdır sees deadly persons in different scenes. While the details of Kirdır’s journey are not very clear, their intent seems obvious: the “inscriptions [reflect] the doubt and anxiety felt about the hereafter.” The high Zoroastrian

1884 See also Bausani 2000, pp. 26–27.
1885 This idea of having a twin is also attested in Manicheism where Mānī is said to have received his revelation from a spirit twin. It is not unique to Manicheism either for “men and gods all [were thought to have] had them.” See Russell 1990a.
1886 Shaked 1999, pp. 72–73.
priest of the early Sasanian period “feels the need to achieve a vision of [the hereafter] through piety and good deeds and report what he has seen for the edification of his contemporaries and the following generations.”

Through the picture that is presented by Kirdır, in fact, one can grasp the potential complexity of the religious scene during the Sasanian period, a complexity reflected in a religious panorama in which a variety of Zoroastrian religions are competing with Judaism, Christianity, Manicheism, not to mention Buddhism and various Gnostic sects. The currency of the idea of a spiritual journey during the period under consideration is also evidenced in the accounts on Máni’s experience, where this third century Mazdean heretic is said to have been “not only in contact with the spirit world in an intimate way; [but also] to have travelled there and taken others with him.”

The prevalence of visionary journeys, however, was not confined to the early Sasanian period. The Ardā Wirāz Nāma (The Book of the Righteous Wirāz) exhibits a similar concern with the ability of select individuals to undertake a journey into the hereafter and view the invisible world, mēnōg. Only select individuals, after preparation—usually in the form of taking a dose of mang (hemp mixed with wine)—were able to undertake it. The journey was fraught with danger. After all, one journeyed to the realm of the dead and experienced temporary death as a result. It is important to note that, as Shaked observes, the “vision of [mēnōg] comes up again and again in Pahlavi literature.” One striking feature of the Pahlavi and early Islamic literature is that they are in fact “practically obsessed with descriptions of visions of the hereafter. To the classical monument of visionary experience, the Ardā Wirāz Nāma, one could add the opening chapters of the book of the Spirit of Wisdom and visions of the Amahraspands [which] are alluded to quite frequently in the Pahlavi books, together with the discussion of the possibility of seeing [mēnōg], or the organ which is set aside for this kind of vision, the eye of the soul.”

1887 Shaked 1999, p. 73.
1888 See Russell 1990a, p. 184, where he outlines the shamanistic nature of Kirdır’s voyage and argues for such a probability also in Máni’s case.
1891 For a further discussion of the Ardā Wirāz Nāma, see §6.3.1.
1892 Shaked 1994a, p. 46. It must be noted, however, that some controversy seems to exist as to whether or not one can consider Kirdır’s vision, as well as those in the Ardā Wirāz Nāma, visionary experiences, a claim which apparently would imply shamanistic tendencies in Iranian religions. Opposition to this view is expressed by W. Malandra, who maintains that “the existence of anything like shamanism for ancient Iranian religions remains, at the very best, a weak hypothesis.” Malandra 1993. Kirdır, it has been maintained, “never really had a vision; instead matters concerning the fate of the departed are reported by mediums.” See Gignoux 1991c, p. 289, and Skjærvø, O., ‘Kirdır’s Vision: Translation and Analysis’, Archäologische Mitteilungen aus Iran 16, (1983), pp. 296-
Mânî

It is not incidental, in the framework of religious developments in this period, or as far as the religious history of Iran is concerned, that the same period during which the Sasanian priest Kirdîr was active, was also the heyday of the heretic Mânî. Neither is it incidental that throughout the reign of Shâpûr I (241–272), both Kirdîr and Mânî vied for the influence with the king, in one instance both accompanying him on his military expeditions. According to one tradition, Mânî was not only present at the coronation of Shâpûr I in 241 CE, but also delivered his first speech on that occasion. During Shâpûr I’s reign, Manicheans were given full liberty to proselytize, with Mânî himself spending a “long time in the royal suite.” Mânî also made extensive missionary trips to the east. Colpe attributes Shâpûr I’s support for Mânî to the “preservation of an Iranian frame of doctrine” in his ideas, and his later persecution to a sudden change in his doctrines. Those who claim Zurvanism to have been a heretical Mazdean theology even consider the age of Shâpûr I to have been dominated by it. There is also anecdotal evidence that Shâpûr I “must obviously have been influenced by sorcerers or devil-worshippers.”

Hormozd I’s yearlong rule (272–273) saw Kirdîr’s rise to power. His rank catapulted from that of ērpât (berbad), which “implies no superiority over subordinates,” to that of magûpât (môbad), chief of the magi. On Hormozd I’s coins, therefore, Ahûrâ Mazdâ takes the place of Mithra and Anâhîtâ. Kirdîr’s control over state affairs had become such that, according to some, he was probably responsible for the accession of Bahram I (273–276) to the throne instead of the elder brother of Hormozd I, Narseh (293–302). He seems to have enjoyed tremendous power at Bahram I’s court, so much so that the King “delivered Mânî into his [i.e., Kirdîr’s] hands. Mânî died in prison and his religion was persecuted, which, according to one account, proves both the strength

306 (Skjærvø 1983). For the purposes of the present argument, however, whether or not Kirdîr’s experiences were visionary are not as relevant as the reflections that they give of his preoccupation with the hereafter.

1893 Zaehner 1972, p. 36.
1894 Zaehner 1972, p. 36.
1895 When the Manichean evangelizer Mar ‘Ammo was dispatched to the east to preach there, he had a “difficult interview with the local goddess who refused to let him in, saying she had enough religions to deal with already . . . [So] the missionary prayed before the Sun for two days.” Russell 1990a, p. 185.
1897 See §5.2.4.
1898 Zaehner 1972, passim.
1899 Zaehner 1972, pp. 34–36. Other deities also continued to be important during Shâpûr I’s reign, like the cult of Anâhîtâ, whose temple in îstakhîr the reputed ancestor of the Sasanians, Sâsân, presided as a priest. Shâpûr I, for example, called his daughter and queen Adur Anâhîd, “Fire . . . Anâhîd . . . a dvandva name, from the name of two deities.” Ṭabarî 1999, p. 4, n. 10.
of state religion and Kirdır’s influence on the king of kings.” It is significant, however, that this religious zealot of the early Sasanian period, who is said to have recklessly striven to “establish Zoroastrianism as a state religion at the expense of his opponent Mānī,” while leaving numerous inscriptions “is not mentioned among the outstanding religious personalities such as Tōsar/Tansar (under Ardašir I), Āṭurpāt/Ādurād-ī Mahrspānd (under Šābuhr II), or Weh-Šābuhr (under Husraw I) in the late Middle Persian literature; . . . even in Manichean literature he is barely alluded to, let alone named, which is strange for someone who apparently had Mānī sentenced to death under Wahrām I in 276 CE.”

During the reign of Bahrām II (276–293), Kirdır’s influence reached its apex. His picture appears on the king’s reliefs at Naqsh-i Rajab (KKRb), Sar Mashhad (KSM), Naqsh-i Rostam (KNRm), and possibly at Barm-i Delak, the last being Bahrām II’s only investiture relief. A host of honorific titles, judge of the empire (advēnpat), master of rites, and finally ruler (patikhāy) of the fire of Anāhīt-Ardashir at Stakhr and of Lady Anahit, are bestowed on Kirdır by the king. His power, at least of persuasion over the king, is said to have been such that for the first time since the advent of the Sasanians, the “all-important ecclesiastical title [of ruler of Anāhīt’s temple] became detached from the royal power.” In the inscriptions from the reigns of Bahrām II and Bahrām III (293), therefore, Kirdır boasts, among other things, that through his efforts, the “affairs of Ohrmozd and the gods prospered; and the Mazdayasnian religion and the Magian hierarchy received great honor . . . [that] Ahriman and the demons were struck down(?) and their teaching was expelled from the empire . . . [that] Jews, Buddhists, Brahmans, two sorts of Christians [!], Manichees and Zandiks were chastised . . . idols were destroyed and the dwellings of the demons undone(?) . . . [and that finally] fires were established throughout the realm, and the Magians prospered.”

For all Kirdır’s boastings, however, his claims to having subdued various

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1902 See §5.2.2.

1903 See §5.2.3.

1904 Huyse 1999b, pp. 109–110. Huyse also argues that while Shāpūr I’s inscriptions were most probably set up sometime between 260 and 262, Kirdır’s inscriptions “were all written during the reign of Wahrām II (276–293), who is named in all four inscriptions.” It seems likely, though not provable, therefore, Huyse argues, that all the inscriptions were set up toward the end of Bahrām II’s life. All in all, a time gap of some thirty years between the engraving of Shāpūr I’s (SKZ) and Kirdır’s inscriptions (KKZ) on the Karba is quite “within the bounds of probability.” Ibid., p. 112.


1906 See §5.2.5.

heresies bear witness in fact to the prevalence of these heresies during the third century. The spiritual panorama that they compose, furthermore, is as multifaceted as that which the Sasanians had inherited from the post-Avestan age. More than three-quarters of a century had passed since the inception of Sasanian power. Yet if the inscriptions of Kirdir are any reflection of reality—they were, after all, cast in stone—the impression they give is that of a continuing heterogeneous religious landscape.

As we have seen, the only doctrine of faith that is actually reflected in Kirdir’s inscriptions at Sar Mashhad (KSM) and Naqsh-i Rajab (KKRb), is the belief in the hereafter. It has been aptly observed that “this does not go very far to define Kardir’s position in relation to heresy.” Significantly, since Kirdir expresses himself “only in Middle-Persian, the language of Persis, not as the kings of the 3rd century, in Parthian, Middle Persian, and Greek,” he might have been promoting the religious tradition of Persis over that of Shiz in Azarbayjan.

After two decades of presumed monarchical–clerical cooperation, through the reigns of Hormozd I (272–273), Bahram I (273–276), and Bahram II (276–293), however, Narseh (293–302) comes to power, and we witness, once again, the emergence of the old gods. During his struggle for power under Bahram II, Narseh concentrated on reverting to the tradition of the first Sasanians. His investiture relief at Naqsh-i Rostam features once again the goddess Anahita. In an inscription that he left at Paikuli (NPi) in Kurdistan, Narseh, who had gained the support of the cities in Mesopotamia for whom Kirdir’s theocracy must not have been a welcome episode, claims to rule “in the name of Ohrmazd, of all the gods and of the Lady Anahita.” He reclaims, moreover, the title of the chief of the Stakhr temple which had remained within the Sasanian family from Babak’s time until Bahram II had bestowed it on Kirdir. Thus all “the temporal and spiritual power was again to be concentrated in the king’s hand.” Narseh destroyed the recently acquired influence of the clergy over the monarchy in other ways too. He re-established contact with the Manicheans, giving an audience to their leader, Innaios, in consequence of which the persecution of the creed was suspended during his reign. According to the Chronique de Seert, Christians too fared rather well under Narseh.

His inscriptions, furthermore, “name Parthian as well as Persian nobles among his supporters, thus illustrating the drawing together of the two imperial peoples, begun under his father Shabuhr I.” In short, for all the talk about the concerted effort of the clergy to gain control of the monarchy, and the Letter

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1908 See page 329.
1910 This is the belief of Lukonin and there is a high probability that this was in fact the case. But as Duchesne–Guillemin observes, quite correctly, it still does not allow us to decipher the contents of Kirdir’s orthodoxy. Duchesne-Guillemin 1983, p. 883.
of Tansar’s claims of monarchical–clerical cooperation, for the first century of Sasanian rule, the claim can only be maintained for the period 272–293 CE, that is through the combined reigns of Hormozd I, Bahram I, and Bahram II. During the short rule of Hormozd II (302–309), the persecution of the Manicheans recommenced and the Mazdean clergy came back into favor, although the king did not “molest the Christians.” And as Hormozd II was invested by Mihr, one might suspect that the primacy of Ahūrā Mazdā was once again questioned by this Sasanian king.

5.2.3 Āturpāt

Religious life during the long reign of Shāpūr II (309–379) is dominated by the figure of Āturpāt, son of Mahraspand, with whose help the king is said to have taken further steps to consolidate the Mazdean creed. During his reign, for example, a council, presumably under the leadership of Āturpāt, undertook the task of establishing a definitive text of the Avestā in twenty-one nasks. In order to establish their veracity, Āturpāt underwent the ordeal of molten metal and thereby defeated, yet again, all kinds of sectarians and heretics. But the religious landscape of Shāpūr II’s kingdom, through most of the fourth century, remained as heterogeneous as ever. The king reportedly introduced himself to emperor Constantius (337–361) as “partners with the stars, brother of the Sun and Moon.” In his Acts of Pusai, the martyr Pusai gives evidence of the Zurvanite tendencies in the belief of the Magi. The king also rekindled the dynasty’s ties with the local cult at Stakhr by founding a fire to Anāhītā. Some scholars even date the initial appearance of the Mazdakite heresy to this period. Presumably, it was partly in opposition to this heresy that Āturpāt underwent his ordeal of fire, and the first attempts at a definition of an orthodox creed were undertaken. Šāpūr II’s reign marks one of the worst episodes

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1915 For the Christians during the Sasanian period, see §5.2.8 below.
1917 For the ordeal by fire, see page 356ff.
1918 The Acts of Mar Pusai and his Daughter Martha contains two of the earliest hagiographies of Christian Persians, composed in the late fourth, early fifth centuries. Pusai was a descendant of Roman captives who were settled in Fārs under Shāpūr II. Living “peacefully as a Christian under Sasanian rule,” Pusai married a local woman, “taught her, baptized his children and raised and instructed them in Christianity.” Together with his family, and following Shāpūr II’s orders, he was later moved to Karka de Lêdana, “the new royal foundation fifteen kilometers north of Susa on the Karkeh river.” While achieving great honors in his new city, where he was appointed “head of the royal weavers’ guild, Pusai ultimately achieved martyrdom when he refused to betray the religion of his parents when interrogated by the chief mobad.” Walker, Joel Thomas, The Legend of Mar Qardagh: Narrative and Christian Heroism in Late Antique Iraq, University of California Press, 2006 (Walker 2006), pp. 222–224. Also see Wiesehöfer, Josef, Ancient Persia: from 550 BC to 650 AD, London, 1996 (Wiesehöfer 1996), pp. 192–193.
1919 For Zurvanism, see §5.2.4 below.
of persecution of Christians, especially in the northwest. But then his reign also coincided with the Byzantine emperor Constantine’s official recognition of Christianity. Sasanian scholars are almost unanimous, therefore, in connecting the two phenomena and in highlighting the purely political motives behind this attack on the Christian population of the empire, whom the Sasanians feared might form a fifth column in their domains. In spite of his horrific persecution of Christians, Syrian hagiographers tell us that Shāpūr II was nevertheless personally interested in Christianity.\textsuperscript{1922}

During Ardashīr II’s reign (379–383), Persian ceased to be the sole language of the reliefs and inscriptions. This development, it has been argued, betrays the fact that the tradition of Persis was no longer considered the dominant tradition in the self-definition of the monarchy, which now sought to distance itself from the traditions of the Persian clergy. The god Mihr appeared on the investiture relief of the king standing on a lotus. This factor might indicate a further token of independence from the traditions of the Persian clergy.\textsuperscript{1923}

The role that Yazdgird I (399–420) played in the religious affairs of the Sasanian polity is forever inscribed in his posthumous epithet of the Sinner, coined, most likely, not only by the clergy, but also by the Pahlav dynasts, as we have seen.\textsuperscript{1924} Yazdgird I “had a good reputation with the Christians, . . . [was] kind to the Jews” and married a Jewess.\textsuperscript{1925} Together with Pūrūz (459–484), he was one of the first Sasanian kings to adopt the title Kāi, thus connecting the Sasanian dynasty to the mythical Kayānids.\textsuperscript{1926} The Kayānids were “extolled in the yašt of the Avesta.” It has been argued, consequently, that Pūrūz’s concoction of a Kayānīd ancestry also had a religious significance, and that after him, the importance of this part of the Avestā was emphasized, or even that the Avestā came to be recognized as the sacred text during this period.\textsuperscript{1927}

In sum, despite the prevalent paradigm in Sasanian studies of an orthodox creed and the church-state confederacy, the available evidence points to a far more volatile and heterogeneous religious climate. Through the fifth century, neither the monarchy nor the Mazdean clergy were able—even if they were so inclined—to impose a uniform orthodoxy. Nowhere is this borne out more clearly than in the socioreligious turmoil that engulfed the Sasanian realm by the late fifth century and well into the first half of the sixth century:

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1922} See also §5.2.8.
\item \textsuperscript{1923} The lotus is said to have been a solar symbol imported from Egypt either directly or via Buddhist Gandhara. Duchesne-Guillemin 1983, pp. 888–889.
\item \textsuperscript{1924} See §2.2.2.
\item \textsuperscript{1925} For this and other religious developments during the fifth century, see Duchesne-Guillemin 1983, p. 890.
\item \textsuperscript{1926} For the Kayānids, see footnote 131; for the Kayānīd pseudo-genealogy, see page 385.
\item \textsuperscript{1927} This is the thesis of Wikander 1946, with which Duchesne-Guillemin disagrees. Duchesne-Guillemin 1983, p. 892. Once we have established the appropriate context, we will further discuss Pūrūz’s religious policies on page 385ff.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
the Mazdakite heresy.\footnote{1928For a further discussion of the Mazdakites, see §5.2.7 below.}

It has been argued, in fact, that when Khusrow I (531–579) continued the persecution started by his father, Qubad (488–531), “the Mazdakite upheaval happened to prepare, in a kind of *argumentum ad absurdum*, the advent of a *strong state and of a definitively established Mazdaean Church.*”\footnote{1929Duchesne-Guillemin 1983, p. 893. Emphasis mine. According to Gardizi, after the destruction of the Mazdakites, Khusrow I Nowshirwan told the populace to learn the precepts of religion so that they would become experts in it and when a Mazdakite appears, he could not sell his lies to them. Gardizi 1984, p. 84:}

The evidence in the *Dênkard*, which is thought to be contemporaneous with Khusrow I’s rule, together with that of the Sasanian Law Book *Mâdigân-i Hazar Dâdestân*, in fact, substantiates this: “His present majesty, King of Kings, Khusrow I, son of Kavad, after he had put down irreligion and heresy with the greatest vindictiveness according to the revelation of the Religion in the matter of all heresy, greatly strengthened the system of the four castes and encouraged precise argumentation, and in a diet [i.e., council] of the provinces he issued the following declaration: The truth of the Mazdayasnian religion has been recognized . . . What the chief Magians of Ohrmrozd have proclaimed, do we proclaim . . . with high intent and in concert with the perspicacious, most noble, most honorable, most good Magian men, we do hereby decree that the Avesta and Zand be studied most zealously and ever afresh.” And further that: “One was to eradicate the teachings and practices of heretics from the realm of Iran by defeating them utterly; one, to put into practice the teachings of the word of Religion . . . in accordance with the teachings and practices of the disciples of Aturpatt, son of Mahraspand, who came from the province of Makran; one, not to neglect in the provinces of Iran hospitality to holy men, the good care of beneficent fire, and the purification of the good waters; one, to cause religion and learning to prosper by being exceedingly zealous . . . to propagate it widely . . . and jealously to withhold it from evil heretics; one, to increase in full measure the service and rites of the gods within the provinces of Iran and to smite, smash, and overthow the idol-temples and disobedience [i.e., unorthodoxy] that comes from the Adversary and the demons.”\footnote{1930Dadestan 1993, *Mâdigân-i Hazar Dâdestân*, Rechtskasuistik und Gerichtspraxis zu Beginn des siebenten Jahrhunderts in Iran, Wiesbaden, 1993, translated by M. Macuch (Dadestan 1993); as cited in Duchesne-Guillemin 1983, p. 895. Emphasis added.}

What is remarkable here is that for all the talk of monarchical–clerical cooperation in articulating an orthodoxy in prior centuries, neither the monarchy nor the clergy had been able to eradicate heterodoxies as late as Khusrow I’s reign. Other evidence from the *Dênkard* further erodes the image of Khusrow I as the enforcer of a strict orthodoxy. Khusrow I “was not impervious to Greek and Indian influences,” so that, ironically, his reign has been described as both orthodox and liberal.\footnote{1931Dadestan 1993 apud Duchesne-Guillemin 1983, pp. 894–895.}
What is even more significant, however, is that whatever measures Khusrow I might have undertaken in support of a presumed orthodoxy and in cooperation with the clerical classes, these were reversed under his son, Hormozd IV (579–590), who “did not govern with the support of the noblemen and the Magi.”

Hormozd IV married a Christian woman and prayed to the martyr St. Sergius, so that he was suspected of converting to Christianity. He superstitiously wore an amulet against death, and put an inordinate emphasis on astrology. By the time of Khusrow II Parviz (591–628), as a result, any remnants of an orthodox predisposition on the part of the monarchy, whatever their strength, must have been completely obliterated. The unsettled conditions of Iran after the death of Khusrow II Parviz, when in the span of about four years about eight different monarchs came to the throne either consecutively, or simultaneously, undermined any effort at a concerted religious policy on the part of the feeble Sasanian monarchs of the period. In short, as Gnoli argues, “Zoroastrianism never succeeded in imposing a spiritual supremacy that was not almost always challenged and in some periods turned out to be downright feeble.”

All this is not to say that the monarchy did not attempt to control the clergy, or that both were not preoccupied with establishing a definition of orthodoxy and heresy. To the contrary, in theory at least, the Sasanian monarchs gave themselves the prerogative of controlling the religious affairs of their realm as a matter of policy. We have evidence of attempts at delineating the religious posture of an heretic. The Avesta itself testifies to the existence of various kinds of Zoroastrian heresies. The Hom Yasht (Yasht 20), for example, defines an ašomaŋya as “he who has the words of this religion in his memory, but does not observe them in actions.” In the Denkart, an ałamŋ i nask ošmurd is defined as a “heretic who acknowledges the Nasks of the Avesta.” An ałamŋ i frēstār, the worst heretic, is defined as one “who distorts a precept as it has been taught by the ancient teachers through interpretation.”

Late Middle Persian literature strove to depict the early Sasanians as champions of an orthodox faith. According to the Denkart, for example, Ardashir I “through the just authority

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1933 See Chapter 3, especially §3.3.
of Tōsar [i.e., Tansar] commanded that all the scattered teachings [preserved in the provinces on the Arsacid Vologeses’ order] to be brought to court. Tōsar set about his business and he accepted one [of those teachings] and left the rest out of the canon, and he issued this decree: the interpretation of all the teachings from the Mazdayasnian religion is our responsibility; from now on there is no lack of certain knowledge concerning them.”

The preoccupation with the interpretation of the sacred text, which Tansar claimed as the prerogative of his class and evidently the monarchy, remained one of the cornerstones of the efforts of both parties in controlling the eruption of heresy.

Neither does the aforementioned account intend to downplay the power of the clergy over their flock, or their desire to control the lives of their constituency. That in spite of all their efforts, neither the state nor the church was thoroughly successful in either of their agendas, however, is again brought out by the Manichean and Mazdakite heresies—the former of which erupted in the third century and continued to menace the Sasanians throughout their later history, and the latter of which started, by some counts, during this same period, but reached its height during the first half of the sixth century. Hindsight, therefore, bears witness that the hold of neither the church nor the monarchy over the population seems to have been so tenacious as to prevent the development of heresy.

But beyond the observation that both church and state were at times preoccupied with leashing heresy—an observation that is neither here nor there, for it does not elucidate the doctrinal aspects of an orthodox creed, nor its social praxis—there is no consensus on popular religious practice within the Sasanian realm. The problem seems to be endemic to the study of Zoroastrianism during the Sasanian period, and has to do with the nature of the sources at our disposal. The contemporary evidence comes mostly from foreign sources, often hostile, usually witness only to conditions in the western parts of the empire, or among the elite with whom the authors of these sources came into contact. They are rarely concerned with the finer doctrinal issues of the creed. The indigenous information, the Middle Persian sources, on the other hand, are, at best, mostly late Sasanian, but generally composed in the ninth and tenth centuries CE. The evidence of the two types of sources cannot be reconciled.

But beyond these differing perspectives, the indigenous sources portray as the orthodox creed would make the evidence of the foreign sources tantamount to heresy. The problem is compounded by the fact that both types of sources give only incidental information about popular forms of religiosity.

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1939Elishé, for example, whose ecclesiastical perspective, whence extreme partiality, needs to be kept in mind, notes that the Sasanians “governed their empire by the religion of the magi and frequently fought against those who would not submit to the same religion; beginning from the years of king Arshak [423–428], son of Tiranz, they waged war up to the sixth year of Artashes, king of Armenia, the son of Vramshapuh.” As is clear the point of reference here for Elishé is the non-Iranian religions of the realm or in the regions under Sasanian suzerainty. Elishé 1982, p. 60.
1940See also our discussion on Arabic sources in this context in §6.2.2 below.
5.2.4 Zurvanism

At best only “two major sectarian movements”\(^{1941}\) have been acknowledged for the duration of Sasanian history, the Zurvanites and the Mazdakites, relegating to the background “various nameless minor movements [that] have been detected within the Middle Persian literature.”\(^{1942}\) Zurvanism, the origins of which have been traced back to the late Achaemenid and the post-Avestan period, has been defined as a monism that was very much influenced by the Mesopotamian and Greek creation myths. A deep doctrinal gulf, it has been argued, separated the Zurvanists from the orthodox Mazdayasnian creed.\(^{1943}\) The Zurvanite myth of creation postulated “a single eternal Being, the Mainyu of Time (Avestan Zurvân), who begot both Ahùrâ Mazdâ, and Angra Mainyu, that is both good and evil.”\(^{1944}\) The Middle Persian sources, on the other hand, depict a dualistic system of belief in which Zurvân can barely be perceived.\(^{1945}\) So how did the Sasanians deal with this presumed heresy? For all the contention that the “lucid and comprehensive doctrines taught by Zoroaster left little scope for heresy and schism,” one of the foremost authorities in Zoroastrian studies has argued that the orthodoxy promulgated by the Sasanians throughout their reign was in fact the Zurvanite heresy. Indeed, Boyce continues, “ironically,

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\(^{1941}\) Boyce 1992, p. 142.

\(^{1942}\) Boyce 1992, p. 142.

\(^{1943}\) An aspect of the doctrinal gulf that Boyce refers to involved the positions that the orthodox Zoroastrians and the Zurvanites maintained on freewill versus pre-destination. In orthodox Zoroastrian cosmogony, Ahùrâ Mazdâ effected creation in two stages. In the first stage, all creation was brought about in a spiritual and immaterial state, the \textit{mênoğ} state. In the second stage, these acquire a material or \textit{gîtìg} existence. These two stages of creation constitute the Act of Creation, the \textit{Bundahishn}. This first Age of the drama of cosmic history is eventually followed by two other periods. The attack of Ahrîmân with his conglomerate of evil forces inaugurates the second Age, the period of Mixture (Middle Persian \textit{Gumezishn}). During this second Age this “world is no longer wholly good, but is a blend of good and evil.” In this second Age, man needs to make a conscious choice of joining the holy alliance of Ahùrâ Mazdâ, the six Amahraspands, the beneficent Yazatas, the lesser two of the Ahûràs, and the Sun and the Moon—who through their functions maintain the \textit{asha}—in order to combat the forces of evil. Free Will on the part of the mankind, therefore, is one of the crucial ingredients of the Age of \textit{Gumezishn}. Through Free Will man implicates himself in the progression of cosmic history, whereby gradually the forces of evil will be overcome, restoring the world to its original perfect state. The third glorious Age, the Frashokereti (Middle Persian Frashegird, meaning probably Healing or Renovation) will thereafter be inaugurated. “Therewith history [as we know it] will cease, for the third [Age], that of Separation [Middle Persian \textit{Wizarishn}] will be ushered in.” Boyce 1992, pp. 25–26. As opposed to this presumably orthodox myth of creation and cosmic history, the Zurvanite cosmogony holds that a man’s role is predestined. In Zurvanite cosmogony, influenced by the Babylonian conceptions of cyclical history, history is divided into great recurrent cycles of time, within which all events repeated themselves. Zurvân, Time, begots both Ahûrâ Mazdâ and Angra Mainyu. In a later articulation of this myth, Zurvân alone had “always been, and shall be forever more.” According to Boyce, the Zurvanite “preoccupation with fate, and the inexorable decrees of Time, obscured the basic Zoroastrian doctrine of the existence of free-will, and the power of each individual to shape his own destiny through the exercise of choice.” Boyce 1979, pp. 68–69.

\(^{1944}\) Boyce 1992, p. 142.

for a dynasty regularly presented as the first creators and defenders of Zoroastrian orthodoxy . . . the Sasanians actually weakened the faith through giving prominence to their own Zurvanite beliefs.”

The thesis that the Sasanians were actually Zurvanites, also espoused by Arthur Christensen, later came to be further fine tuned in the seminal work of Zaehner, aptly recognizing the continued frustration of the field in its title, *Zurvan: A Zoroastrian Dilemma*. Zaehner’s work paved the “royal highway to the solution of the riddle.”

The Zurvanites, considered heretical by Zaehner, moved like a pendulum, affected by the pulsation and relaxation of the Mazdean orthodoxy. While Shāpūr I (241–272) eased the implementation of an orthodox creed, during the career of Kirdīr and Shāpūr II (309–379), orthodoxy reasserted itself to the detriment of the Zurvanite creed. The tolerance of Yazdgird I (399–420) led to the bigotry of his successor Yazdgird II (438–457), and while the Mazdakites and the Zurvanites ran riot under Qubād (488–531), Khusrow I (531–579) tightened the grip of orthodoxy. Too many currents were at play during the rule of Khusrow II (591–628), overwhelming the orthodoxy.

It was in the intermittent periods that Zurvanism had liberty to take the field.

Recently, however, Shaked has questioned whether Zurvanism was a heresy at all, or simply a theological doctrine that adopted one of the numerous creation myths in circulation during the Sasanian period. He argued that the “ideas of Time existing at the basis of the cosmos and even at the roots of the division into good and evil were known and current in Zoroastrianism, with Time sometimes being supplemented by the notion of Space or Place.” These ideas, according to Shaked, while theoretically akin to Zurvanism, apparently were never considered heretical by Zoroastrian orthodoxy, for “we find them in Zoroastrian writings without a hint of reservation.”

The Zurvanites, argues Shaked, were never considered heretical simply because “the adherents of Zurvān as supreme god were simply Zoroastrians.” Shaked’s contribution not only argues for the fluidity of Zoroastrian thought during the Sasanian period but also touches upon notions of heresy versus orthodoxy in Sasanian society. The distinction has to do with the disparity that existed between a learned, theologically oriented Zoroastrianism and the popular versions of the

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1946 Boyce 1979, p. 117.
faith, practiced, in one form or another, by the majority of its adherents. But how did this theologically defined articulation of faith—whatever its nature—protect itself vis-à-vis the potential outbursts of heresy? The crux of the matter had to do with limiting access and knowledge of the Zand, that is to say, the interpretation of the Avesta.

5.2.5 Zandiks

Except for the most crucial and threatening varieties of heretical movements, such as those of the Manicheans and the Mazdakites, the nature of the many heresies in the Sasanian period is lost to us. That other heresies did exist during this period, however, is amply demonstrated by the obsession of the orthodox Zoroastrian articulations of faith with matters of heresy. While by the Sasanian period Zoroastrianism addressed itself to all mankind, insisted on its universalistic tendencies, and engaged in an active proselytizing effort in its competition with other, similarly inclined religious movements, one cannot totally deny the existence of a “secret element in the Zoroastrian religion” of the period. The propagation and, for that matter, procurement of religious knowledge during this period was based on a hierarchy of classes or grades of people—which, incidentally, did not correspond to the strict Sasanian social hierarchy.

The teaching of the Zand in particular seems to have been actively restricted by the Zoroastrian hierarchy, for Zand, that is to say, “the interpretation of the Holy Scriptures, was considered to be the main tool of heretics.” The main articulation of this is found in Masūdī, who maintains that “if anyone came forth in their religion with something that contradicted the revealed message, which is the Avesta, and deviated toward the interpretation, which is the Zand, they [the Persians] would say: ‘He is a Zandi’.” Masūdī, in turn, must have been very faithful to the sources at his disposal for the Dēnkard states the matter quite explicitly: “This, too, thus: One ought not to speak, do, or arrange the business of Zand differently from what the original orthodox spoke, did, taught and brought forth. For heresy comes to the world by one who teaches, speaks or does the business of Zand differently from what the orthodox spoke, did, taught and brought forth.” The Dēnkard continues to warn of the dangers of heresy and of learning the Avesta and Zand from wicked people. Its advice to the flock it sought to control was to beware of following a heretic: “not to hear and not to seek from him the instruction of Avesta and Zand.”

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1952 See also our discussion of heretics on page 337.
had the definition of heresy become with the interpretation of the *Zand*, in fact, that *zandīk* became a synonym for heretic. That in fact knowledge of the scriptures was strictly limited to the learned classes, and the masses were oblivious to their meaning is also stated by Nizām al-Mulk in his *Sīyāṣat Nāma*: when Mazdak was forced to defend his doctrines during his inquisition, he reasoned that it was Zoroaster who had instructed in this way. He argued, furthermore, that “in the Zand and Avesta it stands such as I say, *but the people do not know its meaning*.”\(^{1958}\) As Shaki observes, there were very tangible reasons for this elitist monopoly of scripture: The “Avestan language had long before Mazdak become laden with ambiguities and obscurities admitting of sundry interpretations.”\(^{1959}\) Shaked therefore argued that “the notion of a hierarchy of religious truths, which existed in the Pahlavi literature, was associated with the notion of the religious hierarchy of the believers in the religion, and that these two hierarchies had some relationship to the *division of the Zoroastrian community into folk religion, on the one side, and a more sophisticated type of religion, developed by the learned, on the other.*”\(^{1960}\)

### 5.2.6 Circle of Justice

It is true that the elite–folk dichotomy in the Zoroastrian community did not have an equivalent class basis in that the kings and feudal nobility, not being trained theologians, were as prone to adopting popular forms of religiosity as the masses and the population at large. It is also true, however, that the actual provenance of heresy was thought to have been among the peasantry and the lower strata of Sasanian society. This is clearly reflected in the full-blown articulation of the Circle of Justice, which formulated a very contingent notion of legitimate rule: if the very foundation of the state and the defense of the realm were dependent on the prosperity of the kingdom, which itself could have been achieved only through equitable taxation and the justice meted out to the peasantry, then any injustices inflicted upon the peasantry, in theory at least, gave cause for rebellion and robbed the monarchy of the very basis of its legitimacy. In the *Pīshdādī* section of the national history,\(^{1961}\) the bilateral dimension of the Circle of Justice and the role of the king in the replenishment of the kingdom are first articulated. In Thāalibī’s narrative on the mythical king Manūchihr, for example, this dimension of kingship is clearly articulated in the following terms: “The King has a *right* vis-à-vis his subjects and the subjects have *rights* vis-à-vis the king. The populace are obliged toward the king in that they must follow him, and in that they must not desist in giving him advice, that they should be friends to his friends and enemies to his enemies. The king [on the other hand,] has the obligation of caring for his flock, of having their interests in

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\(^{1959}\)Shaki 1978, p. 299.


\(^{1961}\)See footnote 131.
mind, and of not demanding from them that which is beyond their capabilities. And if there should appear heavenly or earthly calamities as a result of which their produce and wealth dwindle, the [king] is [obliged] to forego taxation in proportion to the damage.”

The Sasanians were well aware that their conception of justice was a double-edged sword. This is reflected in no uncertain terms in the Testament of Ardashir: “Know that the decay of dynasties begins by [the king] neglecting the subjects without [setting them to do] known works and recognized labours. If unemployment becomes rampant among people, there is produced from it consideration of [various] matters and thought about fundamentals. When they consider this, they consider it with different natures, and as a result their schools of thought become different. From the differences of their schools there is produced enmity and hatred [of each other] among them, while they are united in disliking the kings.” While the Testament of Ardashir has often been quoted for its articulation of Sasanian theory of government and the maxim that kingship and religion are twin brothers, however, the fact that it also contains a blueprint and a scenario for conditions conducive to sedition and heresy has seldom been highlighted. The above passage clearly articulates that sedition acquires an ideological dimension by coalescing into a school of thought. What causes this sedition and leads to the formation of various schools of thought is the king’s neglect of his subjects and the implementation of measures whereby unemployment becomes rampant. Turning the maxim of the Circle of Justice on its head, therefore, and given the king’s failure to maintain his contract with his subjects, the masses could rebel. The ideology of the Circle of Justice, then, by definition, gave cause for questioning the very legitimacy of the state if it became dysfunctional, and the Sasanians realized this.

In the Iranian context, the most acute forms of sedition and rebellion are often articulated in the garb of religious heresy among the lower strata of the population. The Testament of Ardashir points out the social sectors which were most susceptible to heretical tendencies, namely, the oppressed lower classes: “The main thing of which I [i.e., Ardashir I] fear for your [i.e., guardians of religion’s] sakes is that the low people should rush and outdo you in the study of religion, in its interpretation and becoming expert in it . . . [As a result] there would emerge secret chieftainships among the low people, the peasants and the rabble that you have harassed, tyrannized, deprived, terrorized and belittled. Know that there can never be in one kingdom both a secret chief in religion

1962Balami 1959, pp. 37–38; Tharâîbi 1989, p. 50, Tharâîbi 1900, p. 67:


1964For the Mithraic dimension of the Circle of Justice ideology, see page 354 below.
and a manifest chief in kingship without the chief in religion snatching away that which is in the hands of the chief in kingship.”¹⁹⁶₅ As Shaked himself has pointed out, “the people among whom this danger [of heresy] is possible are *al-sifla* or lower class people and . . . *al-ubbād wa ‘l-nussāk*, the pious and the ascetic.”¹⁹⁶⁶

### 5.2.7 Mazdakite heresy

The most fertile ground for the cultivation, propagation, and growth of heresy during the Sasanian period, therefore, was amid the lower strata of the population and the peasantry. And it was in fact among this sector of the Iranian population that one of the most potent revolutionary movements in Iranian history, propagating communistic ideals, appeared: the Mazdakite revolution. Whether or not the Mazdakite movement was able to unleash a revolutionary movement that undermined the very foundations of Sasanian society is open to debate.¹⁹⁶⁷ What seems incontestable, however, is the perceived heretical dimension of the movement. We reiterate once more that the eruption of the Mazdakite ideology with such force so late in Sasanian history attests to the inability of either the clergy or the monarchy to impose an orthodoxy. The history of the Mazdakite movement has been amply dealt with in other accounts.¹⁹⁶₈ What follows, therefore, is a selective analysis.

It is generally acknowledged that while the Mazdakite movement came to the fore under the rule of Qubād (488–531), the origin of its doctrines goes back to an earlier period. There seems to be some disagreement, however, over when this earlier phase of the movement began. The figure most often considered the originator of the movement is one Zarādush, son of Khurragān. This Zarādush was a *mōbad* or chief *mōbad* of the town of Fāsā in Fārs. But there is controversy over the exact identity of this Zarādush as well as his date, for a second figure called Bundos, a Manichean who “professed new doctrines in opposition to official Manichaeism”, is also said to have appeared prior to Mazdak.¹⁹⁶⁹ It is unlikely that the controversy over the identities of Bundos and Zarādush will ever be solved with reference to our extant sources. What seems to be clear, however, is that an initial stage of the movement, under the leadership of a figure whom Ibn al-Nadīm calls Mazdak the Older (*al-qadīm*), occurred before the appearance of Mazdak the Younger (*al-akhīr*).¹⁹⁷₀ Mazdak, son of Bāmdād, according to one account, “renewed the doctrine of Zarādush

¹⁹⁶₅See footnote 1963.
¹⁹⁶₇See our discussion in §2.4.5.
¹⁹⁶₈For a discussion of this history, as well as a critical survey of the sources at our disposal for the study of the movement see, Yarshater 1983c, pp. 991–995; see also §2.4.5.
¹⁹⁶₉Yarshater 1983c, p. 996.
Khurاغān and gave it a new impetus, to the extent that the sect came to be known by his name.”

As we have seen, it has been argued that the old-Mazdakite movement might in fact be identical with a heresy that erupted during the reign of Shāpūr II (309–379), in opposition to which ʿĀturpāt son of Mahraspand launched his efforts to outline an orthodoxy. One account places Zarāūdsht “sometime in the course of the 5th century, presumably during or soon after the reign of Bahrām V Gūr.” Another school of thought dates him to the third century, thereby making him contemporary with Mānī. The dispute over the identity of Zarāūdsht betrays the uncertainty of our sources. It does make, however, the question of the prevalence of heresy during the Sasanian period all the more acute. Whether Zarāūdsht was a contemporary of Mānī, who propagated a heresy that “existed now openly now secretly until the time of Khusrau,” or whether he lived in the fifth century, makes a difference insofar as the length of time the Sasanians had to reckon with this disruptive heresy. It is noteworthy that those who view Zarāūdsht as a contemporary of Mānī, maintain that the Zarāūdshtis were a “sect tolerated for a couple of centuries as one of the numerous heresies of the Zoroastrians.”

Chronological problems also plague the period of Mazdak himself. The generally held view, for example, that Mazdak appeared during the reign of Qubād and was destroyed under Khusrow I (531–579) has been challenged.

Among all the varieties of heresy that might have existed in the Sasanian realm, Mazdakism came to be considered the arch-definition of a Mazdean heresy. Once again, the particular interpretation of the Avestā on which the Mazdakites staked their claim, together with the social ramifications of this interpretation, was the crux of the matter. This interpretation dimension of Mazdakite doctrine has been highlighted by, among others, Masūdī in his al-Tanbih waʾl-Ashrāf, where he maintains that “Mazdak was the interpreter (al-mutawahwil) of the Book of Zoroaster, the Avesta . . . and he is first among those who believed in interpretation (tawil) and in inner meanings (bātin).” In fact while the Manicheans were the first to earn the epithet zandik, the Mazdakites

1971 Yarshater 1983c, p. 998.
1972 Zaehner 1972, p. 12. See also our discussion of ʿĀturpāt in §5.2.3.
1977 Crone also advances the thesis that since contemporary foreign sources fail to mention Mazdak, but instead impute heresy to Qubād, while later Middle Persian and Islamic sources link Mazdak to the reigns of both Qubād and Khusrow I, but maintain the charges of heresy against Qubād, this suggests that Mazdak first appeared under Khusrow I and tried to enforce communal access to women and property by raising a peasant revolt, only to be executed along with his followers by Khusrow I in the 530s. Prior to this, however, Qubād had already tried to “enforce communal access to women in the 490s,” only to be deposed by the nobility. The two episodes, Crone argues, have been superimposed on each other. Crone 1991b.
“came to be considered the *Zindiqs par excellence*” for, as Birūnī maintains, the “Manicheans were called *Zindiqs* only metaphorically (*majāzan*).”

It is not our purpose to prove the peasant dimension of the Mazdakite heresy, for this has been established beyond doubt by other scholars. The Mazdakites came from “the poor, the base, the weak and the ignoble plebeians (*al-fuqara, al-sifla, al-dƯwafā, al-luируемā, al-ghawghā*).”

It is instructive for our purposes to note that in the midst of crushing the plebeian revolutionaries, Khusrow I also had to deal with the rebellion of one of his brothers, Kayūs, who, according to some of our sources, had adopted the cause of the revolutionaries and challenged Khusrow I’s right to accession.

The Mazdakite interpretation of the Zoroastrian scripture relied ultimately on the Zoroastrian dualistic scheme of the universe, in which man held a central place. Creation was effected with an end in mind: the replication in the *gītīg* (i.e., this world) of the Ahuraic state as it existed in the *mēnōg* (i.e., spiritual state). As Ahūrā Mazdā and his *mēnōg* creation were the very definition of the *just* order of the world, the Zoroastrian worldview burdened man with instrumentality in the scheme of creation: he was the agent for establishing justice in the *gītīg*. The Mazdean worldview, therefore, like the Mazdakite interpretation of it, was predicated upon this-worldly concerns. Man needs to make a conscious choice.

This involved man, above all, in a creation scheme that derived its meaning from the struggle of the good and the just against evil, the very instrument of injustice. This Mazdean scheme was early on incorporated into the Iranian nationalist ideology by not only making kingship sacramental, but also, by extension, making sedition against kingship heretical and the provenance of evil.

Mention has already been made of the purview of, and potential for, rebellion in the articulation of the Circle of Justice. The worldview espoused by the Circle of Justice ideology can be summed up as a contract between the peasantry and the monarchy, whereby in order to assure its existence, ultimately through the wealth provided by the peasantry, the monarchy undertook to provide for the sustenance of the latter through equitable taxation. As the *Testament of Ardashīr* attests, the monarchy entered into this contract not so much on account of the sacredness of the monarchical office in disposing of its duties, although this claim was made on its behalf, but for utilitarian reasons: the monarchy needed the wealth produced by the peasantry. It may, therefore, be argued that insofar as the Mazdakite rebellion was launched against the

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1981 Theophanes, *Chronographia*, Leipzig, 1883, edited by C. de Boor (Theophanes 1883), pp. 169ff. Cited in Crone 1991b, p. 23, n. 42 and p. 31, n. 237. Crone’s claim that later historiography wanted to discredit Kayūs’ claim to power by charging him with heresy, is not convincing for, in numerous other instances of contention for power among members of the Sasanian family, no such charges were voiced. Crone 1991b, p. 33. For Kayūs, see §4.1.1.
1982 See also our discussion on free-will in Mazdeism in footnote 1943.
1983 See §5.2.6 and footnote 1963.
established hierarchical structure of Sasanian society, of which the Circle of Justice formed the justification and articulation, the movement must have used the interpretation of Zoroastrian scripture to highlight the dysfunction of the state ideology.

### 5.2.8 Jewish and Christian communities

A variety of forms of the Mazdean creed, even a presumed orthodoxy, were not the only religious currents found in the Sasanian realm, however. While it is safe to assume that the majority of the Iranians partook in some form of their ethnic religion, Zoroastrianism, it is also an established fact that substantial minority religions continued to coexist in Iran. Substantial Jewish settlements existed in the Mesopotamian provinces of the Sasanians, most notably in Asōristān (former Assyria), called in Aramaic Bēt Aramāyē.\(^{1984}\) Jewish settlements also existed in Armenia, in the province of Adiabene, in Media (Māh), and in Azarbāyjān (Atropatene). Some of these settlements were already in existence in Arsacid times. The most eastern evidence for Jewish settlement seems to have been the satrapy of Parthia.\(^ {1985}\) In the south, in Iṣfahān, we find a strong Jewish settlement dating from the period of Shāpūr II (309–379), who resettled them there from the town of Van. Toward the end of the fourth century the Jewish population of Iṣfahān seems to have increased at the prompting of the Jewish wife of Yazdghird I (399–420). After a second migration, the community grew substantially so that by the end of the Sasanian period, the Jewish population of Iṣfahān became a very important factor in the life of the city.\(^{1986}\) There continued to be also substantial Christian minorities in the Sasanian realm. To give but one example, as Asmussen observes, the “numerous Iranian names of both laymen and clergy in various fifth century Church documents bear witness to the missionary successes of the Syrian church among the Sasanians’ fellow countrymen.”\(^ {1987}\)

What is of utmost importance for us, however, is that in their relations with the minority communities of Iran, the Sasanians did not have “any articulated legal principle regulating their position except the religious law as contained in the holy canon, the Avesta.”\(^ {1988}\) In spite of the hold exerted on the monarchy intermittently by the clergy, the ultimate authority in declaring cases of heresy rested with the monarch in his position as “chief of the magus state, high priest and supreme judge.” But equally significant for our purposes is the fact that

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\(^{1984}\) Widengren 1961, pp. 117–162. According to Widengren, their center was in northern Babylonia, but Jewish settlements could also be found in the south, in the Sasanian vassal kingdom of Mesene. Ibid., p. 117.

\(^{1985}\) Although a separate tradition testifies to the existence of Jewish communities in Khwārazm. If trusted, this would imply that the Jewish community in Khwārazm could have had contact with Soghdiana, although there seems to be thus far no evidence of Jewish settlement in Soghdiana.


perhaps with a few exceptions, “the king was not led by any religious but by political and economic considerations as far as we are able to judge.”

The central authorities’ relations with the Jewish and Christian communities living in their realm was, therefore, not directed by any systematic policy. The reigns of Shāpūr I (241–272), Shāpūr II (309–379), Yazdgird I (399–420), Bahram V Ğur (420–438), Qubad (488–531), and even of the rebel Parthian dynast Bahram-i Čubin (590–591), attest to this. Yazdgird I, for example, is said to have given a belt (kamar), a mark of honor, to at least one of the exilarchs with whom he had intimate association. The Jewish community may have aided Bahram V Ğur when he was temporarily deposed, Jews being most certainly recruited in his army. Bahram-i Čubin was supported by rich Jews of the empire, and Khusrow I had a rather benevolent policy toward the community. In short, from the information that we can garner, we get the general impression that the community fared rather well for a substantial portion of the Sasanian period. There were, of course, periods of persecution, at times very intense. Under Bahram II, the policies of Kirdir—in whose inscription Jews are mentioned together with other minorities as being smitten in the empire—might point to one such period of crisis for the community. It is not clear, however, to what extent Kirdir’s declarations reflect the actual implementation, or for that matter, success, of the measures he is supposed to have promoted. As far as the Jewish community is concerned, for example, it has been remarked that “it is unclear just how much of [Kirdir’s] boasting is idle . . . [for] Talmudic sources have not produced any unequivocal evidence that contemporary Jews were aware of being persecuted.”

If the persecution of the community by Kirdir is open to question, however, the reign of Yazdgird II (438–457) and his son Piruz (459–484), who inaugurated “a policy of radical persecution of the Jews,” leave dark marks on the Sasanian treatment of this long-established minority community in Iran.

The Sasanian relationship with the Christian communities of their domain seems to have been equally unaffected by a systematic policy. As Asmussen observes, periods of persecution notwithstanding, “[t]hroughout the whole Sasanian period, Christianity was tolerated . . . [so much so that] without reservations on the part of the state, Christians performed services on an equal footing with their Zoroastrian fellow countrymen.”

Elishē describes in emotive detail, for example, how in the days of Shapur, when Christianity was on the rise in the Sasanian realm, the king took measures to stop its spread. But realizing the futility of his efforts, the king ordered “the magi and chief-magi that no

one should molest them [i.e., the Christians] in any way, but that they should
remain undisturbed in their own doctrines without fear, magus and Zandik1994
and Jew and Christian, and whatever other many sects there were throughout the
Persian Empire.” If Elishê’s observations refer to Shâpûr II (309–379),1995
during whose reign, by one account, the “only known general persecution of the
Christians in the spirit of orthodox Zoroastrianism”1996 took place, then Shâ-
pûr II’s change of policy according to Elishê, after “thirty nine or forty years
of [severe] persecution,” must also be noted. According to some, Yazdgird II’s
reign (438–457), however, was also clouded by the persecution of Christian Ar-
menians from 441/2–448/9, which, by one account was precipitated by the
advice of his magi.1997 But Yazdgird II’s attitude to Christianity itself, as por-
trayed by Elishê, for example, can be characterized as ambiguous at best. As
Thomson observes, while “[i]n the first chapter [Yazdgird II] rages when the
Christian faith is expounded; at the beginning of the second chapter he reviews
all doctrines with a view to choosing the best; [and] in chapter three he states
that Christianity is on a par with the Mazdean religion to be the most sublime
of all [!]”1998 It is indicative that, according to Elishê, after he began to pursue
a more liberal policy toward the Christians, Yazdgird II asked: “What harm
have I done, and what crime have I committed against [any] nation, or people
or individual? Are there not many creeds in the land of Aryans, and is not the cult
of each openly [performed]? Who has ever forced or compelled [anyone] to accept

1994 See §5.2.5.
1995 Thomson notes that it is not clear whether Elishê is referring to Shâpûr III (383–388) mentioned
shortly before this observation, or to Shâpûr II “in whose reign there were severe persecutions.”
1997 The two different Armenian historians who cover Yazdgird II’s reign in detail, Elishê and Lazar
P’arpec’i, however, claim two different causes for this persecution. While Elishê attributes it to the
“malicious plotting of King Yazkdert, abetted by his evil counselors, who see in the Christians
potential enemies of the state,” Lazar P’arpec’i saw the cause “in Armenia as a personal quarrel
between the prince of Siunik’ (Vasak), the marzpan (governor) of Armenia, and his son-in-law
Varazvalan.” For a detailed exposition of this see Thomson’s introduction in Elishê 1982, pp. 3–9.
1998 Elishê 1982, pp. 28, 67, 69–70, and 134–135. In view of his observations here, it is unclear why
Thomson continues to argue that “the only Armenian reports of explicit tolerance for Christianity
in Iran date from after the reign of Yazdkert.” And notes that these pertain specifically to the reigns
of Qubâd (488–531) and Khusrow I (531–579). It must be noted significantly, moreover, that with
rather convincing grounds, Akinean suspects that many of the actions attributed to Yazdgird II by
Elishê, as well as descriptions that he gives of the Armenian revolt of 451, bear a striking resem-
blance to actions undertaken by Khusrow I and the Armenian revolt of 572. If true and if Elishê
was actually reporting a later version of events, the remarks that he makes on the religious policies
of Yazdgird II should therefore be attributed to Khusrow I. See Elishê 1982, pp. 23–29. In this
respect one might note, for example, the passage where Elishê describes the policies of Yazdgird II,
and maintains that “he [Yazdgird II] began to give precedence to the junior over the senior, to the
unworthy over the honorable, to the ignorant over the knowledgeable . . . All the unworthy he
promoted and the worthy he demoted, until he had split father and son from each other.” Ibid.,
p. 70. Some of our accounts, as we have seen on page 111, accuse Khusrow I precisely of this policy.
The last word on this issue remains outstanding, nevertheless.
§5.3: Mihr worship

Our overview of the religious landscape in the Sasanian domains, however, would not be complete without a discussion of another age-old Iranian form of worship, that of Mihr (Mithra).

5.3 Mihr worship

While, for obvious reasons, the Mazdakite uprising has attracted much attention in Sasanian scholarship, it has rarely been recognized that of all the forms of Mazdean worship, one in particular was best suited in being exploited for achieving justice: Mihr worship. This, perhaps, more than any other dimension of the worship, explains its cross-sectional popularity in Iranian history.

The God Mihr belonged to the pre-Avestan, Indo–Iranian pantheon of gods. As such, its worship has had a long heritage in Iranian history. Investigations into Mihr worship, however, have long been hampered by the nature of the sources at our disposal. Much controversy, therefore, surrounds, among other things, the character of this ancient faith as it presented itself in the period under investigation in this study. Briefly, and most simply put, the primary question revolves around the degrees to which the pre-Avestan forms of the faith were affected by Zoroastrian reforms, if at all. Various answers have been given to this. There are those who argue, for example, that the popularity of pre-Avestan Mihr worship was such that some aspects of this ancient faith, as we can trace these in one of the most ancient documents of the Zoroastrian faith, the Mihr Yasht, and parts of other Yashts, continued into the Zoroastrian period almost completely unaffected by the teachings of Zarōaster. It is for this reason, they argue, that, well after the appearance of Zarōaster, the god Mihr appears as a primary god in these sources. We should keep in mind, these scholars argue, that, while included in the Avesta, the Mihr Yasht remains one of the oldest sections of the Zoroastrian holy book, some of its sections being even older than the Gāthās. Parts of these sources, this school of thought argues, have “a striking pagan cast [which] survived unaltered, and are as incongruous to Zarōaster’s message as are parts of the Old Testament to Christianity,” Included in this group are those who argue that Zoroastrian reform, with all its

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2000 Mihr shared the guardianship of asha (order, righteousness, and justice) with the two other Ahuras in the ancient Iranian religions. By one account, once Zarōaster proclaimed Ahūra Mazdā the most supreme of the three Ahuras, as the one uncreated God, he worshipped him as the “master of asha.” Boyce 1992, p. 19.

2001 There has also been an ongoing controversy over the precise relationship of this ancient Iranian faith to Roman Mithraism. See also our discussion at the beginning of §5.3.2.

2002 “Although the composition of the Yashts in their extant form is later than Zarōaster, their contents predate him, for they contain myths which the eastern Iranians had inherited from pagan times, as well as legends which reflect pre-Zoroastrian heroic ages.” Yarshater 1983b, p. 365. Some scholars postulate the date of the composition of the Yashts to be “as far [back] as the mid-second half of the 2nd millennium BCE, and, in some cases, to when the Aryans began to appear on the great plateau.” Gnoli 1989, p. 63.

2003 For an elaboration of this discussion, see, Boyce 1992, p. 38.
efforts at elevating Ahûrâ Mazdâ to the position of supreme deity, proved incapable of defeating the “Mithraic type of naturism and the Zoroastrian priests had to give in little by little to popular pressure, recognizing, along with the Zoroastrian angels, the gods of the Mithraic pantheon.”

Another school of thought, spearheaded by the late Mary Boyce, argues that with the Zoroastrian reform of the pre-Avestan pantheon of Iranian gods, while Zoroastrianized by becoming one of the yazatas, albeit one of the most important ones, Mithra was nonetheless relegated to a second-tier god in the Zoroastrian theology. In the orthodox Mazdean system of belief, they argue, Mihr never acquired the same elevated position as Ahûrâ Mazdâ. While much investigation will be required in order to settle this controversy, we shall be arguing in the next two sections that important evidence points to the prevalence of Mihr worship among some of the important Parthian dynastic families under investigation here. Even more significantly, we shall maintain that amongst these Pahlav families the God Mihr was bestowed with such primacy that the nature of Mihr worship espoused by some of the Parthian families of the quarter of the north and the east, could not have been the same as that practiced by Mazdean orthodox population. The Pahlav and the Pârsig, therefore, adhered to different schools of religion, as far as we can establish in the course of this study. Before we present our evidence to this effect, a synopsis of the attributes of the ancient Iranian God, Mihr, is necessary.

5.3.1 Mithra

Throughout its long history, Mihr worship had come to be associated with the three functions of Iranian society: the monarchy, the army, and the peasantry. Above all, however, Mihr (Mithra) was the god of Covenants and Pacts, the quintessential deity who, unlike the remoter Ahûrâ Mazdâ, got his hands dirty, so to speak, in overseeing the proper implementation of pacts and ensuring a just society.

*Mithra, Lord Covenant*

The ancient Iranians attributed great power among the intangible things to the formal spoken word. “Two forms of legalized utterance were held to be imbued with their own distinct Mainyus [spirits], whose workings were so vividly apprehended that in time they came to be revered as great gods. One was the mithra … This was a pact or covenant entered into by two parties—two persons, or tribes, or peoples. The other was the varuna … apparently an oath taken by a single person.” In this way a great triad of gods was

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2004 Bausani 2000, p. 29. According to one theory, this process of the Zoroastrianization of the ancient faith took already place before the Mazdean religion moved west to be adopted by the Medes and later the Achaemenids. Christensen 1944, p. 31.

conceived: Ahūrā Mazda (Lord Wisdom), Ahūrā Mitra (Lord Covenant), and Ahūrā Varuna (Lord True-Speech). A declaration of entering into a mithra or a varuna was thought to invoke the Mainyus “inherent in the words themselves, and this Mainyu was thought to watch thereafter, unsleeping, over those concerned, ready to punish any who broke the faith.” As far as Mihr as a god of contracts was concerned, there “was only one thing sacred about contracts: their inviolability … [Mithra’s] only concern is that, fair or foul, contracts must be kept.” Even with this short introduction, the relevance of Mihr worship to the Circle of Justice should become apparent.

Mithra, the warrior god

Because Mithra/Mihr oversaw a pact entered into by two clans or tribes, if one party would break the covenant, the aggrieved party would then have recourse to Mithra, who, coming to their aid, undertook to set things right by siding with the aggrieved and punishing the covenant breakers. Mithra therefore eventually came to be conceived not only as the god who oversaw the implementation of pacts, but also as an active, warrior god, who undertook to fight on the side of wronged members of society.

The warrior dimension of Mithra was a peculiarly Indo–Iranian trait of the god. In fact it has been argued that one of the chief differences between the Mitra of the Sanskrit Rig Veda and the Mithra of the Avestā, is that in the former the god is viewed as one “who defends and rewards those faithful to their solemn contracts,” whereas in the latter “he balances this rewarding function … against his role as the terrible avenger of those who break their contracts.” The active participation of the god on the side of the aggrieved, in fact, “appears to [have] been the genesis of the concept of him as war god, fighting always on the side of the just—a concept abundantly attested for this many-sided divinity in his Avestan Yašt.”

The Mihr Yasht (Yasht 10) articulates this warrior function of the god in detail: “Mithra, whose long arms seize the liar(?), even if he [the culprit] is in the east of the [eastern frontier] he is caught, even if he is in the west [of the western frontier] he is struck down.” In the Mihr Yasht,
Mithra appears as a “fighting hero on his chariot . . . smiting demons and men that break their contracts.” Mithra therefore eventually came to be the deity in charge of implementing justice. The covenant dimension of Mithra also incorporated his attribute as a judge. In the *Mihr Yasht*, the role of Mithra as a mediator “is of remarkable importance: Mithra is the mediator or the arbiter on the cosmological level between the two spirits of Good and Evil, on the socio-juridical level as head of the institution of the *hanāmand* in many respects similar to the institution of *interdictum* in Roman Law, on the socioreligious level as the god of governing relationships, pacts, contracts, and alliances, and *finally on the eschatological level of the individual soul* . . . [when] he presides over the Činvat bridge tribunal, midway between Heaven and Hell, compulsory passage of the soul of the faithful departed.” This central aspect of the god as a judge was later also formulated in the terminology of *miyānchīgh*.

**Mithra in eschatology**

The concept of Mihr as judge was gradually to become so central, in fact, that in certain Iranian versions of the myth of creation, Mihr, together with his cohorts Sorūsh and Rashnu, became the judges of the cosmic battle between Ahūrā Mazdā and Ahriman in the Zoroastrian eschatology. In his position as judge, however, Mihr was not considered to be impartial. For “all known varieties of Zoroastrianism uphold the absolute righteousness of Ohrmozd, and it seems natural, from the mythical point of view, that the just judge who is Mihr should be firmly and unequivocally on the side of justice, that is on that of Ohrmozd.” This eschatological dimension of Mihr’s function acquires tremendous significance in the late Sasanian and post-conquest history of Iran. It is also very important in deciphering the nature of Mihr worship prevalent among some of the Parthian families, to be discussed shortly.

According to Shaked, “the eschatological description which places mediators between the two antagonists preserves a detail which occurred in an older version of the cosmological myth, in which Mihr, with his associates, did indeed preside, as a judge, over the contract between two powers, and that this trait was generally omitted from later Mazdean accounts as the dualist system of thought hardened and became more rigorous.” The attributes of Mihr as Lord Covenant

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2013 Thieme 1975, p. 31.
2017 Shaked 1980, p. 11.
2018 Shaked 1980, p. 16.
2019 See §5.4.
2020 Shaked 1980, p. 17. Emphasis mine
and judge (mîyânchîgh), as well as his warrior dimensions are also central to the ideology of Circle of Justice, especially if we consider yet another function of the God, his association with royalty.

*Mithra and farr*

Much has been said of the conception of kingship in the Iranian world as being contingent on the king’s acquisition of Divine Glory, farr (xwarra, Khvarenah, Av. xᵛarəṇaḥ). It should also be emphasized, however, that according to an ancient myth it was Mithra who took “charge of the fortune [i.e., farr, Khvarenah] … at times when that precious commodity [was] in danger of falling into the wrong hands.” Perhaps one of the most significant characteristics of Mithra, therefore, was his association with royalty. Mithra bestowed the farr on rulers. This aspect of Mithra is set out in the Zamyâd Yasht (Yasht 19), which is mainly devoted to the farr. It contains the myth of how Yima (Jamshîd), the first man, lost his farr when he lied. After Yima’s death, the farr passed into the keeping of Mithra, and then into the sea (Vourukasha), which was under the protection of Varuna (Vouruna ᴹᵃᵖᵃṭ). 2022

*Mithra and the Circle of Justice*

For the purposes of our discussion of the Circle of Justice it is significant that the “meaning of this myth … is that since the king, reigning through [Khvarenah], maintains thereby social order, when there is no ruler fit to possess it, it returns to the keeping of one of the Ahuras, whose task is primarily to maintain … [asha] order and rightness, in the world of men.” 2023 What is equally significant for our purposes is that “Mithra’s concern with proper government, arising from his political chieftainship and preoccupation with the covenant … turned him into a maker, as well as undoer, of kings.” 2024 Nowhere is the close connection of the Circle of Justice with Mihr worship better illustrated than

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2021 As Birûnî maintains, during the annual festival of Mihrigân in the Sasanian period “it was the custom of … the kings of Iran of crowning themselves on this day with a crown which worked an image of the sun [Mithra] and of the wheel on which he rotates …,” thus confirming their farr with the aid of Mithraic symbols. Garsoian, Nina G., ‘The Locus of the Death of Kings: Iranian Armenia – the Inverted Image’, in *Armenia between Byzantium and the Sasanians*, London, 1985 (Garsoian 1985c), p. 53; Birûnî 1984, pp. 337–342, here p. 370. For farr, see also footnote 222.


2023 Mithra’s role as protector of the farr is shared with Apaṭm Napāṭ, the Grandson of the Waters. According to an ancient Iranian myth, “during the reign of Yima’s successor, the evil Zohâk (Aži Dahâka, [i.e., Daḥhâk]), Mithra keeps the xᵛarəṇaḥ in trust; in time Faridûn (Θατεατωνα, [i.e., Fereydûn]) obtains the xᵛarəṇaḥ, defeats Zohâk, and reigns; after him during Minûčihr’s [i.e., Ma-nûchîhr’s] childhood, the xᵛarəṇaḥ passes to Sâm Narîmân (Karosâspa).” See Mihr Yasht 1959, p. 59, where Gershevitch recapitulates Darmesteter’s reconstruction of the myth in Darmesteter 1892, p. 625, n. 52. As we shall see, it is no wonder that in the absence of a ruler fit to possess farr, in all the major revolts that erupted in Iran in the early ‘Abbâsid period, those of Ustâdîs, Bihâfârîd and Sunbâd, it is Mithra who is invoked. For the revolts of Bihâfârîd and Sunbâd, see respectively §§6.3 and §§6.4 below; for Ustâdîs, see, for instance, Sadighi 1938; and Pourshariati 1995.

2024 Mihr Yasht 1959, p. 60.
in the *Mihr Yasht*, the Hymn to Mithra: “On whom shall I bestow against his expectation an excellent . . . powerful kingdom, beautifully strong thanks to a numerous army? [Once he rules] he appeases through Mithra, by honouring the treaty [read, by implementing justice] even the mind of an antagonized, unreconciled, conqueror.”^2025 This aspect of Mithra permeates the saga of the Sasanian king Pirūz (459–484).^2026

*Mithra’s nourishing function*

There is another very important dimension to Mithra, however. He is the nourishing god who replenishes the earth through rain and vegetation.^2027 In line with Mithra’s pre-Avestan eschatological attributes, it has even been argued that “in bringing rain and vegetation, . . . [the god must have] exercised what we may call cosmic functions already in proto-Aryan times.”^2028 How can we reconcile the three functions of Mithra, the monarchical, warrior, and nourishing functions? It is well worth following in some detail the reasoning of Thieme. “What do rain and vegetation have to do with contracts? Putting the question in this way almost means answering it. According to an archaic, widespread, possibly worldwide belief, a king’s moral behavior is responsible for his people’s welfare, in particular for their health and for the fertile climate of their country.” Ready examples of this include the misdeed of King Romapāda, which resulted in a severe drought; the disastrous plague on the Greek army before Troy, caused by a misdemeanor of Agamemnon toward Apollo; Oedipus’s sins causing a pestilence in his realm.^2029 Now, in the *Mihr Yasht*, “the most essential contract, a contract of a thousand fold sacredness . . . is a treaty between countries, concluded, of course, between their kings. A king who breaks his treaty exposes his whole country to the wrath.”^2030 Here Thieme gives a truncated version of a part of the *Mihr Yasht*: “He wrecks his whole country, the knave who deceitfully breaks his treaty.” And he continues: “The converse of this is that Mitra bestows blessings on the country of the king who is faithful to his treaty. Instead of drought and pestilence, which are the natural consequences of a king’s wrongdoing, he lets the rain fall, the plants grow, gives strength to the bodies.”^2031 The last part of Thieme’s wonderful explication might be questioned, however. Most significantly, it is not certain whether the king’s breaking of a treaty with another country is what this section of the *Mihr Yasht* refers to, or if it is the king’s obligation toward his subjects that is the point. Even if the former, surely this is significant only self-referentially. It is only because the king is inflicting hardship on his own subjects and creating wars

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^2026See page 380ff.
^2027Thieme 1975, p. 31.
^2029Thieme 1975, pp. 31–32.
^2030Thieme 1975, p. 32.
^2031Thieme 1975, pp. 32–33.
by breaking treaties with other countries that a king wrecks his whole country and exposes his whole country to wrath.\textsuperscript{2032} The contract implicit between the king and his subjects is spelled out in the Mihr Yasht: “If the head of the house who presides over the house, . . . the clan who presides over the clan . . ., the tribe who presides over the tribe, or the head of the country who presides over the country, are false to him, Mithra enraged and provoked comes forth to smash the house, the clan, the country . . . [and] the heads of the countries who preside over the countries and the council of premiers of the countries.”\textsuperscript{2033} It has been justifiably observed, therefore, that the “first condition for a country to be able to honour its treaties is that its internal affairs should be wellregulated, the authorities obeyed, revolutions averted. In the fulfillment of this condition Mithra understandably takes an active part.” It is of course natural for the god who provides bounty through replenishing the earth to oversee the welfare of his flock. This function of Mithra replicates, in a sense, that of the king as articulated in the Circle of Justice. This aspect of Mithra’s function has, once again, been aptly summarized by Gershevitch. “The provision of material comfort and of sons must be viewed as part and parcel of Mithra’s care for the nation’s welfare and prosperity, which creates conditions of internal stability, thus leading to treaty-abiding international relations.”\textsuperscript{2034} As the very incarnation of a god whose purpose it is to ensure justice, moreover, Mithra has “an endearing affection for the unjustly oppressed, the loyal pauper.”\textsuperscript{2035} This we read in the Mihr Yasht: “the pauper who follows the doctrine of Truth but is deprived of his rights, the lamenting voice of the latter [invoking Mithra], even though he raises his voice reverently, reaches up to the (heavenly) lights, makes the round of the earth, pervades the seven climes.”\textsuperscript{2036} That the king’s justice is gauged in terms of his equitable behavior toward his subjects, at least in the Iranian context, is borne out by a wealth of tales from medieval Iranian popular literature, whose worldview is infused with pre-Islamic Iranian beliefs.\textsuperscript{2037}

\textit{Mithra and the ordeal by fire}

Besides being the lord of covenants and justice, Mithra was also known as the Lord of Fire, and gradually developed a link with the sun. The epithet of the Lord of Fire seems to have been established in remote antiquity, while the identification with the sun is thought to have been either an Arsacid or a Sasanian phenomenon. Mithra came to be associated with fire because fire came to be associated with truthfulness, and so the ordeal by fire eventually came to establish

\textsuperscript{2032}See also Thieme’s discussion on Mithra’s epithet \textit{vouru.gayaotu} (of broad cattle pastures), which also seems to corroborate our argument here. Thieme 1975, pp. 32–33. Emphasis mine.

\textsuperscript{2033}Mihr Yasht 1959, p. 83; Mihr Yasht 1883, §18. Emphasis mine.

\textsuperscript{2034}Mihr Yasht 1959, p. 32.

\textsuperscript{2035}Mihr Yasht 1959, p. 54. Emphasis added.

\textsuperscript{2036}Mihr Yasht 1959, pp. 113–115; Mihr Yasht 1883, §§84–85.

\textsuperscript{2037}The motif of a king who, in disguise, goes amid his flock only to realize the wretchedness that his policies have caused and thenceforth resolves to rule with justice, is so prevalent in the didactic and popular Iranian tradition that an enumeration of it is beyond the scope of this study.
the veracity of an oath. In case of Varuna, “the validity of an oath [varuna] was judicially tested on occasion by making the man who had sworn it submit to an ordeal by water.” However, since it was “customary to swear to covenants by Mithra . . . in the presence of fire,” in order to establish their innocence, and prove that they possess asha (Vedic ṛta), that is to say, that they are among the ashabavan (Vedic ṛtavan), those “accused of breach of undertakings involving two or more persons,” underwent the ordeal of fire, which therefore “was associated particularly with Mitra.” In this ordeal “metal was heated, and then poured on the naked breast of the accused. If he survived, he was innocent.” There are many references to ordeals by fire in Persian literature. The modern Persian expression for taking an oath, sōgard khordan, “literally to drink sulphur [the substance having a fiery nature], shows that the practice was ancient and widespread.” It is significant that the rite took place at a Dār-i Mihr (the abode of Mihr), and the most central deity in its performance was, besides Mithra, Rashnu the Judge, “a hypostasis of one aspect of Mithra’s, and the Ahura’s helper, with his unerring scales, at the judgment of each individual soul.” The element of fire, therefore, was an essential attribute of Mithra and was used as an ancient rite to establish truthfulness.

Mithra, the Sun

But how did the identification of Mithra with the sun come about? According to Boyce, as fire was already associated with truthfulness, a “climate of thought [emerged] which enabled Zoroaster to see fire as the creation and symbol of Asa [asha] personified; and his new doctrines, establishing this as a primary article of faith, must have discouraged the intimate association of Mithra with fire in general, and have fostered the tendency to link him rather with its particular manifestation, the sun.” Mithra is not identified with the sun in the Mihr Yasht. By the Sasanian period, however, “it was possible to refer to the sun itself as Mihr.”

The close connection of Mihr worship to ideologies that sought to rebel against the status quo and, in a sense, turn the Circle of Justice ideology on its head, seems beyond dispute. To what extent Mihr worship was connected with the Mazdakite ideology, and which forms of it, requires further research. What seems to be clear, however, is that Mazdakite followers, al-fuqarāʾ, al-sīfla, al-dīwāfāʾ, al-luʾwāmāʾ, al-ghawghāʾ, bear an uncanny resemblance to the “unjustly

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2038 Boyce 1975, p. 69–73.
2039 Boyce 1975, p. 69–70.
2040 Boyce 1975, p. 70.
2041 Boyce, Mary, A History of Zoroastrianism I: The Early Period, Leiden, 1996 (Boyce 1996), pp. 27–28. We recall Aturpāt’s voluntary experience of this ordeal; see §5.2.3.
2044 Boyce 1975, p. 75.
2045 Boyce 1975, p. 75. My emphasis.
oppressed, [and] the loyal pauper” for whom Mithra had such an enduring affection. Insofar as the provenance of the heresy is concerned, therefore, and as the evidence of the Mazdakite heresy has shown, the plebeian dimensions of popular religiosity cannot be ignored, even if kings and dynasts were just as ignorant of the requirements of high religion. As we shall see, Mihr worship had a tremendous potential for lending itself to revolutionary upheavals.

5.3.2 Mihr worship in the Achaemenid and the Arsacid periods

That Mihr worship seems to have been a prevalent if not one of the paramount forms of religiosity during the Achaemenid and the post-Avestan period is corroborated on a number of levels. Mithraic theophoric names form the majority of the names found in the Aramaic inscriptions at Persepolis from the time of the Achaemenid king Darius (549–486 BCE). In fact compound names with Mithra outnumber those referring to Ahūrā Mazdā by at least five to three. As the Greek sources testify, moreover, the prevalence of Mithraic compound names was not confined to Persis or Parthava during the Achaemenid period. The literary sources also provide evidence that the worship of Mithra was an important form of worship in Achaemenid Iran. Herodotus informs us, through a curious error, of the cult of a female deity called Mitra whom the Persians had adopted from the Assyrians and Arabs. Xenophon informs us in both Anabasis as well as Cyropaedia that “the Persian king swore by Mithra.” According to Quintus Curtis, Darius III (380–330 BCE) “called upon the sun and Mithras as well as the eternal fire for victory” at the battle of Gaugamela. And finally both Aelian and Pseudo-Callisthenes note that “the [king?] swore by Mithra.” The implication of all this is that “most, if not all, Iranians swore by Mithra, and not just the king or the army.” So prevalent was Mihr worship during the Achaemenid, the Hellenistic, and the Arsacid periods, moreover, that one school of thought has argued that through the migration of the Magi from Babylonia to the eastern Mediterranean and Anatolia, the religion reached the Roman military and, in its by now heavily syncretic form, appeared as Roman Mithraism.

As we already remarked, the religious history of the Parthians has yet to be written. Nonetheless, the claim that the Parthians were adherents of

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2047 Frye 1975b, p. 63.

2048 Frye 1975b, p. 64.

2049 This is the bare outline of the erudite arguments in Bizet, Joseph and Cumont, Franz, Les mages Hellénisés: Zoroastre, Ostanès et Hystaspe d’après la tradition Grecque, Paris, 1938 (Bizet and Cumont 1938).

2050 Boyce 1991b.
orthodox Zoroastrianism seems to have little to recommend it.  

It is true that the Arsacids have been credited with the first codification of the Avestan holy book. The Parthians also used Zoroastrian holy months in their calendar. Considering the confederate nature of the Arsacid polity, and considering the Arsacids' decentralized laissez-faire attitude toward the religious practices in their domains, it may well have been the case that some Parthian dynasts of the Arsacid period were orthodox Zoroastrians. In what follows, however, some significant new evidence as well as a re-assessment of some of the data already at our disposal will be presented in order to make the case that Mihr worship, in contradistinction to orthodox Mazdeism, was the most widespread current of worship in the traditional Parthian domains: the quarters of the east and north. Part of this evidence pertains to the regions under Parthian dynastic control during the Sasanian period, and therefore will be presented as evidence of continuity of religious traditions from the Arsacid to the Sasanian period. In this context the religious history of pre-Christian Armenia—contemporaneous with the first two centuries of Sasanian history—becomes extremely significant. Mihr worship was one of the most popular forms of religiosity in pre-Christian Arsacid Armenia, so much so that some scholars claim that the region was the provenance of Roman Mithraism. Shaked has argued that “traces of Mihr worship, which, to judge by the Armenian evidence, must have existed from Parthian times, have disappeared.” He furthermore maintains, however, that “such worship dedicated specifically to Mihr in the fire temple [existed] seems ... irrefutable.” While “it is difficult to find in the extant literature convincing Iranian parallels to several elements of the [Roman] Mithraic myth [in the western territories]...[this] is no proof that they were not there... We can only manage to reconstruct a small portion of the variegated religious heritage of ancient Iran.” It is in reference to this aspect of Shaked's analysis that we shall present our evidence in §5.4 below.

Theophoric evidence also testifies to the prevalence of Mihr worship among the Arsacids. The ostraca found in Nisā in the Parthian homeland evince “the same picture as at [that presented for] Perspolis under Darius; theophoric names with Mithra are more in evidence than those of other deities.” Mithraic names remained prevalent through the rest of the Arsacid period. At least four Arsacid kings bore the name Mithradates, *bestowed by Mihr*: Mithradates I (171–138 BCE), Mithradates II (124/3–88 BCE), Mithradates III (57–54 BCE), and Mithradates IV (129–147? CE). A significant iconographic feature of Arsacid

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2051 Although the eagerly awaited posthumous volume of Professor Boyce on the religious history of the Arsacids and the Sasanians is certain to clarify a great deal of this.

2052 See §5.4.4 below.

2053 Shaked 1994a, p. 46.

2054 Shaked 1994a, p. 46.

2055 Frye 1975b, pp. 65.
coins seems also to betray a Mithraic provenance.\textsuperscript{2056}

5.3.3 The Pārsīg–Pahlav religious dichotomy

There was a religious dimension to the Pārsīg–Pahlav rivalry during the Sasanian period, and this had to do with the adherence of some of the Parthian dynastic families to Mihr worship.\textsuperscript{2057} It is important to bear in mind that this religious rivalry goes back to the rise of the Arsacid dynasty, when the priestly tradition of Persīs articulated its opposition to the Parthians in religious terms.\textsuperscript{2058} As Eddy’s fascinating study has shown, for more than half a century Persīs resisted Arsacid domination. During the Seleucid period, already from about 280 BCE onward, we have evidence of local dynasts establishing themselves in Persīs. It is only by 140 BCE that the area comes under Arsacid domination. Still, the Persians continued to attack the Arsacids with the same zeal as they had the Seleucids. And this they did in the strongest religious terms. Potent traces of the Persian opposition to the Arsacids is reflected in the first chapter of the \textit{Videvdād (or Vendidad)}, which has been dated to the middle of the second century BCE. Described as a catalogue of \textit{Unholiness in non-Persian lands}, this section of the \textit{Videvdād} omits one district, Persīs. The Median and the Greco–Bactrian states, in contrast, are listed among the unholy Ahrimanic entities that have been created in opposition to the Ahuraic regional creations. It is Parthia, however, that holds the lion’s share of evil territories. Potent traces of the Persian opposition to the Arsacids is reflected in the first chapter of the \textit{Videvdād (or Vendidad)}, which has been dated to the middle of the second century BCE. Described as a catalogue of \textit{Unholiness in non-Persian lands}, this section of the \textit{Videvdād} omits one district, Persīs. The Median and the Greco–Bactrian states, in contrast, are listed among the unholy Ahrimanic entities that have been created in opposition to the Ahuraic regional creations. It is Parthia, however, that holds the lion’s share of evil territories. Nīsā, the original capital of the Arsacids, and the burial site of their early kings, “was guilty of the sin of unbelief; Margiana [Marv] had indulged in sinful lusts; Hyrkania [Gurgān] was guilty of some unnatural sin for which there was no atonement; Rhaga [Rayy], renamed Parthian Arsakeia, had committed another sin without atonement, the sin of utter unbelief. Chorasmia [Khwārazm] had burned corpses, yet another sin without remedy.”\textsuperscript{2059} It is significant that while each of these territories is labeled unholy land because of a particular sin, Parthava and

\textsuperscript{2056} On the reverse side of a substantial number of Arsacid coins, a seated figure is shown holding a bow in a horizontal position. As the \textit{Mihr Yasht} attests, the bow was the chosen weapon of Mithra, with which he struck the \textit{daēvas}. \textit{Mihr Yasht} 1883, §128. Due to the tremendous marksmanship of the Parthian cavalry, the fame of the Parthian bow was widespread among their enemies, especially in the Roman Empire, and classical sources bear witness to this. But the kings who bear these bows on Arsacid coins are not on horseback and the bow is not held in an offensive position. The beardless man holding a bow on the obverse of the majority of Parthian coins is identified by Sellwood as “Apollo seated left on the omphalos and holding a bow.” Sellwood, David, ‘Parthian Coins’, in Ehsan Yarshater (ed.), \textit{Cambridge History of Iran: The Seleucid, Parthian, and Sasanian Periods}, vol. 3(1), pp. 279–299, Cambridge University Press, 1983 (Sellwood 1983), p. 279. Among the classical writers, however, Mithra as the high god was often represented by Apollo.

\textsuperscript{2057} As the cradle of the Achaemenid dynasty, Persīs seems to have already begun the Zoroastrianization of its religious tradition toward the middle of the Achaemenid period. According to Gnoli, this process was of crucial importance in the establishment “of that substantial unity between religious tradition and the national tradition, which was to be characteristic of the whole cultural history of ancient, and, in part, medieval Iran.” Gnoli 1989, p. 36.

\textsuperscript{2058} See §5.4.2 and §5.4.3.

\textsuperscript{2059} Eddy 1961, pp. 79–80.
Rayy, however, are depicted as committing the sin of unbelief.\textsuperscript{2060} We know furthermore that the Parthians “did not follow magian religious prescriptions, for they both burned and buried the dead.”\textsuperscript{2061} But from the perspective of the Pārsīgs, perhaps the greatest heresy that the Arsacids had committed was that of dominating Persis. Thus, as Eddy observes, “the Persians fought their Parthian master. The king from the East whom they had hoped would extirpate the Makedonians [i.e., Alexander’s heirs] turned out unhappily for them to be an Arsakid. The resistance of the Persians against the West had to redirect itself against the Orient.”\textsuperscript{2062}

The early Sasanians continued to use the analogy that Persis had made between unholy creatures and Parthians. In the investiture scene of Ardashīr I at Naqsh-i Rostam (ANRm), both the king and Ahūrā Mazdā are depicted mounted on horses. Ahūrā Mazdā “offers a ring of investiture with attached flying ribbons to Ardashīr.” While the mount of the high God tramples Ahriman, that of the newly invested Sasanian king Ardashīr I tramples the vanquished Arsacid king Ardavan. As Soudavar explains, the message of the scene “is clear: Parthian rule was Ahrimanic and illegitimate, and when the last of the Parthians was vanquished, so was Ahriman.”\textsuperscript{2063}

The hostility of the Sasanians to the religious traditions of the Parthian dynasts finds further evidence in the history of the rise of Ardashīr I to power in the early third century. While arguing for the general applicability of the Letter of Tansar to the reign of Khosrow I Nowshīrvān, Boyce points out a passage which she claims to be appropriate only to the reign of Ardashīr I “and to his reign alone.”\textsuperscript{2064} In this passage, Gushnasp accuses Ardashīr I: “The king of kings has taken away fire temples, extinguished them and blotted them out.” Boyce points out the dissonance of this information with the generally held contention that the Sasanians zealously promoted sacred fires. “The fires in question,” Tansar explains, “had been those of vassal-kings of the Arsacids, who had no ancient entitlement to them.” The only period to which this information can be applicable, Boyce explains, is that of the rise of the Sasanians. As we shall see, however, this evidence is equally applicable to the reign of Khosrow I and later. The Parthian dynast Bahram-i Chubin, for instance, threatened to destroy Hormozd IV’s fire temples, presumably in retaliation for what Khosrow I had done to the Parthian dynasts previously.\textsuperscript{2065} In either case, whether the passage refers to the early Sasanian period or to the period of Khosrow I,

\textsuperscript{2060} Eddy 1961, pp. 79–80. Also see Boyce 1992, p. 40.
\textsuperscript{2061} Eddy 1961, pp. 79–80. Note that cremation as well as interment are against orthodox Zoroastrian doctrine.
\textsuperscript{2062} Eddy 1961, pp. 79–80.
\textsuperscript{2063} Soudavar 1980, p. 33.
\textsuperscript{2064} Tansar 1968, p. 16. See also our discussion of the Letter of Tansar in §2.5.2.
\textsuperscript{2065} See §2.6.3 and §6.1. Boyce observes that this “quenching of local dynastic fires must have deeply offended the pride and piety of many Zoroastrians.” Boyce 1979, p. 108. Boyce’s frame of reference, however, is to the presumed Zurvanite-orthodox dimension of the Sasanian-Parthian rivalry; see our discussion in §5.2.4.
it clearly reflects the Sasanian antagonism toward the religious practices of the Parthian families.

Of the three great sacred fires\(^{2066}\) of the Sasanians, one, the Burzín Mihr fire, was in fact a Parthian fire established in their homeland sometime during the reign of the Arsacids.\(^{2067}\) The particular affection of the Parthians for their fire is reflected in the Parthian romance Vis o Rāmin.\(^{2068}\) Here it is narrated that one of the kings who had “abdicated . . . spent his last days in seclusion at its temple.” The very burial site of Vis and Rāmin, who in this romance appear as a Parthian king and queen, was “a royal sepulcher in the mountains above Adur Burzen-Mihr.”\(^{2069}\)

\textit{Ādhar Gushnasp fire}

While the Burzín Mihr fire was a Parthian fire, however, the Ādhar Farnbagh\(^{2070}\) and Ādhar Gushnasp\(^{2071}\) fires, in Persis and Media respectively, were Sasanian fires.

These fires are postulated to have been constructed in the late Achaemenid or Arsacid period. Their special significance to the Sasanians and the dynasty’s promotion of these fires to primary fires, however, begins only in the mid-Sasanian period, that is, the fourth to mid-fifth century. Significantly, it is believed that the Ādhar Gushnap and the Ādhar Farnbagh fires were promoted in order to “rival the glory of Adur Burzen-Mihr.”\(^{2072}\) Most of our evidence pertaining to these fires, in fact, belongs to this or later periods of Sasanian

\(^{2066}\)For a synopsis of the stimuli that led to the creation of temples with images during the Achaemenid period, in reaction to which fire temples were created, see Boyce 1979, pp. 62–63. From this period onward, two categories of fires are known to have existed. “The great fires, the cathedral fires . . . were all called, it seems, Atar-Verethragna, Victorious Fire (the name is known only in its later forms, as Atakhsh i Varahram, Atash Bahram.) These were created from the embers of many ordinary fires, purified and consecrated through prolonged rites. The lesser fires were known simply as Fire of Fires (in later parlance Atakhsh-i Aduran or Atash Aduran.) These were formed from embers from the hearth fires of representatives of each social class, and their temples were roughly equivalent to the parish churches of Christendom.” Boyce 1979, pp. 64–65. See also footnote 1873.


\(^{2069}\)Boyce 1979, pp. 88 and 90 respectively.

\(^{2070}\)For the legends associated with this fire see Boyce 1991a, pp. 473–475. For the location of the fire see Jackson, William, ‘The Location of the Farnbag Fire, the Most Ancient of Zoroastrian Fires’, Journal of the American Oriental Society 41, (1921), pp. 81–106 (Jackson 1921).

\(^{2071}\)Boyce, Mary, ‘Gushnasp’, in Ehsan Yarshater (ed.), Encyclopaedia Iranica, pp. 475–476, New York, 1991e (Boyce 1991e). As Boyce observes the identification of the fire with the warrior caste, “to which the kings themselves belonged,” was probably effected during the early Sasanian period. “There is no means of knowing whether it was before or after [the late Parthian period] . . . when the Median priests annexed the whole of the early Zoroastrian tradition, from the pagan Kayanian down to the Prophet himself, for their own province, transferring it thus from northeast to northwest Iran.” Boyce 1991e, p. 475.

\(^{2072}\)Boyce 1979, p. 123.
rule. As far as the Ādhar Gushnasp fire is concerned, for example, there “is no mention of it in early Sasanian inscriptions; and excavations suggests that it was not until the late fourth century that it was taken to an unusually beautiful site in Azarbaijan.” The first Sasanian monarch mentioned to have lavished gifts to the fire, to have visited the fire on the festivals of Sadih and Nowruz, and to have made his Indian bride undergo purification there, is Bahrām V Gūr (420–438). In fact, it was probably this devout and zealous monarch “who first fully acknowledged the royal link with this fire.” Archeological evidence, however, gives still later dates. For the “earliest dateable objects found in its [i.e., Ādhar Gushnasp’s] ruins come from the reign of . . . Peroz (459–484).”

Ādhar Farnbagh fire

The earliest reliable evidence that we have for the Ādhar Farnbagh fire, furthermore, belongs to the early fifth century, when Yazdgird I (399–420) is “represented as taking an oath by both the Farnbag and Burzen-Mihr” fires. Other evidence for the Ādhar Farnbagh fire pertains to even later periods. Bīrūnī maintains, for example, that it was Pirūz (459–484), the great grandson of Yazdgird I, who “prayed at the shrine of ‘Adar Khara’ [i.e., Ādhar Farnbagh] for an end to a devastating drought.” The Sasanian solution to the fact that the Parthian fire of Burzin Mihr was “too holy . . . to withhold veneration from it,” moreover, was a measure which must further have offended the Parthian dynastic families and their followers. After the establishment of the two new fires, the Sasanians began to claim a tripartite hierarchy of fires. They now claimed that “Adur Farnbag . . . was the special fire of priests, and Adur Gushnasp . . . that of the warriors, whereas Adur Burzen-Mihr belonged to the lowliest estate, that of the herdsmen and farmers.”

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2073 Boyce 1979, p. 124.
2074 It is interesting to note, in view of our observations on page 373, that Bahrām V Gūr prohibited slaughtering cows before the fires, for he considered this sacrilegious. The slaughter of cows, the king argued, leads to the disappearance of farr from the realm. Ferdowsī 1971, vol. VII, p. 410, Ferdowsī 1935, p. 1678:

2075 Boyce 1979, p. 124. It is also worth noting that this royal fire continued to be “tended in its hill-top sanctuary down to at least the middle of the tenth century.” Boyce 1992, p. 153.
2076 The Ādhar Farnbagh fire was established in Fars, and Boyce maintains that “it is probable that this is where the fire was first grounded, at some unknown date, presumably in the late Achaemenid or Parthian period.” Boyce, Mary, ‘Adur Farnbag’, in Ehsan Yarshater (ed.), Encyclopaedia Iranica, p. 474, New York, 1991d (Boyce 1991d).
2077 “Farnbag means having a share/prosperity through Farnah (farr). Farnah is a dialect form of Avestan Khvarenah (Middle Persian Khwarrah, Persian Khara).” As Boyce observes, the Sasanians put this meaning of the name to much propagandistic use, identifying it “at times fully with divine Khvarenah itself.” Boyce 1979, p. 123.
2078 It should be observed that as a Mithra fire (see below), the Burzin Mihr fire probably addressed the three-fold attributes of this important yazata, the kingly, warrior and nourishing functions.
Burzín Mihr fire

But as the name of the Burzín Mihr fire, Exalted is Mihr, indicates, Mihr was the principal deity of this Parthian fire. Why would this be the case if the Parthians were in fact orthodox Zoroastrians? Boyce explains this by maintaining that Burzín Mihr “is known as a personal name, and is presumed to be that of the unknown founder of the fire.” She believes, in other words, that this major Parthian fire was originally established as a personal fire, as can be the case in Mazdeism. Yet the fire’s theophoric name ‘exalted is Mihr’ would not make any sense, unless the individual in question was not only a Mihr worshipper, but also a powerful political figure, such as an Arsacid king. What lends credence to the conjecture that the Burzín Mihr fire was a fire dedicated to Mithra/Mihr is further theophoric evidence surrounding this fire. One of the two suggested locations for this fire is Mount Mihr, “five miles from a village called Mihr on the highway between Šahrūd and Sabsavār [Sabzivār]” in Khurāsān. The other proposed site is Mount Rīwand, a spur of the Nishāpūr mountains, near which is a village called Burznān. Another curiosity surrounding this fire deserves mention. Of the three fires, only the Burzín Mihr fire’s name appears without the prefix Ādur, Ādhar or Ātakhsh. It has been suggested, therefore, that this might have been the habitual manner of referring to the Burzín Mihr fire. The evidence for this is found in a number of seals. One of these seals bears the inscription Ādur-dukh ftāz o Burzēn-Mihr (Ādur-dukh in front of Burzēn-Mihr). While the reading of the second seal is not clear, two newly discovered seals bear the following clear inscription: “Dād-Burz-Mihr, Parthian aspbed, taking refuge in Burzēn-Mikh[r].” Recall that these seals belong to the Parthian Kārin dynasty. Two other seals bear the inscription “abest ān o Burz-Mihr, confidence in Burz-Mihr.” Gyselen argues, however, that as it is difficult to consider these graphic errors for the name Burzēn-Mihr, one should wonder “who is this Burz-Mihr to whom one is addressing oneself.”

It is possible, therefore, that in establishing a three-fold division of the fires, the Sasanians were attempting to undermine the all-encompassing functions of Mithra.

Another exalted temple, probably established during the Arsacid period, was the fire of Karkoy in Sīstān. According to the description of the temple of this fire by the thirteenth century geographer Qazvinī, the temple had two domes, “bearing horns like that of a great bull.” Boyce 1979, p. 153. If, in fact, this is a Parthian fire, the particular symbolism of the cow’s horn on this temple is significant. To my knowledge no other Zoroastrian temple is described in the literature with this particular motif. As there seems to be a direct connection between Mihr worship and cow symbolism, at least in some versions of the faith (see 373ff below), the Karkoy fire might be considered another example of the particular Mithraic dimension of Parthian forms of religiosity.

William Jackson believed that in his travels he had identified the location of the Burzín Mihr fire “with reasonable certainty” to be there. Jackson, A.V. William, From Constantinople to the Home of Omar Khayyam, New York, 1975 (Jackson 1975).
to this, however, is the one neglected: that the Burźin Mihr fire is the object of devotion here.

There is no doubt that, as a general rule, during the Sasanian period there was a distinction between the religious tradition espoused by the Pārsīg and that adhered to by the Pahlav dynasts. We are not in a position to argue for this across the board, for we lack evidence to this effect for some important Parthian dynastic families, notably the Sūrens and the Ispahbudhān. What is more, we cannot argue for the dominance of a particular religious tradition within all sectors of a particular agnatic Parthian dynastic family. The distinction between the religious beliefs of the Pārsīg and that of the Pahlav during the Sasanian period, therefore, should be regarded as a general observation.

One key piece of evidence is an observation made by a fifth-century Armenian historian who “refers to a Zoroastrian priest who was master of both the Persian and Parthian schools of religious thought.” There is no indication in our sources that any rapprochement between these two schools occurred in subsequent centuries. In fact, all the evidence at our disposal underlines not only a continuing distinction between these two religious schools, but even an outright hostility. The depiction of Khosrow I Nowshīrvān in the Kārnāmag-i Anōshīravān lends credence to this observation. Here, Khosrow I claims that “the mōbadhān mōbadh submitted [the case] of several persons whom he named and who belonged to the nobility. The religion of these persons was contrary to that which we inherited from our Prophet and the learned men of our faith.” According to the Kārnāmag-i Anōshīravān, the mōbadhān mōbadh had warned Khosrow I that these people “were proselytizing in secret for their religion and inviting people to adopt it.” Khosrow I then had these people brought to him in order to dispute with them. Presumably finding them adamant in their faith, Khosrow I then ordered “that they should be banished” from his capital, his country and his empire, “and that all those who shared their beliefs should follow them.”

There is very little doubt that among the nobles in question were members of the Parthian dynastic families. The clergy (mōbads) were key enforcers of Khosrow I’s reforms, as attested by numerous seals. As we shall see, one of the chief accusations of the rebel Bahram-i Chubin against the Sasanians was that the Mihrāns were dejected by the activities of these mōbads, by which he undoubtedly meant their attempts to impose Zoroastrian orthodoxy.

Acknowledging this evidence, Boyce admits the existence of a continued doctrinal difference between the Pārsīg and the Parthians during the Sasanian period, but interprets this as Sasanian adherence to the Zurvanite heresy, versus Parthian adherence to an orthodox form of Mazdeism. The Sasanian

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2086 Boyce 1979, p. 113.
2088 Gyselen 2002.
2089 See §6.1, especially page 403.
2090 See §5.2.4.
adherence to the Zurvanite theology, Boyce argues, “was very probably the main point of difference between Parthian and Persian theology, a difference which evidently persisted, despite the efforts of the Sasanian clergy.”2091 This, she claims, can be substantiated by the evidence of Manichean missionaries in Parthian territories. Although the Manicheans normally rendered the name of their God as Zurvān, when Mānī sent missionaries to Parthia, where his scriptures were translated into Parthian, they “rendered the name of the Manichean gods by ones acceptable to the Zoroastrians of that region.” Instead of calling their God Zurvān they “simply translated the name of Mani’s supreme God literally, as Father of Greatness.” While evidence of Zurvanism can be found among the Sogdians and in the far northeast, Boyce furthermore maintains that “the Parthians appear to have resisted the heresy.”2092

Contrary to Boyce’s claim, however, this difference cannot be explained by the presumed orthodoxy of the Parthians. In fact, the paramount feature of the Sasanian–Parthian religious rivalry in the quarters of the east and the north was the predilection of some of the Parthian dynastic families for Mihr worship. Boyce admits the strength of Mihr worship in northeastern Iran. It is evident, she concedes, that “Mithra worship was strong among the Iranian peoples to the north–east of Iran proper . . . where there seem to have been cults where Mithra was the chief god.” This, however, she argues, cannot be taken to mean “that he was ever worshipped alone.”2093 Yet the evidence at our disposal indicates that Mihr was indeed the paramount popular deity among the Parthians—although his worship did not exclude the worship of other yazatas.

Ardashir I / Ardashān

The Mithraic dimension of Parthian religiosity is highlighted in the narrative of the rise of the Sasanians and their defeat of the Arsacids in the Kārmāmag-i Ardashīr-i Pāpāgan. As in the Mihr Yasht, where the true worshippers of Mithra stand in contrast to those who are not Mihr worshippers (miθrō-drur),2094 so too in the Kārmāmag-i Ardashīr-i Pāpāgan, standing on the side of Mithra, and abiding by his contract, or being in opposition to him and breaking a treaty, is called respectively mihrān kardan, to form a Mithra, and mihr durūjī, to be false to Mithra. This terminology is in fact replete in the accounts of Ardashir I’s victory over the Arsacid king Ardashān.2095

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2091 Boyce 1979, pp. 112–113.
2092 Boyce 1979, p. 112.
2095 Besides the examples below, see Ardashir 1963, p. 186. The Kārmāmag-i Ardashīr-i Pāpāgan is so replete with Mithraic imagery that a separate study needs to be devoted to it. An example of
The narrative of the rise of the Sasanians in the *Kārnāmag-i Ardashīr-i Pāpagān* contains folkloric elements; a popular provenance that makes the information contained in it all the more significant. Here, the rebellion of the upstart king Ardashīr I against the Arsacid Ardavān commences when Ardashīr I, together with a slave girl of Ardavān, fled from the Arsacid ruler. Halfway through their flight on horses stolen from Ardavān’s stable, when the sun had risen, the two were pursued by a ram, the agent that bestows Royal Glory, *farr* (*xwarra, Khavernah*), on behalf of the yazata Mithra.2096 The rising sun, the mounted warriors, and finally the ram are all Mithraic imagery that, in line with the function of Mithra as the “maker, as well as undoer, of kings,”2097 heralds the transference of the *farr* of the last Arsacid, Ardavān, to the first Sasanian king, Ardashīr I. When the ram finally caught up with Ardashīr I, he was consequently assured of kingship.2098 Later in the narrative, Ardashīr I married the sister of Ardavān. The two brothers of Ardavān, in flight, accused their sister of betrayal and dubbed her a *mihr durūj*, a breaker of the contract, and one who had been false to Mithra.2099 In fact, this part of the narrative is replete with the terms *mihr durūj* and *Mihr*.2100 Ardashīr I’s enemy in Fārs, with the significantly theophoric name of Mihrak-i Nūshzādān,2101 broke his collaboration with Ardashīr I by what the *Kārnāmag-i Ardashīr-i Pāpagān* also terms *mihr durūj*.2102

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2097 Mihr Yasht 1959, p. 60.
2098 Ardashīr 1963, p. 196. When Ardavān enquired about the meaning of this, he was told that the ram symbolizes his *farr*. Ferdowsī 1971, vol. VII, p. 128, Ferdowsī 1935, p. 1935:

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2099 Ardashīr 1963, p. 195. For a more detailed account, see page 46.
2102 Ardashīr 1963, p. 188.
Chapter 5: Religion

§5.4 Mihr worship in the quarters of the north and east

The *Xwadāy-Nāmag* tradition is likewise infused with Mithraic concepts. The Sun as bestower of kingly power, the idea of contract (*peymān*) between the king and his flock, the Circle of Justice, and the concepts of dād o Mihr (Justice and Mihr) are recurrent motifs in the *Shāhnāma*. Let us note a few instances in portions dealing with the rise of the Sasanians and their early history. When Bābak dreamt that Sāsān was carrying the three fires of Adhar Gushnasp, Adhar Farnbagh, and Burzūn Mihr, the dream interpreters informed him that his dream signified that the kingship of Sāsān would appear through the Sun.\(^{2103}\) When Bābak sent for Sāsān and asked his pedigree, the latter informed him that if he gave him his protection (*zinbār*), that is, refuge—again a thoroughly Mithraic concept—and took his hand in contract (*cho dastam bigīrī peymān bidast*), then he would divulge his ancestry.\(^{2104}\) When Shāpūr II appointed his brother Ardashīr II as regent for his minor son, Shāpūr III, he did so on condition that Ardashīr II entered in justice into a contract with him (*gar bā man az dād peymān konī*).\(^{2105}\) Ardashīr II kept to the terms of his contract.\(^{2106}\)

### 5.4 Mihr worship in the quarters of the north and east

The predominant form of religiosity during the Sasanian era in the northern and northeastern regions of Iran (*kūst-i adurbādagan* and *kūst-i khwarāsān*) ruled by the Parthian dynastic families, was not the orthodox Zoroastrianism propagated by the Sasanian *mōbads*, but popular religious customs that betray strong currents of Mihr worship. The precise nature of this Mihr worship and the rituals connected with it, and how it differed from the worship of Mihr in the orthodox Zoroastrian systems of belief, cannot be ascertained with any degree of certainty given the evidence at our disposal at this point. What can be asserted, however, is that the Mihr worship prevalent in these regions of Iran was distinct from that which pertained to the orthodox Zoroastrian creed. As


كمس را كه ديدی تو ریسان به خواب
بِه شاهی بارد سر از افتاب


وران پس گود گچت کی شهریار
چو دستم بگیری پیمان بدست

\[^{2105}\]Ferdowsī 1935, p. 2065:

زبان را ز پیمان گروگان کمی
که گر با مین آزاد دی پیمان کمی


نگشتن ان دلأور ز پیمان خویش
به مردی نگ داشت سامان خویش

It should be noted that the use of the term *peymān* here does not seem to have any correspondence with the philosophical and theological terminology of the *right measure* as discussed in Shaked, Shaul, ‘*Paymān: An Iranian Idea in Contact with Greek Thought and Islam*’, in *Transition Periods in Iranian History*, vol. 5 of *Societas Iranologica Europaea*, pp. 217–240, Fribourg-en-Brisgau, 1987 (Shaked 1987).
the territories under the control of the Parthian dynastic families were concentrated in the quarters of the north and the east, furthermore, and in line with the Pārsig–Pahlav political rivalry, a general north–south dichotomy in religious matters seems to have existed through the Sasanian period.

5.4.1 Mihr worship in Ṭabaristān

In the remainder of this chapter, we explore the Mithraic traditions in the quarters of the north and the east, traditionally controlled by the Parthian dynastic families. The primacy of Mihr worship in these regions is reflected in the Iranian national tradition. The stories of a host of primary figures in the mythic sections of this tradition, figures around whom Mihr symbolism coalesces, are appropriated by the Pahlav regions, most notably Ṭabaristān. It must be pointed out from the outset that the association of the events and figures which will be enumerated below with Ṭabaristān was the result of a later identification of the mythical region of Māzandarān from the national tradition with Ṭabaristān. It has been claimed that this association might have occurred in the late Sasanian period. Regardless, however, of when this identification occurred, it is very likely that it was instigated by the Parthian dynastic families. The fact that the original location of Māzandarān from the national tradition is obscure does not undermine the significance of the fact that the motifs, symbols, and primary figures of the national tradition, all of which have strong Mithraic associations, were appropriated by regions ruled by Parthian dynastic families during the Sasanian period.

To begin with, according to a tradition contained in the Videvdād, the abode of the yazata Mithra was in the Alburz mountains. In the original Iranian myth of creation, however, Mithra's dwelling was on the Peak of Harā. The identification of the primordial Mount Harā with Damāvand in the Alburz mountains may be viewed as an example of the regional development of Zoroastrianism and the appropriation of significant motifs and episodes of the Mazdean religion by various regions. Only in Ṭabaristān, however, do we find the identification of the abode of Mithra with a local mountain chain. When precisely this identification of the dwelling of Mithra with Damāvand came to be made is not clear. What is clear, however, is that the Mithraic myths co-opted by the northern regions run through a number of other episodes of the mythic sections of the Iranian tradition. In the Videvdād, therefore, “Mithra is said to approach across the Alburz mountains in front of the sun!” From

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2107 Yarshater 1983b, pp. 446–447.
2108 As Yarshater notes the “original location of the lands that the Iranians called Māzandarān as well as the meaning of the name is somewhat problematic. It was applied originally to a hostile land of different cultic beliefs known to the Iranians in their legendary period. Its use as an appellation for Ṭabaristān is fairly late and probably dates from late Sasanian times.” Yarshater 1983b, p. 446.
2109 Vendidad 1880, §19.28.
2110 See page 321.
Damāvand, Mithra watched over the world, through 360 windows. Mount Damāvand, the highest peak in the Alburz mountains, was located in Padhashkhwārgar, later considered part of the quarter of the north.

**Fereydūn**

Damāvand was not only identified with Mithra, however. It is also the birthplace of the paramount and primary mythic Pishdādi king of the national tradition, Fereydūn. His birth took place toward the end of the millennium during which the evil foreigner Ḡāhak ruled over Iran. According to the national tradition, when Ḡāhak destroyed the Pishdādi king Jamshīd (Yima), Fereydūn’s mother took refuge in the Damāvand mountains, where the boy Fereydūn was born and whence he came out of hiding at the age of sixteen.

What is significant for our purposes about the association of Fereydūn with Šāhristān, however, is that potent Mithraic symbols surround this primary mythic king of Iran. In fact, it might be argued that the figure of Fereydūn represents the God Mihr. According to the Šāhrih-i Šabristān, when Ḡāhak destroyed Jamshīd, the descendants of this Pishdādi king were left distant from the shadows of the Sun (az sāyīh-i khūrshīd nufūr o mahjūr shudand). The deeds of Fereydūn, the king with farr (xwarra, Khvarenah), and the slayer of Ḡāhak, therefore, are appropriately compared to that of the luminous Sun by the Šāhnāma. When Fereydūn prepared to battle Ḡāhak in Šabristān, he first raised his head to the Sun.

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2112 Yarshater 1983a, p. 351.
2113 See page 40 for a delimitation of this region.
2114 According to the Avestā, Fereydūn was born in Varena, “identified in later sources with Var, a village in the area of Lārjān,” near Damāvand Vendidad 1880, §1.17. According to Xwadāy-Nāmag tradition contained in Šabari, Fereydūn was born in Damāvand itself. For Fereydūn, see Yarshater 1983b, pp. 427–429; Taftazoli, Ahmad, ‘Fereydūn’, in Ehsan Yarshater (ed.), Encyclopaedia Iranica, New York, 2007 (Taftazoli 2007); and the sources cited therein. For the Pishdādi dynasty in the Iranian national history, see Yarshater 1983b, pp. 420–436, as well as footnote 131.
2115 According to the Šabhnāma, the tyrant Ḡāhak, who ruled Iran for 1000 years, was of Arab descent. His tyranny was caused by the kiss of Ahriman (the Force of Evil) on his shoulders. Snakes grew in place of this. In order to feed these, the brains of two young boys had to be fed to the tyrant daily. The tyrant’s chefs substituted the brain of a sheep for one of these. Kāveh, the blacksmith, seventeen of whose sons had been fed to Ḡāhak, ultimately led a rebellion that overthrew Ḡāhak, and returned the crown to the Iranian king, Fereydūn. Ferdowsi 1935, pp. 69–114.
2116 Ferdowsi 1935.
2117 Kayūmarth, the first king of the national tradition and the prototype of man in the religious tradition, has also been identified with Mithra, or a brother of Mithra. See Yarshater 1983b, pp. 372–373, and 416. Unlike Fereydūn and a number of other primary figures of the national tradition, however, his figure is not co-opted by the regional traditions of the north.
2118 Ibn Isfandiyār 1941, p. 57.
2119 Ferdowsi 1971, vol. I, p. 57:

بکراد تاسده حورشید بود

جاهاکویی با نژجمشید بود

فیدون به حورشید برد است

به کین پدر نگل لستش کمر

370
Sorūsh and using the bull-headed mace,\(^{2121}\) Fereydūn captured Daḫḥāk.\(^{2122}\) The victory is celebrated on Mihrigān,\(^{2123}\) one of the most cherished festivals of the Iranians, which therefore came to be associated with the northern regions of Iran, the land of the Pahlav.

**Mihrigān**

The festival of Mihrigān, as the name implies, was devoted to the God Mihr. Traditionally an autumn festival, through the Sasanian and the early Islamic period, it was “scarcely less well loved than the Spring festival of Nō Rūz.”\(^{2124}\) In fact Bīrūnī observes that “some people have given the preference to Mihrigān by as much as they prefer autumn to spring.”\(^{2125}\) While Mihrigān continued to be celebrated by orthodox Zoroastrians during the Sasanian period, however, it was a festival that was essentially untouched by Zoroastrianism.\(^{2126}\) As one of the ancient attributes of Mihr was his eschatological function,\(^{2127}\) so too was the eschatological dimension of Mihrigān very significant, for according to Bīrūnī, “the Iranians who believe in tawil . . . also believe Mihrigān to be a sign of resurrection and the end of the world, . . . For they argue that on this day that which grows reaches its perfection.”\(^{2128}\) Significantly, the festival “was also a time for rallying the forces of good to oppose the demons of the coming winter and darkness,” for Mihr “was one of the great fighting divinities of Zoroastrianism, a champion for the kingdom of righteousness.”\(^{2129}\) It was also believed that the pact between Ahūrā Mazdā and Ahrīman “which fixes the period of

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\(^{2121}\) Yarshater 1983b, p. 372. The ox-headed mace is also called the mace of Mithra; see footnote 2155 below.

\(^{2122}\) Ibn Balkhī 1995, p. 114.

\(^{2123}\) Thaālībī 1900, pp. 35–36; Bīrūnī 1984, pp. 337–338.


\(^{2125}\) Bīrūnī 1984, p. 339; Boyce 1983\(^{a}\), p. 801.


\(^{2127}\) See page 353.


\(^{2129}\) Bīrūnī 1984, p. 338; Boyce 1983\(^{a}\), pp. 801–802. Emphasis added. We should stress that Boyce is only referring here to the position of Mihr in Mazdean doctrine.
their struggle, was made at Mihrigān, since Mihr is the lord of all covenants.”

Mihrigān was celebrated by the Sasanian kings and commoners alike. For our purposes, its significance, besides its obvious Mithraic provenance, was that it represented the popular celebration of the defeat of Dāhšāk by Fereyduş. In the popular imagination, Dāhšāk’s defeat took place in Ṭabaristān. Significantly, the very first fire temple built by Fereyduş was also believed to have been in the city of Tus, in the vicinity of which, we recall, the Burzin Mihr fire was located. We should add to our list of locations carrying theophoric Mithraic names, a village called Mihrijān (the Arabicized version of Mihrigān), in the environs of Nishāpur.

In order to defeat Dāhšāk, a bull-headed mace was constructed for Fereyduş. This mace too is likened to the high Sun in the Shāhnāma. In his fight against the quintessential symbol of injustice, Dāhšāk, Fereyduş is naturally the quintessential symbol of justice rising from Ṭabaristān. After his defeat of Dāhšāk, when on the day of Mihr, Fereyduş crowned himself, “the times became bereft of evil and people began to follow the path of wisdom.”

The religion of Fereyduş, the Shāhnāma finally maintains, is the worship of Mihrigān. Once he defeated Dāhšāk in Ṭabaristān, from the Alburz mountains, Fereyduş circled around the globe, and saw what was hidden and manifest. With his benevolence he forbade every manifestation of evil and restored every land that had been ridden with destruction. The regions which were barren, he cultivated, making the world paradise incarnate. Like Mihr, therefore, Fereyduş had his abode in the Damavand mountains, from where he rose. Like Mihr, raising his head to the Sun, he restored kingship, here to himself. Like Mihr circling the globe from Damavand, Fereyduş circled the world, and like

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2132 See, for instance, footnote 2081.
2134 Ferdowsī 1971, vol. I, p. 66:

فروران به گردار حورشید برز
پیچش چهار چوبی ییونه گیر

2135 Ferdowsī 1971, vol. I, p. 76:

گرکند هرکس رهه مجدید
زمانه بی اندوه گشت از بید

2136 Ferdowsī 1935, vol. I, p. 76:

تن اسانی و خوردن این ایست
پرستیدن مهرگان دین ایست

2137 Ferdowsī 1971, , vol. I, p. 81:

وارزان پس فریدون به گرجه‌دان
هران چه گری را بیاد دید
بنیکی تیست از همه دست بد
بیاراست گمی بسی بیست
Mihr watching over the world through 360 windows, Fereydūn saw all to be seen and that which was hidden. Like Mihr, he actively destroyed evil and injustice, and as Mihr he had a nourishing function. Finally, like Mihr, he advocated Mihrigān.

The cow in Mihr worship

The central role of the cow in the narratives of Fereydūn and Šābaristān likewise connects Fereydūn to Mihr. According to Ibn Isfandiyār, when Fereydūn came of age, he left the Damavand region as a result of its unsuitability for cultivation and migrated to the environs of Shalāb on account of its pastures and the fact that the population of the region subsisted from the breeding of kine and the profits that accrued from this. At the age of seven Fereydūn would fix halters to the cow’s snout and make a riding beast of it. Each day Fereydūn would ride the cow out hunting and in pursuit of other affairs until he reached the prime of his life (bi rowq-i shabāb resīd). While seated on the cow, according to the Tārīkh-i Šābaristān, “one would think that from the reflection of the heavenly bodies on earth another sun is rising from Taurus.” Here, he takes the form of a constellation crossing the sky, to wit, Thawr or Taurus, the sign of the bull. The imagery of the Sun, Taurus, and the riding figure on it, namely

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2138 Yarshater 1983a, p. 351.
2139 Significantly, Ferdowsī comments that Fereydūn was not an angel (Amahraspand). It was on account of his justice and kindness that he found the good fortune. Ferdowsī seems to be replying here to what must have been a prevalent popular interpretation of this myth of Fereydūn, for according to Bīrūnī some people thought that during Mihrīgān the angels came to the aid of Fereydūn. Bīrūnī 1984, p. 338:

2140 The nature of the terrain in both Šabristān as well as Gilān is such that the breeding of kine was one of the central economic activities of the region. So much so that to this day cows are a central part of the landscape in this region. The symbolic connection of the cow with Šabristān, however, continues to be especially significant for, except in the lush Caspian provinces, as Insler argues, “cattle never prospered well in the barrenness of Iran.” Gathas 1975, The Gāthās of Zarathustra, vol. 8 of Acta Iranica, 1975, translated by Stanley Insler (Gathas 1975), quoted in Harper, Prudence O., “The Ox-Headed Mace in Pre-Islamic Iran”, in Papers in Honour of Professor Mary Boyce, vol. 24 of Acta Iranica, pp. 248–265, Leiden, 1985 (Harper 1985), p. 248, n. 9.

2141 Ibn Isfandiyār 1941, p. 57:

2142 Ibn Isfandiyār 1941, p. 57:
Fereydūn, the king who is endowed with Divine Glory, replicates in minute detail the Mithraic tauroctony,²¹⁴³ except that, unlike Mithras, the young man atop the cow is not depicted as killing the animal.²¹⁴⁴ In this manner and in the prime of his life Fereydūn improved the affairs of his people and managed to gather the inhabitants of the region, including, significantly, those of the Kārin Mountain (Kūh-i Kārin). At this point, according to Ibn Isfandiyār, Fereydūn’s followers built him an ox-headed mace (gorz) with which he captured Daḥḥāḵ.²¹⁴⁵ So central was the role of Fereydūn in the popular memory of Ṭabaristān that Ibn Isfandiyār, writing in the thirteenth century, maintains that the remnants of his constructions in his capital Tammīsha (nishast-i jāy-i khud) are still in existence.²¹⁴⁶ From the narrative of Fereydūn in the national tradition to the history of Ṭabaristān during the Sasanian period to the accounts of the revolts in the region in the post-conquest period, the cow motif appears with a frequency unparalleled in the narratives of any other region of the Iranian plateau. Mihr worship and cow symbolism were also embraced by the Āl-i Jāmāsp family, the family of Gāvbārīh, the Cow-Devotee, who ruled in Ṭabaristān from the sixth through the mid-eighth century.²¹⁴⁷ Finally, it is worth noting that according to Yaqūt, the inhabitants of Ṭūs were called “the cows,” Yaqūt expressing disdain about its meaning.²¹⁴⁸

The cow had always been considered sacred in orthodox Zoroastrianism.²¹⁴⁹ Before the relatively late domestication of the camel and the horse among the Indo–Iranians, the cow was considered the most valuable domesticated animal. From early on, therefore, a cow or a bull (gāv) became “traditionally the best offering men could make to the gods.” The primordial bull also plays a central role in Zoroastrian cosmogony. In the Zoroastrian myth of creation, it is from the sacrificial slaughter of the cow that all animal life spreads across the gītīg (material world). Nonetheless, it has been argued that the soteriological dimensions of the sacrifice of the bull was pre-Zoroastrian and in all probability Mihric. The cow holds a significant place in Mithraic/Mihr religious

²¹⁴³See footnote 2150.
²¹⁴⁴Ulansey, David, The Origins of the Mithraic Mysteries: Cosmology and Salvation in the Ancient World, Oxford University Press, 1989 (Ulansey 1989). In Āthār al-Bāqiya, Birūnī gives a similar depiction of this mythic episode. When night came, a cow made up of light, with horns of gold, and feet of silver appeared, carrying the wheel of the moon, the whole scene appearing and disappearing at intervals. Birūnī gives this under his discussion of the celebration on the day of Mihr of the month of Day, and maintains that Iranians celebrate this festival because on this day Iran freed itself from the rule of Turkistān, and retrieved the cows which the Turkistānis had stolen from them. Birūnī 1984, pp. 345–346.
²¹⁴⁵In the Āthār al-Bāqiya, Fereydūn swore on the “blood of the cow that was in [his] ancestor’s house” to kill Daḥḥāḵ. Birūnī 1984, p. 339.
²¹⁴⁶Ibn Isfandiyār 1941, p. 58. For the significance of aspects of Iranian national history in the popular memory of various regions in Iran, as contained in the local historiographical tradition, see Pourshariati 2000.
²¹⁴⁷See §4.3, especially page 302.
rituals, customs, and doctrine. In the Roman Mithraic tauroctony,\(^\text{2150}\) the sacrifice of the bull by Mithras is of a central and crucial significance.\(^\text{2151}\) Under the Achaemenids, the focal point of the autumnal festival of Mihrigān was the “sacrifice of a bull, or its substitute, to Mithra.”\(^\text{2152}\) The sacrosanct function of the cow in the Zoroastrian creed, therefore, seems to have a Mithraic heritage. At the initiation ceremony of a Mazdean priest, for example, the mōbad is given the famous bull-headed mace, the gorz. These gorzes are “carried at major ceremonies and decorate the wall of Zoroastrian temples.”\(^\text{2153}\) A Zoroastrian priest carries the mace “as a symbol of the moral fight which he is taking up against evil.”\(^\text{2154}\) The gorz, like Mihrigān, however, does not have a Zoroastrian origin, and even in the orthodox Zoroastrian creed it is acknowledged as the mace of Mithra.\(^\text{2155}\) As Hinnells points out, the designation of “the whole fire temple . . . as dar-i Mihr, the gateway or court of Mithra,” as well as the ritual dimensions of the cow motif, could “have developed only if Mithra was traditionally a god of outstanding ritual significance.”\(^\text{2156}\)

Manūchihr

Further evidence for the prevalence of Mihr worship in the northern regions is found in the story of the Pīshdādī king Manūchihr,\(^\text{2157}\) which begins a new chapter of the Iranian national history. As Yarshater observes, with the advent of Manūchihr, “the world is no longer ruled by a single king.” The ferocious feud between the Iranians and the Tūrānians\(^\text{2158}\) starts during the reign of this king, where he is the first to have to reckon with a powerful enemy king. A derivative of this king’s name, Manush,\(^\text{2159}\) is directly connected with the north, for the Bundahishn identifies Manush as a mountain belonging to the Alburz

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\(^{2150}\) In Roman Mithraism, in the Mithraea (Mithraic temples) scattered around the Mediterranean world, the central scene of the murals depicts the God Mithras killing a sacred bull.

\(^{2151}\) Hinnells 1975, p. 308.

\(^{2152}\) Hinnells 1975, p. 307. This practice continued into the Sasanian period: In gratitude for victory over his enemies, for example, the Sasanian king Yazdgird II (459–484) “increased the sacrifices of fire with white bulls and hairy goats, . . . [and] assiduously multiplied his impure cult.” Elīshē 1982, p. 66.

\(^{2153}\) Hinnells 1975, p. 308.

\(^{2154}\) Boyce 1983a, p. 802.


\(^{2156}\) Hinnells 1975, p. 308.

\(^{2157}\) Manūchihr, whose name (Middle Persian Manushchihir) means from the race of Manu, and is regarded in India as “the first man and father of the human race,” is only mentioned in the Avestā once, and then only in the Yashts. Frawardin Yasht 1883, §131; Yarshater 1983b, pp. 432–433.

\(^{2158}\) For the Tūrānians, Iran’s arch-enemies in the national tradition, later identified with the Turks, see Yarshater 1983b, pp. 408–409.

\(^{2159}\) Zamyad Yasht 1883, §1.
chain, where Manúchihr was born. In his wars against the Tūrānian Afrāsīyāb, Manúchihr habitually took refuge in Tabaristan. Manúchihr, who was one of the first mythic kings to acquire a reputation for justice and equity (adl o nikāyi), declared in the Shāhnāma that he was both “wrath and warfare as well as justice and Mihr,” virtually identifying himself, in other words, with the god. He ordered the people of Iran to engage in agriculture as well as cattle breeding.

Another important Mithraic aspect of Manúchihr’s figure is the popular etymology of his name. According to the Bundahishn, the king acquired his name when the rays of the sun fell on his face at the time of his birth. Manúchihr also inherited the Farr (xwarra) of Fereydūn. Like Fereydūn, Manúchihr acquired this Farr from the sun Mihr. According to Ibn Balkhi, the father of Manúchihr was called Mishkuryār, which Ibn Balkhi translates as the “constant companion of the rays of the sun (hamishih āfābāyār).” Manúchihr’s chief achievement, however, was his role as the avenger of the murder of the favorite son of Fereydūn, Iraj, who was killed by his brothers. As we shall see, the Mithraic motif of revenge for a wrongful murder also appears in the revolts of Bahram-i Chūbīn in the late sixth century, and of Sunbad in the early Abbasid period, testifying to the continuity of the Mithraic tradition in the region.

The collaboration of Manúchihr’s spāhbeds, Kārin and Ārash, the presumed progenitors of respectively the Kārins and the Mihrāns, with the king of Tabaristān is also detailed in the Tarikh-i Tabaristān. The legendary hero Ārash appeared from Tabaristān during Manúchihr’s war with Tūrān. In order to determine the boundaries between Iran and Tūrān, Ārash, “the best Bowman of Iran . . . [and] helped by divine guidance,” shot an arrow that landed somewhere in the east. Ārash’s arrow left his bow at sunrise, and landed at its destination at sunset, thus mimicking the movement of Mihr’s sun chariot.

The bow shot of Ārash established a contract between the two peoples, which, significantly, Afrāsīyāb broke by attacking Iran. It was to Ārash of Rayy that

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2160 According to Balāmī some traditions maintain that the birthplace of Manúchihr was Rayy. Balāmī 1959, p. 33. After his defeat at the hands of Afrāsīyāb, Balāmī maintains, Manúchihr was held captive in the city of Amul in Tabaristan. Ibid., p. 34.
2162 Thaālībī 1900, p. 68, Thaālībī 1989, p. 50.
2163 Thaālībī 1989, p. 50, Thaālībī 1900, p. 68:

و اول من جعل لكل قرية دهاقا و اخذ اهلها حولا والسبهم لباس الدنيا و رازهم اذناب الفقر

2164 Bundahishn 1990, p. 150.
2166 Yarshater 1983b, p. 434.
2167 See respectively pages 413 and 443 below.
2168 Ibn Isfandīyār 1941, pp. 60–62.
2169 Birūnī maintains that the bow was shot from the Rūyān mountain in Tabaristan. Birūnī 1984, pp. 334–335.
2171 Thaālībī 1989, pp. 91, 95, 96. It is important to note that the story of Ārash is not found in
the Parthian Mihrānid dynast Bahram-i Chubin traced his genealogy. Like Feraydun, all the attributes of Manuchirh, his court in Tabaristan, his justice and wrath, his nourishing function, his association with the sun, as well as those of the Tabaristanī hero appearing during his reign, Arash, with his bow that followed the movement of the sun, all these attributes replicate those of the God Mihr.

Exactly when the primary mythic figures of the Pishdadi section of the national tradition, such as Feraydun, Manuchirh, and Arash, acquired such heavily laden Mihr symbolism cannot be ascertained. That an intimate relationship between these figures and the north was established under the patronage of the Parthian dynasts ruling these domains, however, warrants serious consideration. But Mihr symbols are not confined to the mythic history of Tabaristan; they are also found in it historical narratives in other crucial ways. The history of the house of Ali-i Jamasp, a cadet branch of the Sasanians, also contains potent symbols of Mihr worship, above all the symbols of the cow and the sun. Before we proceed, we must recall that Jamasp (497–499), the brother of Qubad, was not only accused of having Mazdakite proclivity, but also carries the epithet mihtar-parast in the Shāhnāma. As we shall see in the revolts chapter, Ferdowsi’s rendition of Jamasp as a mihtar-parast is only the poetic license used by the author for rendering the term Mihr parast, a worshipper of Mihr. Therefore, once again, one must entertain the connection of Mihr worship with the Mazdakite doctrine.

Three generations after Jamasp, we recall, in the reign of Jil-i Jilanshah, parts of Tabaristan were finally conquered by the Ali-i Jamasp, a family who had hitherto had their base in Gilan. It is appropriate to briefly recall Ibn Isfandiyar’s account, which is replete with Mihr symbolism. The astrologers predicted greatness for Piruz, the son of Jamasp, and informed him that his grandson will be a great king. Piruz’s grandson, hearing the same prophecy, left deputies in Gilan, picked up two cows and went on foot to Tabaristan, which was still reeling from the Arab incursions at the tumultuous end of Yazdgird III’s rule. According to Ibn Isfandiyar, his courage earned Jil-i Jilanshah the epithet Gavbarih, the Cow Devotee. According to Amid, barih actually means friend (dust). This Mihr symbolism connected with Jamasp and his progeny is augmented by Mithraic theophoric names of this dynasty. Among the descendants of Jil-i Jilanshah, we find Dadhihr (bestowed by Mihr) and Khurshid...
§5.4: MIHR WORSHIP IN THE NORTH AND EAST

Except in the Parthian epic-romance of Samak, where the main king of Iran is called the Sun-King (Khurshid Shāh)—a figure who acquires his name in precisely the same manner as the Pishdādī king Manūchihr, that is, when the rays of the sun touch his nose—to my knowledge, no other historical dynast bears such a theophoric name in the annals of Iranian history of classical antiquity. Khurshid, moreover, collaborated with the Iranian rebel Sunbād, who revolted against the Abbāsids, and who encouraged his numerous followers to pray to the Sun and make it their qibla.  

5.4.2 Mihr worship among the Mihrān

As we have seen, the Parthian families pitted the fire of Burzīn Mihr against the Sasanians, took refuge in the said fire as a matter of habit, and continued to use Mithraic theophoric names. Among these Parthian dynasts rose the families of the Mihrāns and the Kārins, whose historical and anecdotal narratives are replete with Mihr worship. The earliest evidence we have for the prevalence of Mihr worship in the quarters of the north and the east during the Sasanian era is provided by the rebellion of the Mihrānīd Bahram-i Chūbin. As the theophoric name of this dynastic family suggests, Mihr worship was, in all probability, the predominant form of religion among this family and the populations under their control. Incorporated within Bahram-i Chūbin’s sociopolitical and ideological antagonism toward the Sasanians, was, therefore, as we shall see, a religious rivalry.

Both Bahram-i Chūbin and his grandfather, whom Sebeos calls Golon Mihrān, are given the epithet Mihrewandak, Slave of Mihr. This epithet is reiterated by Ferdowsī, although in a more poetic rendering. The focal point of the rebel’s worship was not the royal fires Adhar Farnbagh or Adhar Gushnasp, but the Burzīn Mihr fire, to which Bahram-i Chūbin compares himself in the poetic rendering of Ferdowsī. An avowed goal of the Mihrānīd rebel was the destruction of the mōbad-controlled fire temples of the Sasanians. The Sasanians’ destruction of fire temples, as evidenced in the Letter of Tansar and Kārnamag-i Ardashīr-i Pāpāgan, should therefore be viewed in the context of the continuing Parsig-Pahlav religious rivalry. The concomitant Mihrānīd agenda of obliterating the celebrations of Sadīh and Nowruz is surely significant in this connection as well, although the precise meaning of this remains unclear.

2177 On whom see §4.5; for his coinage, see Justi 1895, p. 430.
2178 See §6.4.
2179 See §6.4.2.
2180 See page 364.
2181 For an in depth discussion of this aspect of Bahram-i Chūbin’s rebellion, see §6.1.
2182 See pages 103 and 399.
2183 For further discussion, see §6.1, especially page 399.
2184 See footnote 2319. Although it is known that the feast of “Sada was celebrated by the king and commoner alike” during the Sasanian period, the celebration of this festival was specifically associated with the first Sasanian king, Ardashir I. It is very probable, therefore, that Bahram-i Chūbin was here referring to a Zoroastrian feast that was directly associated with the Sasanian
Bahrām-i Chūbin’s rebellion was also attended by strong millennial motifs. While in the legitimist Sasanian apocalyptic rendition of the rebellion, Bahrām-i Chūbin is depicted as an illegitimate low-born rebel, in an alternative rendition, most probably articulated by the Mihrāns, Bahrām-i Chūbin’s rebellion is sanctioned by Mihr himself, the very agent of eschatology. Bahrām-i Chūbin moreover sustains the connection of Mihr worship to Ṭabaristān, claiming descent from the heroic archer Ārash, and from Milād (Mithradates, bestowed by Mithra).

5.4.3 Mihr worship among the Kārins

The Mihrāns, however, were not the only Parthian dynasts of the north that espoused Mihr worship. A strong Mithraic current is also evident among the Kārins, whose home territories had come to be in the quarter of the east, in Ṭabaristān and parts of Inner Khūrasān, near the Burzīn Mihr fire. Our first evidence to this effect is again theophoric. Of the six known progenies of the towering Kārinid Sukhrā, three bear Mithraic names: Zarmihr (537–558), Dādmihr (558–575), and Mihr (600–620). Sigillographic evidence further corroborates the Kārin’s Mithraic propensities: the seals of Dādmihr, the Kārinid ʿerān-spāḥbed of Khūrasān with a clearly Mithraic theophoric name, underline, we recall, that he took refuge into the Burzīn Mihr fire, the regional Parthian fire of Khūrasān. Apart from theophoric and sigillographic evidence, the most poignant and explicit affirmation of the Kārins’ Mihr worship, however, comes through the course of an extremely significant narrative pertaining to the reigns of Pirūz and Khusrow I. In it, the Kārins are depicted as heroes in whom all the attributes of the yazata Mihr coalesce.

Although Pirūz (459–484) owed his throne to the Mihrānid Rahām, it was during the reign of this same Sasanian king, we recall, that the Kārins began their spiraling rise to power: they essentially ruled the empire during the reigns of Pirūz, Bīlāsh (484–488), and the young Qubād (488–531). In reaction to the overpowering and suffocating hold of Sukhrā and the other Kārins on him, where the very taxation of the realm came to Sukhrā’s treasury, Qubād was finally able to rid himself of the tremendous hold of the Kārins with the aid of the Mihrānid Shāpur of Rayy (Shāpur Rāzi). According to Ibn Isfandiyār, it was in the aftermath of this and the Mazdakite uprising that Qubād sent the Kārins into exile, the fortunes of the family being resuscitated, once again, by Khusrow I Nowshirvān, when he gave the spāḥbed of the east to the Kārins.
The green-clad army

Now the narrative under examination here deals with the wars of Pîrûz and Khusrow I Nowshîrvân in the east and the role that the Kârins played in these. We can begin by the rendition of this narrative in the work of Ibn Ïsandîyâr, the Tâbaristânî author whose work contains—in disjointed form—the saga of his compatriots, the Kârins, from the reign of Pîrûz onward, including the rebellion of the Kârinid Mâziyâr during the early Ìbbâsid period. According to the Târikh-i Tâbaristân, in one of Khusrow I’s battles against the Turkish Khâqân, unexpectedly, an army of about two to three thousand emerged—it is not clear whence—all clad in green attire, so much so that “all except their eyes and [that of?] their horses was covered in green.” Donning green and hurling green flags, they aided Khusrow I to victory, setting out to leave the battle arena in the same mysterious way in which they had appeared. None could ascertain their provenance. They disregarded Khusrow I’s numerous appeals as to their identity, until he finally dismounted his horse and implored them to God and the fires, when they finally halted to converse with the king and revealed themselves to be Kârins. At this point Ibn Ïsandîyâr informs us that there is a background to this episode and narrates the story of Pîrûz’s disastrous defeat at the hand of the Hephthalites.

As we shall see shortly, in almost all the Arabic, Persian, and Armenian sources, Pûrûz’s defeat at the hands of the Hephthalites is explicitly connected to his oath-breaking and injustice, and he is represented as a king who epitomizes folly. In all these narratives, moreover, the king’s folly, his oath breaking, and the disastrous consequences of these were all amended and set straight by the activities of the Kârins.2193 Now, as a god who represents the three functions of royalty, warrior caste, and peasantry, Mihr also carries the three colors of white, red, and green, representing each function respectively.2194 The nourishing function of Mihr seems to have been so important, however, that in all the narratives and rebellions that we shall examine, it was the color green that held paramountcy. Thus, in this narrative of Pûrûz, the color green assumes a primary function. While Pûrûz exemplified mihr durûjî, to be false to Mithra, therefore, the Kârins donned with the green of Mihr, functioned as their yazata, Mihr, toward kingship: they restored and safeguarded the king’s crown.

Pûrûz’s injustice

It is apt to analyze this episode in more detail. As noted earlier, Mihr cosmogony posits a direct connection between the justice of the king and the replenishment of his kingdom. In the Circle of Justice ideology, unjust kings brought natural calamities upon their subjects.2195 In Thâ’ilî’s narrative this

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2195See §5.2.6.
connection is explicit. Pirūz’s reign had started unjustly because he had waged an unjust war against his brother Hormozd III (457–459). The brothers’ war, in which Hormozd III and three of his family members were killed, wreaked havoc in the land and led to tremendous bloodletting. When Pirūz ascended the throne, the rain stopped. As a result, rivers dried up and a drought devastated the land. Ṭabarī replicates this narrative: Pirūz “was a man of limited capability, generally unsuccessful in his undertakings, who brought down evil and misfortune on his subjects, and the greater part of his sayings and the actions he undertook brought down injury and calamity upon both himself and the people of his realm.” For seven years continuously during his reign the land was stricken by famine. “Streams, qanāts, and springs dried up, trees and reed beds became desiccated . . . Dearth, hunger, hardship, and various calamities became general for the people of his realm.”

 Presumably realizing his error, Pirūz began to act with justice. He suspended land and capitation taxation, abolished corvées, forbade hoarding of grain and other foodstuffs, and ordered the rich to share their wealth with the poor. “In this way [Pirūz] ordered the affairs of his subjects during that period of dearth and hunger so that no one perished of starvation except for one man [!] . . . [So Pirūz] implored his Lord to bestow his mercy on him and his subjects and to send down His rain . . . So God aided him by causing it to rain . . . Pirūz’s land once more had a profusion of water . . . and the trees were restored to a flourishing state.” Pirūz then commenced his construction activities. Of the three cities that he built, one was in the vicinity of Rayy, called Rām Pirūz, another between Gurgān and Bāb-i Šul, called Rowshan Pirūz, and the third in Azarbāyjān, called Shahrām Pirūz. It is worth noting that two of these three cities are in the hereditary territory of the Kārin, the Mihrān, and the Ispahbudhān families, the Pahlav regions infused with currents of Mihr worship.

The connection between the justice of the king and the prosperity of the land is of course not peculiar to Iranian notions of kingship. When, however, this connection is accompanied by notions of oath-breaking, as is the case in almost all of the narratives of Pirūz, it clearly assumes Mithraic characteristics. Once Pirūz’s land was prosperous again, however, he stumbled, once more, by attacking the king of the Hephthalites, Akhshunwār. When the war proved inconclusive, Pirūz sued for peace. In exchange, Akhshunwār made Pirūz swear “with an oath and agreement sworn before God, that he would never in the future mount raids against him.” Pirūz agreed. Once back in Iran, however, he decided to renew hostilities. He broke his oath against the wishes of “his viziers and close advisors, who argued that commencing war would involve breaking the agreement.” Having marched out, Pirūz was confronted with Akhshunwār, who

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“publicly adduced before Fayrûz [i.e., Pîrûz] the document with the agreement he had written . . . and warned him about his oath and his undertaking,” Pîrûz’s army and his followers “were, however, in a weakened and defeatist state because of the agreement that had existed between them and the Hephthalites.” Akhshunwar then proclaimed: “O God, act according to what is in this document.”2199 The theme of Pîrûz’s oath-breaking is reiterated in almost all our narratives, including that of Łazar P’arpec’i. The Hephthalite king “sent word to Peroz: ‘You have a sworn covenant with me, written and sealed, [not to attack me] if I do not wage war against you . . . So remember the covenant . . . Return in peace and perish not . . .’ When the Aryans heard the arguments of the Hephthalites, they said to Peroz: ‘He is right, and we are waging an unjust war’. Łazar P’arpec’i also stresses the episode’s association with Tâbaristan. When Pîrûz and all his sons and people perished as a result of his unjust war, a “few men escaped from the slaughter; reaching Vrkan [i.e., Gurgân, the abode of the Kârins], they told everyone of these grievous events, which caused all the nobles and the rest of the populace in Vrkan to flee to Asorestan.”2200 As a result of Pîrûz’s oath-breaking, “the Persian army suffered a defeat the like of which they had never before experienced.”2201

The theme of oath-taking and oath-breaking also looms large in the Shâbûnûmâ’s rendition of Pîrûz’s reign.2202 According to Ferdowsi, when Hormozd III (457–459) ascended the throne, Pîrûz grew jealous and with a number of the elite (mâhân) approached the Hephthalites. The king of the Hephthalites, Chaghânî, gave him in contract an army (bib pêyman sipârâm sipêbî tow râ), and reminded him that Yazdgird II (438–457) had already given him the control over the regions of Tirmidh and Siyahgîrd.2203 With the aid of the Hephthalites, Pîrûz then gained the throne.2204 Ferdowsi, too, recounts the drought that engulfed Iran, the measures taken by Pîrûz to deal with the calamity, the restoration of the land, and his building activity, followed by his attack on the

2199 Bosworth notes: “That is, bring upon Fîrûz the stipulated curse for his breaking the agreement he had made with Akhshunwâr.” Ṭabarî 1999, pp. 113–116, and n. 294, de Goeje, 874–877.


2201 The narrative of Pîrûz’s war against the Hephthalites, his oath to the enemy, the breaking of this oath, and its consequences are even contained in Procopius, pointing to an original Persian source as the provenance of this and other parts of Procopius’ work dealing with Iran. Procopius 1914, I, iii.1–v.1. Pîrûz’s oath-breaking is also detailed in Joshua the Stylist, pp. 10–11. The successive wars of Pîrûz against the Huns in the east and Transoxiana hit his domains very hard. He was forced to underwrite these wars by, among other means, demanding a tribute from the Byzantines. According to Joshua the Stylist, in the midst of his wars against the Hephthalites, the king also imposed a poll-tax upon his entire domain. When Bilâsh (484–488) came to power, he “found the Persian treasury empty and the land ravaged by the Huns.” Joshua the Stylist 2000, p. 16.

2202 Ferdowsi 1971, vol. VIII, pp. 8–9:

382
Hephthalites.\textsuperscript{2205} While at war, his youngest son, Bīlāsh, occupied the throne, but affairs were in the hands of his Kārinid minister Sukhrā.\textsuperscript{2206} When the army reached Central Asia, to the agreed upon Oxus border according, this time, to a pact of Bahram V Gūr (420–438) with Khoshnāvāz, Pīrūz decided not to abide by the agreement.\textsuperscript{2207}

The issue of contract breaking (\textit{peymān shikanī}) looms large in Ferdowsī’s subsequent rendition of events. When the son of the Khāqān heard that Pīrūz had crossed the Oxus with his army, he wrote a letter to the Sasanian king and threatened Pīrūz that if he reneged on his kingly oath, he would not be considered of royal lineage, and further that if Pīrūz broke the oath, he, too, would be forced to break his contract and resort to war. The terminology used in almost the entire narrative is \textit{peymān shikanī} or at times \textit{ʿabd shikanī}.\textsuperscript{2208} Significantly, it is to the Kārinid Sukhrā’s messenger that the Khāqān communicated his accusation of Pīrūz’s breach of contract.\textsuperscript{2209}

It is noteworthy that both Nöldeke and Bosworth recognized the centrality of oath and oath-breaking in the narrative of Pīrūz’s wars in the east, but attributed it to Pīrūz’s defeats in these wars.\textsuperscript{2210}

The fact that contracts are made under the protection of Mihr, by now readily associated with the Sun, is explicitly stated by Ferdowsī: The Khāqān asked his messenger to tell Pīrūz that he would bring the contract of his ancestor atop a lance, as if it were the sun.\textsuperscript{2211} Significantly, on account of

\textsuperscript{2207}Thālibī 1900, pp. 578–579, Thālibī 1989, pp. 372–373; Ferdowsī 1971, vol. VIII, p. 12, Ferdowsī 1935, p. 2270:

\textsuperscript{2208}Ferdowsī 1935, pp. 2270–2271, Ferdowsī 1971, vol. VIII, pp. 12–13:

\textsuperscript{2209}Ferdowsī 1971, vol. VIII, p. 21, Ferdowsī 1935, p. 2280.

\textsuperscript{2210}Bosworth maintains, for example, that the “narrative emphasizes Fīrūz’s responsibility, as the breaker of his oath, for the ensuing catastrophe”; but as Nöldeke skeptically observes, “if Fīrūz had been victorious, all mention of his oath-breaking would have been tossed aside!” Šabarī 1999, p. 115, n. 292.

\textsuperscript{2211}Ferdowsī 1971, vol. VIII, p. 14:

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Pīrūz’s contract-breaking, the Khāqān now accused him of irreligiosity. The Khāqān beseeched God, who is here rendered as the Righteous Judge (dāvar-i dādpāk), in supplication against the unrighteous Pīrūz (Pīrūz-i bidādgār), who sought grandeur through the use of the sword. And thus the Khāqān set out against Pīrūz. Naturally, Pīrūz suffered a humiliating defeat, losing his life as well as that of the major grandees of the empire in the process. In Procopius’ account, when the escape routes of the king were closed, the magi advised the king that he should make sure to meet the Hephthalite leader at “dawn, and then, turning toward the rising sun, make his obeisance. In this way, they explained, he would be able to escape the future ignominy of his deed.” As Trombely and Watt observe, “in reality, Pīrūz was making obeisance to the rising sun (that is, the visible shape of the god Mithra).” The paradigm for this narrative, without doubt, is “the popular variant of the Iranian myth of creation [where] . . . the sun, i.e., Mihr, . . . is the arbiter between the two adversaries,” here co-opted by the Sasanian king Pīrūz.

Another common element in all of the narratives concerning Pīrūz’s reign is the central role played by the Kārīnīd Sukhra, avenging the king’s defeat precipitated by his oath-breaking. There is little doubt, therefore, that the narrative of Pīrūz’s humiliating defeat and all the Mithraic motifs contained in it have to be considered in conjunction with the rise of the Kārīns to power and the extremely positive representation of this Parthian dynastic family in most of our narratives. The heroic accounts of the Kārīns’ role in leashing and highlighting the king’s folly and restoring his kingship were inserted in Pīrūz’s narratives by the Parthian Kārīnīd dynastic family. In all probability, likewise, the theme of making and breaking contracts looms large in Pīrūz’s narrative because the Parthian Kārīns were, like the Mihrāns, Mihr devotees, who inserted their beliefs into these sections of the Xᵛᵛadāy-Nāmag tradition. In fact, in all other substantive narratives in which the Kārīns appear, aspects of Mihr worship appear alongside them. This comes across very clearly in the Taʾrīkh-i Tabarīstan.

As the Kārīns’ fortunes continued to rise throughout the rule of Bilāsh and the first part of Qubād’s reign, it is, in all probability, primarily on account of this family’s power over his kingdom that Qubād started his Mazdakite phase and commenced the reforms that are said to have continued during his son Khusrw I’s reign. According to Ibn Isfandiyār, Qubād substantially reduced the power of the Kārīns over his realm by banishing them to

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2214 Procopius 1914, I. iii. 1–22.
2215 Joshua the Stylite 2000, pp. 11–12, n. 44.
2216 Shaked 1980, p. 18.
2217 Tabarī 1999, p. 117, de Goeje, 877.
2218 See §2.4.
2219 See §2.4.5.
Chapter 5: Religion §5.4: Mihr worship in the north and east

Ṭabaristān and Zābulistān. Ibn Isfandiyār’s explanatory notes on the Kārīn end here, and the narrative of the green-clad army coming to the aid of Khusrow I commences. When Qubād killed Sukhrā, Ibn Isfandiyār explains, his sons fled from Ṭabaristān to Badakhshān. Hearing of Qubād’s death and Khusrow I’s regret at his father’s treatment of them, the Kārins then came with their green-clad army to Khusrow I’s aid against the Khāqān. In sum, the Kārins wore the color green and assumed their chief deity’s role in bestowing and restoring kingship, because they were replicating in Pīrūz’s narrative the function of their chief God, Mihr.

Kayānid pseudo-genealogy of the Sasanians.

Under Pīrūz, the Sasanians also challenged the Parthians’ territorial and religious legitimacy by concocting their own pseudo-genealogy to rival the pseudo-genealogy of the Arsacids. The Sasanians now traced their descent, through the Achaemenids, to the Kayānids, and above all to Kai Vishtaspā. As the father of the last Achaemenid ruler, Darius III (380–330 BCE), was called Vishtaspā, they identified him with his namesake, the patron of Zoroaster. With one stroke, therefore, under Pīrūz the Sasanians seem to have effected two feats. On the one hand this was political propaganda par excellence, “since a claim to Kayanian blood gave these kings of the south-west an ancient title to rule also over the north-east.” Insofar as the Sasanians tied their genealogy to the patron of the Mazdean faith, Vishtaspā, moreover, it gave them religious legitimacy.

There is little doubt, therefore, that the Sasanian concoction of this genealogy was “proclaimed and exploited from the time of Peroz, the son of Yazdgird II (459–484).” Significantly, it was Pīrūz, as well, who first adopted the title of Kai, reviving the ancient title of Kāvī, on some of his coins. Naming one of his sons Kavād or Qubād, after the first Kayānid king, Kai Kavād, and another Jāmāsp, after Vīshtaspā’s wise counselor, Jāmāsp, was another move in this direction. Thereafter the use of Kayānid titles among the Sasanians became common. We recall that around this same time, the Sasanians began to...
promote the Ādhar Gushnasp and Ādhar Farnbagh fires in rivalry against the Burzín Mihr fire. 2227

What led Pīrūz to engage in this politico-religious struggle for legitimacy with the Parthians? Boyce claims that Pīrūz’s exploitation of this genealogical tradition and its attendant religious connotations was probably prompted by the Hephthalite threat in the northeastern parts of his realm, “thus making the Sasanians keenly aware of their need to foster loyalty among their own subjects.”2228 But the subjects of the Sasanians in the northeast were Parthians, in whose historical tradition Pīrūz is portrayed in a decidedly negative light. 2229 It might be proposed, therefore, that the Sasanians’ propagandistic use of the eastern Kayānid right to power and their promotion of the Ādhar Farnbagh and Ādhar Gushnasp fires against the Pahlav Burzín Mihr fire reflected the suffocating hold that the Parthian dynastic powers were exerting on Sasanian domains at this juncture of Sasanian history. In the context of this struggle and in an attempt to co-opt the Parthian dynastic families’ claim to legitimacy in their ancestral domains, Pīrūz constructed the cities Rām Pīrūz near Rayy, and Rowshan Pīrūz between Gurgān and Bāb-i Șūl in these very Pahlav territories.

5.4.4 Mihr worship in Armenia

In the political history chapter we discussed the intimate sociopolitical connections of Iran to Armenia during the Arsacid and Sasanian periods. 2230 The Arsacid descent of the Armenian kings formed a constant and lively reminder for the Sasanians of the sociopolitical presence of the Parthians throughout their rule. In this context, we highlighted the continued intimate association of the Parthian dynastic families of the Sasanian period with Armenia and briefly traced some of the better-known aspects of this relationship, especially that of the Mīhrāns. What we must underline in this section, however, and what is of even further crucial importance in the history of Irano–Armenian relations, is that throughout Armenian history, and especially prior to the conversion of the Armenians to Christianity—a process that like all the processes of conversion was drawn-out and complex2231—“Iran . . . was to be the dominant influence in
Armenian spiritual matters.”

The Armenians probably became Zoroastrian during the Achaemenid period. For almost a millennium prior to the official Armenian adoption of Christianity in the fourth century CE, therefore, the Armenian religious landscape was informed by Mazdean forms of worship, although strong regional traditions also affected it. It would be logical to presume, therefore, that this spiritual tradition would substantially influence later Armenian religious practice. In fact, so potent a mark Iranian religion had left on the Armenian landscape that, as James Russell observes, “numerous survivals of Armenian Zoroastrianism remain to this day.”

As in post-Avestan and Sasanian Iran, so also in pre-Christian Armenia, no centralized orthodox Zoroastrian church existed. Aramazd (Ohrmozd, Ahūrā Mazda), sometimes called the manly god, was the principal deity, and the father of all gods. Anahit was his progeny, Mihr his son, and Nanē—a female god of Uruk origin—his daughter. Mimicking the dynastic structure of the Armenian polity, it seems “that the royal family presided over the cult of the supreme God, while local dynasts, the naxarars, attended to lesser yazatas.” Anahit, the Lady, who bears another epithet whose meaning remains unclear (the golden mother), had her own separate temple. Tir, the scribe of Aramazd, and the name of the fourth month in the Armenian calendar, and Sandaramet were other noteworthy Zoroastrian yazatas replicated in Armenia.

Of all the Iranian religious currents prevalent in pre-Christian Armenia, however, Mihr worship was particularly strong. In fact, so prevalent was Mihr worship in Armenia, we recall, that it has been claimed that this religious also acknowledged that the “conversion of king Trdat (Tiridates) to Christianity in the early fourth century and the work of Saint Gregory did not bring about an immediate and total rejection of pre-Christian Armenian traditions. Thus, early Armenian historiography presents us with a fascinating picture of the interplay of cultures pagan and Christian, Iranian and Hellenistic. But the Armenian historians themselves, being Christian, impose upon that complicated amalgam interpretations based upon their own beliefs and ideals, using imagery drawn from the Judeo-Christian world.”

Emphasis mine. As a result, Garsoian maintains, “any Iranian element lurking beneath the surface of early Christian Armenian civilization can all too easily be overlooked, swamped by Armenian hostility and the highly articulate and well-documented classical tradition which was an indubitable component of the contemporary scene.”

Garsoian 1985c in Garsoian 1985b, p. 29.

2232 Unless otherwise noted, the following discussion follows Russell 1991, p. 439.


2234 The name [Aramazd] is a loan from Parthian, cf. Greek Aramasdês.” The temple of Aramazd “held an image, probably resembling the image of the manly Zeus, destroyed by St. Acindynus.” As Russell explains, the Armenians made statues of their gods. These were mostly imported from the west and placed in shrines. The function of Aramazd as a thunder god was probably influenced by a non-Zoroastrian weather god. Russell 1991, p. 439.

2235 As Russell explains, the cult of Anahit might have absorbed symbols of the Mesopotamian goddess Ishtar. Russell 1991, p. 440.


2237 Derived from a southwest Iranian word, Spandaramet, the earth personified. Russell 1991, p. 442.

2238 The following discussion is likewise indebted to James Russell’s interesting article Russell 1990b, p. 183.
tradition influenced the development of Roman Mithraism. The very name for a pre-Christian Armenian temple, mehean, “from a Middle Iranian derivative of Old Iranian *māṭhrāṇa or mithradāṇa,” testifies to the spread and importance of the cult of Mithra in Armenia. As we have seen, and as Russell also notes, during the Islamic period any Zoroastrian temple was called a dār-i Mihr and Armenia was no exception to this general practice. Likewise, any pagan priest was called a Mithraist. The Armenian king Tiridates I (56–59 and 62–72 CE) invoked Mihr, the god of contracts, in his treaty with the Roman emperor Nero (54–68 CE), and in an inscription, he referred to himself as the Sun, the very symbol of Mithra. The high frequency of theophoric names composed with mihr, mrh, or meh among the Armenian Arsacid kings and dynasts in the classical period and late antiquity further underlines the significance of Mithra in the Armenian spiritual landscape. To this day, Mihr remains the seventh month, as well as the eighth day of any month in the Armenian calendar. And in Armenian Christianity, the twenty-first day of Mehekan, Greater Mihrigān in the Zoroastrian calendar, is devoted—appropriate to Mihr’s warrior function—to St. George the Soldier. As late as the nineteenth century, when water seeped from a certain rock, Armenians believed it to be the “urine of Mithra’s steed.”

*Mithraic elements in hunting and banquet scenes*

As Russell notes, the many terracotta figurines that have been found in Parthia and Armenia “of an archer in an Iranian dress on horseback are very likely votive images of Mithra, who is shown hunting on horseback on many Mithraic monuments.” As Garsoian has brilliantly shown, the motifs of the hunting scene, as well as the banquet, so widespread in Parthian Armenian and Sasanian art, have Mithraic provenance. In the Armenian context, as in the Iranian setting, the man on the horse has heroic and supernatual overtones.

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2239 Russell 1991, p. 440. A cave-like temple of Mithra in a village in Armenia has been identified. The temple had already been mentioned by Agat’angelos as a temple of Mithra, mrhakan mehean, at Bagayarich (town of god), now Pekeriç. A second cave continues to be associated with Mihr in living Armenian epic. The epic describes a lion Mher (Mithra) and a little Mher, the latter of whom is “guided by a raven . . . to a cave at Van, where he waits on horseback, the wheel of destiny (charkhé falak) in his hand, for the end of days when justice will return to earth.” Russell 1990b, p. 184.

2240 Russell 1990b, p. 183.

2241 Schippmann 1980, p. 56.


2243 As Garsoian observes, the “name Mithra/Mihr is a common component of the onomasticon of Armenia and its neighbors: Mihrdat/Mithradates, Mihran, Mihr-šapuh, Mer Šapuh,” etc. Garsoian 1985c, p. 56, n. 90.

2244 Russell 1990b, pp. 185, 190, 191, 192.


2246 Russell 1990b, p. 184.

2247 The persistent survival of the ideal of the hunter among Iranians is exemplified by a poem which opens with the stanza “La Roi declara . . . Qu’ils célébrent les louangées du Chasseur, maître
its Iranian analogues, “the horse of the evildoers stumbles at the critical moment” in Armenian epic literature. We recall the horse that kicked Yazdgird I the Sinner to death in Parthava. The imagery of the hunt in Armenian literature and art, therefore, replicates that of the Parthians and the Sasanians, all incorporating potent Mithraic symbolism. Thus “the twin frescoes from the Mithraeum at [Arsacid] Dura Europos [which depict] the galloping of the god Mithra drawing his bow at a fleeing herd of bucks, onagers, wild boars, and lions, depict in an identical prefiguration . . . the gesture of the Sasanian royal representation, and thereby identifying their prototype.” Just as on a Parthian seal from Nisa we find a rider “crowned with a diadem spearing a wild beast and surmounted by a crescent moon,” so on a Sasanian hunter intaglio we find the rider accompanied by the sun and the moon.

The banquet (bazm), a central social function in both the Iranian and Armenian context, and well-represented in Armenian and Iranian literature, also betrays a Mithraic provenance. The banquet, as Garsoian observes, “became one of the settings of the apotheosis at which the gates of eternity opened to reveal the banquet of immortality. The banquet scene . . . concludes the series of Mithra’s terrestrial exploits preceding his ascension on the chariot of the sun.” It is crucial to note that, as Garsoian observes, “in the heavenly vision of . . . [the infamous] Sasanian high-priest Kartër [Kirdır] described in his inscription at Sar Mashhad [KSM] the central image is of a golden throne dominating a banquet.”


2250 Initially excavated in 1920–22 under the direction of Franz Cumont, Dura Europos, “on the right bank of the Euphrates between Antioch and Seleucia on the Tigris, [was] founded in 303 BCE by Nicanor, a general of Seleucus I . . . [It was] brought into the Iranian cultural sphere after the Parthian conquest in about 113 BCE. This domination lasted three centuries.” Originally only a fortress it was “constituted as a city only in the late Hellenistic period and had been only sparsely populated throughout the Greek period. It was under the Parthians, however, that the city assumed its essential aspect.” Leriche, Pierre and Mackenzie, D.N., ‘Duraeuropos’, in Ehsan Yarshater (ed.), Encyclopaedia Iranica, New York, 2007 (Leriche and Mackenzie 2007).

2251 Garsoian 1985c, p. 54.

2252 “Nous voyons un cavalier, un prince, éclatant, et il est assis sur un cheval précieux, et il a une bannière (?) [dans la main?] . . . [Et là] un homme [apparait?] . . . et placé sur un trône en or.” Gignoux 1991c, pp. 95–96.

§5.4: MIHR WORSHIP IN THE NORTH AND EAST  
CHAPTER 5: RELIGION

is given and whose name is used for the 27th day of the Armenian month, became particularly strong in Armenia. In the process Vahagn became second only to Aramazd, and, like Mithra, identified with the Sun. In his narrative on the Christianization of Armenia, Agat'angelos “devotes far more detail to the destruction of Vahagn’s temple at Aštišat in Tarōn than to any of the other pagan shrines,” the compiler stressing “that St. Gregory was especially desirous of destroying this temple because it was outstanding for its wealth, and because ignorant men still made profane sacrifices at these surviving altars.” The first Armenian church was erected on the site of the former temple. As has recently been suggested with “considerable persuasiveness by James Russell . . . [however] at the beginning of the Sasanian period Vahagn was taking the place of the sun god,” Mithra. Thenceforth Vahagn assumes Mithra’s place in the “dominant Zoroastrian official trinity of Armenia: [the trinity becoming that of] Ahūra Mazda, Anāhit, Vahagn.”

We should not lose sight, moreover, of the close correspondence of Mithra and Vahagn. For as Gershevitch and others have shown, in the Mazdean tradition Verethragnā (Avestan Vərətʰraŋa)/Bahram/Vahagn “is the constant companion of [Mithra], thus making the confusion understandable” in the Armenian context. The white horse in particular is the symbol of Bahram since the “third incarnation of the god is specified to be as a white horse.”

Divine Glory (farr), a necessary prerequisite of kingship, contingent on the king’s fulfillment of his contract and the maintenance of the Circle of Justice underwritten by Mihr and represented by a host of Mithraic symbols, was as integral a part of the discourse of political legitimacy in Armenia as in Iran.

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2255 Garsoian 1985a, in Garsoian 1985b, pp. 158, 180, n. 74.
2257 Mihr Yasht 1959, p. 107; Mihr Yasht 1883, §§70–71. See also Bahman Yasht 1880, Bahman Yasht, vol. 5 of Sacred Books of the East, Oxford University Press, 1880, translated by E.W. West (Bahman Yasht 1880), pp. 243–244, cited in Garsoian 1985c, p. 52, n. 85. In the Mihr Yasht we find: “he [Mithra] who is strong and victorious [Verethragnā], [Mihr Yasht 1883, §16] . . . the supernatural god who flies over climes bestowing good fortune [farr] . . . bestowing power; victoriousness . . . he increases, [Mihr Yasht 1883, §§67, 127] . . . flying behind [him, Mithra] comes the strong likeness of Ahūra Mazda’s creature, in the shape of a wild aggressive male boar [Verethragnā] . . . in front of him [Mithra] flies the blazing Fire which (is) the strong Kavyan Fortune [Mihr Yasht 1883, §141].” Garsoian 1985c, pp. 55–56, n. 90. Recall that boar (goraz, boraz, or varaz) is also the suffix of the name of our towering Mikhānid dynast, Shahvarz; see page 146.
2258 Bahman Yasht 1880, §9, cited in Garsoian 1985c, p. 53, n. 87. See also page 411 below.
2259 See our discussion on page 354.
2260 Among the central themes of Elishė’s history, Thomson notes the theme of “the covenant (ukht) and the secession (erparakatwim) of those who abandoned the covenant. For Elishė, the covenant is a covenant of the church; he [i.e., Elishė] emphasizes not merely that the pact to which Armenians swore allegiance was one of loyalty to God and country, but that in that pact the church played the leading role.” Observing that the concept “of holy covenant as the body of the faithful does not occur in the New Testament,” Thomson argues that it nevertheless has a “definite precursor in the Judaism of the second century BCE,” for which he gives evidence from 1 Macc. 1:15–16,
As Garsoian observes, “the supernatural aura of both rulers [Armenian and Sasanian] was ... identical. The central Iranian concept of the royal glory, the kavyan xwarrah [Armenian P'ark’], which identifies, accompanies, and protects the legitimate ruler, but escapes from the usurper, and abandons an evil king, is present in Armenian sources even in a Christian context.”

In short, the affinities of the pre-Christian Armenian religious tradition with the Iranian spiritual tradition were so strong, direct, and thorough, having outlived the gradual social Christianization of Armenia, that it has been claimed that the “Armenian religious vocabulary is almost entirely Iranian and covers most Zoroastrian ideas, religious institutions and instruments.”

Obviously, then, the Sasanian connection with Armenia had not only a political dimension, but also a strong cultural and religious one. Through a good part of their history, therefore, the Sasanians were forced to deal not only with an Armenia which was Arsacid and hence a constant reminder of the continued forceful presence of Parthians in their own sociopolitical structure, but also with an Armenia in which currents of Mihr worship were strong. The Mihrans of the Sasanian domains who had established sociopolitical ties with pre-Christian and Christian Armenia and Albania (Arrán), along with other Iranian Parthian houses, such as the Suren, whose presence in the pages of Armenian history is replete, were dealing with Parthian naxarars among whom Mihr or Bahram worship predominated. It was to the Parthian dynast Mihran, for example, that Vahan Mamikonean argued his case for his loyal behavior toward the Sasanian king Piruz, and it was this same Mihran who urged the Armenian rebels to convert, or possibly reconvert, and “take refuge in fire and worship the sun.”

The Armenian rebels finally resorted to him for rendering and Daniel 11:18–30. The similarity of the concepts of ukht and erkparakut'wm with the Mithraic concepts of forming a contract, mihran kardan, literally to form a Mithra, and mihr durju, to be false to Mithra, is nevertheless striking. Elishé 1982, pp. 9–11.

Garsoian 1985c, p. 42 and n. 53. “The most common representation of the xwarrah ... is that of a ram adorned with flying ribbons.” Ibid., p. 44, n. 58, citing Bivar, A.D.H., Catalogue of the Western Asiatic Seals in the British Museum, Stamp Seals II, the Sasanian Dynasty, London, 1969 (Bivar 1969), pl. 16. Also see now the excellent work Soudavar 1980, pp. 13–39, where the Mithraic provenance of the ram adorned with flying ribbons, and the flying ribbons (dastar) themselves, is convincingly argued. Even the Armenian Holy Cross is depicted “with a pair of stylized wings underneath ... and is referred to as P'ark' Khach' (Glorious Cross).” Soudavar, citing personal correspondence with Russell, ibid., p. 21 and p. 151, figure 24. Soudavar's work is accompanied by fascinating plates which substantiate most of our arguments.


As mentioned, we have merely been able to touch upon the intimate relations between Armenia and Iran in this study; see our discussion on page 43.


mediation (mijnord). The chronicler Łazar P’arpec‘i must have been thoroughly familiar with the Mithraic beliefs of the Parthian Mihrāns but not necessarily with the beliefs of the Sasanian Pirūz. When the Mihrānid Bahrām-i Chūbin solicited the aid of the Armenian dynasts, therefore, a common recent religious culture probably further strengthened his claim of affinity with them, a dimension of the rebellion that could very well have been deleted from the pages of heavily Christianized Armenian historiography.

The tension and antagonism existing between the Sasanians and the Parthians in religious matters must have also exacerbated the religious dimension of the Sasanian relationship with pre-Christian Armenia. Mithraism seems to have been so entrenched in Armenia and neighboring Azarbājān that it probably even undergirded the cataclysmic rebellion of Bābak Khurramdīn against the Abbāsids in the early ninth century in Azarbājān.

5.5 Conclusion

While underlining their confidence for the continued prevalence of Mihr worship in Iran, scholars have long bemoaned the dearth of evidence to this effect. Giving a synopsis of the variegated panorama of religious life in Sasanian Iran, however, we have attempted to single out the prevalence of Mihr worship among the Parthian dynasts, especially the Kārins and the Mihrāns, ruling in the quarters of the north and the east (kūst-i ādurūbadagan and kūst-i khwarāsān) of the Sasanian domain. The political rivalry between the Sasanians and the Parthians was exacerbated by religious disparity, if not outright conflict. Like the Pārsīg–Pahlav sociopolitical rivalry, this dichotomy had a geographical dimension. The quarters of the east and the north, regions which continued to be ruled by Parthian dynastic families even after the demise of the Sasanians, were particularly affected by strong currents of Mihr worship.

Insofar as the Sasanian kings, not being trained theologians, might have adhered to various forms of popular worship, we might argue that Mihr worship was as prevalent among the Sasanian kings as it was among the Parthian dynastic families. If, on the other hand, the orthodoxy that a number of Sasanian kings upheld was in fact the Zurvanite heresy, then clearly the Parthian dynasts of the quarters of the north and east did not partake in it. Enough evidence has hopefully been presented to testify to the prevalence of Mihr worship among the Kārins and the Mihrāns. While little evidence seems to survive for the primacy of Mihr worship among the Ispahbudhān family, we argued that their

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2267 See page 128.
2268 We shall provide further evidence of this when discussing Bahrām-i Chūbin’s rebellion in §6.1 below.
2269 Bābak Khurramdīn’s rebellion was in all probability a Mithraic socioreligious movement against the caliphate; see footnote 2597. We shall be dealing with this in a later work.
2270 Shaked 1994a, p. 46.
2271 See Chapters 4 and 6.
traditional homeland was Parthava, the regions under the control of the Prince of the Medes, that is to say, Khurāsān and Azarbāyjān.\textsuperscript{2272} Considering the strong Mithraic currents present in these regions, it is plausible therefore that this agnatic Parthian dynastic family may also have partaken in the religious dimensions of agnatic worship prevalent in the regions under their control.\textsuperscript{2273} What is more, the type of Mihr worship practiced by these Parthian families seems to be substantially different from the devotion of Mihr that was incorporated in the orthodox Zoroastrian creed. As Shaked has argued, “Mihr was ... identified with the Sun, and the worship of the sun could be understood as the worship of Mihr.” In orthodox Zoroastrianism, however, “Mihr’s position ... is not so central that he would deserve to be placed at the top of the Pantheon.” In the orthodox conceptualization of the divine, other gods were clearly “lesser divinities, subordinate to the Creator [Ahūrā Mazdā].”\textsuperscript{2274} While Shaked observes that “Ohrmazd himself was also identified with the sun in various Iranian areas, especially in the eastern Iranian provinces, as may be deduced from linguistic evidence,” the absence of any reference to Ahūrā Mazdā in any of the rebellions in the quarters of the north and the east investigated in Chapter 6, and the central position of the Sun in all of these, is so conspicuous that we must conclude that these revolts had nothing to do with orthodox Zoroastrianism.\textsuperscript{2275} To what extent we can consider Mihr worship in the Pahlav domains as sectarian, strictly speaking, requires a great deal of further investigation. There is one last observation of Shaked that seems especially pertinent to the religious landscape of the regions under study here. As Shaked has argued, the “pluralism of faith that may have prevailed in the Sasanian period ... is to all appearances not one that entailed necessarily a pluralism of sects.” There is no reason to assume, in other words, “that every shade of faith had, so to speak, its own church.”\textsuperscript{2276}

In all the varieties of Iranian religious belief, including Mihr worship, religious identity was closely bound to ethnic identity. In the greater scheme of things, a Mazdean, no matter what his/her popular cosmogonical belief, or who his/her chief yazata, was an Iranian, who identified him/herself, if forced, in contradistinction to a non-Mazdean, who was an anēr. The coalescence of

\textsuperscript{2272}See page 188ff.
\textsuperscript{2273}See §1.2 for the concept of agnatic group.
\textsuperscript{2274}Boyce 1979, p. 56.
\textsuperscript{2275}The evidence that we have gathered calls into question, or should at least be considered side-by-side, Shaked’s subsequent claim, viz., that the “religious reality of the Sasanian period was such that Mihr, identified with the sun, was indeed a central god in the western regions of the empire.” Shaked 1994a, p. 92. Emphasis added.
\textsuperscript{2276}Shaked, Shaul, ‘Some Islamic Reports Concerning Zoroastrianism’, Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 17, (1994b), pp. 43–84 (Shaked 1994b), p. 46. “It seems clear from what we know of the period from other sources, namely, that there were widespread deviations from the norms of the written religion, and that, as far as we can tell, many of these deviations simply did not exist as separate church structures.” Shaked 1994b, p. 46. Significantly, two exceptions seem to be the Sīsāniya sect (the followers of Bihāfarid, see §6.3, especially page 436) and the followers of Bābak Khurramdān. Ibid., p. 46–47.
the linguistic, religious, and ethnic dimensions of identity in Sasanian Iran in fact harked back to the Achaemenid period, when the term *airya* was used to connect language, descent, and religious affiliation in Darius I’s inscriptions at Bisetun (Behistun). As Gnoli argues, the Avestan tradition “was an Aryan tradition par excellence.” Significantly in fact, as Gnoli observes, while the ethnicon *airya* never appears in the Gāthās, it does appear in the Younger Avestā, in particular in the *Yashts*, and more specifically in the great *Yashts*, namely those dedicated to Anāhītā (Yasht 5), Tishtrya (Yasht 8), Mithra (Yasht 10), and the Fravashis (Yasht 13). With the assimilation of the “different religious trends that are echoed in the *Yashts*, an assimilation which led to the formation of the Younger Avestā, the tradition we might define as *airya*, began to be an organic part of Zoroastrianism.” It was then, Gnoli argues, that “the foundations [were] laid of that *substantial unity between religious tradition and national tradition*, which was to be characteristic of the whole cultural history of ancient and, in part, medieval Iran.” On some very crucial level, the national dimensions of identity as articulated in the *Xvādāy-Nāmag* tradition created a meta-history. The irony of it all was that with the conquest of the plateau by the Arabs, as Crone observes, the Iranians came into contact with a people for whom religious and national identity were equally compounded. Whoever the God of the Arabs was, he spoke Arabic.

While the kingdom of the Sasanians ceased to exist in the Islamic period, the Pārsīg–Pahlav genealogical heritage of the ruling dynasties continued to inform the heritage of those who claimed descent from it, witnessed by the genealogical claims circulating in the tenth centuries among the Samanids, the Buyids, and most importantly, the patrons of the *Shāhnāma*, the family of ʿAbdalrazzāq. Throughout the Sasanian period, therefore, except for periodic upsurges of centralization, the center–periphery discord, and the localized dimensions of identity, as articulated in an agnatic family structure, remained a paramount feature of Iranian society. And as the surge of the *ghulāt* in the medieval period attests, the tension between orthodox and heretic tendencies continued to inform Iranian history. But as attested by the

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2278 Gnoli 1989, p. 35.
2281 Mihr Yasht 1883, §§4 and 13.
2282 Frawardin Yasht 1883, §§10, 43, 44, 87, and 143.
2284 For ʿAbdalrazzāq, see page 463 below, as well as Pourshariati 1995.
2285 In this sense the history of Iran is no exception to that of any other region in the pre-modern world. One need not put forth an unwarranted claim to continuity to recognize this.
2286 The *ghulāt*, literally the *exaggerators*, were various Shi’ite sects in Iran during the late antique to early modern period. See Babayan, Kathryn, *Mystics, Monarchs and Messiahs: Cultural Landscapes of Early Modern Iran*, Harvard University Press, 2002 (Babayan 2002).
proliferation of the *Shāhnāma* tradition and the strength of its popular dissemination, and as reflected in the prolific popular literature of Iran, the ethnic and national dimensions of identity have, throughout Iranian history, superseded these centrifugal tendencies.

\[2287\] The author’s research into this will be forthcoming. The concepts of the *ajam* versus the Arab or the Turk infuse Iranian popular literature throughout the Qajar period. Their strong currents, in different terminologies, in the modern period of not only Iranian, but also Turkic and Arab modern histories is recognized by all.
CHAPTER 6

Revolts of late antiquity in Khurāsān and Ṭabaristān

In the previous chapter we argued that the histories of the quarter of the east (kūst-i khwarāsān) and the quarter of the north (kūst-i ādurbādagan) during the Sasanian period, being for the most part controlled by Parthian dynastic families, testify to the existence of popular religious practices prevalent in these regions. Moreover, the predominant popular form of this spirituality in Khurāsān, Ṭabaristān, Gurgān, and the Caspian provinces, as well as in Azarbāyjān, was Mihr worship. Given also the prevalence of Mihr in pre-Christian Armenia, it can therefore be said that in an extensive stretch of territory from the northwest to the northeast of Iran, the most popular form of religious practice during the Sasanian period was Mihr worship. The evidence for this in our sources is, as we have seen and will hopefully continue to establish, overwhelming. Moreover, our evidence will underline the substantial and direct continuity of religious practices prevalent in these regions of Iran from the late Sasanian period through at least the first century and a half of post-conquest Iranian history. In order to establish this we first take up an investigation of the religious dimensions of a revolt whose political ramifications were already examined in Chapter 2: the revolt of Bahrām-i Chūbīn (590–591). We have deferred a detailed study of its religious aspects to this chapter in order to highlight the shared religious landscape of this revolt with those that transpired in the quarters of the east and north of the former Sasanian domains after the eruption of the ‘Abbāsid revolution (747). After our analysis of Bahrām-i Chūbīn’s rebellion, we will have to briefly discuss the ‘Abbāsid revolution, before we pick up, once again, our narrative.

6.1 Bahrām-i Chūbīn

The rebellion of the Mihrānid Bahrām-i Chūbīn against Hormozd IV and Khusrow II in 590 was an unprecedented revolt in the history of the Sasanians, for it marked the first significant breakdown of the Sasanian–Parthian confederacy,

2288 For lack of space and time, we cannot present all our evidence for the latter region here.
2289 See §5.4.4.
when a Parthian dynast rebelled against the very legitimacy of the kingship of the Sasanians. As a rebellion against the Sasanians, and in line with the religio-political ideology maintained by the dynasty and promulgated through their ideological machinery, the revolt of Bahram-i Chubin was naturally considered as the ultimate act of sacrilege. In the religio-political dogma promoted by the Sasanians and the orthodox religious establishment with which it sought at times to form a partnership, any rebellion against the state involved, by definition, apostasy. As it has been so cogently argued by Gnoli, this definition of apostasy had a long heritage in the religio-political discourse of the Mazdean religion and the Iranian notion of kingship, and was not an invention of the Sasanians. Insofar as there was no clear definition of orthodoxy in the post-Avestan, pre-Sasanian history of Iran, however, the purview of apostasy could not have been very clearly defined prior to the rise of the dynasty. Besides its implicit heretical purport, however, the rebellion of Bahram-i Chubin embodied even more explicit and directly potent signs of heresy. For, as we shall argue in this section, a key feature of the Parthian dynasty’s rebellion was its promulgation of and adherence to Mithraic currents of religiosity. What is our evidence for this?

6.1.1 Mithraic purview of Bahram-i Chubin’s rebellion

A perusal of Ferdowsi’s account of Bahram-i Chubin, narrated from the legitimist perspective of the Sasanians as articulated through the Xwaday-Namag tradition, gives us a very significant piece of information about this Mihra’id Parthian dynast. While recounting the saga of Bahram-i Chubin, on a number of occasions, Ferdowsi refers to the Parthian dynast as Bahram-i Mihtar-parast. The only other figure that carries this epithet in the Sasanian sections of Ferdowsi’s work is the Sasanian king Jamasp, the progenitor of the Al-i Jamasp dynasty in Gilan and eventually Tabaristan, and the ancestor of Jil-i Jilanshah Gavbari, the Cow Devotee. We recall that it was this Jil-i Jilanshah, the Cow Devotee, who, together with the family of Farrukhzad, aka Zinabi, made a pact with the Arab armies. There is very little doubt that Ferdowsi’s epithet of Mihtar-parast, applied to Jamasp and Bahram-i Chubin, is the author’s poetic rendering for Mihr-parast, that is to say, a devotee of Mihr, and thus signals the Mithraic dimension of the religiosity of these two important dynastic figures in Sasanian history. The literal meaning of this term, “one who is devoted to one’s master”, makes little sense in this context since both figures in fact rebelled against their overlords. One can only deduce, therefore,

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2290 See §2.6.3.
2291 See for instance our discussion in §5.2.1.
2292 Gnoli 1989, passim.
2294 Ferdowsi 1935, p. 2298. In assessing the significance of this epithet of Jamasp we should also recall that the Sasanian Jamasp partook in all probability in the Mazdakite creed; see §4.3.1.
2295 See §4.4.1.
that using poetic license to suit the rhyme and rhythm of his opus, the poet is simply substituting *mihtar-parast* for the intended *Mihr-parast* (Mihr devotee), giving us the actual religious affiliations of Bahram-i Chubin. Had this been our only evidence of Bahram-i Chubin’s Mihr worship, we would not be offering a strong case for it. Ferdowsi’s rendition of Bahram-i Chubin as a Mihr worshipper, however, is corroborated by Sebeos, who on two separate occasions refers to the rebel as *Vahram Merbewandak*, where *Merbewandak* or *Mihrewandak* is a literal translation of the *servant of Mithra*.2296

Many Mithraic motifs have been infused in Bahram-i Chubin’s narrative. Before we get to the crux of the Mithraic framework of Bahram-i Chubin’s story, however, it is best to highlight some of the more nuanced reflections of it. According to the *Shahnama*, before embarking upon his wars in the east against Savih Shah, who had attacked the Iranian realm during Hormozd IV’s reign, and against whom he was called in, Bahram-i Chubin prayed to God.2297 But from the description that follows it becomes apparent that the god to whom he prayed was not Ahur Mazda, but Mithra, the warrior-god of Justice. In his prayer, Bahram-i Chubin entreated his god, whom he addressed as the Judge of Equity (davar-i daad o pâk), to make a judgment call: if he reckoned this war to be unjust (gar in jang bidad bini hamiti), then he should protect Bahram-i Chubin’s enemy Savih Shah. If, on the other hand, he deemed Bahram-i Chubin to be fighting on his side (vagar man zi bahr-i tow kushman hamti), that is to say, on the side of justice, then the divinity should aid him. Bahram-i Chubin subsequently asked the Judge to confer bliss on him and his army by replenishing the earth after the battle.2298 Now, like the literary narratives of Piruz’s war,2299 all the Mithraic motifs are gathered here in Ferdowsi’s narrative. The god in question is a Judge who, based on his decisions as to on whose side Justice resides, will

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2296 For Sebeos’ narrative on Bahram-i Chubin’s rebellion, see Sebeos 1999, pp. 14–23, especially n. 104, and pp. 168, 169, n. 8. It must be noted that in the accounts of Sebeos, when asking the aid of Musel Mamikonean, the Armenian sparapet, against Khusrow II, and promising him remuneration, Bahram-i Chubin prayed to Ahur Mazda and other gods besides Mithra: “If I shall be victorious, I swear by the great god Aramazd, by the lord Sun and the Moon, by fire and water, by Mihr and all the gods.” This is evidently an indication that the Mihr worship of Bahram-i Chubin did not necessarily exclude his worship of Ahur Mazda, but only points to the primacy of Mihr in the rebel’s religious beliefs.

2297 The *Xwaday-Namag* and the Arabic traditions ignore Bahram-i Chubin’s campaigns in the west (see page 125) on behalf of Hormozd IV, the failure of which, according to western sources, was the actual cause of Hormozd IV’s disenchantment with Bahram-i Chubin. Instead, for reasons that will become apparent shortly, the emphasis is put on Bahram-i Chubin’s campaigns in the east and his tremendous success in that region.


2299 See our discussion on page 380ff.
undertake to help the aggrieved party, and subsequently undertakes to replenish the realm that has been destroyed through the acts of the aggressor. Here we have an amalgam of all the Mithraic motifs come together. The warrior dimension of Mihr has already been discussed in detail.\textsuperscript{2300} We have also highlighted the intimate connection of Mihr worship, in its Iranian context, with the notions of a just versus an unjust war, as well as the connection of war to notions of just kingship, the Circle of Justice,\textsuperscript{2301} and welfare of the realm and the populace. It seems very probable therefore that the god to whom Bahram-i Mihrewandak prays is none other than the warrior god of Justice, the God of Contracts, that is, Mihr.\textsuperscript{2302}

Bahram-i Chubin subsequently successfully defended the realm against the aggression of Sayih Shâh, and his son, Parmûdih. After his defeat, however, Parmûdih asked Bahram-i Chubin for refuge (\textit{zinbâr}). Now, “taking refuge (\textit{zinbâr}) [into Mihr]” likewise betrays a clear Mithraic terminology, reminiscent of the personal seal of Dâd-Burz-Mihr (Dâdmihr), the Parthian spâhbed of the east of Hormozd IV, who takes refuge (\textit{panâh}) in the Burzin Mihr fire.\textsuperscript{2303} It is in Mihr that an aggrieved party takes refuge seeking his protection, as well as aid against an aggressor and breaker of pacts. Later in the narrative, Bahram-i Chubin openly accused Khusrow II Parviz of not abiding by the god’s contract \textit{(peymân)}. Considering the oath-breaking of Khusrow II, moreover, Bahram-i Chubin proclaimed that as it was his camp only that had justice, Mihr, armour, and hand, he was certain to be victorious.\textsuperscript{2304} The notion of \textit{dast}, hand, as in the hand that will be lent by Mihr to aid the aggrieved and bestow victory, is also patently Mithraic.\textsuperscript{2305} In the \textit{Mihr Yasht}, the supplicants have outstretched hands when entreating for the aid of Mihr.\textsuperscript{2306} All these Mithraic motifs coalesce in the ways in which Bahram-i Chubin described himself and the enemy. Initially against Sayih Shâh,\textsuperscript{2307} and later against Khusrow II, the Justice of Bahram-i Chubin’s cause was always assessed self-referentially.\textsuperscript{2308}

\textsuperscript{2300}See page 352.
\textsuperscript{2301}See page 354.
\textsuperscript{2302}See page 351.
\textsuperscript{2303}Gyselen 2001a, p. 46, seal A. Ferdowsi 1935, pp. 2631–2633.
\textsuperscript{2304}See footnote 2308.
\textsuperscript{2305}For a brilliant exposition of this see Soudavar 1980, pp. 13–16. As Soudavar explains, in the rock relief of Shapur I in Bishapur where the king’s successive victories over Gordian III (238–244), Philip the Arab (244–249) and Valerian (253–260) are depicted, an angel is seen offering a flying ribbon (\textit{dastâr}), a purveyor of victory, to “Shapur who is depicted with one already floating behind his head.” Shapur I, moreover, is depicted as “squeezing the wrist of the captive Roman emperor (captivity and submission are termed \textit{dastgir} in Middle and New Persian.)” Ibid., pp. 13–14, nn. 33 and 38, and fig. 2, p. 149.
\textsuperscript{2306}Mihr Yasht 1959, p. 113; Mihr Yasht 1883, §83.
\textsuperscript{2307}Ironically, after his rebellion, the Khân of the Turks was also on Bahram-i Chubin’s side.
\textsuperscript{2308}Ferdowsi 1971, vol. IX, p. 32; Ferdowsi 1935, p. 2697:
Ṭabarī’s narrative suggests that supernatural forces were at work in the final episode of Bahram-i Chūbin’s struggle against Khusrow II Parvīz, but fails to identify their agency: When Khusrow II Parvīz “got trapped in a defile,” according to Ṭabarī, Bahram-i Chūbin pursued him, “but when Bahram-i Chūbin was sure that he had Abarwīz in his power something that could not be comprehended [i.e., some supernatural power] took the latter up to the top of the mountain.”2309 In Ferdowsī’s narrative, however, this supernatural force is identified as the angel Sorūsh, the right hand aide to the god Mihr. The god Sraoša (Sorūsh), the hypostasis and genius of Discipline, is “in this capacity . . . a natural ally of Mithra the guardian of Contract, and of Rašnu the judge . . . [This] divine triad remains throughout the development of Zoroastrianism in charge of prosecuting the wicked . . . [Sraoša’s] specific function within the triad . . . must have been that of a punisher.”2310 While Khusrow II is saved by the angel Sorūsh, however, there is no guarantee that, as a breaker of Contract, he is saved from his wrath.

According to Ferdowsī, when Bahram-i Chūbin finally opted to mint coins in the name of Khusrow II Parvīz, he chose a messenger, whom the author compares to Sorūsh.2311 So although initially Sorūsh supported Bahram-i Chūbin, he then apparently switched sides, for it was this same god who ensured Khusrow II Parvīz’s victory in his last desperate attempt against the rebel. Khusrow II, having found himself in a cul-de-sac, entreated God, asking him to come to his aid in his hour of weakness. Suddenly and miraculously, Sorūsh appeared from the mountains, riding a horse and wearing a green garb. He grabbed the hand of Khusrow II (cho nazdīk shod hast-i Khusrow girift) and carried the king to the heavens, to safety. In tears, Khusrow II then implored the angel to disclose his identity, at which point the latter identified himself as Sorūsh and prognosticated for Khusrow II that he would soon assume the throne and warned him that thenceforth he should act piously.2312

Mihr, of course, could be read here as friendship, which given the context, would be rather absurd!

2311 Ferdowsī 1971, vol. VIII, p. 419:

فارس ها ای جست با راز و هوش

ناپی برتر از گردش روزگار
نو تانی ننای به کومن به تیر
بیدام از اریزه فرخ سروش
ز دیار خو کشت خرس و دیار
رودان پاد این ناند شگفت
به سپاه اور و بدرتششش
همی کشت جدی و جنگی گریست
چو اذین شهیدی دویان از خرخش
نابینه که باکی جز از پارسا

2312 Ferdowsī 1971, vol. IX, p. 121:
Once again, as in the narrative of the Kārins’ aid to Khusrow I Nowshirvān in his wars in the east,²³¹³ a green-clad rider, the symbolic representation of Mithra, who in this case happened to be actually his right hand aide, the angel Sōrūsh, mysteriously appeared to aid a Sasanian king back to the throne. The fact that Sōrūsh here came to the aid of Khusrow II Parvīz rather than Bahrām-i Chūbin, however, most probably represents a classic case of co-option of the divinity of one enemy’s camp into one’s own.²³¹⁴ In fact the one monarch who is certain to have tampered with the Xwadāy-Nameg tradition when the account did not please him is Khusrow II Parvīz.²³¹⁵

There is little doubt that the rebellion of the Mihrānid Bahrām-i Chūbin was attended by strong currents of Mihr worship. That the Parthian version of Mihr worship was in fact hostile to the religion advocated by the Sasanian kings of Persis is also confirmed by Ferdowsī’s narrative: the Mihr worship of Bahrām-i Mihrewandak was distinct from that of the Sasanian king Khusrow II Parvīz. The clearest reflection of this is Bahrām-i Chūbin’s agenda of destroying the fire temples (konad bā zamīn rāst ātashkadih) of the Sasanian realm.²³¹⁶ The Pahlav rebel not only promised to renew justice and the traditions of the Arsacid Mithradates (Milād) in the world,²³¹⁷ but also claimed to be the very apotheosis of the fiery fire of Burzīn Mihr.²³¹⁸ He also promised, as we have seen, to destroy the festivals of Nowrūz and Sadib.²³¹⁹

I owe this reference to Dr. Asef Kholdani.

²³¹³ See pages 113 and 380.

²³¹⁴ This, it has been argued, for example, was one of the reasons why the Romans adopted the god of their enemy, the Parthians, when they started to worship Mithras on such an extensive and grand scale. Speidel, Michael P., ‘Parthia and the Mithraism of the Roman Army’, Études Mithraïques IV, (1978), pp. 470–485 (Speidel 1978), pp. 470–485.

²³¹⁵ The intervention of censoring Sasanian monarchs seems to have been the most acute precisely in the rendition of those periods of their history when their legitimacy was questioned. And this was certainly the case with Khusrow II Parvīz. By adopting the angelology of the enemy, Khusrow II also usurped the legitimacy that the angel is supposed to bestow on the rebel, Bahrām-i Chūbin. In Bayhaqi, Ibrāhīm b. Muhammad, Al-Mahāsin wa l-Masāwi, Giessen, 1902, edited by F. Schwally (Bayhaqi 1902), we are informed that at the end of Khusrow II Parvīz’s wars with Bahrām-i Chūbin, the monarch “ordered his secretary to write down an account of those wars and relate events in full, from the beginning to the end. The secretary complied, and when they read off the narrative to Xusrau [Khusrow II], its preface did not please him. Thereupon a young secretary wrote an eloquent and rhetorical prologue to the work and presented it to the king. Xusrau . . . was delighted with it and ordered the promotion of the young scribe to a higher grade.” Bayhaqi 1902, p. 481, quoted in Shahbazi 1990, p. 210. For an example in the case of Bahrām-i Chūbin’s story, see Jāhiz’s comment on page 34.

²³¹⁶ The catch of the narrative is that this the rebel claims on behalf of Sāvih Shāh.

²³¹⁷ Ferdowsī 1971, vol. IX, p. 32, Ferdowsī 1935, p. 2697:

²³¹⁸ Ferdowsī 1971, vol. IX, p. 32, Ferdowsī 1935, p. 2697:

Khusrow II Parviz in fact accused Bahram-i Chubin of irreligion and this, not only in the context of the official Sasanian ideology, where rebellion was tantamount to heresy, but also on account of Bahram-i Chubin’s clear apostasy. “Zoroaster has said in the Zand,” Khusrow II declared to Bahram-i Chubin, “that he who apostatizes from the pure religion (bar gardad az din-i pakte) has no fear and fright of God.”2320 Lest this be construed as apostasy against the state, the literal irreligion and apostasy of Bahram-i Chubin and his followers is further reiterated by Khusrow II Parviz in Ferdowsi’s narrative. At the beginning of his war against Bahram-i Chubin, Khusrow II prayed to the sun, whom he also calls the Just and Illuminated (rowshan-i dadgar), vowing that if he wins the war, “from the supporters of Bahram-i Chubin, whomever is taken into captivity, he will force them to become the worshippers of the glorious fire (parastandih farrukh atash konam), thereby placating the hearts of the mubarids and herbads” (dil-i mowbad o hírbad khosh konam).2321

When Bahram-i Chubin became confronted with the possibility of a numerous army gathering around Khusrow II, and recognized that the war, having divided families, had pitted members of his camp against their relatives in Khusrow II’s camp, he instructed his army to lure to their side all of their relatives who were of the same inclination and faith (kih bashand yik dil bih goftar o kish).2322 For if they gave their souls to his cause, in contract (bih peymán), then in Khusrow II’s camp there would remain only the armies of Barda’a and Ardabil and a few contingents from Armenia.2323

The antipathy of Bahram-i Chubin’s followers toward the mobarid structure of Khusrow II’s regime is reiterated again and again in Ferdowsi’s narrative.

2320Ferdowsi 1971, vol. IX, p. 34, Ferdowsi 1935, p. 2699:


2322Ferdowsi 1971, vol. IX, p. 42:

When Hormozd IV sent a woman’s attire to Bahram-i Chubin as a recompense for his supposed disloyalty, the elite in Bahram-i Chubin’s court reminded him of the wise man from Rayy who, at the rise to power of Ardashir I, had claimed: “I loathe the mobad and the throne of the king (bizaram az mobad o takhti shab) when he does not pay heed to my protection.” In one of his diatribes against Khusrow II Parviz, while considering Ahurā Mazdā as deserving of praise, Bahram-i Chubin nevertheless referred to him as your god (Urmazd-i shomā). According to Simocatta, furthermore, once Khusrow II Parviz decided to flee his homeland, he “entrusted the reigns of his flight to the supreme God; after looking up to heaven, and turning his thoughts to the Creator, disregarding the false gods and placing none of his hope in Mithras … and by changing faith he also changed fortune toward the better.” From Bahram-i Chubin’s epithet Mihrewandak, slave of Mithra, to his claim that he was the very reincarnation of the Burzin Mihr fire and that Justice, Mihr, armour and hand—that is to say, Mihr with all his attributes—were on his side, to his platform of destroying the mobadic fires, and his declaration that Khusrow II had broken the contract and Ahurā Mazdā was his (Khusrow II’s) god, and finally to the rebel’s open declaration that his camp detested the mobads, to Khusrow II’s avowed intention of forcibly converting the captive followers of Bahram-i Chubin, there is every indication, therefore, that in the warfare of the Parthian Mihrāns against the Sasanians we are witnessing a continuation of the Pārsīg-Pahlav religious antagonism.

### 6.1.2 Bahram-i Chubin and the apocalypse

Further evidence for the Mithraic purview of Bahram-i Chubin’s rebellion is its messianic character. Indeed, so powerful the image of Bahram-i Chubin as the saviour of Persia seems to have become that it left its mark on the Sasanian apocalyptic literature, where “he assumed the proportions of the Messiah promised in the sacred books.” This messianic dimension of Bahram-i Chubin’s rebellion is significant for our purposes, not only on account of its clear Mithraic provenance, but also because the motifs associated with it are replicated in another rebellion that takes place in the same regions, Tabaristan and "When they bring this message to you, may your Ohrmozd be blessed." Ferdowsi 1935, p. 2770.

With the variant Ferdowsi 1971, vol. VIII, p. 399:

\[
\text{به ری چون دلس تگ شید ز اردشير} \\
\text{چو نیک و بد من ندارد نگاه} \\
\text{که بیامز آر موبد و کن شاه}
\]

2324 Ferdowsi 1935, p. 2646:

\[
\text{که فرحمده باد اوررد نما} \\
\text{چو این نامه ارند ندرد نما}
\]

2325 “When they bring this message to you, may your Ohrmozd be blessed.” Ferdowsi 1935, p. 2770.


2327 Czegledy 1958, p. 21.
Khurāsān, more than two centuries posterior to it, namely the revolt of the ispahbud pirūz, the victorious spahbed, Sunbad. The superimposition of these motifs on Sunbad’s rebellion undoubtedly betray, as we will see, the continued prevalence of Mithraic currents in these regions in the mid-eighth century.

To establish the apocalyptic dimension of Bahram-i Chubin’s rebellion, we will make extensive use of Czegledy’s excellent article ‘Bahram Chubin and the Persian Apocalyptic Literature’. There is, however, one crucial issue that is lost sight of in Czegledy’s fascinating analysis, namely that whenever these apocalyptic accounts take a legitimist tone from the Mihrānīd perspective, they are framed by thoroughly Mithraic motifs. This should come as no surprise since Mihr is not only the yazata in charge of fulfilling millennial expectations at the apocalypse, but also the actual historical provenance of Bahram-i Chubin’s rebellion is from within a region infused with Mithraic religiosity. As a dynastic leader, the Mihrānīd Bahram-i Chubin belonged to the quarter of the north, and gathered his support from this region as well as from the quarter of the east, in both of which regions one of the most current forms of religiosity was Mihr worship.

So let us follow in some detail Czegledy’s argument, amending it where necessary with our argument as to the Mithraic dimension of the messianic motifs in Bahram-i Chubin’s rebellion. According to Czegledy, there are a number of motifs, all historical, with which Bahram-i Chubin’s narrative always appears in the apocalyptic sources such as the Zand i Vahuman Yasn, Jamasp Namak and Bundahishn. These include Bahram-i Chubin’s campaigns against the Western and Eastern Turks, through which Balkh, among other major cities, was conquered and the tremendous booty that Bahram-i Chubin obtained on these campaigns.

Moreover, even if the narrative is sympathetic to Bahram-i Chubin, as is the case in the romance of Bahram-i Chubin, he is always depicted from the point of view of the legitimist claims of the Sasanians to kingship. In his examination of these accounts, Czegledy further highlights the importance of the Ctesian method in the Iranian historical tradition and shows how it applies in particular to the apocalyptic traditions surrounding Bahram-i Chubin. In the Iranian epic romances, he argues, “many of the ancient heroes of the religion are vested with traits of historic personalities who lived in the ages of the Achaemenids, Arsacid and Sasanians.” Among these ancient Iranian heroes whose myths underwent such an anachronistic adaptation, the most

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2328 See §6.4.
2329 For the eschatological dimension of Mihr, see page 353.
2330 We recall, for example, that the ērān-spāhbed Gorgōn of the kūst-i ādurbadagān was Bahram-i Chubin’s grandfather; see page 103.
2331 See §5.4.
2335 See footnote 609.
important was Spandīyād, “the hero of Zoroaster’s Millennium who, at the
time of Vištasp [Kai Vištaspā], thrice vanquished and finally killed Arjāsp, the
prince of Tūrān,” the archenemy of Iran in the Iranian national epic. According
to Czegledy, one of these anachronistic adaptations in Spandīyād’s story took
place under the influence of Bahrām-i Chūbin’s history. Mimicking
the historical episodes of Bahrām-i Chūbin’s wars in Transoxiana, Spandīyād’s
military campaign was extended beyond the city of Balkh, a feat that was never
actually undertaken by him in the Old Iranian epic. In these later versions,
however, Spandīyād crossed the Oxus and progressed as far as the Copper
Fortress, the Tūrānian capital, where he killed Arjāsp, the Tūrānian king. We
have therefore three new motifs in Spandīyād’s story in the later versions of
his epic: 1) his crossing of the Oxus; 2) the mention of the Copper City and;
3) his murder of the Tūrānian prince, all of which follow Bahrām-i Chūbin’s
story.

Now, from Tibetan texts of Tun-Huang origin we know that around
750 the Copper City was the name of the capital of the Central Asian Uyghurs.
Madīnatu as.-sufriya and, “in part also the Persian Dizh-i Rūyīn . . . are [therefore]
translations of the Turkish Baqir Baliy mentioned in the Tibetan text.”
In the Persian traditions, the Copper City, Rūyīn Dizh, is located either, signifi-
cantly, in the vicinity of Rām Pīrūz, the city established by the Sasanian king
Pīrūz near Rayy, or in the city of Paykand, about thirty kilometers from
Bukhārā. But it is not only in the Xwadāy-Nāmag tradition that we witness
a superimposition of Bahrām-i Chūbin’s apocalyptic stories.

According to Czegledy, the figure of Bahrām-i Chūbin, together with all the
motifs of his narrative, were also anachronistically inserted in the most impor-
tant apocalyptic literature of the Sasanian period. When describing the events
of the Fourth Millennium, the Jāmāsp Nāmak “vividly portrays the emergence
of a false pretender. This insignificant and dark (khvartak ut apa’tāk) person ar-
rives, with a great army, from Khorasan and, after seizing power, he disappears
(apa’tāk bavit), in the middle of his reign (miyān i pātakhsāhīh), whereupon
the realm is overtaken by foreigners. Then comes the victorious king (Aparvēz
Khvatāy), who conquers large territories, as well as many cities from the Ro-
mans. The fortunes of Iran are thenceforth in decline, with misery and great dis-
tress, when it is best not to be born to witness the great disasters that engulfs
the kingdom at the end of Zoroaster’s Millennium.” Czegledy brilliantly points
out the parallels of the Jāmāsp Nāmak’s false pretender and the context in which
he appears with the figure of Bahrām-i Chūbin and the history of the Sasanians
in the late sixth century. Bahrām-i Chūbin, too, appeared from Khurāsān as a
false pretender. In line with the legitimist dimensions of the Xwadāy-Nāmag, he,
too, is depicted as a low-born man, who seized power through violence. And “above all, it was Bahram-i Chubin who disappeared in the midst of his reign. The subsequent rule by foreigners is an obvious reference to the fact that the reign of Khosrow II was reestablished by the Byzantine army.”2342 The story of the victorious king (Aparvez Khvataiy, who took away large territories and many cities from the Romans, refers then to Khosrow II Parviz’s reign, whereas the subsequent decline, when “misery engulfed the land”, is a clear reference to the Arab invasion of Iran.2343 What is even more significant for our purposes, however, is Czegledy’s assertion that next, “the text describes the eschatological battle of Mihr and Eshm [Kheshm].” This, Czegledy believes, is actually portraying “the war of the Mohammadan conquerors against Zoroastrianism.”2344

Now, in the introductory passages of the Jamsap Namak, when the final collapse of Eranshahr at the end of the millennium at the hands of the Taziyyan (i.e., the Arabs) is given in a synopsis, the cause of the calamity is ascribed to the people’s oath-breaking (mihr duruj or peymân shekani). People exhibited hatred (kin), envy (rashk) and falsehood (durugh) against each other.2345 It is to be remarked, incidentally, that according to our analysis of the Arab conquest and the Parsig-Pahlav factional strife, this is precisely what happened. It is significant in this context therefore, that the Mithraic concept of oath-breaking (mihr duruj, peymân shekani) is used here. At any rate, after a detailed description of the wretchedness to which people succumbed at the onset of the Taziyyan conquest,2346 the text begins to give a somewhat more detailed chronological narrative of the prior conditions that had led to the final calamity.2347 It is to this latter section that Czegledy’s perceptive identification of Bahram-i Chubin’s narrative refers. Here indeed almost all of the historical episodes of Bahram-i Chubin’s rebellion, Khosrow II’s assumption of the throne with the aid of the Byzantines, his subsequent war against and victories over the latter,2348 the havoc under his sons and finally the onslaught of the Turks, the Byzantines and the Arabs against the Iranians are one by one briefly depicted.

A Mithraic end-of-time scenario, or as Czegledy puts it, the “eschatological battle of Mihr and Eshm [Kheshm]” is therefore offered. There then comes a passage that Czegledy considers to be interpolated, where the theme of Bahram-i Chubin is repeated through a description of a false pretender. This time the false pretender, together with a large army, arrived, significantly, from the direction of the kist-i nemroz, had pretensions to leadership (khudavandi), and through a lot of bloodshed conquered cities and was victorious. At the end, however,

2342Czegledy 1958, p. 34.
2343Czegledy 1958, pp. 32–34.
2344Czegledy 1958, p. 33.
2346Jamasp 1941, pp. 116–118.
2347Jamasp 1941, p. 118.
2348His ultimate defeat is, of course, skipped over.
this rebel fled from the hands of his enemies to Zābulistān and recuperated. In the process, the population of Erānsahr descended from the heights to utter hopelessness and sought refuge for their own lives.\textsuperscript{2349} The end of this false pretender is not described.\textsuperscript{2350} In analyzing this section, however, Czegledy maintains that this passage “is obviously closely related to the previous narrative [of Bahrām-i Chūbin].” It is once again a false pretender that brings misery on Iran. While the end of this figure is not narrated, moreover, Czegledy believes that the whole “passage seems to be an incomplete doublet of the former narrative,” the difference being that while in the former Bahrām-i Chūbin accurately comes from Khurāsān, in this one he comes from the south.\textsuperscript{2351} One must not be put off, Czegledy argues, by the fact that in this version our figure appears from Nimrūz, for we do have certain traditions according to which Bahrām-i Chūbin comes from Fārs. As far as the mention of Zābulistān is concerned, we do know that, as Nöldeke confirmed, Bahrām-i Chūbin’s “army actually rallied from Hephthalite territory.”\textsuperscript{2352} The nature of apocalyptic literature—where layers of tradition are superimposed on each other—is such that Czegledy’s arguments about this passage might very well be accurate. There is, however, a variant reading of this passage that might actually make more sense. This passage might more appropriately be seen as depicting the revolt of Ustādsīs (circa 767 CE) rather than being a doublet of Bahrām-i Chūbin’s narrative, for all the elements of Ustādsīs’ rebellion are incorporated here. Unfortunately, lack of space prevents us from elaborating this point further here.\textsuperscript{2353}

The motif of treasure

After the interpolated passage, there is a second narrative in the Jāmāsp Nāmak that portrays Bahrām-i Chūbin in apocalyptic terms. In this passage, a man saw the god (izād) Mihr on the seacoast of Padhashkhwārgar (Ṭabaristān), who told him many secrets. Mihr then sent this man with a message to the king of Padhashkhwārgar. “Why are you maintaining this blind and deaf (kar o kūr) kingship,” Mihr asked. “You, yourself must assume kingship as your ancestors had,” Mihr exhorted the king of Padhashkhwārgar.\textsuperscript{2354} “How am I to assume kingship when I own not an army or commanders, nor a treasury as my ancestors did”, the king retorted. At this the envoy showed the king of Padhashkhwārgar the treasures of Afrāsiyāb. Once the king obtained these treasures, he set out with an army from Zābulistān against the enemy. When the Turks, the Arabs and the Romans (Byzantines) learned of the take-over of the treasure of

\textsuperscript{2349}Jamasp 1941, p. 119:
\textsuperscript{2350}Jamasp 1941, p. 119. Czegledy 1958, p. 31.
\textsuperscript{2351}Czegledy 1958, p. 31.
\textsuperscript{2352}Czegledy 1958, p. 34.
\textsuperscript{2353}For the background of Ustādsīs’s rebellion, see Pourshariati 1995.
\textsuperscript{2354}Jamasp 1941, p. 119. Czegledy 1958, p. 37.
Afrāsīyāb by the king of Padhashkhwārgar, they conspired to capture him and obtain his treasures. The king of Padhashkhwārgar then engaged his enemies in the middle of Ėrānshahr, in a region called the White Forest.  

With the “power of the gods (Yazdān), the farra [Divine Glory] of the Kayānids, and that of the religion of the Mazdeans, with the farra of the Padhashkhwārgar and [with the aid of] Mihr, Sorūsh, Rashnu, Ābān, Ādharān and Ātashān,” the king of Padhashkhwārgar defeated his enemies. Then, at Ahūrā Mazdā’s order, Sorūsh, along with Pashūtan, came from the fortress of the Kayānids, Kang Dizh. Together with 150 of his companions, wearing black and white clothes, Pashūtan then went to Pārs, to the abode of Ātash (the god of fire) and Ābān (the god of water), reciting the Yashts and performing other rituals, thus ending the Age of the Wolf and starting that of the Lamb, when the Zoroastrian religion was established.

Czegledy aptly recognizes that this section of the Jāmāsp Nāmak “even to a greater degree than the foregoing passages, betrays that it was composed under the impression of Bhrām ˇCob¯ın’s historical part.” Padhashkhwārgar is a clear reference to the ancestral territories of the Mihrāns, that is, the regions of Rayy and ˇTabaristan, and the king of Padhashkhwārgar refers to the dynastic leader of these regions in the period under consideration, Bhrām-i Chūbīn. What is even more significant, Czegledy reminds us, is that the envoy urges the king of Padhashkhwārgar to recall his own kingly heritage when contemplating rebellion. It is clear, Czegledy argues, that the dynasty to which the king of Padhashkhwārgar belonged was different from that of the blind and deaf king, in whose person we find an unmistakable reference to Hormozd IV, who was, in fact, blinded by his uncles, the Ispahbudhān Vinduēh and Vistāhm. Incidentally, we should keep in mind that in the Mithraic conception of kingship, an illegitimate king is also depicted as being blind and deaf: Mithra induces fear “in men who are false to the contract” by carrying “off . . . the light of their eyes, the hearing of their ears.” It is Mithra who switches off the “eyesight, [and] deafens the . . . ears” of the enemy. By contrast, it is Mithra who has “a thousand perceptions, [and] ten thousand eyes for seeing all around.”

We recall that these were also precisely Fereydūn’s attributes, when from the Alburz mountains, he circled the globe and saw all there was to be seen.

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2355 As Czegledy remarks the “White Forest is an archaism . . . [It is in] a more pedantic than apocalyptic style that the compilers [of the Zand i Vahuman Yāsn] enumerate all the great battles which, according to the Iranian romances, were fought in the White Forest.” Czegledy 1958, p. 38. Emphasis added.

2356 Jamasp 1941, p. 120.

2357 Jamasp 1941, p. 120.


2359 See page 127.


2362 Mihr Yasht 1959, pp. 77, 113, 117 and 145 respectively. Mihr Yasht 1883, §§7, 82, 91, 141.

2363 See page 372.
According to Czegedy, the role of the envoy sent by Mihr to the king of Padhashkhwârâgar is replicated in the Xᵛᵛadây-Nâmag tradition of the Šahânâma by Bahram-i Chûbin’s companions. Like the envoy of Mihr, Bahram-i Chûbin’s companions argued that the Mihrânid himself was entitled to kingship based on his Arsacid lineage. The reference to Padhashkhwârâgar Shâh’s initial poverty of means and his subsequent wealth through obtaining the treasury of Afrâsiyâb, Czegedy argues, is a clear reference to “the vast booty which Bahram-i Chûbin acquired after the defeat of the Hephthalites and Turks and the killing of the Turkish Khaqan.” In short all the motifs of the historical episode of Bahram-i Chûbin’s rebellion can be found in this apocalyptic narrative. There is, however, one very telling curiosity and difference in this version of Bahram-i Chûbin’s narrative with the one that preceded it, and Czegedy himself acknowledges this. In this version of the apocalyptic narrative, the king of Padhashkhwârâgar actually fulfilled the messianic expectation and reestablished order, legitimate kingship, and the good religion. In Bahram-i Chûbin’s story there was no such blessed ending: his rebellion ended in terrible defeat. The legitimist tenor of all the Bahram-i Chûbin narratives, wherein a base-born rebel severely disrupts the natural order of things, is conspicuously absent in this narrative. “At first sight it appears,” Czegedy perceptively realizes, “that the author of this vaticination does not regard Bahram-i Chûbin as a false pretender . . . [and] even looks down upon the reigning king as a deaf and blind king.”

The narrative has a positive ending, Czegedy believes, because “at this point, all allusions to the history of Bahram Çobin come to an end . . . So, at this point, we deal with a genuine forecast of the future . . . a victorious Prince of the Last Days, the king of Patašxvârâgar, alias Bahram Çobin, is heir to the legitimate reign of the Kayanian.”

What Czegedy fails to perceive here, however, is the thoroughly Mithraic provenance of this second, positive depiction of Bahram-i Chûbin in the Já-mâsp Nâmak. Considering all that has been said about the Mithraic predilections of the Parthian Mihrân dynasty, and considering the primary eschatological responsibilities of Mihr, therefore, it is no surprise that in this second narrative—where he is not portrayed as a base-born rebel and the potential destroyer of the legitimate Sasanian kingship, but as an equally legitimate dynast of Kayanid ancestry—it was the god Mihr who shored up the king of Padhashkhwârâgar (Tabaristan) against the Aparvâz Khvâtây (Khusrow II Parviz). It was Mihr who provided him with Afrâsiyâb’s treasury, and it was Mihr who, true to his function as a warrior god, supplied him with a powerful army.

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2364 Czegedy 1958, p. 37.
2367 See §5.4.2.
2368 See page 353.
2369 This too, as the Mihr Yasht informs us, is a function of Mithra: he “bestows riches and fortune . . . and much comfort.” Mihr Yasht 1959, p. 127; Mihr Yasht 1883, §108.
In fact, in all versions of the apocalypse in the Jāmāsp Nāmak, the Last Days’ onslaught starts not with the attack of Ahriman against Ahūrā Mazdā, but with that of Mihr against Kheshm.\textsuperscript{2370} Here, in fact, the Jāmāsp Nāmak replicates the narrative found in the Mihr Yasht. As a mediator god, or Arbiter, the cosmological role of Mihr is quite significant in the Mihr Yasht,\textsuperscript{2371} where he bestows legitimate kingship and an army to the king against his enemy: “On whom shall I bestow against his expectation [as is the case with Bahram-i Chubin in the positive Mithraic depiction of him] an excellent . . . powerful kingdom, beautifully strong thanks to a numerous army. Once he rules he appeases through Mithra, by honouring the treaty.”\textsuperscript{2372}

The Mithraic, messianic dimension of Bahram-i Chubin’s second narrative is nowhere better exemplified than in the very name of the hero as it appears in other apocalyptic literature. For while the Jāmāsp Nāmak does not mention the name of our hero, the Zand i Vahuman Yasn and Bundahishn identify him both by his appropriate title Kai Bahram.\textsuperscript{2373} As Czegledy remarks it “is in this name that the motifs of Bahram’s history and the ancient apocalyptic elements are perfectly fused.”\textsuperscript{2374} What is significant for our purposes is that the name “Wahrām, Varostragna, in the ancient apocalyptic nomenclature, is the customary and well-known expression of the hope that the eschatological victory will be achieved for Erān by the Genius of Victory himself, Wahrām.”\textsuperscript{2375}

In Zoroastrianism, especially in its Mithraic articulations, Verethragnā (Wahrām, Bahram, Pirūz) is the quintessential apotheosis of the god of victory. In the Mihr Yasht, specifically, it is Verethragnā (Bahram) who flies in front of Mithra.\textsuperscript{2376} Most of the divinities that help Kai Bahram, the Padhashkhwāgar Shāh in the Jāmāsp Nāmak, namely, the Divine Fortune (farr) of the Kayānids and of the Mazdean religion, Sorūsh, Rashnu, and the gods Ābān, Ādharān and Ātashān, furthermore, are precisely those that accompany Mithra in the Mihr Yasht.\textsuperscript{2377} Even in the Bundahishn, where the positive depiction of Kai Bahram

\textsuperscript{2370}Jamasp 1941, pp. 119–120. For a synopsis of the specific characteristics of the literature of the apocalypse as a genre, see Collins, John, ‘Genre, Ideology and Social Movements in Jewish Apocalypticism’, in John J. Collins and James H. Charlesworth (eds.), Mysteries and Revelations: Apocalyptic Studies since the Uppsala Colloquium, pp. 11–33, Sheffield Academic Press, 1991 (Collins 1991). The legitimist aspect of the genre of apocalypse is particularly pertinent to the present study, of course. As Collins explains, “the genre of apocalypse can be said to have a function, for example, to legitimate the transcendent authorization of the message.” Ibid., p. 19. For another important example of the Persian apocalyptic tradition, see Hulgårt, Anders, ‘Bahman Yasht: A Persian Apocalypse’, in John J. Collins and James H. Charlesworth (eds.), Mysteries and Revelations: Apocalyptic Studies since the Uppsala Colloquium, pp. 114–134, Sheffield Academic Press, 1991 (Hulgårt 1991).


\textsuperscript{2373}Czegledy 1958, p. 39.

\textsuperscript{2374}Czegledy 1958, p. 39.

\textsuperscript{2375}Czegledy 1958, p. 39.

\textsuperscript{2376}See footnote 2257.

\textsuperscript{2377}Among Mihr’s companions are listed the Mazdayasnian Religion, Sraoša (Sorūsh), Rašnu
is incorporated, upon closer scrutiny, the ambivalent position of Kai Bahram toward the Mazdean religion is traceable.\textsuperscript{2378}

Czegledy argues that two factors marred the “joy after the great victory [?] of eschatological proportions.” One was the actual military defeat of Bahram-i Chubin and the other is the evidence that is provided in Simocatta’s writing. For according to the latter, after Khusrow II’s flight to the Byzantines, Bahram-i Chubin “got angry with the clergy (the mōbads), who thought differently.”\textsuperscript{2379} Czegledy never makes it clear, however, why Bahram-i Chubin should have gotten angry with the clergy. We have said enough thus far to explicate Bahram-i Chubin’s presumed anger against them: the Mihrans rejected the mōbadic arm of the étatiste endeavors of the Sasanians, because, in addition to their other issues with the Parsig, they had a different doctrinal interpretation of faith. It is only in the context of the Mithraic provenance of Bahram-i Chubin’s rebellion, therefore, that we can understand why his followers “continued to expect his return [even] after his final disappearance … and … death … It was at this time, that Bahram-i Chubin … became a messianic figure, not unlike Ushetar, Ushetar-māh or Sošhyant.”\textsuperscript{2380}

\textsuperscript{2378} In the Bundahishn, the farr of Kai Bahram came from the seed of the gods (bidī ferra az dü-dib-i baghān ast). Bundahishn 1990, p. 142. Is this a reference to the fact that it is Mihr who bestows Kingly Glory? But then, when Kai Bahram assumed kingship, he established the religion of Zoroaster (din-i zardusht rā barpā dārad). It is to be noted that in the primary text of the Bundahishn based on which Bahar has edited his text, the phrase din-i zardusht rā barpā dārad is broken precisely where the word barpā comes in. In other words barpā comes at the beginning of the next folio. The point is that, if not an editorial change, the word barpā can easily have been inserted as a result of a scribal error, or intentionally, instead of bar. In this latter case the phrase would read din-i zardusht rā bar dārad (destroyed Zoroaster’s creed). With a slight change, therefore, the meaning of the text would change drastically. Here Kai Bahram, true to his Mithraic beliefs, and in opposition to the religion established by the mōbads, came to destroy the religion of Zoroaster, in which case the rest of the passage would make sense. Thereafter, “none could be found [that adhered to] any [other] creed (kas bih bich giravishi peyda natavan kard).” Then, however, Pashutan came from Kang Dīzh, together with 150 pious (parhīzgār) men and destroyed the temple (butkadih) that was “the abode of their secrets and established the fire of Bahram in its place.” And he rectified the religion and re-established it. If no emendation were to be made, however, the passage as it stands would make little sense: If Kai Bahram had already established the religion of Zoroaster so that “none can be found [that adhere to] any [other] creed,” then why was it necessary for Pashutan to come once again? Moreover, what temple did Pashutan destroy which was the abode of their secrets, and why was he obliged to establish in its place the fire of Bahram, once again?

\textsuperscript{2379} There is no doubt that Bahram-i Chubin considered himself the Sōshyant or messiah. The “Soashyant is thought of as being accompanied, like kings and heroes, by Khvarenah [Divine Grace], and it is in Yasht 19 [Zamyād Yasht] that the extant Avesta has most to tell of him. Khvarenah, … will accompany the victorious Soashyant … so that he may restore existence … he will drive the Drug [Falsehood] out from the world of Asha [Righteousness].” The farr (Khvarenah), therefore, is here bestowed upon Bahram-i Chubin by the yazata to whose safe-keeping it has been given in the absence of a ruler fit to rule, namely the yazata Mihr. Zamyad Yasht 1883, §§89, 92, 93; Boyce 1979, p. 42, also pp. 74–75.
The motif of revenge

There is one final element of the millennial dimension of Bahrām-i Chūbīn’s rebellion that is significant for our purposes: the motif of revenge. Recall that in the midst of his rebellion, when the Ispahbudhān brothers had first blinded Hormozd IV and then had him killed, Bahram-i Chubin justified the continuation of his revolt on the basis of revenge for the murdered king. This comes from a source, namely Dinawari, who clearly had access to the positive, popular renditions of Bahrām-i Chūbīn’s rebellion as articulated in the epic romance Bahrām-i Chūbīn Nāma. The motif of revenge in Bahram-i Chubin’s narrative connects it to the legends of Manūchihr and Afrāsiyāb. In order to explicate this, we might begin with Tord Olsson’s analysis of the genre of apocalypse. According to Olsson, a key criterion of apocalypticism is its phenomenological parallel in other cultures. An apocalyptic movement entails “a certain method of interpreting reality with reference to a cultural heritage . . . [Thus,] the revitalization of mythic material and its reinterpretation with reference to the contemporaneous situation is a recurrent feature in these movements.” On a more universal level, Olsson argues, apocalyptic activity bespeaks of the belief “in the possibility of the communication between man and the supramundane world, i.e., that divine secrets or plans relative to the mundane world in the present, past or future, can be revealed to human recipients . . . [Moreover,] these revelatory worldviews are regularly actualized in situations of conflict or crisis, real or imagined, or in the context of the fear of such situations, . . . [when] the social organization, including access to central power, has been affected by a decrease in intra-system communication so that the cultural integrity of a certain group is jeopardized.” The apocalyptic activity within such a group then forces the group to “codify or restore their cultural identities or traditional value systems in opposition to rival communities or groups through revelatory systems of ideas.” In the Iranian apocalyptic literature, including the Jāmāsp Nāmak, the “legendary motifs are thus actualized, and reinterpreted, often in political terms with reference to the contemporaneous situation or confused with the accounts of recent conflicts with the Arabs and other peoples . . . the apocalypses and legends thus deal with the fundamentals of Iranian civilization, culture and religion.” Olsson observes subsequently that in the

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2381 See page 127.
2382 Dinawari 1967, p. 97.


Jāmāsp Nāmak, Bahram-i Chubin’s legend incorporates the “traits of the old legend about the conflict between Manūščihr and Frāšiyāp [Frāšiyāb].”

In the Iranian national epic, the ferocious feud between the Iranians and the Turānians, we recall, began with the reign of the mythic king, Manūščihr, who was the first to have to reckon with a powerful enemy king. We also recall Manūščihr’s connection with Ṭabaristan, where he was born on Mount Manush in the Alburz, and where he took refuge during his struggle with the Turānian Afrasiyāb. By far, however, the chief achievement of Manūščihr in the Iranian national tradition was his role as the avenger of the death of the favorite son of Fereydun, Iraj, who was murdered by his brothers. In our subsequent discussion of the religious revolts that transpire in the quarters of the east and the north from the mid-eighth century onward, therefore, besides the currents of Mithraism prevalent in these regions, and besides all the motifs, similarly Mithraic, that are imbued within the apocalyptic accounts of Bahram-i Chubin’s rebellion, we have to keep in mind the relevance of the old legend of Manūščihr and Afrasiyāb, and especially the crucial theme of revenge therein.

Before we get to these, however, we must briefly discuss an episode of early Islamic history, the cultural and geographical provenance of which fall outside the purview of this study, namely the ʿAbbāsid revolution. It is precisely in order to underline the extraneous characteristic of this revolution to the concerns of this study, that we must do this.

6.2 The ʿAbbāsid revolution

In 129 AH/746–747 CE, an obscure figure, carrying the enigmatic name of father of the Muslims, Abū Muslim al-Khurāsānī (or al-Marwazī or al-İsfahānī), is said to have received instructions from an Imām, Ibrāhīm b. Muḥammad, to launch a call (daʿwa) on behalf of an acceptable member of the family of the Prophet (al-riḍā min al-i Muḥammad) in the far-eastern corners of the former Sasanian domains and on the edges of the land of the Pahlav. Donning black garments and raising a black standard in the village of Sefīdanj in Marv, Abū Muslim instructed his followers to do the same and, lighting a fire, signaled the inauguration of a revolution, not just any revolution, but, as the motto of the rebellion indicated, an Islamic revolution. About twelve centuries later, in the

2390 As Yarshater notes, there seems to be a certain primacy about Manūščihr. Yarshater 1983b, p. 435.
2391 See page 375ff.
2393 Yarshater 1983b, p. 434.
2394 A full analysis of the relevance of ʿAbbāsid revolution to the issues discussed in this study must be postponed to the author’s forthcoming work. Here we shall only provide a short synopsis.
heat of the nineteenth century racialist theories smothering the west, and with romanticized obsessions about revolutions percolating in the minds of European orientalists, gazes were turned to this fascinating episode of the history of the Orient, the Abbâsid revolution. A long history of erudite scholarship was then precipitated, addressing an equally long list of crucial questions, some of which remain unsettled to this day: who was this obscure figure who galvanized the East into launching a revolution? Whence his ethnic origins? Was he an Arab or an Iranian moving the oppressed Iranian mawâli against the yoke of their oppressors? Was this an Arab, Iranian, Abbâsid or Shîite revolution? Above all, however, one question was raised: why did the revolution take place in the far eastern corners of Iran, in Khurâsân, of all places? And so, in spite of solitary voices later raised in objection, the gaze of scholarship was fixated on this northeastern corner of Iran, the frontier region of Khurâsân, where the enigmatic Abû Muslim had launched a revolt almost a millennium and a half earlier.

An overview of the state of the field of this research is in fact quite pertinent to our concerns, and should have ideally appeared here. But the evidence that we would have to bring in order to fill what we perceive to be one of the most crucial lacunae in the field, is too multifaceted, and so considerations of space preclude their inclusion here. In order to contextualize our perspective on the Abbâsid revolution in reference to the thesis presented in this study, however, a few words need to be said.

Partly as result of its scholarly heritage, contemporary scholarship on the Abbâsid revolution continues to remain contentious. Precisely because of this, while numerous monographs have attempted to elucidate the socioeconomic, religious, and political dimensions of the revolution, one of the most crucial issues concerning this presumed watershed of early Islamic history has been neglected, namely an investigation into the natural environment in which it unfolded. Except for brief and often artificial asides that have sought to explain the suitability of Khurâsân as a frontier society for Arab mass migration—the latter being a conditio sine qua non for the revolution—no systematic study of the relationship between the natural environment of the region and its social

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2396 Scholars such as Van Vloten and Wellhausen, to whom, needless to say, we owe a serious debt for the corpus of scholarship they produced on this and a host of other aspects of the history of the region.


2400 These will be hopefully brought together in a sequel to the present work in the near future. For the time being, the reader is referred to Pourshariati 1995, Ch. II and III, as well as Pourshariati 1998, pp. 41–81.
environment has ever been attempted. Examining the scholarship on the topic, one might very well presume that the ‘Abbāsid *da‘wā* exploded on a blank terrain and the ‘Abbāsid *dwāt* acted on an expansive but empty stage. Khurāsān as a geographical entity remains a more or less abstract territorial domain in this scholarship. This abstract conceptualization of the land as a frontier society has also precluded any systematic investigation into the diverse socioeconomic infrastructure of the various parts of this extensive territory and the suitability of each of these to an influx of a substantial population. The notion of a mass migration of the Arab population into the region, embedded within which is the question of the numbers of these Arab migrants, has likewise either been accepted *a priori*, based on nineteenth century research, or has simply been taken for granted.\footnote{2401} The question of the pattern of Arab settlement in the region, a question that has hitherto formed the premise of all subsequent studies of the ‘Abbāsid revolution, and a viable indicator for potentially re-assessing the popularity of the revolution, has likewise attracted very little attention.\footnote{2402} Above all, with one notable exception,\footnote{2403} no systematic study of one of the most crucial issues of early Islamic history in general, and the ‘Abbāsid revolution in particular, namely the issue of conversion, has ever been undertaken in the field.\footnote{2404} Whether one agrees with Bulliet’s thesis or his methodology, his conclusions on conversion remain the only plausible working hypothesis to date and as such must be reckoned with: not until the period between the 790s and the 860s did a substantial population of Iranians convert.\footnote{2405} All the outstanding questions related above are closely interconnected and require a brief reconsideration of the topographical and geographical characteristics of

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\footnote{2401} The question of the numerical strength of this foreign population is of course crucial to any investigation of the topic. In the past decade two dissertations, by Agha and by the author, independently came to the conclusion that the Wellhausanian assessment of the numerical strength of this migration into the region has been exaggerated. Having argued this, the two authors, however, reached different conclusions about the nature of the ‘Abbāsid revolution. See Agha, Saleh Said, *The Agents and Forces that Toppled the Umayyad Caliphate*, Ph.D. thesis, University of Toronto, 1993 (Agha 1993), subsequently published as Agha, Saleh Said, *The Revolution which Toppled the Umayyads: Neither Arab nor ‘Abbāsid*, Leiden, 2003 (Agha 2003); and Pourshariati 1995.

\footnote{2402} See Pourshariati 1998, pp. 41–81.

\footnote{2403} Bulliet 1979.

\footnote{2404} The title of Dennett, Daniel C., *Conversion and the Poll Tax in Early Islam*, Harvard University Press, 1950 (Dennett 1950), is a misnomer, for in this book, an examination of the issue of conversion is not undertaken but simply asserted as a matter of fact. This is also the case with the latest work on the topic, Agha 2003. For an overview of the state of the field on the issue of conversion, see Humphreys 1991, pp. 273–283, where he maintains that in spite of the fact that “conversion to Islam was … a massive process … it remains one of the most poorly examined fields in Islamic studies.” Ibid., p. 274. Emphasis mine.

\footnote{2405} Bulliet 1979. A caveat to Bulliet’s methodology must be mentioned, nonetheless: while conversion entailed a rural–urban migration according to Bulliet, and hence also affected the rural population, his evidence has, per force, been culled from urban literary products and therefore explicates more the urban transformations than the rural conditions. For the majority of the agrarian population of Iran, therefore, we have yet to devise a methodology that addresses the issue of their conversion. See also footnote 2432.
Khurāsān as a frontier region, relegating a more in-depth study of the topic to the future.

6.2.1 Inner–Outer Khurāsān

The Khurāsān that we readily define as a frontier region suitable for mass migration of the Arabs in the wake of the conquests was a vast region. Not all of the varied regions subsumed within this extensive territory had the potential to absorb a serious influx of a foreign population. The relationship between the natural environment of a region to its human population, furthermore, is one of the basic criteria that affect, over time, its evolving social relations. A detailed investigation of the geographical and topographical characteristics of the extensive Khurāsānid territory, therefore, ought to form the very first direction of our research, lest, as Morony puts it, we commit blunders in our subsequent assessment of the history of the region.\textsuperscript{2406}

Once such an investigation is undertaken, it becomes apparent that one of the most fruitful ways of conceptualizing the geographical, topographical, and hence social-structural characteristics of Khurāsān in the late antique period, is to follow its natural demarcations and conceive of the land as two distinct territories: Inner and Outer Khurāsān.\textsuperscript{2407} An extensive series of impassible mountains, the Greater and Lesser Balkhān, Kürendagh, Kopet Dāgh, and Bīnālūd, running in a diagonal axis from northwest to southeast, divide Greater Khurāsān naturally into two regions: Inner Khurāsān to the west of this barrier, and Outer Khurāsān to its east. The extensive Khwārazm desert, lying immediately to the north and east of these mountains, provides yet another major divide between these regions. As nineteen century travelers have reiterated again and again,\textsuperscript{2408} the paucity of passes and corridors through this barrier effectively hampers communication between the two regions. When we habitually promote the conception of Khurāsān as a frontier society, and when we readily argue that by virtue of this, the region was ideal for the purposes of Arab migration and settlement, it behooves us to specify to which part of this extensive region we are referring: the truly frontier cities of Marv, Sarakhs, Nīsā, and Abīvard in Outer Khurāsān, or do we have Nishāpūr, Tūs, Qūmis, Bākharz, and Khwāf in Inner Khurāsān in mind? As mentioned, a detailed investigation of this crucial and contextual dimension of the ʿAbbāsid revolution and the natural environment in which it unfurled will be undertaken in a later study.

For now it should be noted that the proposal for viewing Khurāsān in the post-conquest century as having an inward and an outward orientation is not meant as a pedantic exercise in providing alternative terminologies. This

\textsuperscript{2406}“Historical events must be understood in their proper physical setting lest one commits blunders in understanding the course of those events.” Morony 1984, p. 589.
\textsuperscript{2407}I owe this terminology to my former advisor, Richard Bulliet.
\textsuperscript{2408}See, among others, Curzon, George N., Persia and the Persian Question, London, 1892 (Curzon 1892), pp. 142–143.
geographical delimitation offers a more accurate way of investigating the sociopolitical and cultural inclinations and developments of the two regions during the post-conquest period. The socioeconomic and political forces operating in Outer Khurāsān as well as Central Asia were quite distinct from those affecting the Iranian plateau. As we will be arguing elsewhere, the socioeconomic forces, structures and conditions, and the ideological dynamics that precipitated and sustained the ʿAbbāsid revolution were alien to the Iranian plateau, including the Inner Khurāsān regions. A close reassessment of the conclusions reached by scholarship based on this new geographical conceptualization of Khurāsān underlines a crucial fact: the geographical spread of the ʿAbbāsid revolution was not in the vast expanse of the Khurāsānid territory, as has been thus far cavalierly maintained, but specifically in Outer Khurāsān and Transoxiana. It is perhaps no exaggeration to maintain that the frontier cities of Nīsā, Abīvard, Sarakhs, and Marv set aside, the ʿAbbāsid revolution was more of a Central Asian phenomenon than a strictly speaking Khurāsānid one, precisely because the popular base of the revolution followed the pattern of Arab settlement within these regions. The natural environment and the socioeconomic infrastructure operative in Central Asia during the late antique period, can be more readily compared to the western regions of Iran and Mesopotamia than to the Pahlav lands investigated in this study, as Richard Frye already pointed out. While he aptly makes a distinction between what he terms western and eastern Iranian lands, however, he continues to conceptualize a Khurāsān that was undifferentiated in its geographical and topographical environment. What is missing in Frye’s appropriate distinction between eastern and western Iran, is a further fine-tuning of his conceptualization of the eastern Iranian lands: All of Khurāsān, together with Central Asia, is included in his definition of the east. A distinction, however, ought to be made. For the series of mountains that divide Khurāsān into Inner Khurāsān and Outer Khurāsān, also make a division in the infrastructural, social, and economic forces within these regions. As Frye himself underlines, the infrastructure of Central Asia, like western Iran, was marked by a relatively much higher degree of urbanization than the quarters of the east and the north. “It should be noted,” Frye remarks, “that whereas in Sasanian Iran the landed aristocracy, the priests, scribes and common folk comprised the four traditional classes or casts, in Transoxiana the society seems

2409 See Pourshariati 1998, pp. 43–44.
2410 Frye is also the first to point out that the local histories of Iran provide evidence of the Arab–Iranian relationship at the time of the Arab conquest of their territories: “I have reported on one of these … and have heard of others.” These documents, he further maintains, give us evidence that “the Arab conquests loomed very large in the minds of the the people, at least in later times when the histories were written.” He even acknowledges that “most small towns and villages in Iran and Central Asia were relatively untouched by Islam in the Umayyad period, and their populations were converted only several centuries or more after the Arab conquests.” Frye 1975a, p. 94. Emphasis added. The author subsequently published her Pourshariati 1998, and had she undertaken a re-reading of the relevant parts of Frye, she would have acknowledged that Frye had already pointed the way.
to have been divided between the landed aristocracy . . . the merchants . . . and the ordinary folk.”

While these social divisions might have been more an idealized depiction, they nevertheless do underline a significant distinction between the Pahlav domains on the one hand, and the Central Asian and Outer Khurāsānid society on the other. Frye’s remarks are germane to any investigation of the numerical strength, pattern, and consequence of the Arab settlement in the east, and, therefore, ought to direct the focus of our gaze in deciphering the milieu of the ‘Abbāsid revolution. For as he underlines, a crucial dimension of the economic infrastructure of Central Asia was “the more important position of the merchant in Central Asia . . . as compared with Iran corresponding to the more significant role which he played in the society of small Central Asian states, a society which was based on trade.”

Compared to the predominantly agricultural economic infrastructure normative for the Pahlav territories, we seriously question whether a similar agnatic social structure and the multifarious checks and balances ensuring its cohesion, operated in the urban centers of Outer Khurāsān and Central Asia.

The comparatively much more diverse linguistic and religious landscape operable in the Outer Khurāsānid and Central Asian societies needs to be taken into account as well. As Frye warns us, for example, when examining the linguistic landscape of this part of the east, “one must be careful in interpreting the word Persian in the sources, because it could be used for Sogdian, Khwarzamian, or another Iranian language.” Likewise, the religious landscape of Transoxiana was, comparatively, much more diverse. Buddhism, Manicheism, Nestorian Christianity and local Zoroastrianism, not to mention small colonies of Jews and Hindus, were all part of the picture in Central Asia.

As far as the Iranian religions of Central Asia and Outer Khurāsān are concerned, furthermore, we do not know to what extent a conservative agnatic social structure sustained the religious life of these communities.

As we have argued in a previous study, on some fundamental level, the conditions that precipitated the eruption of the ‘Abbāsid revolution—whatever the nature of this latter—had very little to do with the regions under investigation in the present study, the land of the Pahlav, the former quarters of the north and the east of the Sasanian domain, of which Inner Khurāsān was an

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2411 Frye 1975a, p. 94. Emphasis added.
2412 “The enormous number of wall paintings in Panjikant . . . indicates that no town based solely on the surrounding agriculture could have afforded such expensive decorations in so many houses, or would have been interested in such luxuries.” Frye 1975a, p. 99. Emphasis added.
2413 We do acknowledge, needless to say, that even the trade economy of Central Asia was ultimately agriculturally sustained.
2414 In contrast, he maintains, when “it is recorded . . . that Arabs or non-Arab Muslims spoke Persian, one should accept this as it stands. For Persian or Dari, the Persian spoken at the Sasanian court by the bureaucracy, undoubtedly continued to be a lingua franca in the eastern part of the Iranian world, and with the Arab conquest in Central Asia, this tongue, Dari, became even more widespread in the east at the expense of local tongues such as Sogdian.” Frye 1975a, p. 99.
2415 Frye 1975a, p. 100.
2416 Pourshariati 1998.
§6.2: Abbasid revolution  

6.2.1 Chapter 6: Revolts

integral part. For, except for numerically very small communities of Arabs in these lands, the Arabo-Islamic presence in these regions was practically non-existent, at least late into the Umayyad period. As Ṭabarî maintained and as the consensus of the scholarship reflects, therefore, not much had changed with the conquest of the regions in the period 640–650 and this remained the case throughout the Umayyad period. The concerns and the platforms of the ‘Abbāsid revolution were alien to the ruling and ruled population of these predominantly Pahlav regions.\(^\text{2417}\) Contemporaneous with the ‘Abbāsid revolution, and for close to a century subsequent to it, however, substantial upheavals did in fact take place in the Pahlav regions. There are grounds, therefore, for us to relegate a more detailed investigation of the ‘Abbāsid revolution to a future study. For as we shall presently see, the concerns of the latter had very little to do with the issues that were simmering in the Pahlav lands and the revolutions that were launched there.

6.2.2 Post-conquest Iran and contemporary scholarship

Ever since the nineteenth century, scholarly obsession with the ‘Abbāsid revolution has pre-empted any serious investigation into the socioreligious history of the rest of Iran in the post-conquest period. A number of significant studies in this direction set aside for the moment, the information that one has culled for the post-conquest history of Iran about the social and cultural forces operating in the region has been confined, for the most part, to the political history of various provinces of Iran under the Umayyads. To a large extent this state of research reflects the Arabist predisposition of the field. The nature of the sources at our disposal, however, has also seriously exacerbated the situation. The interruption of the \(X^{\infty} \text{adāy-}Nāmag\) tradition at the end of the Sasanian history, juxtaposed next to the \(futūh\) narratives—all contained within the Islamic historiographical tradition—has created a false dichotomy. This artificial creation of the conquests as a watershed in Iranian history, precipitated by the discontinuity in our sources, has undermined our appreciation of the tremendous degree of social continuity characterizing the post-conquest period of Iran. In its final form, produced three centuries after the events, Islamic historiography was above all a self-conscious attempt at the creation of an Islamic religio-political community. An awareness of the emergence of the ethniconic community of the Arabs, and the centrality of this community in the formation of the Islamic polity, were among the primary stimuli for the rise of this historiography.\(^\text{2418}\)

This Arabo-Islamic bias of the sources has provided a convenient pretext in

\(^{2417}\) The case of Gurgān, and the presumed support there for the ‘Abbāsids can also be explained. We intend to deal with this in our forthcoming work.

\(^{2418}\) While much has been written about the influence of the Judeo-Christian tradition in contradistinction to which the Arabo-Islamic identity was gradually forming, little attention has been paid to the fact that one of the most readily available models of an ethnic community infused with a religious identity was the Iranian model. Among the few scholarly works noting this is Cook and Crone 1977.
modern scholarship for neglecting the socioreligious history of Iran in the immediate post-conquest centuries. All are well aware that on the Iranian plateau alone a number of highly significant revolts erupted simultaneous with, and shortly after, the ‘Abbāsid revolution. Yet, for all the preoccupation with the ‘Abbāsid revolution, and the numerous monographs dealing with this episode of late antique history of Iran, except for a few significant works with which we shall be dealing shortly, modern scholarship has mostly neglected these revolts. The Arabo-Islamist bias of the field in this regard is clear and one need not make apologies for underlining it.\footnote{2419}

One of the pioneering attempts at highlighting the artificial and abrupt change of focus in our sources, resulting in a skewed image of the post-conquest history of Iran, was made by Gholam Hossein Sadighi. In his classic account of Iranian religious movements of the second and third Islamic centuries,\footnote{2420} Sadighi underlines the partiality of the sources at our disposal. As we have no sources written in Persian in the first three centuries of the Muslim era, we are forced to rely primarily on classical Arabic sources. These sources, however, Sadighi continues, leave many questions pertaining to the Iranian religious scene in the post-conquest period unanswered. The lives of the prophets and leaders of these religious movements remain little known, as do the intellectual, religious, moral, economic, and administrative inclinations and practices of the Iranian population during this period. The “natural antipathy of some of these [classical] authors for the enemies of Islam complicates the task of those” seeking answers.\footnote{2421}

This situation is exacerbated by the fact that the Middle Persian (Pahlavi) sources that might have shed more light on the socioreligious history of Iran during the late Sasanian and post-conquest centuries, were composed during the ninth and tenth centuries—that is to say, around the same period in which the Islamic historical corpus was developed\footnote{2422}—under the patronage of a by then solidified Mazdean orthodoxy. As Shaked explains, these Middle Persian sources “present a one-sided view of the situation in the Sasanian and early Islamic period. They reflect the attitude of an orthodoxy that may have crystallized toward the end of the Sasanian period … an orthodoxy that must have rejected

\footnote{2419} As the late Mary Boyce has maintained, western scholarship has emphasized the supposed aridity of Zoroastrianism during the seventh century, giving the impression that “this ancient faith had become too mummified by ritual and formality that it needed only the thrust of a conquering sword to crumble into nothingness.” Such impressions, Boyce continues, “owe much … to the misconceptions engendered by the ultimate victory of Islam; and similar analyses of medieval Christianity would undoubtedly have been offered if Saracens and Turks had succeeded in subduing Europe.” Boyce 1979, p. 143.

\footnote{2420} Sadighi 1938.

\footnote{2421} Sadighi 1938, pp. 111–112.

\footnote{2422} The fact that the composition of the Middle Persian sources dealing with the history of the Mazdean community, as well as the prolific Shāhnāma production, were contemporaneous with the Islamic historical writing, is extremely significant and bespeaks the simultaneous preoccupation of both communities with archaizing efforts toward self-definition.
modes of belief that were unacceptable to it." Taking issue with the school of thought represented by Sadighi, moreover, Shaked argues that compared to the Middle Persian sources, the value of Islamic sources, composed mainly by authors of “Iranian origin, generally not farther removed from their Zoroastrian ancestry than one to four generations . . . [and living amidst] a lively and vigorous Zoroastrian community,” have been underrated. It is true, Shaked argues, that these sources betray the Muslim’s attitude toward non-Muslims. But precisely because they were not “bound by loyalty to an orthodoxy, they felt free to report views, beliefs, and practices without checking them against the standards of acceptability of a religious establishment.” The variegated information they contain, moreover, is not only “the most important aspect of their contribution to the subject . . .,” but also a testimony to the diverse religious scene during this period.

Sadighi’s work remains to date one of the most elaborate attempts in drawing the contours of the religious history of Iran in the post-conquest centuries. Half a century after his work, however, the void was still felt. Amoretti observes, for example, that “[t]he religious evolution of Iran during the centuries from the Arab conquest to the rise of the Saljuqs was determined by a number of factors which, so far, have not been adequately isolated and analyzed.”

Since then, while a number of significant studies have been made, the issues raised by the revolts that erupted in the wake of the ‘Abbāsid take-over of the caliphate, have not been revisited. Sadighi highlights the crux of the problem when investigating the Iranian revolts of the second and third century hijra. Muslim authors, he argues, provide uneven treatment of the Iranian religio-cultural tradition. As a result, scholars have been led to believe that the Iranians were so troubled at having lost their independence to the Arab conquerers that they no longer had the quietude to occupy themselves with matters of faith. One can in fact trace a high degree of continuity, Sadighi objects, between the religio-cultural traditions of the Sasanians and those prevalent in Iran during the late Umayyad and early ‘Abbāsid periods. As late as the mid-eighth century—the period under investigation in this chapter—a substantial number of Iranians had yet to abandon their national cult, for traces of Iranian religions and the persistence of their ceremonies and practices can be found everywhere.

A corollary to these misconceptions about the continuity of Iranian religious traditions is an overestimation of the doctrinal and institutional solidity of Islam and the effect of this on conquered populations. Just as there has been

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2423 Shaked 1994b, p. 43. Emphasis added.
2424 Shaked 1994b, p. 43.
2426 To name a few: Bausani 2000; Madelung 1985; Madelung 1988; Madelung 1992; Shaked 1995.
2427 The few exceptions will be noted as we proceed.
2428 Sadighi 1938, p. 111.
2429 Sadighi 1938, p. 111.
a tendency to underestimate the continuity of Iranian religio-cultural traditions in the post-conquest period, so too there has been a corresponding inclination to overestimate the effect of Arab rule and the advent of Islam on the newly conquered territories. One need not adhere to the Wansbroughian thesis, or the schools of thought following him, in order to make this claim, although the implications of this thesis for the post-conquest history of Iran and especially the process of conversion are tremendous. The fallacies of presuming an ideologically cohesive religion appearing as Islam during this period has also been pointed out by Bulliet: “When in the second half of the seventh century CE the Arabs conquered the Persian empire … they did not bring with them the religion that is described in general books on Islam. They brought with them something far more primitive and undeveloped, a mere germ of later developments …” The society of … [the] conquered lands was certainly not an Islamic one to begin with … [The] Muslims in these lands … at first represented one small element, albeit the ruling element, within a territory that was dominated numerically by adherents of other religions. Bulliet observes furthermore that “[a]s long as the Muslim population remained a minority or constituted only a bare majority of the entire population of a region, the society of that region as a whole was not an Islamic society, nor the culture of that region an Islamic culture.”

The present work is not a study in change, but an investigation into the continuity of Iranian sociopolitical and religious tradition. It is therefore only indirectly concerned with the issue of conversion. In order to investigate the socioreligious currents that informed the revolts galvanizing Iran from the middle

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2431 As has been observed previously, the conclusions reached by the revisionist school of thought about the Islamic narrative of origin, and by extension its historiographical corpus, are by no means monolithic.

2432 Bulliet 1979, pp. 1–2. In this context, it has been argued that the many rites and obligations which bound the Zoroastrians to their own priests from cradle to grave, might have found in the “new religion which had yet to create its own hard shell of scholastic dogmatism, and so laid few restraints on independent thought,” a respite from the ancestral religion. It might equally be true that “women, too, though in the long run *losers under Islam*, experienced an immediate benefit on conversion through freedom from those laws of purity which pressed so heavily on them in their daily lives.” Boyce 1979, p. 149. Yet, as Boyce herself argues, the Iranian masses were little concerned with scholastic matters and “their religious lives, though devout and instructed up to a point, were lived more simply.” As far as the actual role and power of women from various strata of the Sasanian society are concerned, furthermore, we know very little of how their lives were led. Moreover, an overriding consideration in any examination of the issue of conversion should be an acute awareness of the ethnic dimension of any variety of Iranian religion. As Boyce underlines, the ancient notion that conversion to a non-Iranian religion, in this case Islam, meant in reality becoming a non-Iranian (an¯er), a damning indictment, formed a potent hindrance to conversion. Ibid., p. 151. The narrative of the history of three generations of the families of a convert, Dinār, the issues confronting early converts and the problems they faced in the community from which they apostatized are successfully followed in Bulliet, Richard W., *Islam: The View from the Edge*, Columbia University Press, 1995 (Bulliet 1995), pp. 44–66.

2433 Bulliet 1979, p. 2.
of the eighth century to the end of the first quarter of the ninth, therefore, we shall start with an observation that is particularly pertinent to our concerns. In his study on Iranian sects and heresies, Amoretti observes that “by concentrating on one area or province, one can attain a more realistic, although possibly still universal vision, which is important for a number of interrelations between the various areas or provinces, and above all take into account whatever each area more or less consciously chose to preserve, in a national sense as one might say today, out of the supranational whole of aims and interests which the caliphate’s Islamic ideology expressed in different occasions and forms, within the territorial boundaries of the caliphate.”

Amoretti’s point of reference was the Iranian plateau as a whole. Our prism in what follows will be the religio-political revolts that transpired from the mid-eighth to the first quarter of the ninth century in the quarters of the north and the east, that is, the regions that remained under Parthian control at least during the first post-conquest century. Having limited our study to these regions, therefore, we shall also confine our conclusions as being pertinent to these same regions.

One can argue that the seminal work of Sadighi has already addressed the topic under investigation. There are two serious shortcomings in Sadighi’s work, however, that the present work hopes to address. Firstly, as Widengren perceptively observes, “this meritorious work has not succeeded in establishing a historical connection between Sasanian and post-Sasanian times and must be supplemented in this regard.”

Viewing the religious revolts that transpired in the quarters of the east and the north up to the middle of the eighth century in the context of the history of these regions during the Sasanian period, as discussed amply in the previous chapters, will therefore provide a far clearer picture of precisely how the histories of these regions continued in the post-conquest period. Secondly, while highlighting the heterodox dimension of some of the revolts which he investigated, Sadighi did not properly contextualize the provenance of these revolts, partly because he did not address the Sasanian religious landscape in his work. What then can we add to the picture drawn by Sadighi?

The histories of the quarters of the north and the east connect, in a very direct manner, from the late fifth century to the mid-seventh, when agreements between the Arabs and Farrukhzâd, the son of the Prince of the Medes, also known as Zinâbi Ābû l-Farrukhân or Bâv, and his allies Jîl-i Jîlânshâh and the various spâhbeds, were effected. The families around whom the accounts of the conquest revolved were not only families having a long heritage in these territories, but also families who continued to the rule in these regions after the conquest: the Parthian Ispahbudhân, Kârins, Mihrâns, and Kanärangîyân, as well as the Sasanian Āl-i Jâmâsî. For almost a century after the conquest, with

2436 See §3.4.6, especially page 264.
2437 See §4.1.2, especially page 291.
the exception of the Mihrāns, not much had changed in the quarter of the north. In the truncated quarter of the east, what we termed Inner Khurāsān, likewise, very little changed prior to the actual eruption of the ‘Abbāsid revolution.

Contemporary with the ‘Abbāsid revolution and for almost a century afterwards, however, a significant number of popular revolts in Iran and Central Asia shook the nascent ‘Abbāsid regime, forcing it to expend substantial manpower, resources and money to quell these. While these revolts might have shared a number of characteristics, the examination of all under the same rubric is unwarranted. Madelung’s contention, moreover, that all of these revolts “overtly mixed Persian and Islamic religious beliefs and motives,” under the the generic name of Khurramiyya, needs to be reassessed, for this assessment clearly contradicts his assertion that these were anti-Arab and anti-Muslim activities which “reached [their] climax in the great rebellion [of Bābak].” The Šī‘ite heresiographies and other classical Islamic texts that identify the Khurramiyya “with the Muslimiya, who considered Abū Muslim as their Imām, prophet or an incarnation of the divine spirit,” need to be approached with caution and with the understanding that these were in fact later texts that superimposed the conditions of their times onto the presumed origins of these revolts. As Madelung himself observes, the “reports of the Muslim sources about the doctrine and practices of the Khurramiyya are mostly summary and biased.” Against Agha’s contention, moreover, that “preceding and succeeding Abū Muslim and his followers, the almost uninterrupted string of Iranian rebels, apostates-heretics and heresies [such as Rizām b. Śābiq, Ibn Ishāq al-Turk, Barāz, and al-Muqanna] came straight from the ranks of Abū Muslim,” we must note that all but two of these revolts originated in Central Asia. The two exceptions mentioned by Agha are Khidash and Sunbād. As for Khidash, the one thing that we are certain about is that we are not certain about anything, except that, according to both Šabārī and Baladhurī, he began straying away from the Ḥāshimiya political propaganda espoused by the Abū Muslimites, and according to Baladhurī, he began teaching the doctrines of the Khurramiyya. The sources even suggest that Khidash was preaching some version of Khurramiyya doctrine, and it was probably precisely because of this that he was shunned by the ‘Abbāsid Imām. Accounts of Sunbād’s rebellion,

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2440 Madelung 2007b.
2441 Madelung 2007b. Madelung notes that this does not apply to the works of the tenth century geographer Maqdisi, which are “based on his personal acquaintance with members of the sect and his reading of some of their books.” Maqdisi, however, was also a tenth-century author.
2443 For Sunbād’s revolt, see §6.4 below.
2445 Crone, Patricia, ‘Review of Sharon’s Black Banners’, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and
on the other hand, follow the thematic motifs of Bahrām-i Chūbin’s rebellion to such an extent, that we will argue that the theme of revenge for Abū Muslim was a later topos incorporated into the narrative of his rebellion. Therefore, generalizations that do not take the regional variations of these revolts into account are unwarranted. Considering this, we shall confine our investigation to two major revolts that transpired in the quarters of the east and north of the former Sasanian domains, namely those of Bihāfarīd Māhfarvardīn in 129–131 AH/747–749 CE,2446 and of Sunbād, the ispahbud pīrūz, in 137 AH/755 CE.2447

Our sources, inadequate and biased as they may be, nonetheless portray both revolts as extremely popular uprisings. A simple onomastic glimpse at the name of their leaders underlines their Iranian ethnicon and religion.2448 Both revolts, moreover, appear to be driven not by an orthodox, elitist Mazdean ideology, but by strong currents of popular Mithraic religiosity. As such, they provide evidence of continuity of the religious currents prevalent in these regions during the Sasanian period. Finally, whether or not they sought to end Arab rule, both revolts had strong political implications for the consolidating ʿAbbāsid regime. We shall begin by addressing the revolt launched by Bihāfarīd Māhfarvardīn, when the ʿAbbāsid proselyte Abū Muslim was in the process of taking over the city of Marv, the ummaʾl-qūraʾ of the east, at the edge of the quarter of the east, the territory designated in this study as Outer Khurāsān.

### 6.3 Bihāfarīd

When the young Abū Muslim declared his call for al-ridā min ʿal-i Muḥammad, he was well aware of the stiff competition confronting him. Besides the octogenarian Umayyad governor of Khurāsān, Naṣr b. Sayyār, who still maintained de jure rule of the province, he also had to reckon with Judayb. b. ʿAlī al-Kirmānī and al-Ḥārith b. Surayj. The struggle that unfolded among these men on the eve of the ʿAbbāsid revolution, whether sustained by a predominantly Arab or Iranian constituency, originated in the vast regions of Outer Khurāsān and Transoxiana, beyond the Iranian plateau.2449 With the conquest of Marv2450 and the flight of Naṣr b. Sayyār to Nishāpūr, Abū Muslim thought his mission...
accomplished. Little did he know that another adversary, this time with a completely different ideological platform, was incubating a revolt in an unexpected corner of the vast Khurāsānī territory: the region of Nishāpūr. Of this he was informed by a curious assembly: the Zoroastrian high clergy of Nishāpūr. The new rebel carried the symbolically significant name Bihāfarīd Māhfarvardīn,\footnote{An extensive bibliography of primary sources on Bihāfarīd can be found in Yusofi, Gholam Husayn, ‘Behāfarīd’, in Ehsan Yarshater (ed.), Encyclopaedia Iranica, New York, 2007 (Yusofi 2007), which also provides an excellent synopsis of Bihāfarīd’s rebellion. The discussion that follows will only concentrate on those aspects of his revolt which have hitherto gone unnoticed by scholarship. While we have consulted all of the primary and secondary literary sources on the rebel, we shall nonetheless refrain from citing them all. For these, the reader can consult Yusofi 2007; Sadighi 1938; Pourshariati 1995.} not one of the typically Arab names which the ‘Abbāsid leader had encountered among the supporters of his previous adversaries. His domain was the region of Nishāpūr, in Inner Khurāsān, unfamiliar to Abū Muslim and his colleagues. His audience, therefore, was not the predominantly Arab, Arabicized Persian, or Iranianized Arab, with which the ‘Abbāsid had been dealing. The man, in other words, was somewhat of an oddity in Abū Muslim’s familiar setting. There is very little indication in the sources that there previously existed a relationship between Abū Muslim and Bihāfarīd Māhfarvardīn.\footnote{Yusofi 2007.} The eruption of his rebellion and the threats inherent in it to both Islam and Mazdeism were relayed to Abū Muslim by Bihāfarīd’s staunchest enemies, the herbads and the mōbads, the Mazdean clergy.

Bīrūnī provides one of the most complete accounts of Bihāfarīd’s revolt.\footnote{Bīrūnī 1984, p. 314. Also see Browne, E.G., A Literary History of Persia: From the Earliest Times until Ferdowsi, Bethesda, reprint edn., 1997 (Browne 1997), p. 308; Gardizī, Abū Sa‘īd ‘Abd al-Hayy, Zayn al-Akhbār, 1968, edited by ‘Abd al-Habībi (Gardizī 1968), p. 120.} A native, most probably, of Zūzan, in the northern reaches of the Qūhistān region to the south of the extensive region of Nishāpūr, Bihāfarīd launched his rebellion in Sirāwand, one of the districts of Nishāpūr in Khwāf. Of the personal history of the rebel we know very little. According to Bīrūnī, prior to launching his rebellion, Bihāfarīd had spent seven years in China, from where, among other Chinese curiosities, he had brought back a “green shirt, which, when folded up, could be held in the grasp of a man’s hand, so thin and flexible it was.” Upon returning to his native region, Bihāfarīd launched his rebellion. Bīrūnī’s account of Bihāfarīd’s rebellion clearly draws on popular stories in circulation and therefore provides a unique window on its popular perception. As we shall see, the details of the preparation for his revolt are significant. Bihāfarīd is said to have gone up to a roof one day at night. Upon his descent from the structure, significantly, in the early morning hours, the first man to notice the rebel was a peasant ploughing his field. It was to this peasant that the rebel, donned in the symbolically significant green silk shirt, proclaimed the first item of his doctrine: that he had ascended to the heavens, where he had seen Heaven and Hell, and, inspired by God, who had clothed him in green, he had
descended to earth in order to proclaim his message. The peasant, believing Bihafarid, narrated to the people who had gathered around the rebel, how, in fact, he had beheld him descending from the heavens. According to Biruni, Bihafarid’s doctrines, and his mission as a Prophet, were subsequently believed and led to the conversion of many in the surrounding regions. Our sources, albeit hostile, nevertheless highlight the numerical strength of his supporters. Bihafarid, however, “differed from the Magians in most rites,” but believed in Zoroaster and claimed for his followers all the institutes of Zoroaster. In the annals of the religious movements in late antique Iran, the Prophet Bihafarid Mahafarvardin established one hitherto unprecedented and crucial innovation: he offered his adherents a new holy book composed, significantly, in Persian. As has been observed, moreover, his message was monotheistic, one of the seven prayers which he instituted being in praise of the one God. It seems clear that Bihafarid’s doctrines were directed against the orthodox, learned Mazdean creed, for according to Biruni, his followers “strongly oppose[d] the Zamzamis amongst the Magians.”

Although Bihafarid can be called a Zoroastrian heretic, in that he seems to have indulged in Zand or reinterpretation of the faith, he is also one of the few figures in the history of the faith who radically departed from it. In this sense, he can be compared more readily to Mani than to Mazdak. Bihafarid claimed Prophethood and buttressed this claim with reference to a new holy book that he presented to his followers. He was not there to simply reinterpret the faith, but to substantively change it. His emphasis on worldly concerns, on the other hand, puts him more on a par with Mazdak.

Furthermore, Bihafarid appears to have come from a learned background. He must be considered, therefore, a man of knowledge, at least religious knowledge, for while we know very little of the contents of his holy book, the fact that he produced one indicates a learned background. Only an extremely restricted group of people in Sasanian society could boast of such skills. Considering all this, it becomes rather evident that, in league with other infamous zandikes of the faith, he did not come from the plebeian classes. There are other indicators that point to the potential wealth of our self-proclaimed Prophet. As we have seen, several sources maintain that he traveled to China and Transoxiana, some even claim for trade, and give the duration of his stay in these regions from anywhere between one and seven years. We must remember that China in the regional terminology used at the period referred not to China proper but to the area of the Western Turks.

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2456It is of course feasible that he was not necessarily a man of learning himself, but one with access to the services of the learned, a patron of the clerical classes, so to speak. Even so, he must have been personally engaged in the religious discourse current in his society.

2457Czegledy 1958, p. 42, n. 85.
In line with Sadighi, we also note that the social dimension of Bihāfarīd’s doctrine seems to have been greater than its purely doctrinal aspect. Some of his most radical departures from the orthodox faith espoused by the established clerics were aimed at ameliorating the lot of the middle classes of the society and undermining that of the nobility and the elite. The most important of these was the ban on close-kin marriage (khwēdō dah), a long-established institution, sanctified hitherto even by the most radical revolutionaries in Sasanian society, the Mazdakites. Close-kin marriage aimed to ensure the prerogatives of the nobility by keeping wealth, and therefore status, within the higher echelons of Sasanian society. Bihāfarīd’s insistence on the interdiction of this institution, therefore, highlights the strong hold that class divisions still had on the community in which he preached and explains why his support base was plebeian and probably mercantile. Regarding marriage customs, he set the uppermost limit of mahr (dowry) at 400 dirhams. This was still a substantial sum that could only have been afforded by the middle-income sector of his society. Bihāfarīd also introduced some kind of taxation reform, for he propagated the collection of oneseventh of all property and income (haft yek-i amvāl va kasb-i amāl) as taxes for the repair of roads and bridges, the construction of caravansaries, care for those with incurable diseases, relief of the poor, and other charitable causes. His preoccupation with building roads, bridges, and caravansaries, as well as other social aspects of his creed seem to have addressed the concerns of a mercantile, middle class, rather than the lowest or the highest echelons of society. In this, our rebel might have shared similar concerns with the ‘Abbāsid revolutionaries. While the mercantile dimension of his social doctrines is the most blatant, he also seemed, as his charitable and relief efforts indicate, to have been concerned with the lot of the less fortunate, of whom there must have been many during this period.

One of the most interesting religious dimensions of Bihāfarīd’s claim to prophethood, however, was his avowed journey into the hereafter during his occultation. It was during this journey that he claimed to have seen Heaven and Hell, and to have received a green cloth from the Divine, before returning to the gitig. The eschatological dimension of Bihāfarīd’s doctrine, in fact, is one of the best documented aspects of his faith in our sources and seems to have formed one of the central cores of his dogma. According to Bīrūnī, he instituted seven prayers for his followers. Four of these were concerned with matters of death and the hereafter: one for death, one for the day of reckoning (baṣṭ o ḥisāb), one for the populations of Heaven and Hell, and one in praise of the

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2458 Sadighi 1938.
2459 Bīrūnī 1984, pp. 299–300.
2461 Bīrūnī 1984, p. 315.
2462 Contra Sadighi 1938, p. 158.
inhabitants of Heaven.\textsuperscript{2463} The Prophet’s epithet, Māhfarvardīn, also reflects this eschatological concern, for according to Zoroastrian belief it is in the five days of Farvardīgān that the souls of the dead return to their abodes. During this period, the relatives of the deceased cleanse their homes and lay out clean spreads on which they put appetizing foods, which they then consume, hoping that the souls of the dead would thereby gain vigor. As eschatology formed one of the basic concerns of the Zoroastrian faith throughout the Sasanian period, Bihāfarid’s doctrine reflected a potent mark of continuity in Iranian expression of spirituality. We should recall at this point, however, that it was the God Mihr who was the quintessential deity for eschatological concerns.\textsuperscript{2464}

Among the accounts of Bihāfarid’s journey to the hereafter is Tha‘alībi’s \textit{Ghurar}, who adds the following interesting narrative.\textsuperscript{2465} In preparation for the proclamation of his Prophethood, Bihāfarid concocted an elaborate scheme in which he would feign his own death for a period of time, after which he would reappear and claim that he had ascended to the Heavens and had received his prophetic mission from the divine. To this end, in order to sustain himself during his occultation, he prepared imperishable edible provisions which he placed within two pillow-like sacks, hid two garments in a piece of cloth, and then gave orders to construct “a very large dome, from among the best and widest domes … with openings allowed for rain on all sides.” After these preparations, he feigned an incurable fatal disease and his subsequent death. Meanwhile, he had asked his wife that, upon his death, she should place him under the dome together with the sacks he had previously prepared. He then willed her to come every week to his shrine and wash her face at the openings in the dome. In this way, our hostile source informs us, the Prophet ensured his provisions, for, lying under the dome, each day, he would consume from the edibles he had prepared and would drink from the seeping rain or from the water with which his wife washed her face, until a year had passed. Sadighi takes issue with Tha‘alībi’s narrative, arguing against the logic of this narrative and the fact that Bihāfarid’s presumed instructions for his burial under a covered dome do not tally with Zoroastrian burial customs. But the point is precisely which burial customs, for, as we know, “the officially sanctioned Zoroastrian mode for the disposal of the dead was not scrupulously followed in the Sasanid period.”\textsuperscript{2466} At any rate the description that Tha‘alībi gives of Bihāfarid’s burial place resembles less a tomb than a shrine, for the construction was to be in the shape of a dome. In fact, the later Bihāfaridīya expressly argued against the burial practices of the Muslims, for they maintained that the earth was

\textsuperscript{2463}\textsuperscript{2463} As for the remaining three, one had to do with the Unity of God, one with the creation of the skies and earth, and one with the creation of animals and their nourishment.

\textsuperscript{2464}\textsuperscript{2464} See page 353.

\textsuperscript{2465}\textsuperscript{2465} Tha‘alībi 1900, pp. 258–290, Tha‘alībi 1989, pp. 169–170.

\textsuperscript{2466}\textsuperscript{2466} Shaked 1994a, p. 41. He further observes that “[e]ven the ancient Iranians may well have had several different modes for the disposal of the body, one of which was eventually adopted as the official Zoroastrian practice, while the others continued in use without religious sanction.” Ibid., n. 41.
an angel which would be polluted through the burying of a corpse. This last consideration also echoes the Zoroastrian conception of the earth as one of the Amahraspands.\footnote{Spandarmad (Avestan Spenta Armaiti), Holy Devotion, is the Amahraspand presiding over the earth.} As for the meaning of this narrative, we shall get to it shortly. In any event, when one year had passed, Bihäfarid awaited that period when the populace would gather to pay their respects at his shrine.\footnote{According to Mary Boyce, and based on contemporary practice, the Zoroastrians do not make a sanctuary of a grave. Boyce, Mary, ‘Bibi Shahrbanu and the Lady of Pars’, \textit{Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies} 30, (1967), pp. 30–44 (Boyce 1967), p. 30. However, as we have maintained earlier, a uniform burial practice and, by extension, commemoration of the dead cannot be established for the period under consideration. Incidentally, this tradition must have been either incorporated in Bihäfarid’s story at a later date, when the faith of the Prophet was well established and he had gathered enough followers who would undertake a pilgrimage to his shrine. Alternatively, and only if we give any historical credibility to this account, it betrays the status of the historical figure of Bihäfarid, for only a man of considerable wealth and social standing in the rebel’s society could be expected to have his burial site turn into what seems to have been a pilgrimage center.} Tha’alibi’s narrative then reaches its climax: in the midst of the commemorations of his death, Bihäfarid “got up, donned the green shirt and the green cloak, and when people saw him, announced: ‘O, people, I am Bihäfarid, the messenger of God to you’.”\footnote{Tha’alibi 1900.}

### 6.3.1 Interlude: \textit{Ardá Wiráz Nāma}

The most interesting aspect of this narrative, as well as Bihäfarid’s institution of prayers to the dead and to the population of Heaven and Hell is its uncanny resemblance to the narrative of the \textit{Ardá Wiráz Nāma}, a Zoroastrian work obsessed with the description of the Day of Judgment and Heaven and Hell, painting in colorful detail the rewards and gruesome punishments of its respective occupants.\footnote{Compare also with Kirdir’s journey to the hereafter on page 329.} The \textit{Ardá Wiráz Nāma} commences with a description of the destructions wrought on Iran after the conquest of Alexander, when kingship, religion, and people succumbed to utter chaos, “doubting the matter of God (amr-i yazdān), with many religions and practices.”\footnote{Arda Wiraz 1999.} In order to quell these and achieve certainty about the afterlife for the edification of the disbelievers, the \textit{mōbads} then decided to choose a righteous man and prepare him for a journey to the hereafter. Ardá Wiráz (or Ardá Virāf) was chosen for the purpose. The \textit{mōbads} then “chose an agreeable place in the house of minū\footnote{Bahar gives the equivalent of this as the \textit{house of the minavi Ātash}, that is, presumably, the fire temple.} measuring 30 gaz (dar khānā-i minū jāʾi khūb bīb andāza-i sī gām guzīdand).” There, Ardā Wiráz washed his body, “donned a new attire, and on a befitting bedstead … set up a clean and new bed … He [then] … prayed … ate … and was given wine and \textit{mang}.\footnote{Arda Wiraz 1999, p. 302.} While in a semi-dead state, his seven sisters prayed for him for seven days, not leaving his bedside. During this period, the soul
(ruwan) of Ardā Wirāz was taken to the Chinvat Bridge on mount Chagād-i Dāīt (Harā/Alburz). There, Sorūsh, together with Izad-i Adhar, awaited him and subsequently guided him on his journey through Heaven, Purgatory, and Hell, and answered all his questions. Upon his return from the realm of the dead after seven days, Ardā Wirāz’s sisters greeted him: “Welcome, O Ardā Wirāz, our Mazdayasian Prophet. You have come from the realm of the dead to this abode of the living.”

All the motifs of Ardā Wirāz’s journey into the hereafter—the preparation of a special place for the temporarily deceased to be laid for the duration of his absence, the preparation of nourishment, in Ardā Wirāz’s case before and after his journey, a woman, or women, who keep(s) guard during his absence, the feigning of death, in Ardā Wirāz’s case by taking mang, and finally the reappearance of the deceased as a prophet from the hereafter—are also present in the sources narrating Bihāfarīd’s presumed occultation and return from the dead. Also significant is the indication that the appearance of Bihāfarīd gives of the turbulent spiritual and social conditions that must have existed during his lifetime, conditions which in their reflection of the spiritual and social anxiety of the age also explain the millennial hope of the appearance of a new Prophet. The uncanny similarity of the two narratives becomes even more interesting, however, when we consider what must be their Mithraic purview.

6.3.2 Mithraic purview of Bihāfarīd’s rebellion

In the case of the Ardā Wirāz Nāma, when the soul of Ardā Wirāz is taken across the Chinvat Bridge, it is not only Mihr, but all his associates, including the angels Sorūsh, Rashnu, and Verethragna Izad-i Adhar, that lead the way for Ardā Wirāz and answer his queries. Here the Ardā Wirāz Nāma itself is perhaps betraying its original Mithraic provenance: Mihr is performing his eschatological function on the individual level where “he presides over the Činvat bridge tribunal, midway between Heaven and Hell, [overseeing] the compulsory passage of the soul of the faithful departed.” Insofar as the eschatological function of Mihr is presumed to date back to remote antiquity, therefore, we must also date the germs of Ardā Wirāz’s narrative to this same period. Now, while in none of the traditions of Bihāfarīd the name of the divinity that directs Bihāfarīd’s entrance into Heaven is provided, his narrative is replete with other symbols of Mihr worship. To begin with, the color of the garment bestowed on Bihāfarīd by the unnamed divinity is the quintessential color of Mithra, green. Invariably, moreover, like the God Mihr, descending from the Harā/Alburz mountain, Bihāfarīd descends either from atop a mountain or a dome. Like Mihr, who appears “earlier than the sun, . . . [and] travels in front of the sun,” so, too, Bihāfarīd appears precisely at daybreak. Finally, as with the nourishing

2475 Belardi 1979, pp. 697–698.
2476 See page 353.
function of Mihr, the god of agriculturalists, so, too, in both Bīrūnī’s and Majd-i Khwāﬁ’s narrative, Bihafarīd first appears to a peasant.

While there is no detailed description of Bihafarīd witnessing the hereafter, moreover, a substantial part of the Prophet’s doctrine, not to mention his name, is concerned with the hereafter and death. The eschatological, Mithraic purview of Bihafarīd’s doctrine, therefore, has a lot to recommend itself. Besides its affinities with the Ardā Wirzā Nāma and the eschatological dimensions of his dogma, however, and above and beyond all the other evidence that we have pointed out, there is one other aspect of Bihafarīd’s doctrine which clearly betrays a Mithraic purview: his installment of the Sun as the qibla.2477 The priority of the sun as the paramount symbol of worship in Bihafarīd’s doctrine distinguishes it clearly as a Mithraic creed. For as we have noted, in the Mazdean faith, the sun, while deserving of worship and prayer, was never so central as to be placed, as is the case here, at the top of the pantheon.2478 So incongruous, in fact, was Bihafarīd’s insistence on sun-worship with what we know to be the monotheistic dimensions of his creed, that it left the late Sadighi perplexed. In view of the monotheistic dimensions of the faith, Sadighi argues, it is not clear why the Prophet attached so much importance to the sun, and neither do we understand the relationship of this astral symbol to God in Bihafarīd’s doctrines.2479 Sun worship did have a place in the Mazdean faith, being performed three times during the day by the believers. In the case of Bihafarīd, however, as Sadighi observes, the only prayers incumbent upon the believers were those with the Sun as their qibla. Bihafarīd also composed a holy book in Persian for his followers. This does not imply, given the primarily oral tradition in Sasanian Iran, that Bihafarīd’s audience was therefore an educated, that is literate, audience. It does imply, however, as Amoretti observes, that the “Persian language was obviously chosen because, unlike the protagonists of Abū Muslim’s revolution, the followers of Bihafarīd were only local people.”2480

Predisposed to overestimating the development and spread of Islamic dogma during these early decades, some scholars have observed that aspects of Bihafarīd’s doctrines testify to their synthesis with Islamic injunctions.2481 Among these they cite his prohibition against close-kin marriage, drinking wine, and

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2477 For the identification of Mithra with the sun, see page 357ff.
2478 Shaked 1994a, p. 92.
2479 Sadighi 1938, p. 124.
2480 Amoretti 1983, p.490. According to Sadighi, it is not clear whether Bihafarīd’s book was written in Pahlavi or Arabic characters. Sadighi 1938, pp. 122–123. The answer to this seems fairly obvious. If, as Sadighi himself admits, the Muslims were oblivious to the proselytizing of the new Prophet as well as to his person, his holy book could not have been written in Arabic characters. After all, to which audience would the book have addressed itself, had it been composed in Arabic characters? In fact, the question of the book’s script is a non-issue, for in whichever character, the readership of the book would have been very limited. The language, nonetheless, remained Persian. It might be postulated, nevertheless, that some of the supporters of Bihafarīd belonged to the more literate sector of society, hence the actual composition of a book for the edification of these.
consumption of animals not properly slaughtered. For none of these, however, can we establish with any certainty an Islamic influence. Bihāfarīd’s presumed injunction against drinking wine, for example, requires further research. It is not clear whether the ban was against drinking wine or against getting too intoxicated (ṣukr) by it.\footnote{Sadighi 1938, p. 161.} If the former was the point of the commandment, then we should observe that to the east of Iran, in a region with which Bihāfarīd had intimate connections,\footnote{Among other regions, Bihāfarīd’s followers continued to live in Bādgīs.} Shahrīstānī cites at least two sects among the religions of India, namely the Bihādūniya and the Bāsūya, the adherents of which were prohibited from drinking wine as well. If indeed even modest drinking was prohibited, then Bihāfarīd clearly went against both Mazdean and Mithraic practices. For, in Zoroastrianism, in general, and in Mihr worship, in particular, wine holds a sanctified place.\footnote{Bundahishn 1990, p. 78.} Drinking wine in moderation is even considered a meritorious act in Zoroastrianism.\footnote{Widengren 1979, p. 679.} In Mihr worship it even holds a central place.\footnote{The evidence for this is substantial; we shall deal with this in a forthcoming project on the connection between Mithraism and the doctrines of the šyṣyārs.} If Bihāfarīd forbade drinking wine, therefore, in this he was dissenting from Mihr worship. As far as the injunction against eating meat is concerned, moreover, we should observe that in the Mazdakite doctrine there was a similar injunction.\footnote{Shaki 1978, p. 305, n. 149, where among others he gives reference to Mirkhwānd, Ṭovīdat al-Sāfā, Tehran, 1960 (Mirkhwānd 1960), where it is maintained that Mazdak “forbade the people to kill animals and eat their meat and fat.”} The Bāsūya mentioned by Shahrīstānī, moreover, were also encouraged to desist from lying, to praise fire, and not to eat the flesh of animals not slaughtered for fire. The point is that prohibitions such as eating flesh or drinking wine were prevalent enough in the immediate milieu of Bihāfarīd and need not be explained in Islamic terms. In short, while some of the injunctions of Bihāfarīd might reflect later Islamic dietary practices, to attribute these solely to the latter can be hurried and rash.

As far as the Muslim antagonism toward khwēdōdah was concerned, furthermore, we should note that Christian observers had long reprimanded the Zoroastrians for what had seemed to them an abhorrent practice. Never had this affected any anxiety among the Iranians prior to this. There is little reason to suspect, therefore, that Muslim attitude against this practice had inspired Bihāfarīd’s ban. For, while, unlike the Christians, the Muslims were in power and their polemics against Iranian practices could have had potentially more force, it is patently clear that Bihāfarīd was oblivious to their concerns. We should not lose sight of the fact that one element of Bihāfarīd’s creed would have been the most loathsome to any devout Muslim: his self-proclaimed Prophethood. There could have been no reconciliation between this and Islam, as one of the most basic tenets of the faith—if one follows the Islamic narratives of its own origins—was its belief in the Prophet Muhammad as the Seal of the Prophets.
The observations about Muslim influence on Bihāfarīd’s creed also rely on the presumed association of the rebel with the ‘Abbāsids. These stem from a unique tradition in the Fihrist of Ibn al-Nadīm, where a connection is established between Abū Muslim and Bihāfarīd. According to this tradition, when Bihāfarīd’s movement had gained momentum, presumably enough to cause anxiety for the movement that was broiling in Outer Khurāsān and Transoxiana, Abū Muslim sent envoys to the self-proclaimed Prophet, inviting him to become a Muslim. This, reportedly, they achieved. Shortly thereafter, as Bihāfarīd had continued to indulge in prognostication, however, Abū Muslim turned against the Iranian rebel, and, dispatching ʿAbdallāh b. ʿSaʿid with an army to Zūzan, had Bihāfarīd captured in Bādghīs and brought to Nishāpūr. In Nishāpūr, Abū Muslim ordered the murder of the self-proclaimed Prophet, and had him hung in the jāmiʿ mosque, which, incidentally, Abū Muslim himself had only recently constructed when he had made the city his capital. Shortly prior to this, as we shall see, another important ‘Abbāsid general, Ḥumayd b. Qahtabah, had effected another crucial anti-Parthian policy: he had dethroned the Kanārangiān, undermining their power in Inner Khurāsān after more than half a millennium of rule. All the evidence, therefore, suggests that Abū Muslim’s policies in Iran proper were staunchly anti-Iranian. In view of the ultimate treatment of Bihāfarīd himself at the hands of the Muslims, any ostensible connection between the ‘Abbāsids and the rebel must be considered shortlived at best. Yet, the tradition handed down by Ibn al-Nadīm would have us believe that a man who had only recently launched his own claim to Prophethood, and who had gained a substantial following in the process, suddenly and unexpectedly, had forgone all this only to join the ranks of those who propagated the rule of al-ridā min al-ʿIbrahim. In fact, other traditions put presumed Bihāfarīd’s conversion after his capture at the hands of the agents of Abū Muslim.

Unlike Abū Muslim and other contenders for power at the time of the ‘Abbāsid revolution, whose sphere of activity was predominantly Outer Khurāsān and Transoxiana, the genesis, progress, and final demise of the rebellion of Bihāfarīd all took place in Inner Khurāsān. There is no indication that Bihāfarīd had any support whatsoever in the regions where Abū Muslim sent his dwāt and found his followers. As all our sources underline, Bihāfarīd’s ultimate goal was the takeover of Nishāpūr and its dependencies, not that of Marv or the frontier cities of Outer Khurāsān.

One of the sensitive issues for medieval Islamic authors writing about heterodox revolts was the extent of their popularity. It is a function of the relative objectivity of the Islamic sources, however, as well as the overwhelming

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2489 See footnote 2562.
2490 See Pourshariati 1998. Later on, however, some of his followers are mentioned in the vicinity of Marv. Sadighi 1938, p. 165.
2491 Gardizi 1968, p. 120; Birūnī 1984, pp. 210–211.
The popularity of these revolts, that almost all of our sources underline the tremendous support that the movement of Bihāfarid garnered. The popularity of the revolt was such in fact, that it led Sadighi to conclude that had the Abbāsid revolution not been led by the energetic Abū Muslim and had Bihāfarid had more time at his disposal, the post-conquest history of Iran might have taken a different turn from that which ultimately transpired. But Abū Muslim did suppress Bihāfarid and murdered him, together with his followers. And, in the final analysis, this rather than any conjectural hypothesis about the presumed affinities between the two movements, must direct our assessment of the nature of their mutual relationship.

Bihāfarid’s movement, however, did not die: in subsequent centuries, it coalesced into a sect. Shahristānī mentions them and observes that the Sīsāniya or Bihāfaridīya, the followers of Bihāfarid, had been encouraged by their Prophet to keep their hair hank, and “occupy monasteries [where they] vie[d] with each other in bestowing generously.” According to Shahristānī, they remained “the deadliest enemies of the Zamzamī Majūs.” All of this has led Shaked to argue that whereas all the other varieties of Iranian religions during the Sasanian and early Islamic period “simply did not exist as separate church structures,” the sect of the Sīsāniya seems to have been an exception to this rule. They came to have “a full code of religious behavior, as well as a full corpus of doctrine, and something like a separate church, an organization of believers . . . [all of which are] the necessary ingredients for the definition of a sect . . . [but which] are not frequently encountered in other groups.” In view of our postulate that the Mithraic provenance of the Bihāfaridīya is valid, it is extremely interesting to note that the one other exception to this rule was yet another Mithraic group, namely the followers of Bābak Khurramdin, who also seem to have had a rather strict organization. So abhorrent did the later Bihāfaridīya and their doctrines remain in Muslim eyes, in fact, that they were singled out as one of the only sects from whom collecting jizya was forbidden.

From the paramountcy of sun-worship in Bihāfarid’s doctrine, to its evident eschatological concerns, to the motifs in his narrative that closely follow the functions of Mihr, very little doubt ought to remain about the Mithraic provenance of his movement. In the present state of our knowledge, unfortunately, we cannot ascertain Bihāfarid’s agnatic heritage. As almost all other rebellions

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2492 Ibn al-Nadīm 1987, p. 614; Gardīzī 1968, p. 120; Bīrūnī 1984, p. 210. Other sources give specific numbers. The author of Șawar al-Aqālim, for example, gives the figure 30,000 for the number of adherents. Sadighi 1938, p. 120.
2493 Sadighi 1938, p. 121.
2494 As quoted in Shaked 1994b, p. 63. It should be noted that the competition of the Sīsāniya in making charitable donations should caution us against considering the exorbitant demands of the Zoroastrian mōbads as a cause for apostasy from the faith.
2495 As quoted in Shaked 1994b, p. 63.
2496 Shaked 1994b, pp. 46–47.
2497 Shaked 1994b, pp. 46–47, who does not, however, recognize the Mithraic purview of either movement.
within the Pahlav domains in the post-conquest period were led by dynastic figures of substantial wealth and power, and considering the information we have on Bihāfarīd’s status, a plebeian background for the self-proclaimed Iranian Prophet is out of the question. Bihāfarīd’s rebellion does point to the rise of mercantile interests within the region and a possible antipathy against the interests of the landed gentry. Beyond this, we cannot comment further on the rebel’s personal background.

6.4 Sunbād the Sun Worshipper

Less than five years after Abū Muslim al-Marwazi launched the ʿAbbāsid revolution from Outer Khurāsān, Transoxiana, and Soghdiana, and effected the transition of the caliphate from the Umayyads to the ʿAbbāsids, the second ʿAbbāsid caliph, Abū Manṣūr al-Dawānīqī (136–158/754–775), had him killed in 755. About two months later a tumultuous popular revolution engulfed the quarters of the north and the east, the domains of the Parthian dynastic families who had remained in power after the Arab conquest of the region, throughout the Umayyad period. The revolt was led by a figure called Sunbād the Magian, ostensibly under the banner of revenge for the murder of the ʿAbbāsid leader Abū Muslim. What is striking in the accounts of Sunbād’s rebellion, however, is how thoroughly they replicate the topos of the narrative accounts of the rebellion of the Parthian dynast Bahram-i Chubin, a revolt which had transpired in these same regions a century and a half earlier.

Before we give our evidence for this, it is necessary to give the main themes of the accounts of this enigmatic rebel of the kūst-i ādurbādagān and kūst-i khwarāśan against the nascent ʿAbbāsid regime. To this end, we shall start with Balʿamī’s account, for it contains most of the primary themes of Sunbād’s narrative. Balʿamī informs us that Sunbād was a very wealthy Magian (ū rā khwāstah-i bisyār būd) from one of the villages of Nishāpur. When the news of the

2498 For the dynastic background of Sunbād, see §6.4.4; for those of Ustādī, Bābak Khurramdīn, and Mazīyār, see the forthcoming work of the author.

2499 Revisionist historiography on the ʿAbbāsid revolution has in fact been curiously dismissive or simply incongruent in its treatment of the Iranian revolts that erupted subsequent to the ʿAbbāsid revolution. See, for example, Omar, Farouq, The ʿAbbāsid Caliphate: 132/750-170/786, Baghdad, 1969 (Omar 1969), pp. 138 and 195; Shaban, M.A., Islamic History: A New Interpretation, vol. II, Cambridge University Press, 1971 (Shaban 1971), p. 14. While calling Sunbād’s rebellion a minor affair and foregoing a discussion of it, Shaban acknowledges, for example, that the rebellion was potentially dangerous because it threatened to cut off the vital northern route between Khurāsān and the west. As we have argued elsewhere, however, there is every indication that the Khurāsān highway was not functioning during the Umayyad period. Pourshariati 1995, pp. 141–143.

2500 For Sunbād’s rebellion see, among others, Ibn Taqtqa, Muḥammad b. ʿAlī b. Ṭabātābā, Tarikh-i Fakhrī, 1988, translated by Muḥammad Vahid Golpaygānī (Ibn Taqtqa 1988), pp. 232–233. A complete bibliography of sources pertaining to this revolt has been provided by Sadighī 1938, pp. 168–170, and others, including Daniel 1979; Pourshariati 1995. In the present study, only a selection of these will be offered.

2501 Czegledy had observed this without ever providing an explanation.

murder of Abū Muslim reached him, Sunbād allegedly became heavy-hearted and subsequently proclaimed that as he was indebted to Abū Muslim, it was only just that he should spend his own wealth in avenging the latter’s death. If he were to exhaust his wealth, Sunbād proclaimed, he would be ready to give his life. Remaining true to his promise, Sunbād then distributed his riches and gathered a substantial army and set out, reportedly to avenge Abū Muslim’s death. Now, Abū Muslim, according to Balʿamī, had many followers (shiʿa) in Khurāsān. So two months after Abū Muslim’s murder an army of 60,000 people gathered around the Magian Sunbād and set out from Nishāpur toward Iraq. On their way they halted in Rayy, the former Mihrānid capital of the quarter of the north, now under the jurisdiction of the Al-i Jāmāsp.

Here, one of Sunbād’s first acts was to kill Abū Ubaydah Ḥanāfī, the governor of Rayy from before Mansūr’s time, appointed to the region by the ʿAbbāsid revolutionaries themselves. In Rayy the number of Sunbād’s followers increased substantially, reaching the incredible number of 100,000, likewise eager to avenge the murder of Abū Muslim. When the shrewd ʿAbbāsid caliph Mansūr was informed of Sunbād’s rebellion, he sent Jawhar b. Marrār al-Ijlī to quell the uprising. In a speech before the battle, Jawhar made the stakes involved quite clear for the mostly Arab forces that had gathered around him: Sunbād’s followers were bent on “exterminating your religion and expelling you from your worldly possessions.” Jawhar’s forces, we are told, included a comparatively meagre 10,000 men. Somewhere between Hamadān in Media and Rayy, the two forces finally engaged each other, and in spite of the presumed numerical superiority of Sunbād’s army, he was defeated by Jawhar. In flight, Sunbād returned back to Rayy whence he set out for Gurgān. In Gurgān he was intercepted by the ispahbud of the region, rendered by Balʿamī as Hormoz b. al-Farjān (Farrukhān), who forthwith killed Sunbād, presumably on the order of the ʿAbbāsid caliph, Mansūr.

Balʿamī provides further details: When Sunbād had reached Rayy with his army, he found Abū Muslim’s treasury there. Taking over Abū Muslim’s treasures, Sunbād now allegedly proclaimed that as he was the one who had

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2503 Nöldeke 1879, pp. 1093–1094. See also §4.5.
2506 Kennedy perceptively points out that Mansūr sent against the rising rebel “not the Khurasaniya, who might have felt some sympathy for his cause, but the people who had most to lose from his success, i.e., the Arabs of western Iran, led by Jawhar b. Marrar al-Ijlī. The Ijlīs were the most powerful Arab tribe in the area of Jibal and they followed Jawhar, along with the troops of Fars, Khuzistan and the lightly armed troops of Isfahan and Qum.” Kennedy, Hugh, The Early Abbasid Caliphate, Totowa, reprint edn., 1981 (Kennedy 1981), p. 64.
2507 Kennedy 1981, p. 64.
2508 Nöldeke 1879, p. 419, n. 2365, Nöldeke 1979, pp. 1093–1094. This Farrukhān is probably the cousin of Khurshid, see page 314. In Ibn Isfandiyār’s narrative the name of this cousin is rendered Tūs; see §4.5.2.
2509 Balʿamī 1959, pp. 1093–1094. For Abū Muslim’s treasury, see footnote 1812 and page 444ff below.
risen in order to avenge the blood of the revolutionary leader, he was also the most entitled to his wealth. The already wealthy Sunbād, therefore, presumably also usurped Abū Muslim’s treasury in Rayy. Sunbād, the alleged avenger of Abū Muslim, then proceeded to disclose one of the most important components of his platform: to end Arab rule over Iran, and implicitly, by extension to restore Iranian hegemony. In the Siyāsat Nāma, Niẓām al-Mulk adds further significant information not found in Balʿamī’s narrative. Whenever in privacy with the Magians, Sunbād would declare that “the rule of the Arabs had reached its end . . . [for he had seen this] prophesied in one of the books of Bānī Sāsān.” Sunbād’s anti-Arab, anti-Muslim stand is underlined in Niẓām al-Mulk’s narrative. The rebel declared that he would not cease until he had destroyed the Kaʾba. The Kaʾba, he argued, had been installed as the qibla in lieu of the true direction of prayer, namely the Sun. As it had been in former times, Sunbād therefore pledged, he would restore the sun as the qibla.  

Niẓām al-Mulk’s account contains other, perplexing information, however. Shortly after maintaining that Abū Muslim was in fact dead and that he had risen in his revenge, Sunbād is said to have proclaimed to the “people of Iraq and Khurāsān that Abū Muslim was[in fact] not dead.” According to Niẓām al-Mulk, Sunbād now argued that when Maḥsūr attempted to murder Abū Muslim, the latter murmured the name of God almighty (nām-i mabīn-i khudā-y-i tavālā bikhānd), forthwith turned into a white dove, and flew off to the east. There, in the Copper Fortress, Abū Muslim sat in the company of the Mahdī and Mazdak. “The first to appear will be Abū Muslim! Mazdak will be his vizier! And I myself, will receive the epistle of Abū Muslim,” Sunbād then proclaimed. This, then, was how Sunbād viewed Abū Muslim and his own relation with the ‘Abbāsid rebel, according to Niẓām al-Mulk’s curious narrative. 

Niẓām al-Mulk’s millennial depiction of Sunbād’s rebellion is itself partly a testimony to its posthumous articulation. It contains both the hindsight of the rebel’s defeat and his hope for enacting the millennial aspirations of his followers. So total was Sunbād’s defeat, in fact, and so many of Sunbād’s followers were massacred in the war against Jawhar, that, according to one tradition, until the year 300 AH, their corpses were still extant. After defeating Sunbād, Jawhar usurped all of Sunbād’s wealth as well as Abū Muslim’s treasury. Subsequently, fearing that Maḥsūr would seize this wealth, Jawhar


\[ \text{Sadighi 1938, p. 140.} \]

\[ \text{Nizām al-Mulk 1941, pp. 260–261.} \]

\[ \text{Ibn Isfandiyār 1941, p. 174.} \]

himself mutinied and rebelled against the ‘Abbāsid caliph.\textsuperscript{2515} The motif of treasury, therefore, continues to loom large in Sunbād’s narrative.

There is another significant tradition, however, contained in the Tārikh-i Ṭabaristān and other sources about the ultimate fate of Sunbād and that of his treasury, which provides an extremely crucial context for understanding Sunbād’s rebellion and the provenance of his narrative.\textsuperscript{2516} Ibn Isfandiyār, the author of the Tārikh-i Ṭabaristān, was a native of the region. Having access to local traditions circulating in his homeland around the fate of this regional hero, his account must be deemed more trustworthy than others. According to this author, when the news of Abū Muslim’s murder reached Sunbād in Rayy, Sunbād allied himself with the Āl-i Jāmāsp ispahbud of Ṭabaristān, Khurshīd, the Sun-King.\textsuperscript{2517} According to Ibn Isfandiyār, we recall, before proceeding to war against Jawhar, Sunbād had already sent “all of his treasury and beasts of burden in safe-keeping to Khurshīd. Together with these he had sent six million dirhams as gifts.”\textsuperscript{2518} While Sunbād’s army was defeated by the forces of Jawhar b. Marrār,\textsuperscript{2519} Sunbād himself survived and took refuge with the king of Padhashkhwārgār. Unlike Ba‘lamī, who calls him the ispahbud Fārrukhān, Ibn Isfandiyār and most other sources correctly identify this figure as the ispahbud Khurshīd, the Āl-i Jāmāsp progeny of Gāvbārīh (the cow devotee). We recall, however, that Sunbād was, in fact, killed on his way to Khurshīd by the latter’s cousin, Tūs.\textsuperscript{2520} While Ibn Isfandiyār maintains Tūs to be a cousin of Khurshīd, Ibn al-Athīr claims him to have been a governor (ṣāmil) on behalf of Khurshīd.\textsuperscript{2521} As Sadighi observes the two affiliations were not necessarily mutually exclusive: Tūs could have been both a cousin as well as a governor of Khurshīd, since an agnatic structure of power dominated not only the polity of the Parthian dynasts—presumably subservient to the rule of the Āl-i Jāmāsp at this point—but also the Sasanian family of the Āl-i Jāmāsp. While agitated and saddened over Sunbād’s murder at the hand of Tūs,\textsuperscript{2522} according to Ibn Isfandiyār, Khurshīd, nevertheless, conveniently seized the wealth that Sunbād had committed to his safe-keeping, and with one of his representatives, called, significantly, Pīrūz (Verethragna, the victorious), he sent the already severed head of Sunbād, together with presents, to the ‘Abbāsid caliph Mansūr. The latter, not content with what he had received, demanded the treasuries of Abū Muslim usurped by his avenger Sunbād. Once more, therefore, the motif of

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\textsuperscript{2516}Ibn Isfandiyār 1941, pp. 174–175.

\textsuperscript{2517}Also in Nöldeke 1879; and, without naming Khurshīd, but mentioning Tūs, Ibn al-Athīr 1862, vol. 5, pp. 481–482. For Khurshīd, see §4.5.

\textsuperscript{2518}Ibn Isfandiyār 1941, p. 174.

\textsuperscript{2519}Ibn Isfandiyār 1941, p. 174.

\textsuperscript{2520}See §4.5.2.

\textsuperscript{2521}Ibn al-Athīr 1862, vol. 5, pp. 481–482.

\textsuperscript{2522}As Sadighi aptly observes, however, Tūs as a figure under the authority of Khurshīd, could not have undertaken such an action without the latter’s approval. Sadighi 1996, p. 182, n. 3.
treasury appears in the narrative. Khurshid refused to oblige, and here starts the saga of the destruction of the Al-i Jämäsp at the hands of the Abâbîd caliph. Ma&&!ur sent Abû 'l-Kha!b 'Umar b. al-AlâÄ against Khurshid. It is at this point, we recall, that, after the final defeat of Khurshid, the army of Islam settled in the territory for a period of two years and seven months, taking “up residence under the roofs of houses” in the former lands of Khurshid Shâh.

6.4.1 Sunbåd and Bahrám-i Chúbïn: recurrent narrative motifs

This, then, is the germ of the narrative of the Magian Sunbåd Nishâpûrî: a hero who emerged emerged from the east, with a substantial army and wealth at his disposal. He then came to Tabaristan where he entered into an alliance with the Padhashkhwârgar Shâh, the Sun-King, Khurshid. In the former capital of the Mîhrâns, Rayy, however, not only did his army increase, but, even more importantly, he presumably also obtained the treasury of Abû Muslim. Somewhere in the process he claimed to have been an avenger bent on retaliating against the unjust murder of another eastern hero. While his rebellion ultimately ended in defeat, the millennial hope of his cause remained active. For the spirit of his cause célèbre had already flown east, to the Copper Fortress.

This, we realize, is a familiar narrative, one which, once again, superimposes historic events onto a paradigmatic mythic narrative, most likely of popular provenance. It is also thoroughly Mithraic. In what follows, it will be argued that while some aspects of the historicity of the relationship between Sunbåd and Abû Muslim are probably valid, the ideological and political platforms of the two rebellions were so distinctly at odds that the primary motif of revenge for the murder of Abû Muslim in Sunbåd’s narrative, as well as a number of other motifs, are nothing but Mithraic topoi borrowed from the rebellion of Bahrám-i Chúbîn, and ultimately from the myth of Manûchîhr and Afràsiyâb. These topoi were superimposed onto Sunbåd’s narrative precisely because, like Bahrâm-i Chúbîn, Sunbåd’s revolt erupted in the quarters of the north and the east, where Mihr worship was the dominant form of religiosity. Once we recognize that the rebellion of Bahrâm-i Chúbîn provided the paradigm for the narrative structure of Sunbåd’s rebellion, some of the details of Sunbåd’s account, especially the problematic relationship of Sunbåd with Abû Muslim, become suspect. They forewarn us about imputing to Sunbåd’s historic rebellion cultural currents and influences, especially Islamic ones, that were most probably alien to the cultural milieu of Sunbåd.

To further identify these motifs, therefore, we shall begin with the regional issue: Sunbåd’s rebellion engulfed both the quarters of the north and the quarters of the east. One tradition even claims that Sunbåd’s rebellion actually started in Azarbâyjân and then spread to Rayy and Tabaristan. Agapius of
Manjib maintains that Sunbād, who was one of the commanders of Abū Muslim’s army, received the news of the latter’s death while in Azarbāyjān, from where he went to Rayy in order to gain the support of the Magians and the Daylamites. All other sources, however, connect Sunbād’s rebellion systematically and intimately to the regions of Nishāpūr, Rayy, Qūmis, and Gurgān, the same regions, in other words, in which the rebellions of the Parthian dynasts Bahrām-i Chūbīn and Vistāhm had taken place some century and a half prior to this.

The geographical motifs of Sunbād’s rebellion, however, go beyond this. Sunbād, like Bahrām-i Chūbīn, emerged from the east. Almost all of our sources maintain that the original homeland of the Magian Sunbād was the region of Nishāpūr in Inner Khurāsān. Where exactly in the extensive region of Nishāpūr the rebel came from is not clear. Most sources agree that he was from one of the villages (qurā) of Nishāpūr. A second geographical motif, however, connects Sunbād’s rebellion to even further east. For the putative connection of Sunbād with the unjustly murdered Abū Muslim, a hero who rose in Outer Khurāsān, to the east of Sunbād’s native territory, reinforces the eastern provenance of Sunbād’s rebellion. Add to this the transmigration of the soul of Abū Muslim to the Rūyūn Diz (Copper Fortress), and we realize that the geographical framework of Sunbād’s rebellion replicates that of Bahrām-i Chūbīn. Like Bahrām-i Chūbīn’s rebellion, however, the revolt of Sunbād was also intimately connected with Rayy. Almost all of the sources at our disposal highlight the fact that, while a native of Nishāpūr, it was from Rayy that Sunbād launched his rebellion against the caliph. In Rayy, furthermore, his army was substantially augmented when the population of the quarters of the north and the east joined his ranks. It was in Rayy, moreover, that Sunbād, like Bahrām-i Chūbīn, came into the possession of a treasury.

### 6.4.2 Mithraic purview of Sunbād’s rebellion

While obscurity shrouds the relationship of Sunbād with Abū Muslim and his army of the east, and while the Rūyūn Diz is clearly a legendary motif, however, the actual historical relationship of Sunbād with Ṭabaristān and Rayy is thoroughly historic. It was with the king of Padhashkhwārgar that Sunbād formed a collaboration. To this historic association, however, has been added a legendary myth. As in the Mithraic rendition of Bahrām-i Chūbīn’s narrative where the hero acquired a treasury from the God Mīhr, so too in Sunbād’s narrative, it was in Rayy that the hero obtained a treasury. However, while in

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2527 Agapius of Manjib 1911, p. 538.
2531 See below.
the former narrative it was Mihr who bestowed a treasury on the king of Padhashkhwārgar, Kai Bahrām,2532 in Sunbād’s narrative this Mithraic paradigm is inverted and it was Sunbād who gave his treasury in safe-keeping to the king of Padhashkhwārgar, Khurshīd. There remains, however, an amazing historic dimension to this aspect of Sunbād’s saga, as well, for the Al-i Jāmāsp king with whom Sunbād collaborated was in fact called Khurshīd, his very name reflecting the theophoric dimension of his spirituality, for he was the Sun-King. While there is historic certainty about the correspondence of Sunbād with Khurshīd, however, a second motif appearing in Sunbād’s narrative is actually quite problematic.

The motif of revenge

This second motif is the purported connection of Sunbād with the figure of Abū Muslim. In this connection the theme of revenge is invariably highlighted in all of our sources. Sunbād supposedly launched his revolt to avenge the death of the leader of the ʿAbbāsid revolution, Abū Muslim. This theme of revenge has also been emphasized by all the secondary literature on the topic. Revenge for the murder of the ʿAbbāsid leader has been considered as one of the primary stimuli for Sunbād’s rebellion. One of the explicit conclusions that has followed as a result of this emphasis on vengeance has been the claim that a great many of Sunbād’s supporters were remnants of Abū Muslim’s army. As most have recognized, however, the connection of Abū Muslim to Sunbād is in fact one of the most problematic aspects of Sunbād’s background. Sadighi even expresses despair that the nature of this relationship will perhaps never become clear.2533 As we have seen, Sadighi underlines the incongruity of Nizām al-Mulk’s narrative. Did Sunbād claim to avenge the murder of Abū Muslim, or did he maintain that the latter was actually alive, and he was only his apostle?2534 Likewise, while acknowledging that Sunbād was “closely connected with Abu Muslim, whose death was the immediate cause of the outbreak” of his rebellion, Kennedy also expresses despair about Sunbād’s postulated association with the ʿAbbāsid revolutionary: As Sunbād “sought to revive the old Persian religion and drive the Arabs out of the country, an aim summed up in his declared intention of sacking the Kāba, . . . [and as there] is no evidence that Abu Muslim had any intention of ending Arab rule or restoring Zoroastrianism, . . . [the most] curious feature of this rebellion . . . is the connection of Sunbād with Abū Muslim.”2535

2532 See page 411.  
2533 Sadighi 1938.  
2534 Together with other scholars, Sadighi therefore concludes that the “exposition of Nizām al-Mulk reflects the different doctrines which existed” when Nizām al-Mulk was writing, doctrines which were prevalent among the sects that had been formed in the centuries following Sunbād’s rebellion. Nizām al-Mulk’s rendition of events probably reflects “the state of these doctrines as they evolved, . . . [the author having confused] the essential ideas of the leader with the diverse [beliefs] of his followers.” Sadighi 1938, p. 140.  
2535 Kennedy 1981, p. 64.
The theme of revenge is also a central part of another narrative discussed in this study, namely that of Bahrām-i Chūbin. While initially launching his rebellion against Hormozd IV, we recall, after the subsequent blinding and deposition of the king at the hands of the Ispahbudhān brothers, Bahrām-i Chūbin went on to sustain his rebellion on the platform of avenging Hormozd IV against the usurper Khusrow II Parvīz. It is in the theme of the “old legend about the conflict between [Manūchihr] and [Afrāšīyāb],” superimposed on Bahrām-i Chūbin’s narrative, that Sunbād’s rebellion mimics that of the Parthian Mihrānīd dynast Bahrām-i Chūbin. The chief achievement of Manūchihr, as we have mentioned before, was avenging the death of Iraj, who was murdered by his brothers. This theme, together with all the narratives that replicate it, is thoroughly Mithraic. It is Mithra who “balances [his] rewarding function . . . against his role as the terrible avenger of those who break their contracts.” This theme is also incorporated in the narrative of the Karīnīd Sukhrā’s war against the Hephthalites on behalf of Pīrūz. There is little doubt, therefore, that Mithraic religio-cultural currents informed Sunbād’s rebellion against the Abbāsid caliph, as they did in the revolt of Bahrām-i Chūbin.

The motif of treasure

What lends credence to the superimposition of Bahrām-i Chūbin’s narrative onto that of Sunbād is a third motif, the motif of treasure. In Sunbād’s narrative, a systematically highlighted theme is the rebel’s supposed acquisition of Abū Muslim’s treasury. While the theme of the personal wealth of Sunbād is reiterated in a number of our sources, it is the motif of the treasury of Abū Muslim falling into the hands of Sunbād that is highlighted in almost all of our narratives. Significantly, by most accounts, this occurs in Rayy. This incongruous juxtaposition of the motifs of wealth and treasury is nowhere better highlighted than in Baḥāmī’s narrative. On the one hand, Sunbād is said to have been an independently wealthy acquaintance of Abū Muslim. In this part of the narrative, the affluent Sunbād was so heart-broken by the news of Abū Muslim’s death that he vowed to avenge him with an army that he subsequently recruited using his own personal wealth. In a later section of this same narrative, however, Baḥāmī gives a completely different provenance for the wealth of Sunbād: when Sunbād reached Rayy with his army, he found Abū Muslim’s treasury there. He then took possession of this treasury arguing that as the avenger of Abū Muslim’s blood, he was the most entitled to this treasury.
Most of the evidence at our disposal, however, indicates that the theme of Abū Muslim’s treasury is in fact a mere topos. Indeed, it is never explained clearly why Abū Muslim, going on a temporary visit to Mansūr, would have carried his treasury with him, and why, of all possible locations, he would have left these in Rayy. In fact, as Sadighi observes, the account of Abū Muslim’s presumed activities in Rayy remain extremely nebulous. The respective capitals of Abū Muslim in Khurasan were Marv and Nishāpūr. Suspecting the motives of Mansūr, in a trip wrought with uncertainties of potential war with the caliph, and in anticipation of distributing wealth to his army, Abū Muslim could very well have taken his treasury along with him, but the whole narrative of this episode is so confused in the accounts of our sources that none of this clear. The motif of the treasury and the choice of Rayy, on the other hand, have such an uncanny resemblance with the motifs of Bahram-i Chūbīn’s rebellion and his acquisition of wealth as the king of Padhashkwargar, that it makes the reappearance of this theme in Sunbād’s rebellion extremely suspect, to say the least.

### 6.4.3 Sunbād and the apocalypse

Prominent in the accounts of Sunbād’s rebellion is its apocalyptic dimension, whereby the destruction of the agents of Khosrau, the Arabs, and their temple, the Kaʿba, and the restoration of the kingdom of Iran, along with the sun as the qibla are promised. In its millennial features, Sunbād’s movement bears testimony to the continuation of the millennial aspirations as evinced in the rebellion of the Parthian Mihrānid dynast Bahram-i Chūbīn at the end of the sixth century. As we have seen, Bahram-i Chūbīn’s rebellion later became part and parcel of the apocalyptic literature. Sunbād seems to have had access to this same textual tradition. We recall that according to Nizām al-Mulk, Sunbād would secretly prognosticate: “the rule of the Arabs has reached its end for I have seen it [foretold] in one of the books of Banū Sāsān.” As Sadighi observes, millennial expectations of ending Arab rule preoccupied the Iranian popular imagination in the wake of the Arab conquest and held currency for many centuries thereafter. Contrary to Rekaya’s claims, and those following his school of thought, these millennial expectations prevailed, at least among

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2544 See note 1812.

2545 Sadighi 1938, p. 137. While the details of Sunbād’s association with Rayy, and his activities there are not clear, however, in the connection that Sunbād established with the ispahbud of Ṭabaristan, Khurshīd, the rebel’s intimate connection with Rayy is beyond any doubt.

2546 For Abū Muslim’s activities, especially his construction activity when he established Nishāpūr as the capital of Inner Khurasan, see Pourshariati 1998.

2547 See pages 408 and 410.

2548 Nizām al-Mulk 1941, pp. 260–261. Incidentally, we recall that one of the accusations hurled by Abū Muslim against Bihāfārid was a similar tendency toward prognostication; see page 435.

2549 Sadighi 1938, pp. 140–141. Millennial expectations were current during the antique and late antique period throughout the Mediterranean world, Mesopotamia, and Iran, so there is nothing unusual about this phenomenon in the Iranian case. Eddy 1961. What was peculiar to this juncture of Iranian history was that the Arabs, as opposed to, say, Alexander, became the point of reference.
some sectors of the population, for a long period even subsequent to Sunbād’s revolt. Birūnī, in fact, bears testimony to the prevalence of these expectations during the Buyid period (934–1055): the Buyid assumption of power had apparently also engendered the millennial hope that through them Arab rule would soon be terminated and kingship would be restored to the Iranians.2550 As Bloch et justifiably observes, therefore, when Sunbād declared that he had seen the prognostication of the end of Arab rule “in one of the books of the Banū Sāsān,” he was probably sincere: the Bundahishn, for instance, maintains that sometime after the “Arabs … [have] spread their own law and their cursed religion in Iran … their tyranny will cease, and they will be overthrown.”2551 The apocalypse of the Arab conquest and the millennial expectation of the termination of Arab rule is contained not only in the Bundahishn, but also in all other Iranian apocalyptic literature, such as the Jamāsp Namak and the Zand i Vahuman Yasn. The continuity of the millennial tradition from the revolt of Bahram-i Chūbin to that of Sunbād, therefore, is not open to question. Whereas Bahram-i Chūbin, in support of an illegitimate or legitimate cause, depending on the apocalyptic tradition one considers, wages a war against the Sasanians, however, Sunbād, from the perspective of his followers, wages an unquestionably just war against the Arabs.

Perhaps the most significant current infusing the narrative of Sunbād, like its paradigmatic model, the rebellion of Bahram-i Chūbin, is that of Mihr worship. This was to be expected. For the territorial environment of Sunbād’s rebellion, like that of Bahram-i Chūbin, was one in which Mihr worship was the most predominant form of spirituality. All the symbols, or motifs that betray this symbolism, can be found in the narratives of Sunbād’s rebellion: Like Bahram-i Chūbin, Sunbād came to acquire an army and a treasury in the capital of the Padhashkhwārgar Shāh. As with Bahram-i Chūbin, Sunbād emerged from the east. As Manūchīhr and Kai Bahram, Sunbād rose against an egregious injustice and led a rebellion. Finally, as with the former, Sunbād’s protagonist, Abū Muslim, and presumably the rebel himself, found their fate, once again, in the east, in the Rūyin Dizh. It should be remarked, incidentally, that insofar as both Bahram-i Chūbin and Sunbād emerged from the east and returned to this same

2550 Birūnī 1984, p. 303. Having observed the currency of these sentiments, however, Birūnī expressed his reservations about these and declared that the choice of the Buyids as the agency for restoring Iranian kingship seemed unwarranted. For, among the governments that had appeared thus far, the astrological configurations signaling the fulfillment of millennial expectations fell more clearly during the period of the ‘Abbāsid dawla, who “were a Khurāsānīd and eastern government.” Birūnī subsequently added, however, that “both the ‘Abbāsids, as well as the Buyids, were far from [successful in] reviving Persian kingship and government.” Birūnī 1984, p. 303. The constant postponement of millennial expectations in the face of actual historical realities is, of course, a chief characteristic of the apocalyptic genre.

2551 We have used Blochet’s French translation here. The relevant chapter is entitled “On the calamities that have befallen the Persian through different ages.” Here the restoration of Iran is promised in reference to the Avestā. Blochet, É., Le messianisme dans l’hétérodoxie Musulmane, Paris, 1903 (Blochet 1903), pp. 45–46. Blochet concludes, therefore, that “it is possible that this passage of the Siyāsat Nāma is an exact reproduction of the proclamation of Sunbād.” Ibid., p. 45.
region, they were replicating the movements of the God Mihr, who, riding on his chariot, begins his westward journey in front of the sun only to return to the east, to its point of origin, to recommence the day. Like Bahrām-i Chūbin-i Mihrwāwandak, who, as a Mihr devotee, wanted to restore the Burzin Mihr fire, so too Sunbād aspired to destroy the Ka`ba and restore the Sun as the true qibla. This, they aimed in historical reality and not simply in mythical fiction. While the movement of the Mihrānīd Bahrām-i Chūbin gained momentum through the support it received from the küst-i ādurbādagān and küst-i khwārarāsān, so too did Sunbād work in close collaboration with the Sun-King Khurshīd of the Al-i Jāmāsp, a dynasty known as the Gāvbārih or Cow Devotees.2552 Not coincidentally, as we have seen, all the Parthian dynasts had placed themselves under the rule of this same Khurshīd (734–759).2553 Finally, as Bahrām-i Chūbin carried a name literally signifying victory (Bahram),2554 this same epithet was carried by Sunbād, the pīrūz spāhbed, literally, the victorious spāhbed. In analogy with the epithet of Manūchihr’s father, Mishkhuryār, that is to say, one whose constant companion is the sun,2555 moreover, it has been conjectured that the etymology of the very name of the rebel, Sunbād, derives from sunbad, meaning guardian of the sun. The Mithraic purview of Sunbād’s rebellion, therefore, must be deemed certain.

6.4.4 Gentilitial background of Sunbād

While the motifs of Abū Muslim’s treasury and revenge loom large in Sunbād’s narrative, the independent wealth of this historical figure is also highlighted in some of our accounts. Some sources underline the high administrative and/or military function of Sunbād in Nishāpūr prior to his revolt. Nizām al-Mulk, for example, calls him a chief (raʾis) of Nishāpūr and claims that he was an old acquaintance of Abū Muslim (har Abū Muslim ḥaqiq-i subbat-i qadmī dāsht), whom the latter had appointed commander of the army (sipahsālār).2556 Now the title sipahsālār is the equivalent of the title of spāhbed. The anonymous Kitāb al-ʿUyūn wa ʾl-Ḥadāʾiq fī ʾl-Akhbār al-Ḥaqāʾiq reiterates Sunbād’s acquisition of the title spāhbed, maintaining that after Sunbād launched his revolt and conquered Nishāpūr, Qūmis and Rayy, he came to be called, as we have seen, pīrūz isbahbudh (victorious spāhbed).2557 If our information is to be trusted in this case, then Sunbād was presumably the spāhbed of the east, or part of the east. We can therefore surmise that Sunbād was of a high enough status in the region to warrant him the his acquisition of the title and position of spāhbed. As we have seen, ever since its institution by Khusrow I Nowshīrvān, the office

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2552 See page 377.
2553 See §4.5.
2554 See page 411.
of spāhbed in the quarters of the north and the east of the Sasanian empire was almost always held by Parthian dynastic families. After the Arab conquest of Iran, moreover, the dynamic between the conquering and conquered populations of these regions was such that creating status in the post-conquest period, where no such status existed during the Sasanian period, was basically out of the question. Considering the dearth of Arab juridical, executive, and material presence in these regions, and in the absence of any indication whatsoever of an upheaval in the sociopolitical structure of these regions, the agnatic nature of the political, social, and religious affiliations of the Parthian dynasts must be considered a constant in the post-conquest period. Except for the disappearance of the Sasanians from the center, whose presence was, nevertheless, continued in the Al-i Jāmāsp family in the north, and except for the age old re-shuffling of power among the Parthian dynastic families, very little had changed in the wake of the Arab conquest of the quarters of the east and north. Sunbād’s social standing, therefore, suggests that he must have come from an agnatic Parthian family, probably, as we shall argue, the Kārin.

There are two traditions concerning the activities of Abū Muslim in Nīshāpūr, before he launched the ‘Abbāsid revolution, within which one might attempt to contextualize the possible acquaintance of Sunbād with Abū Muslim, however transitory this relation. The earlier tradition is given in an anecdotal garb by Nīshāpūrī in the Tarīkh-i Nīsābūr and is representative of the mostly hostile traditions regarding the ‘Abbāsid revolution and Abū Muslim in Inner Khurāsān. In this narrative Nīshāpūrī informs us that when Abū Muslim came to Nīshāpūr and declared his imminent intention of conquering all of Khurāsān, “some half-witted juveniles cut the tail of his ass.” When Abū Muslim saw this, he asked: “What is the name of this quarter?” They said: “The quarter of Būyābād [literally the smelly quarter].” In anger, Abū Muslim retorted that he would soon turn this quarter into the quarter of Gandābād (literally the foul quarter). After he became the governor of Khurāsān, Abū Muslim, true to his word, destroyed the quarter of Būyābād, which “was never reconstructed again.”

Typical for the traditions in which the ‘Abbāsids did not find any support in Inner Khurāsān, this tradition of Nīshāpūrī highlights the antagonism of at least part of the population of Nīshāpūr against Abū Muslim.

This narrative resonates with that of the Arab conquest of the Parthian territories of Inner Khurāsān, especially the conquest of Tūs and Nīshāpūr in the 650s. There too, we recall, while the Parthian Kanārāngīyān family, in collaboration with the Isphahbudhān family of Farrukhzād, made peace with the Arab armies in exchange for remaining the de facto rulers of the territories, a faction of the Nīshāpūrī population opposed both the Arab armies as well as the Kanārāngīyān family. This faction, we recall, was led by the Kārin. The

2558 The Mihrānid downfall being the exception; see §3.4.4.
2559 Nīshāpūrī 1965, folio 59. For the story of Būyābād, also see Ibn al-Athīr 1862, vol. 5, p. 258.
2560 See §3.4.7.
2561 See our discussion on page 271ff.
narrative of Abū Muslim’s hostile reception in Nishāpūr, therefore, reflects a tradition that betrays opposition to the ʿAbbāsids and Abū Muslim in parts of the city. The question then becomes the provenance of this narrative. In order to contextualize this we have access to a second narrative contained in the Shāhnāma-i Abū Mansūri. Here we are informed that, after the Arab conquest, the region of Tūs and parts of Nishāpūr remained under the control of the Kanāragiyan family until the takeover of the region by ʿUmayd b. Qahtabah b. Tāʾī, one of the foremost generals of the ʿAbbāsid army.2562 As we have discussed in detail elsewhere,2563 the narratives at our disposal here betray not only the sociopolitical structure of rule in Inner Khurāsān, in Tūs and Nishāpūr specifically, on the eve of the ʿAbbāsid revolution, but also the intense ʿAbbāsid struggle against the Umayyads in Inner Khurāsān.2564 The ʿAbbāsids had to reckon with the power of the Kanāragiyan family, a Parthian dynastic family who perceptively realized that, after a rule of more than half a millennium, the end of the nominal control of the Umayyads over their territories meant also the demise of their own de facto power in these territories. The antagonism of the Tūsīs toward the ʿAbbāsids is even highlighted in the later popular traditions contained in the epic-historic narratives of the Abū Muslim Nāma—hence the historicity of the germ of these traditions contained in the epic—where we are informed that the one ʿAbbāsid dāʾī (missionary) assigned to Tūs was unsuccessful in winning the population of the region to the cause of the ʿAbbāsids.2565 From the Arab conquest of Inner Khurāsān to the end of the Umayyad rule, besides their control over Tūs, the Kanāragiyan had undisputed control only over parts of Nishāpūr, the Kārins being their hostile adversaries.2566 We must also recollect the episodic insurgencies led by the Kārins against both the Arab conquerors and the other dynastic powers in some parts of Khurāsān and Nishāpūr, underlining their continued aspirations, which, however, remained predominantly unfulfilled.2567 And thus we come to a second tradition concerning Abū Muslim and the positive reception that he receives in parts of Nishāpūr at the inception of the ʿAbbāsid revolution. This tradition, we shall argue, is most probably of Kārinid provenance.

This other tradition stands in stark contrast to the one discussed above and actually reflects a very positive historical memory about Abū Muslim’s association with Nishāpūr. No half-witted juvenile cuts the tail of his beast here! This tradition is contained in a later source, Mirkwānd, who wrote in the ninth century hijra (14–15th century CE). According to this tradition, Sunbād, who was one of the wealthy (fi ḫ-jumlih miknati dāsh) fire worshippers of Nishāpūr, saw Abū Muslim when the latter, coming from the Imām, was heading for

2564 Pourshariati 1995, Chapter 1.
2565 Tarsūsī, Abū Tāhir ʿAlī b. Ḥusayn, Abū Muslim Nāma, Tehran, nd (Tarsūsī nd), p. 635.
2567 See for instance, page 277ff and §4.5.1.
Marv. Sunbād, according to Mīrkhwānd, saw the signs of statesmanship and prosperity (āthar-i dowlat va ʾiqbāl) in Ābū Muslim’s appearance, took him to his own abode and asked him about his future undertakings.\footnote{2568} Initially reluctant, Ābū Muslim finally revealed his secrets to the wealthy magian of the city. This, then, is the way in which Sunbād is said to have become acquainted with the ʿAbbāsid revolutionary leader Ābū Muslim al-Marwāzi.

Unlike our previous narrative, moreover, this account betrays a separate provenance. Here we are not dealing with a negative reception of the ʿAbbāsid leader, but one in which a harmonious, positive collaboration is depicted. The provenance of this second narrative, in other words, must be sought alongside those traditions which, like Niẓām al-Mulk’s, claim, for example, that Ābū Muslim appointed Sunbād as the spāḥbed of his army, presumably in Inner Khorāsān. By now it must be clear how we view what must have transpired and hence what the provenance of the respective narratives is. While, as our second narrative betrays, there was most probably a historic dimension to Sunbād’s collaboration with the ʿAbbāsids, this must be contextualized in the confines of the inter-Parthian dynastic rivalries that continued to engulf the quarters of the north and the east throughout the Umayyad period, and not in a presumed conversion of Sunbād and his followers to the cause of the ʿAbbāsid revolutionaries. While the Kanārangiyyān had lost power in Inner Khorāsān with the advent of the ʿAbbāsids to power, another dynastic group must have gained by the victorious launching of the ʿAbbāsid revolution.

As the Kanārangiyyān had, in fact, only recently lost power at the hands of the ʿAbbāsid army and their foremost general Ḥumayd b. Qaḥtabah, Sunbād’s dynastic background cannot be sought in the ranks of this deposed dynastic family: Why collaborate, however nominally, with an emerging power that had destroyed one’s family fortune just recently? While Sunbād collaborated with the Āl-i Jāmāspīd Khurshīd, we should recall that he was actually murdered by another member of this same family.\footnote{2569} The tenor of the whole story of his

\footnote{2568}Sunbād then prognosticated that his instincts had told him (marā az ʿarīq-i firāsat chīnān bīb khāṭīr mīresad) that Ābū Muslim would one day overturn the land and “would kill many from among the elite of the Arabs and the great Iranians (ashrāf-i arab va akābīr-i ājam)” Mīrkhwānd 1960, pp. 404–405. Zarrinkub cites this story of Mīrkhwānd as a later narration, adopted from popular myths, about the manner of the acquaintance of Sunbād and Ābū Muslim. This narrative, he suggests, is taken out from later Ābū Muslim Nāmas written subsequent to Ābū Muslim’s death: “the interesting point is that this story does not exist in earlier sources and it seems as if later sources [adopted it from] the myths and stories of the Persian Ābū Muslim Nāma.” Zarrinkub, Abī al-Husayn, Dow Qarn Sokūt, 1989, reprinted in German (Zarrinkub 1989). As we are attempting to show, here, however, the late Zarrinkub’s distrust of the germ of this tradition was not valid. This story is also given in the later Taʾrīkh Alffī. According to this source, Sunbād was a citizen of Nīshāpur. At the time of the disturbances in Khorāsān, he incited the people of Nīshāpur to revolt and encouraged them to kill the noble Arabs and the aristocratic Iranians. According to Daniel, Sunbād’s “speeches attracted the attention of Ābū Muslim, who was very pleased by them and who decided to cultivate Sunbād’s friendship. Sunbād and his brother wore black, provided the Abbasid rebels with supplies, and received assistance in fighting the Arabs.” Daniel 1979, p. 126.\footnote{2569}See §4.5.2.
murder, moreover, strongly suggests that he could not have been a member of this dynastic family either.

Considering the thematic context of Ibn Isfandiyar’s narrative—where the story of Sunbad and his rebellion against Mansur is narrated immediately after the story of the rise of the Karins to power, and where the theme of their arrogance against the Al-i Jama’sp, under whose theoretical suzerainty they fell, is highlighted—and considering the history of the dynastic rivalries within the region during the previous centuries, it is very probable, therefore, that from the two remaining Parthian dynastic families, the Ispahbudhan and the Karin, Sunbad actually belonged to the Karih family. There is no reason to assume that the rivalry between the Kanarangiyan and the Karins in Inner Khurasan had subsided during the century that had elapsed. In fact, as we have seen, once before, with the murder of Farrukhzad and their revolt in Inner Khurasan, the Karins had already attempted to regain their lost power. While at the beginning of the conquest the power of the Karins had declined at the expense of the Kanarangiyan in the region, moreover, there is every possibility that the Abbasiids also availed themselves of the dynastic rivalries within the region, and having toppled the Kanarangiyan, once again brought the Karins back to power. The Karins’ tumultuous relationship with the Al-i Jama’sp, moreover, fits very well with the uneasy relationship between Sunbad and the Al-i Jama’sp Khurshid. This uneasy relationship of the Karins, now with the Al-i Jama’sp, and then with the Al-i Bavand, continued to mark the dynamics between these dynastic powers in the region. There is every indication, therefore, that of all the possible candidates for the agnatic background of Sunbad, the Karins are the most likely contenders. This background, however, seems to have become obscured as a result of the strength of a more powerful legend that in later centuries was superimposed on the figure of Sunbad: his problematic connection to Abu Muslim.

6.5 Conclusion

The revolts erupting in the Parthian homelands at the inception of the rise of the ‘Abbasiids to power testify not only to the continued currency of Mihr worship, but the persistent aspirations of the Parthians in the northern territories of Iran. Our evidence for the forceful prevalence of Mihr worship, as we have hoped to have shown, is in fact overwhelming. Leaving the late Sadighi at a loss, it is rather evident that Bihafarid’s revolt was actually a Mithraic revolt. The accounts at our disposal clearly betray the Mithraic motifs of his rebellion, the narratives of the rebel ascribing to Bihafarid the role of Mihr himself.

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2570 See §4.5.1.
2571 See page 307.
2572 For the Karins in Tabaristan, see §4.2 and §4.5.1.
2573 Unfortunately, considerations of time and space have not allowed us to follow this latter relationship in more detail.
Considering the currency of millennial beliefs in Bihāfarīd’s milieu, moreover, as well his clear prophetic and messianic mission, we can probably also confidently maintain that included in the platform of the rebel was a prognostication for the end of Arab rule. That Mazdean millennial calculations did not tally with the timing of Bihāfarīd’s rebellion, as the late Sadighi argued, does not detract from these claims. For as we know, and as reflected in the Bun-dahishn itself, there were many different millennial calculations current among the Iranian populations at this period. Sunbād’s historic saga, as well as the topos of his narrative, leave no doubt that his too was a Mithraic rebellion. In fact, it is in Sunbād’s narrative that we most clearly see the incredible continuity of Mithraic beliefs in Pahlav regions from the rebellion of Bahram-i Chūbin onward.

While the personal background of Bihāfarīd is shrouded in obscurity, moreover, and while in fact a Parthian dynastic background might be a less likely conjecture for this Mihr worshipping rebel, there is every possibility that in the rebellion of Sunbād, the ispahbud pīrūz, we are in fact witnessing a Parthian rebellion, probably of the Kārin dynastic family. While this claim can only be postulated, given the information at our disposal, however, it gains tremendous force when considered in conjunction with the later rebellion of the Parthian Kārinid Máziyar, and his close association with the Azarbāyjānī rebel, Bābak-i Khurramdīn who, incidentally, also launched a Mithraic rebellion. While we must postpone an investigation into these latter rebellions for a sequel to this study, therefore, considering what has already been said of the history of the Pahlav dynasts in the late antique period, and with historical hindsight, we can confidently claim that Parthian political and cultural presence in the northern regions of Iran continued for an inordinate amount of time after the demise of the house of Sāsān. The currency of Parthian agnatic genealogies in the tenth century gives us an incredible vista into the contribution of the Pahlav to Iranian history and culture throughout the late antique, early medieval period.
Further investigation into the currents of Near Eastern studies during the past half century is sure to expose its scholarly predisposition. It is not clear why, exactly, systematic studies of late antique history of Iran were put on the shelf after Christensen’s authoritative studies. Not to be misconstrued, there have been many individual scholars who have made significant contributions to the field. Unfortunately, however, as any impartial and cursory inquiry will reveal, their efforts have been against the current and therefore not successful in changing trends in late antique studies of the Middle East. There has been a systematic neglect of this and the subsequent late antique, early medieval period of Iranian history, and no matter how we justify it, there is no denying it. This trend can be partially explained by the long history of hegemony exerted by classical studies, which have been part and parcel of the birth of modern historiography. Delving into this, however, is to point to the obvious. There is then the Arabist and Islamist predisposition of the field. Disregarding the explicable nineteenth and early twentieth century history of this current in the field—coming as it does in the wake of the direct colonial and imperial history of Europe in the Arab Middle-East—we still need to reckon with the void left in late antique studies of Iran during the past half century. The discourse of nationalist Iranian scholars of the past two generations, some of whom tenaciously, and at times belligerently, underlined the Iranian contribution to the early medieval history of the Middle East, has also been partly responsible for the subsequent scholarly disregard of the history of Iran during this period. It created a defensive backlash in the field in which any subsequent scholarly effort towards highlighting the Iranian dimension of late antique history of the Middle East became more or less suspect. In this climate, one can scarcely discuss any dimension of Iranian history in a positive light without being accused by some of Iranian cultural chauvinism. This trend is unfortunate and must be remedied. Sound scholarship must not be censored and suffocated, irrespective of

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2574 The momentous *Encyclopaedia Iranica* project has provided a much needed respite in the midst of all this.

2575 As all are aware, the heritage of modern Europe has been sought in classical antiquity.

the implications of its finding. There was then the Iranian revolution of 1978–79, which prompted the creation of an army of modernists and Islamicists in Iranian studies. Valuable as this scholarly surge has been, it has served to further undermine late antique and medieval history of Iran in recent scholarship.

The picture drawn by Christensen of the Sasanian empire left numerous crucial questions unanswered. Above all there remained one critical, perplexing, question: in the span of two decades and in spite of its tremendous power, why did one of the two most powerful empires of late antiquity succumb so rapidly and disastrously into obliteration? The social, ideological, and political trends briefly enumerated above conspired to detract scholarly attention from this crucial question of late antique history of Iran. Arabist and Islamicist concerns have absorbed the lion’s share of academic attention. It was fortunate that the Abbāsid revolution redirected scholarly attention to northeastern Iran. Even here, however, it was not the details of Iranian sociopolitical history in the post-conquest century that became the focus of scholarship. In numerous scholarly works on the topic, brief introductory chapters dealt away with the history of Iran during the Sasanian and Umayyad periods, only to focus their attention on the northeastern territories of Iran in order to dissect the enigma of Abū Muslim and his followers. Crucial questions such as conversion and the course of Iranian history during the Umayyad period were either accepted a priori, with very little investigation, as remains the case with the question of conversion, or were not dealt with altogether. The later medieval history of Iran has not fared any better in recent decades. The dearth of scholarship on these crucial periods of Iranian history to this day remains truly astounding.

Foremost among the intended aims of the present work, therefore, has been a plea to the students and scholars of the field to reconsider the lackadaisical manner in which scholarship has treated the late antique and early medieval history of Iran. As we have hoped to have shown in the course of the present study, Iranian history in the period under investigation provides a treasure trove of venues for research, not least of which might have revolutionary implications for the paradigmatic narrative of the origins of Islamic history itself.

After Christensen, scholarship became unduly obsessed with his paradigm of a centralized Sasanian state. There was perhaps an unrecognized ideological locomotive at work here as well. It might be justifiably postulated that the romanticized myth of the nation, summoned by the nineteenth and twentieth century conceptions of modern European nation-states, also affected Christensen’s implicit ideological assumptions in his study of the Sasanian empire. These theories conceived of centralized modern European states as the epitome of

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2577 See our discussion in §6.2.2.
2578 To this day substantive accounts of the histories of the Tāhirids and the Samanids are nowhere to be found in western languages. Bosworth’s monographs on Sīstān and Mottahedeh’s work on the Buyids have not been supplemented by further studies. And, after the pioneering efforts of Minorsky on the Caucasus and Azarbāyjān, not a single work on this region’s history in late antiquity has appeared.

454
rationally constructed political organizations that engendered, besides national identity, all other benevolent aspects and directions of human sociopolitical organization. In this conception, one might argue, a decentralized state was considered an inferior state, not capable of rationally mustering all its forces for ameliorating the conditions of its realm. The intimate connection of decentralization with various forms of feudal or semi-feudal, hence pre-modern, economic and political structures, further underlined the presumed shortcomings of decentralized states. So paradigmatic has this equation of centralization with a more advanced form of political organization become that its marks can be felt on the scholarship on other periods of Iranian and early Islamic history as well. Even the recent revival in Parthian studies, for example, has not remained immune to it: the question of whether or not, and at which point, and to what extent, we can consider the Parthians as being more centralized, and thus implicitly more modern, and in better control of the diverse polities within their realm, has continued to form a bone of contention in the field.

In the case of the Sasanian state, however, there is surely no reason to continue to presume the equation of centralization with the proper functioning of their government. In order to make our case for the dynastic and decentralized nature of the Sasanian state, and while detailing its systematic confederacy with the Parthians, we were obliged to underline those dimensions of this system which made it prone to dysfunction. All with some familiarity with Iran’s late antique history will recognize, however, that this is only one side of the picture. For the reverse side of the argument has always been implicit in the picture that we have tried to present in this study, namely that it was precisely because of their decentralized form of government and their confederacy with the Parthians, that the Sasanians became as powerful as they did during the late antique period. The Sasanians could not have functioned, and would not have been able to maintain power for as long as they did, had it not been for their active alliance with the Pahlav dynasties. For the most part, therefore, and in spite of the tensions inherent in it, the decentralized Sasanian political structure was remarkably efficient. It was in fact to the credit of the Sasanians that they acknowledged the sociopolitical and regional centrifugal tendencies embedded in their realm, and set up a system that gave due credit to the realities of Iran in the late antique centuries. In a sense, one might argue that, as with other aspects of their rule, the Sasanians in fact followed the Parthian heritage here as well, and not just during the third century. Just as various Parthian families had agreed to the kingship of the Arsacids, their later history notwithstanding, so

2579 Elwell Sutton’s obituary of Christensen provides interesting clues about the scholar’s political orientation. See Sutton, L.P. Elwell, ‘Arthur Emanuel Christensen’, Bulletin of the British Society for Middle Eastern Studies 10, (1983), pp. 59–68 (Sutton 1983). Needless to say, none of this is meant to downplay, by any means, the tremendous debt that Iranian studies owes to the works of this towering Danish scholar.

2580 This perspective has also affected various theories advanced about the emergence of an Islamic state after the death of the Prophet.
too they came to agree to the kingship of the Sasanians through most of Sasanian history. Had it not been for the irrational attempts of Qubad and Khusrow I at reforming this system with the aim of augmenting monarchical power and establishing an étatiste state, the Sasanians would have, in all probability, never experienced the series of Parthian rebellions that shook their realm in the late sixth century. Khusrow II, who owed his very power to the agreement of the Parthians, especially the Ispahbudhan family, was able to recreate the imperial Achaemenid boundaries with the help, predominantly, of the armies that the Parthian dynasts continued to bring to bear in his campaigns against the Byzantines. The fate of the Sasanians in the “greatest war of antiquity” is in fact a telling testimony to the consequences of Parthian withdrawal of their confederacy from the Sasanians: the sudden and utter defeat of the Sasanian military endeavors against their recently defeated foes, the Byzantines. The fate of Khusrow II might have been very different had he paid heed to the desire of the Parthian dynasts for peace after three decades of internecine warfare. His blind pursuit of imperialistic aims against the Byzantines, however, led the Parthian dynasts to the bosom of the enemy, with the result that important Parthian families made their peace with the shrewd Heraclius.

The Sasanian dynasty, according to James Russell, “has often been presented as consistently intolerant in matters of religion, partly for ease of contrast with its predecessors and probably also to make the Islamic conquest of Iran somehow justifiable.” Indeed, the scholarship that has leapt from the Arab conquest and its rapid success to the Abbasid revolution and its central premise of conversion to an egalitarian Islam, needed as its foundation the topos of a religiously intolerant, doctrinally static, Zoroastrian church, in order to explain the conquest and set the stage for the Abbāsids. Not integrating the results of the last two decades of scholarship on Sasanian religious history, and in view of the dearth of actual scholarship on conversion, this theme of Islamic redemption of the Iranian masses, in other words, needed the image of a suffocating Zoroastrian church in order to uphold it. It needed, furthermore, to uncritically accept the Sasanian ideological topos of religion and state as the “twin pillars of government.” If the Iranian masses were not suffocating under the yoke of an oppressive Zoroastrian church that acted in concert with the Sasanian state, after all, how could one possibly argue for the speedy and mass conversion of Iranians from their centuries-old ancestral beliefs to a barely formed religious doctrine? If the Iranians freely exercised their spiritual beliefs in a religious landscape that was not doctrinally and structurally hegemonic, centralized, and uniform, why convert? Conveniently set aside was the hallmark of spiritual identity among Iranians: in every variety of Iranian religion, ethnicity was closely

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2581 Zeev Rubin’s theory on the barbarization of the standing Sasanian army has to be reckoned with here. Rubin 1995, p. 285.
Conclusion

...intertwined with ancestral beliefs. Conveniently forgotten, as well, was the agnostic dimension of the Iranian religious experience, where religious practices, rituals, and narratives also had a regional dimension. Perhaps herein lies one of the causes behind the emergence and growth of the Shu'ubiya movement, once a substantial group of Iranians and the elite sectors of their society had in fact converted. The Shu'ubiya assuaged their guilt of conversion to a non-ethnic religion by insisting on the disassociation of the former links between ethnicity and religion—taunted this time, ironically, by the Arabs—even while they continued to promote their identity in ethnic terms.

During the past two decades, the numerous blindspots of this Sasanian topos of monarchical–clerical cooperation has been, again and again, explicated. It is time to come up to speed with the results of this research. The religious panorama of the Sasanian realm was far more complex, layered, and multifaceted than it has been hitherto admitted by the scholars of early Islamic history. Perhaps one of the most important dimensions of this rich religious landscape, moreover, was the prevalence of Mihr worship among a number of powerful Parthian dynastic families and the populace living in their realms, in the quarters of the east (kust-i khwarasân) and north (kust-i adurbâdagân) of the Sasanian domains. To this we must add the rich pre-Christian religious traditions of Armenia, themselves strongly influenced by Iranian Mazdean systems of belief, but especially, by Mithraic traditions. Taking into account the naturally slow process of conversion in Armenia as elsewhere, this meant that during the late antique period, Mihr worship was one of the most significant forms of religiosity in a territory that stretched from Khurâsân, to Tabaristan and Gilân, and further to the west into Azarbâyjân and Armenia. The Parsig–Pahlav dichotomy in Iran, therefore, translated itself also into the realm of spirituality in the late antique period.

Apart from its highly ethical and moralistic dimensions, the Mithraic ideology also had the potential for being an ideology of subversion and dissent. Mihr worship was not, as it has been often characterized, nature worship. As the God of contracts and as the quintessential instrument for implementing justice, Mihr equipped its adherents with a powerful weapon in times of hardship, crisis, and uncertainty. It was perhaps the backbone of the Iranian Circle of Justice theory of government. As such, it formed one of the most forceful ideological and social mechanisms with the aid of which one could rebel against oppressive governments. And thus, in rebellion after rebellion in the Pahlav lands, we find not some abstract precepts of a monolithic Mazdean religious ideology at work, but...

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2583 Among Islamicists, and besides Minorsky, Crone was one of the few who paid attention to this aspect of Iranian identity.
2584 Pourshariati 2000. We are well aware that among the anti-Shu’ubiya, there were those of Iranian ancestry. This, however, is a moot point, that we hope to address in a future study.
2585 See §5.4.
2586 See §5.4.4.
2587 See §5.2.6.

457
the very specific tenets and symbolism of Mihr worship. In a crucial juncture of Iranian history and, in the face of Parthian pretension and political power in the Pahlav regions, the Sasanian king Pırüz attempted to launch his own religio-political platform. He promoted the powers of the Ādhar Gushnasp and Ādhar Farnbagh fires, and emphasized Sasanian legitimacy by connecting the ancestry of the dynasty to the Kayānids. In response, the Kārins redacted the very segments of Pırüz’s reign in the Xwādāy-Nāmag history: they infused the narratives of his reign with Kārīnid grandeur and wrapped the story of Pırüz in the Mithraic symbolism of their creed. Like Mihr, they became the instruments for restoring farr to the king. In line with the Circle of Justice ideology, they accused him of being an unjust king. Adopting the green color of Mihr, they indicted him with the Mithraic charge of reneging the contract and unleashing hardship. The Parthian Kārins were, undoubtedly, Mihr worshippers. They highlighted this in their seals when they took refuge in the Burzīn Mihr fire. They used theophoric names that paid tribute to the God they worshipped. What is perhaps most significant for our purposes is that in reality, and not as it has been claimed, in fiction, the Kārīn dynasty and its cultural traditions continued to exist well into the post-conquest history of Khurāsān and Šabāristān, until at least the ninth century. As we have argued for Sunbād, and as we hope to show in a sequel to this work for Māziyār, these rebellions formed a direct continuity with the history of the Kārins in these territories.

The populist Bahram-i Chūbīn, the Mihrewandak and Mihtar-parast rebel, was also a Mihr worshipper and articulated this in no uncertain terms in his ideological warfare against Hormozd IV and Khusrow II Parvīz. The Mihrānīd rebel not only flaunted his Parthian genealogy and legitimacy, but also gave voice to the resentment of the populace against the Sasanian appointed mōbads in the Pahlav domains. His historic narratives are infused with mythic narratives of Mihr worship. The rebel himself forcefully articulated the superiority of his religion; the family, after all, carried the name of their God as their dynastic name. Galvanizing the Pahlav domains with the Mithraic ideology of dissent, his rebellion was on the verge of collapsing Sasanian power had another towering Parthian dynastic family, the Ispahbudhān, not come to the aid of the feeble Khusrow II Parvīz, enlisting the support of the former foes, the Byzantines, in the process.

The Parthian dynastic families and their followers were not the only agnatic groups who worshipped Mihr in the northern territories. The Sasanian branch of the Al-i Jāmāsp in Šabāristān also followed the Mithraic creed. They used

2588 See page 385.
2589 See page 380ff.
2590 See §5.4.3.
2591 See §6.4.4.
2592 See §6.1, in particular, page 398.
2593 See page 128ff.
2594 See §5.4.1, in particular, page 373ff.
symbolic names such as Khurshid and Gavbarih to render their Mihr spirituality. Popular stories depicting their ancestor atop a Mithraic ox, circulated in their territories. The rebel who was their cohort against the newly established ‘Abbásid caliphate, Sunbād, the victorious (Verethragna) ispahbud, was working within the same spiritual universe. Sunbād’s narrative was, in fact, a Mithraic narrative, following in its accounts the apocalyptic tales of Bahram-i Chūbin and the Padhashkhwārgar Shāh Kai Bahram.2595 Sunbād’s alleged desire for revenge of Abū Muslim’s murder was nothing more than a Mithraic topos inserted into the saga of this Mithraic hero. Nizām al-Mulk’s post facto rendition of the picture notwithstanding, there was, therefore, very little connection between Sunbād and Abū Muslim, and in all probability, next to no synthesis of Islamic and Mazdean propaganda in the doctrines that Sunbād promoted. Destroying the Ka‘ba, yes. But the promotion of al-ridda min al-i Muḥammad, unlikely! It is, in fact, a reflection of the subtleties with which ancient practices persevere and take on a new color, that Abū Muslim (the father of the Muslims) found his way into the mythic narratives of Mihr worshippers. Mihr worship also provided the spiritual context of the green-clad Prophet Bihāfarīd.2596 His followers knelt before the sun as their qibla. Like Mihr and his right hand aid, Soroush, Bihāfarīd appeared at dawn from atop a mountain or a higher structure. And reflecting the nourishing functions of Mihr, preached to the peasants, albeit his message, contained in a holy book in Persian, and thus totally anathema to a Muslim audience, addressed mercantile interests.

As we shall try to establish in a sequel to this study, there is very little doubt as well that the rebellion of Bābak Khurramdīn was a Mithraic rebellion, the rebel being probably of Parthian ancestry himself. Widengren had long ago already identified the Mithraic rituals of the Bābakiya,2597 a fascinating study which was again conveniently ignored by subsequent meagre scholarship on the rebel. Further symbolic reflections of Bābak’s Mihr worship infuse other accounts of his rebellion. From Khurassān to Azarbaijān and Armenia, therefore, in an extensive territory, the God Mihr was exalted above other deities in late antique Iranian history. These regions also remained immune from incursions of an alien culture well into subsequent centuries. Herein lies therefore testimony to the continuity and pervasiveness of Mihr worship in Parthian domains through successive centuries, a testimony which ought to be reckoned with when we search for the provenance of Mihr worship in Roman Mithraism.

While it is true that in their official patronage of the Xvadāy-Nāmag tradition the Sasanians virtually deleted the history of the Arsacid dynasty from their accounts, cutting it to half of its actual duration, and manipulating it so as to make their own assumption of power coincide with millennial expectations, it is also true that their efforts in deleting the sagas of the Parthian dynastic families from the accounts of the Book of Kings was woefully ineffective. For the

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2595 See §6.4.1.
2596 See §6.3.2.
2597 Widengren 1979, passim.
The *Xwadāy-Nāmag* tradition gives ample testimony to the editorial manipulation and re-writing of Sasanian history by various Pahlav families. It is on account of this Parthian rewriting of the *Xwadāy-Nāmag* tradition that as soon as the Sasanian section of the *Shāhnāma* gains substance, significantly, with the reign of Pirūz (459–484), at almost every turn of event, and side-by-side of almost every single Sasanian king, we find as well the saga of the particular Parthian dynastic family that held control over the king. It is in this sense therefore that the *Shāhnāma* becomes a book of kings as much as a book of rebels, an “epic of sedition.”

What is crucial to note is that this Parthian historiographical tradition was inserted into both the historical (Sasanian) and some of the mythical (Kayānid) sections of the *Shāhnāma*, predominantly during the Sasanian period. This, then, must also partly explain the various recensions of the *Xwadāy-Nāmag* tradition and the divergences contained therein, observed by the Shurūbiya writer Ḥamza ʾĪṣlahānī. Above and beyond the great intrinsic value of the *Shāhnāma* as a source for reconstructing Sasanian history, therefore, herein also lies the tremendous importance of the Sasanian sections of the opus: the *Shāhnāma* and the *Xwadāy-Nāmag* traditions allow us to follow the fascinating saga of the Pahlav dynasties in the Sasanian domains.

This Parthian role in the transmission of their history, intertwined in the Sasanian accounts of the *Shāhnāma* is explained by their real power within the Pahlav territories, and even in the center of the empire. There is every reason to assume that in their regional capitals such as Rayy, Gurgān, Qūmis, or Tūs, the various Parthian dynasts of the Mihrāns, the Kārins, the Ispahbudhān, and the Kanārāngiyān, held their own courts and their own mechanisms for retaining their histories and sagas for future generations. It is on account of the Pahlavs’ tremendous wealth, allowing the preservation of their chivalrous exploits, that the traditionalists of the conquest underlined, for example, the riches that the Arab conquerors obtained from the capital of the Mihrāns in Rayy, and compared these to the booty collected from the Sasanian capital, Ctesiphon (al-Madā’in).

Whether the Parthians cultivated their traditions in a written or through an oral tradition, we can as yet not ascertain with any degree of certainty. Whatever the case, there is no doubt that, as the *Shāhnāma* bears witness, the Pahlav dynasts continued to *speak the Parthian language* until the end of the Sasanian period and probably for centuries thereafter. When the feeble Shīrūyih Qūbād sent messengers to his father, Khusrow II Parvīz, Ḫālīnūs informed

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2598 Davis 1992, *passim*.
2599 A comparative analysis of these divergent traditions contained within the *Xwadāy-Nāmag* recensions that have come down to us, is sure to yield important results.
2600 See §3.4.4, in particular, page 251.
2601 The fact that our latest written evidence for the Parthian script pertains only to the fourth century is no indication of the non-existence of a later written tradition. Unfortunately, modern archeological investigations of the Pahlav domains are next to nonexistent. There is no telling what future investigations on this neglected and crucial aspect of the pre- and post-conquest history of the Pahlav domains will bring to the fore, were they to be undertaken.
them that he needed to be made privy to the message, “whether it was delivered in the Persian or the Parthian language.”

The political and religious Pārsīg–Pahlav dichotomy, therefore, also permeated into the linguistic realm. As the evidence of the Mihrāns in the Bahram-i Chubin Nāma and the Book of Shahrvarz and Khusrow, the Kārins in the Ayādgār-i Wizurmihr-i Bokhtagan, and the Ispahbudhān in the Bāvand Nāma, in which account, presumably, the imploded saga of Bāv (Farrukhzād) of the Ispahbudhān family was spelled out in more detail, bear witness, the Pahlav systematically preserved their traditions throughout the Sasanian and well into the post-conquest centuries. Add to this the potential that the Sistānī cycle of the Shāhnāma was promoted by the Sūrens, and the Parthian influence becomes pervasive.

Among the various recensions of the Xwaday-Nāmag tradition, the Shāhnāma of Ferdowsī remains the most fateful in its retention of historical information on the Pahlav during the Sasanian period. And it is to the credit of the collectors of the prose Shāhnāma, as well as Ferdowsī, that some of this information cannot be found elsewhere. It is on account of this that the Pahlav identities of some of the presumably legendary figures populating the Shāhnāma can now be established in reference to the recently discovered seals of Gyselen. For when the seals of the spāhbeds Sēd-hōsh and Gorgōn from the Kārin family, and Chihr Burzin from the Mihrān family were discovered, searching through the secondary sources (the so-called universal histories) left Gyselen stranded in identifying them. Little was it known that Shēdōsh (Sēd-hōsh), Gorgōn, and Simāh-i Burzin—the latter’s name, after a simple synonymic substitution becoming Chihr Burzin—were all along roaming the Shāhnāma of Ferdowsī. The information in the Shāhnāma proves to be quite exhaustive, moreover: every Parthian spāhbed from the seals also appears in Ferdowsī’s opus as a

2602Ferdowsī 1971, vol. IX, p. 258, Ferdowsī 1935, p. 258:


2604Of this book, according to Christensen, “we know nothing but its name . . . It would be tempting, however, to see in this book the remote origins of an Arab romance, which existed independently before being incorporated into the collection of A Thousand and One Nights, that is the romance of ‘Umar b. Nūmān and his sons.” Christensen 1936, p. 61.

2605Bozorgmehr 1971.

2606Ibn Isfandiyār 1941, p. 4. Ibn Isfandiyār, it should be mentioned, has not a few unkind words to say about this source.

2607I am told that to this day, in Sistān, the Sūrens are jealously guarding their traditions, refusing, unfortunately, academe any access to what seems to be a rich ancestral archive. An entry in Wikipedia on the Sūrens is being currently maintained by members of this family. And, if I am not mistaken, one of the towering figures of Iranian art history, Dr. Souren Melikian-Chirvani, traces his genealogy to this very important Parthian family.

2608The one possible exception, in fact, is the seal of the Pārsīg spāhbed, Wēh-Shābuhr, whom
powerful general, either in the post-reform Sasanian narratives of the *Shāhnāma*, or through the Ctesian method, in its Kayānid sections.  

In their redaction of the *Xwâdây-Nâmāg*, the Parthian families, like the Sasanians, were bound to embellish some of the exploits of their family members. We can also deduce that they deleted some of their lesser deeds from the pages of the *Xwâdây-Nâmāg* history. They attempted to camouflage their central involvement in those crucial junctures of Sasanian history that subsequently became a source of embarrassment for the family. It is on account of this that the rebellion of Vistâhm cannot be found in some of the extant *Xwâdây-Nâmāg* traditions. Through this mechanism, the complicity of Farrukh Hormozd with the Byzantines against Khusrow II is buried or even lost in some of the accounts at our disposal, unless we consult the *Shāhnāma* of Ferdowsi. Through these editorial manipulations of the Ispahbudhân family, Rustam achieves immortality, becoming the penultimate hero of the *Shāhnāma* of Ferdowsi and the subsequent nationalist psyche. His systematic procrastination in the war against the enemy, his very reluctance to lead his army, and his obstinate pursuit of peace, all of this is eclipsed by his heroic aura in the *Shāhnāma* of Ferdowsi.  

Farrukhzhâd’s rebellion against Yazdgird III is even deleted from the pages of Sebeos’ narrative and is downplayed in the *Shāhnāma*. Incredibly, this towering Pahlav figure subsequently disappears from the pages of all *Xwâdây-Nâmâg* narratives. It is a testimony to the primary importance of the theme of Iran in the futûh narratives that we have the fortune of following, albeit painstakingly, the saga of this Pahlav dynast when he reappears under his bastardized, Arabicized, name Zinabî in the accounts of the conquest. And so, only by juxtaposing the *Xwâdây-Nâmâg* and the futûh traditions, we are apprised of Farrukhzhâd’s defection from the Sasanian king and his collaboration with the Arab armies. It is one of the ironies of history that, through this process of redaction, the Ispahbudhân inadvertently also erased most traces of their family’s great accomplishments, such as the very name of their progenitor, the great Asparapet, or their creation of an autonomous Ţabaristân after the Arab conquest by Bāb

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2609 Revisiting the *Shāhnāma* as a historical source, therefore, might lead its ardent student to even predict the find of other seals pertaining to powerful generals of late Sasanian period. One such conjectural seal could belong to an ērân-spâbed of the kūst-i nêmrûz; see footnote 840.  

2610 It is one of those happenstances of history that in this Rustam seems to be replicating the great deeds of his namesake, the legendary Kayānid hero, Rustam, of the national epic, both attempting to uphold Iranian kingship in spite of its folly. Ironically, by one account, the Rustam cycle in the *Shāhnāma* is itself inspired by the deeds of another Parthian general, this time from another family, in another epoch, and with a different fate: Orodes II’s (57–38 BCE) general, Surena, whose actual name was Rustaham Sûren. Sûren’s defeat of the Roman general and triumvir, Marcus Licinius Crassus, at the battle of Carrhae in 53 BCE, effectively established the Euphrates as the border between the Roman and Parthian empires in subsequent centuries. Shahbazi, Shapur, ‘Carrhae’, in Ehsan Yarshater (ed.), *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, New York, 2007b (Shahbazi 2007b).
CONCLUSION

(another alias of Farrukhzād).  

The Parthians played a crucial role in the demise of the Sasanians through their agreement with the Arabs, although some among them, such as the Mihrāns or the Kārins, put up fierce resistance. In a sense, from the Arsacid through the Umayyad period, the dynamics among the Pahlav dynastic families, and between each of these and the central authorities, had not changed. The crucial dimension of the cooperation of the Pahlav who came to terms with the Arabs—as it was worked into the treatises they made with the conquerors—was the understanding that they would continue to control their realm after the collapse of the Sasanian empire. The demise of the Sasanians, therefore, did not mean the demise of the Parthians. As we shall hope to show in a sequel to this study, it is in this sense that, through their very presence in the post-conquest centuries, the Parthian families promoted the continuity of the Iranian national tradition. The very mechanism through which Māmārī compiled the prose Šāhnāma in the tenth century, bears witness to the direct part played by the Parthians in creating one of the very first and most important prototypes of the Book of Kings, the prose Šāhnāma of Abū Mašūr ʿAbdalrazzaq (Ṣāḥib-šāh-i Abū Mašāʾīrī). It was, after all, the very progeny of the Kanārangiyan, the families of ʿAbdalrazzaq and Māmārī, who gathered the “dihqānān, the wise (farzānīgān) and sagacious (jahāndīdīgān) men” of the very heartlands of the Pahlav regions, Tūs and Nīshāpūr, in order to compose the prose Šāhnāma.  

Parthian genealogical traditions were very much in vogue during the tenth century in the northern and eastern parts of Iran. Leaving aside the genealogical claims of various smaller dynasties that assumed power in Gīlān, Tābaristān, and Azarbāyjān during this period, not only did the various patrons of the Šāhnāma, Māmārī and Abū Mašūr ʿAbdalrazzaq, claim Parthian heritage by tracing their ancestry to the Kanārangiyan, but so did the very dynasty under whose patronage an alleged revival of the Iranian tradition took place, namely, the Samanids, who claimed their descent from none other than the Parthian Mihrāns and the emblematic figure of this family, the rebel Bahrām-i Chūbīn. This they did at a time when the Buyids were claiming Sasanian genealogy and reviving the title of Šāh-šāh, King of Kings. In fact, Birūnī gives ample evidence of the popularity, as he puts it, of forged genealogical traditions during this period. Forged or not, and even if Birūnī’s partiality in promoting the ancestral claims of the Buyids were to be denied, there is no doubt that four centuries after the fact, Parsīg–Pahlav genealogical warfare was still in full sway

2611 Bāv’s story does not belong to the Šāhnāma by design, but is found in the Šāh-nāma-i Tabaristān, suggesting that the Šān-adāy-Nāmag tradition extended beyond Ferdowsī’s artificial confines to pre-conquest Iran. The redactional efforts even led in this case to a pseudo-genealogy to the Sasanian Kayūs.

2612 Birūnī’s doubts as to the veracity of the genealogy that this family claimed must be dismissed on account of the political rivalries among the Buyids and the Samanids in the tenth century and the role of the ʿAbdalrazzaq family in this complex situation.

2613 From Herāt and Sistān, they probably also gathered the wonderfully diverse Sistānī cycle of the Šāhnāma, a substantial part of which is extant outside the Šāhnāma. Qazvini 1984, pp. 34–35.
among the Iranians.\textsuperscript{2614} In a sense then, one can perhaps argue that there was no such thing as a revival of ancient Iranian traditions during the tenth century, for these had never become extinct to require resurrection in the first place. The interlude of the mid-eighth to the tenth centuries, however, has to be further investigated in order to substantiate this last claim.

The defeat of the Iranians by the Arabs in the course of the conquest has left a scar on the national Iranian historical memory. This was articulated in no uncertain terms by Ferdowsi more than a millennium ago, and has been part and parcel of the Iranian nationalist discourse to this day. For Ferdowsi as well as for some of the scholars who address this juncture of Iranian history, the Arab conquest of Iran marks a watershed. This is a juncture wherein the \textit{pre-Islamic} history of Iran is presumed to have ceased, and the history of \textit{Islamic} Iran to have commenced. This perspective is no longer tenable considering the results of the present study. If substantial Pahlav domains continued to be ruled \textit{de facto} by Parthian dynasts even after the Arab conquests in the seventh century, then the process of the conquest needs to be reassessed and the dichotomous rendition of this juncture of Iranian history as pre- versus post-Islamic history should be deemed a false dichotomy. The Arab conquests were not the watershed that one has made of them.\textsuperscript{2615} Shifting paradigms, however, is no easy matter. It might serve us well, therefore, to trust those isolated traditions that do not have the \textit{postfacto} imprint of Islamic narratives of conquests, and portray the conquests as what conquests have always been in the histories of peoples: access to resources, in this case Arab access to the entrepôts of trade. Once we recognize this, it might be easier to fathom why the Arabs did not migrate \textit{en masse} to the Iranian plateau and settle in its various territories, and why the Pahlav agreed to the arrangements that we have delineated. The Arab conquest was not a nineteenth-century British colonial endeavor, but an altogether different matter. If we recognize this, moreover, we can more easily understand why the comparatively meagre Arab settlement and colonization that did in fact take place, was not in the length and breadth of the Iranian lands, but mainly in Outer Khurásan, \textit{Transoxiana}, and the lands beyond these, just as the Arabs had guaranteed the Parthian dynast Rustam.\textsuperscript{2616} This is perhaps the true meaning of those traditions that maintain that the Arab intentions were honorable.\textsuperscript{2617}

Another, more crucial, leap of faith, however, has been argued in this investigation, a leap that, nevertheless, and in view of the new evidence presented here, must be taken seriously. The early conquest of Iraq did not begin at the inception of the reign of the last Sasanian king, Yazdgird III, in 632, as it is currently believed, but in 628, at a time that was most opportune for it:

\textsuperscript{2614}There is no doubt that Iranian genealogists vied with Arab genealogist during this period. Ibn Balkhi calls the former the Persian genealogists (\textit{nassáb-i Pársíyán}). Ibn Balkhi 1995, p. 11.

\textsuperscript{2615}Insofar as the colonial dimension of the Arab conquest has been highlighted, we should probably also reckon that our scholarly heritage has a nineteenth-century colonial and imperial context.

\textsuperscript{2616}For the issue of Arab settlement, see also Pourshariati 1998.

\textsuperscript{2617}Tabari 1992, p. 68, de Goeje, 2272.
immediately after the devastating Sasanian–Byzantine wars of 30 years, at the end of Shīrūyih Qubād’s reign, when, too little too late, the powers of late antiquity realized in fact that “from the Arab regions strong winds were blowing.” The interregnum period of 628–632 was a time of utter confusion. As troops had been dispersed in the wake of the Byzantine–Sasanian war, resulting in the formation of three distinct armies of the Sasanian empire, and as the Parsig–Pahlav rivalry had intensified, the perfect power vacuum had been created in Syria, in Iraq, as well as on the Iranian plateau. The Arabs naturally took advantage of this chaotic situation. After we delete what we know to be the postfactual *ḥijra*, annalist, and caliphal chronological constructions of the *futūḥ* literature, Sayf’s traditions of the early conquest of Iraq synchronize perfectly well with the one chronological given that scholarship had hitherto systematically refused to reckon with: the Sasanian chronological indicators of the reigns of the ephemeral kings and queens of the period 628–632 CE. After all, as Ballāmī informs us, Muḥammad’s flight from Mecca to Medina (the *ḥijra*) did not become the calendar landmark of choice for all the various groups within the nascent Muslim community, even in later decades. For a group of Ballāmī’s Shi‘ite contemporaries, as the author underlines, insisted that the death of Hūsain was a more decisive moment in the history of the early Muslim community than the *ḥijra* of the Prophet.2618 If the Shi‘ites were too biased to lend credibility to this assessment, what ought we do with a tradition describing a group of Ballāmī’s contemporaries who claimed Mu‘āwiya’s assumption of the caliphate to be a more appropriate calendar marker for the Muslims than the *ḥijra* of Muḥammad from his native city?2619 While sometime in 16–18 AH/637–639 CE some might have decided to mark Muḥammad’s *ḥijra* as a watershed event in early Islamic history, therefore, up until the tenth century, there was still no consensus on the matter, albeit the dissent was probably voiced by a minority.

How will our chronological reconstruction of the early Arab conquests of Iran affect our reconstruction of early Islamic history, and our appreciation of the Islamic historiographical tradition, especially the *futūḥ* narratives, beyond the strides that scholarship has already made apropos these? If alive, where was the Prophet Muḥammad when the early conquests were taking place? Why does his name not appear in the narratives of the conquest? And what was his relationship to Abū Bakr and ʿUmar? The traditional Islamic narratives of origin cannot quite accommodate the picture that we have presented in this study.

2618 Ballāmī 1987, p. 87.
Tables, figures and map

Key

The following symbols and abbreviations will be used in the tables and the index.

Abbreviations

- *Khu* Khusrow
- *Hor* Hormozd IV
- *Pbl* Pahlav faction under the leadership of the Ispahbudhān, including the army of Azarbāyjān.
- *Prs* Pārsīg faction under the leadership of Firūzān, including the Nīm-rūzī faction and the *army of Persia and the East*.
- *Sbr* Shahrvarāz’s conquest army from the Byzantine wars.
- *Arm* Armenians
- *Trk* Turks
- *Dlm* Daylam

Marks

- * conjectural
- ↔ collaborator or defector
- † died
- *** contradictory or inconsistent
- ⇔ identification
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Battle or Raid</th>
<th>King and Faction</th>
<th>CE Date (revised)</th>
<th>Commanders and Generals</th>
<th>Iranian</th>
<th>Arab</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ubullah</td>
<td>Ardashīr (Prs, Phl)</td>
<td>III 628</td>
<td>Hormozd&lt;sup&gt;Prs&lt;/sup&gt;, Qubād&lt;sup&gt;Phl&lt;/sup&gt;, Anūshjān&lt;sup&gt;Phl&lt;/sup&gt;,</td>
<td>Khālīd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Azādbih, Jābān</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dḥat al-Salāsil</td>
<td>Ardashīr (Prs, Phl)</td>
<td>III *629</td>
<td>Hormozd&lt;sup&gt;T<em>Prs&lt;/sup&gt;, Qubād&lt;sup&gt;T</em>Phl&lt;/sup&gt;, Anūshjān&lt;sup&gt;T*Phl&lt;/sup&gt;,</td>
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<td>Azādbih, Jābān</td>
<td></td>
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<td>III 629–30</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>III 629–30</td>
<td>Bahman Jādhūyīh&lt;sup&gt;Prs&lt;/sup&gt;, Andarzghār</td>
<td>Khālīd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ullays</td>
<td>Ardashīr (Phl)</td>
<td>III 630</td>
<td>Jābān</td>
<td>Khālīd</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Maqr</td>
<td>Shahrvarāz (Prs, Shr)</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>Firūzān&lt;sup&gt;Prs&lt;/sup&gt;, Jābān, Azādbih</td>
<td>Khālīd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veh Ardashīr</td>
<td>Shahrvarāz (Prs, Shr)</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>Bahman Jādhūyīh&lt;sup&gt;Prs&lt;/sup&gt;,</td>
<td>Khālīd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anbār</td>
<td>*Shahrvarāz (Prs, Shr)</td>
<td>*630</td>
<td>Bahman Jādhūyīh&lt;sup&gt;Prs&lt;/sup&gt;, Shīrzād</td>
<td>Khālīd</td>
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<td>Shahrvarāz (Prs, Shr)</td>
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<td>Mihrān Bahrām-i Chūbin&lt;sup&gt;Shr&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Khālīd</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>*630</td>
<td>Rūzbih, Zarmihr</td>
<td>Khālīd</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namāriq</td>
<td>Būrāndukht (Phl)</td>
<td>631</td>
<td>Rustam&lt;sup&gt;Phl&lt;/sup&gt;, Narsī&lt;sup&gt;Phl&lt;/sup&gt;, Jābān</td>
<td>Muthannā</td>
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<td>Būrāndukht (Phl)</td>
<td>631</td>
<td>Narsī&lt;sup&gt;Phl&lt;/sup&gt;, Jālinūs&lt;sup&gt;Arm&lt;/sup&gt;,</td>
<td>Abū</td>
<td></td>
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Table 6.1: **Conquest of Iraq**: tentative chronology of the battles during the interregnum (628–632), erroneously dated in the *futūh* to 12–13 AH/633–634 CE.
### Tables, Figures and Map

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Battles and Conquests</th>
<th>Yazdgi’s Location</th>
<th>CE Date</th>
<th>Commanders and Generals</th>
<th>Arabic Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Qādisiya</td>
<td>Ctesiphon</td>
<td>635</td>
<td>Rustam&lt;sup&gt;Phl&lt;/sup&gt;, Kanārang&lt;sup&gt;Phl&lt;/sup&gt;, Vindúyiḥ&lt;sup&gt;Phl&lt;/sup&gt;, Tīrūyiḥ&lt;sup&gt;Phl&lt;/sup&gt;, Mušel&lt;sup&gt;Arm&lt;/sup&gt;, Grigor&lt;sup&gt;Arm&lt;/sup&gt;, Mīhrān-i Bahram-i Rāzi&lt;sup&gt;Phl&lt;/sup&gt;, Shahrīyār&lt;sup&gt;Phl&lt;/sup&gt;, Firūzān&lt;sup&gt;Prs&lt;/sup&gt;, Hurmuzān&lt;sup&gt;Prs&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td>Hulwān</td>
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<td>Hulwān</td>
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<td>Abū Mūsā ·Ashārī</td>
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<td>Tustar</td>
<td>Isfakhr</td>
<td>637</td>
<td>Varaztirots&lt;sup&gt;Arm&lt;/sup&gt;, Akbar, Jāḥūyāh&lt;sup&gt;Prs&lt;/sup&gt;, Firūzān&lt;sup&gt;Prs&lt;/sup&gt;, Nu&amp;mān</td>
<td>Nu&amp;mān</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nihāvand</td>
<td>Kirmān</td>
<td>642</td>
<td>Qārin&lt;sup&gt;Phl&lt;/sup&gt;, Dinār&lt;sup&gt;Phl&lt;/sup&gt;,</td>
<td>Nu&amp;mān</td>
</tr>
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<td>Hamadān</td>
<td>Kirmān</td>
<td>642</td>
<td>Shahrvarāz Jāḥūyāh&lt;sup&gt;Phl&lt;/sup&gt;, Fāḏūsān, Bahram Jāḥūyāh&lt;sup&gt;Prs&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td>642</td>
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<td>Nu&amp;mān</td>
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<td>Fārs</td>
<td>*Sīstān</td>
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<td>*651</td>
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<td>Gurgān</td>
<td>Marv</td>
<td>639, *651</td>
<td>Suwayd</td>
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<td>Marv</td>
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<td>Suwayd</td>
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<td>·Abdallāh b. ·Amīr</td>
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<td>Azarbāyjān</td>
<td>643, &gt;651</td>
<td></td>
<td>Isfandiyār&lt;sup&gt;Phl&lt;/sup&gt;, Bahram&lt;sup&gt;Phl&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>T’ēodoros&lt;sup&gt;Arm&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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Table 6.2: Conquest of Iran: tentative reconstruction, including Yazdgi’s location during his flight.
### Table 6.3: Seals: the recently discovered seals of eight spābeds. Information attested on the seals is in boldface.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Seal</th>
<th>King</th>
<th>Kust</th>
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<th>Family</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1a</td>
<td>Khu I</td>
<td>East</td>
<td>Chihr-Burzen (Simāh-i Burzin)</td>
<td>Karin (Phl)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1b</td>
<td>Hor</td>
<td>East</td>
<td>Dād-Burz-Mihr (Dādmihr)</td>
<td>Karin (Phl)</td>
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<td>2a</td>
<td>Khu I</td>
<td>South</td>
<td>Wahrām Adurmāh (Bahrām-i Māh Ādhar)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2b</td>
<td>Hor</td>
<td>South</td>
<td>Wēh-Shābuhr</td>
<td>(Prs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2c</td>
<td>Khu</td>
<td>South</td>
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<td>2d/1</td>
<td>Khu II</td>
<td>South</td>
<td>Pirag-i Shahrvarāz (Shahrvarāz)</td>
<td>Mihrān (Phl)</td>
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<td>2d/2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3a</td>
<td>Khu II</td>
<td>East</td>
<td>Wistakhm (Vistāhm)</td>
<td>Ispahbudhān (Phl)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3b</td>
<td>Hor</td>
<td>West</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4a</td>
<td>Khu I</td>
<td>North</td>
<td>Gör-gōn (Gołon)</td>
<td>Mihrān (Phl)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4b</td>
<td>Khu I</td>
<td>North</td>
<td>Sēd-hōsh</td>
<td>Mihrān (Phl)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 6.1: Seal 3b of the ērān-spābed Vistāhm.**
Table 6.4: **Genealogical tree:** the Sasanians (middle), Āl-i Jāmāsp (left), and the Ispahbudhān (right) from the time of Hormozd III. Monarchs are in italics; a double dotted line indicates a marital relationship; a Greek letter denotes a wife whose name is unknown.
Figure 6.2: Map of the Sasanian empire: fourth century CE
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For our citation conventions, see p. xii. The numbers between brackets after a reference refer to the pages on which the source is cited.


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Glossary

A

Ahriman  Avestan Aŋra Mainiū: the evil spirit opposing Ahūrā Mazdā (q.v.).

ahūra  Vedic asūna (evil god), but in Zoroastrianism one of the three great Lords: Ahūrā Mazdā (q.v.), Mithra (q.v.), or *Vouruna/Apañ Napat (Varuna; grandson of the waters).

Ahūrā Mazdā  Middle Persian Ohrmazd, New Persian Hormozd, Armenian Anamazd, Greek Aramasdes, but sometimes also Zeus (Zeus): Lord Wisdom, the benevolent supreme deity of Zoroastrianism, who opposes and ultimately defeats the evil spirit Ahriman (q.v.).

ʿajam  From Arabic ʿajama (to mumble); similar in use as Greek βαρβαρός (indistinct speech): non-Arabs (from uraba, to speak clearly), but in particular, Persians.

Amahraspands  Avestan Amāša Spontā (Bounteous Immortals), the six archangels or emanations of Ahūrā Mazdā: Vohu Manō (Bahman, Good Thought), Aša Vahišta (Ardwahisht, Ordibehesht, Highest Asha), Xšaθra Vairiia (Shahrevar, Desirable Dominion), Spontā Armaiti (Spandarmad, Holy Devotion), Hauruuatāt (Hordād, Health), and Amorotāt (Amurdād, erroneously also Mordād, Immortality). Their names still survive as the eleventh, second, sixth, twelfth, third, and fifth months respectively, in both the Iranian and Zoroastrian calendars, as well as the names of, respectively, the second to the seventh day of each month in the Zoroastrian calendar.

Amesha Spentas  See Amahraspands.

Anāhitā  Avestan Arōduui Sūrā Anāhitā (the Strong and Immaculate), Armenian Anabīt: goddess of pure waters (Ābīn) and fertility. The Sasanian kings were often the high-priests of her cult center at Stakhr in Fārs.

anēr  Non-Iranian, specifically a non-Zoroastrian.

argbed  See hargbed.

asha  Avestan aša, Sanskrit rta, Middle Persian arda/ablawa: order, righteousness, justice, the moral opposite of drug (q.v.).

asbed  Middle Persian aspa-pati, Armenian aspet, aspípídes: general of the cavalry.

Avestā  From Old Persian upastāwaka (Praise of God), Middle Persian abestāg: collection of Zoroastrian sacred texts, consisting of the Gāthās (q.v.), the
Yashts (q.v.), and other liturgical material; whence Avestan, the old Iranian language of these texts closely related to Old Vedic (Sanskrit), normally divided into Gathic (Old) and Younger Avestan.

**ayyār**  
Member of secret brother/sisterhoods in Iran during the late antique and medieval periods, often expressing themselves with a Mithraic ideology against the status quo.

**azādhān**  
Literally, *the free people*: lower nobility.

**B**

**barīd**  
From Latin *veredus* (post-horse): postal and intelligence service of the Sasanians.

**barsom**  
Avestan *barsman*: sacred twigs in Zoroastrian rituals, bound together in a bundle (the number of twigs in a bundle depends on the particular ceremony). Originally twigs of the *hōm* (q.v.) plant were used, but later substituted by those of the pomegranate.

**bullā**  
Clay imprint of a seal.

**C**

**caesaropapism**  
From Latin *Caesar* (emperor) and *Papa* (pope): Byzantine model of government in which the emperor was also the head of the Church.

**Chinvat Bridge**  
Avestan *cinuwatō porat̕a* (bridge of the collector), Middle Persian *chinwad puhl*: narrow bridge on the top of Mount Harā/Alburz (Chagād-i Dāīti) leading to the afterworld, which the soul of the departed, under the guidance of Sorūsh (q.v.), has to cross three days after his death, accompanied by his *dēn* (in the form of a fair maiden), after being judged to be righteous by a tribunal presided by Mithra (q.v.), the *miyānchīgh*.

**Ctesian method**  
Named after the Greek historian Ctesias, who embellished his stories with mythical material: a method of historical writing in which contemporary histories are anachronistically superimposed onto mythical times.

**D**

**darīgbed**  
Palace superintendent, akin to a Byzantine *cura palatii*.

**dastār**  
Flying ribbons symbolizing *farr* (q.v.), often in conjunction with a ram.

**dastgird**  
Avestan *dasta-koroṭa* (handiwork): royal or seigniorial estate.

**dastwar**  
Avestan *dasta-bana*, New Persian *dastūr*: religious teacher, spiritual authority; similar to Avestan *nātu*.

**dawā**  
Religious call.

**dayeakordi**  
Armenian *daye'kut'wən* from Middle Persian *dāyag* (wet nurse): Armenian form of child rearing through a foster *naxavar* (q.v.) family, whence guardianship.

**dehkān**  
Middle Persian *dabīgān*, *dehgān*, Syriac *dīgān*, Arabic *dīhqān*: military landlord, presumably after Khusrow I’s reforms. Possibly the same as a *shābrig* (q.v.).
dév  Avestan daēnua, from Vedic daiva (younger god), which acquired in Zoroastrianism the meaning of its moral opposite: evil spirit, demon.

dīwān  Army register; treasury for levying land taxes.

driyōšān jādaggōw ud dādvār  Literally, protector of the poor and judge: judiciary office, possibly in replacement of the office of mōbad (q.v.). See also jādbū-yīḥ.

drug  Avestan druji: falsehood, lie, whence, on a cosmological scale, the evil creation of Ahriman (q.v.).

dvandva  From Sanskrit dva (two): in onomastics, a compound name formed from the names of two separate deities; e.g., Mihr Hormozd.

E

cērān-dibhērbdh  Head of the scribal caste.

cērān-spāḥbed  Head of the army. Also spāḥbed (q.v.).

ethnicon  Ethnic (self-)identification.

exilarch  Hereditary leader of the Jews after the Babylonian exile.

F

farr  Avestan xwarzar, Middle Persian xwarra, khvarenab, Armenian P’ark’: the Divine Fortune, associated with legitimate kingship; bestowed by Mithra (q.v.).

frashegird  Avestan frašō-koroiti (making juicy, wonderful): judgment day, the time of healing, renovation.

G

Gāthā  Avestan gāθā, Middle Persian gāb: a sacred hymn from the Avestā (q.v.), attributed to Zoroaster himself.

ghulāt  Literally, exaggerators: the name given to various extremist Shi‘ite sects in Iran.

gītīg  From Avestan gaēθā (living beings): material existence.

gumezishn  Literally mixture: the present, material world, when Ahriman’s (q.v.) drug (q.v.) is mixed with Ahūrā Mazdā’s (q.v.) asha (q.v.).

H

ḥadīth  Literally tradition: an account of the words and deeds of the Prophet Muḥammad, second in authority to the Qurān (q.v.).

hargbed  From Middle Persian hang (tax, see kharāj) and pati (head): chief of finances. Because of the military nature of the office, an alternative proposition is argbed (fortress commander).

hazāraft  See hazārbed.

hazārbed  Also hazāraft, or erroneously hazārbandak (Owner of Thousand Slaves), from Old Persian hazāra-pati (chiliarch): Chief of the Thousands, grand intendant, whence also prime minister, wuzurg framādār (q.v.).
herbad Avestan aëthra-paiti, Middle Persian ērpat: Zoroastrian priest.

hōm Avestan haoma, Vedic soma: unidentified plant with psycho-pharmacological properties, used in Zoroastrian rituals, where it is now substituted with harmel (esfand) or ephedra; the deity associated with this plant and worshipped in the Hōm Yasht (q.v.).

Hormozd See Ahūra Mazdā.

I

ibāha ʾl-nisā Literally permission of women: Arabic term for the Mazdakite tenet of the “communal sharing of women.”

Iblīs From Greek διαβολος (devil, from Middle Persian dēv, q.v.): the Islamic nomenclature for the devil.

Imām Religious supreme leader.

ispahbud Arabic isfahbud or isbhabad: New Persian form of spābbed (q.v.) or ērān-spābbed (q.v.), in the later period, also meaning ruler of a region.

J

jādhūyih Middle Persian jādaggōw: advocate, spokesman, in particular vis-à-vis the king (see footnote 1092). See also dīyōsān jādaggōw ud dādwar.

jizya Poll (head) tax.

K

Ka’ba Cube shaped shrine in Mecca, believed to be the house of God (Allah) by the Muslims. It constitutes the qibla (q.v.) for the daily prayers and is the focus of the annual pilgrimage (hajj).

kārdār Tax collector; akin to Arabic ʿāmil.

karīz See qanāt.

kharāj From Greek χορηγία (literally organizer of a choir, whence provision, revenue) or Aramaic harāg, Middle Persian harag (tax): land tax, but sometimes used in the generic sense of tax.

Kheshm Avestan aēšma-daēwua, Middle Persian xešm or ēšm, Hebrew Ashmedai, Greek ἀσµοδαῖς: anger, whence in Zoroastrianism the demon Wrath, the chief demon of Ahriman (q.v.). In the apocalypse, the opponent of Mithra.

Khudāynāmag See Xᵛə aday-Nāmag.

khvarenah See farr.

khvēdōdah Avestan xᵛə actuwaadatha: close-kin (consanguineous) marriage, a practice that was prevalent among Zoroastrian noble families.

Koran See Qurān.

kunya In Arabic naming practice, referring to the patronymic construction Abū (father of), or its female equivalent Umm (mother of); sometimes used instead of the proper name (ism).
kūst One of the four quarters (or sides) in which Khusrow I divided the empire, each assigned to an ērān-spābbed (q.v.).

kūst-i ādurbādāgān The quarter of the north, comprising Azarbāyjān, parts of Gīlān, Tabaristān, and northern regions.

kūst-i khwarāsān The quarter of the east, comprising Gurgān, Khurāsān, and eastern regions.

kūst-i khwarbarān The quarter of the west, comprising Sawa’d, Iraq, and western regions.

kūst-i nēmrōz The quarter of the south, comprising Fārs, Kīrmān, and Sīstān.

M

mahistān Avestan mazišta, Middle Persian mahist (greatest): council of high nobility, senate.

mainyu Avestan mainiiu: spirit. See also mēnōg.

mang A mixture of hemp and wine, with intoxicating properties. Alternatively, henbane, or a substitute for hōm (q.v.).

marzbān Old Iranian marza-panā, Armenian marzpan: margrave, warden of the marches (borders); by extension a military commander, similar sometimes to a spābbed (q.v.).

mawlā (pl. mawālī). Literally client: in the early Islamic period referring to a non-Arab (Iranian) convert.

mażālim Literally, not in the right place: direct dispensation of justice by the ruler.

mēnōg From mainyu (q.v.): spiritual state.

Mihr See Mithra.

Mihrigān Autumnal festival in celebration of Mithra (q.v.), commemorated on the day of Mihr of the month of Mihr, that is to say, 195 days after Nowrūz (q.v.).

mithraeum Cave-like, often subterranean, temple devoted to the Roman god Mithras (q.v.).

Mithra Avestan Mithra, Persian Mihr: literally contract, whence the Indo-Iranian deity of the contract. In Zoroastrianism, one of the three ahuras (q.v.), whose worship extended greatly beyond orthodox praxis and who became identified with the sun.

Mithras Roman deity, most probably derived from Iranian Mithra (q.v.). His cult in the Roman Empire is referred to as Roman Mithraism, an extremely popular religious current, which flourished especially during the first three centuries CE, when it rivaled nascent Christianity. See also taurroctony.

mōbad Middle Persian magu-pati, Parthian magupat (chief mōγ, q.v.): Zoroastrian priest holding also an administrative or supervisory office.

mōbadhān mōbadh The mōbad (q.v.) of all mōbads, head of the priestly caste.
môy

Avestan mōγu, Old Persian maguš, Middle Persian magu, mgw, Greek μαγος, Arabic maj¯us: mog, mage, Magian, member of the sacerdotal caste. Originally they may have been a Median tribe of priests. The three wise men from the East adoring the infant Christ (at the Epiphany) were mōγs (one of these Magi, Gaspar, is claimed to be the Sûrenid ērān-spā-bed (q.v.) Gondofarr, son of general Rustaham Surena). See also mōbad.

nask

Prayer, but by extension one of the twenty parts in which the Avestā (q.v.) is divided.

naxarar

Parthian naxvadar: Armenian high nobility.

nisba

Noun of relation: in Arab nomenclature, the tribe or region to which one belongs; whence, in modern usage, family name.

Nowrūz

Literally new day: the festival of the Zoroastrian as well as the secular Iranian new year. In modern times, after the calendar reforms and except for certain Parsi calendars, it always falls on the vernal (spring) equinox. During the Sasanian period, due to calendar shifts, the festival fell later in the year.

Ohrmazd

See Ahūrā Mazdā.

ōstāndār

Ruler of an ēstān (region, territory), whence governor. The difference with shahrab (q.v.) is not always clear.

ostracon

From Greek οστρακόν (shell): piece of pottery with an inscription.

P

pādhūspān

Avestan patikauš-pāna, Middle Persian pāygospān: protector of the realm, whence governor.

Pahlav

Ethnic group, originally called Parni or Dahae. Their name is derived from the Achaemenid term for the region, Parthava, to which they migrated. By extension, Pahlav or Parthian is also used to refer to the Arsacid dynasty, and related dynastic families from this region. The derivation Pahlavi refers to a particular script (derived from the Aramaic script), and by extension to the Middle Iranian language written in this script.

Pārsīg

From or belonging to the region of Fārs, whence Persian. By extension, the faction associating itself with the Sasanians.

Parthian

See Pahlav.

polis

Greek πολις (city): a Hellenistic city-state, often self-sufficient and semi-independent.

Q

qanāt

From Akkadian kanū (reed), Latin canalis (canal): underground irrigation canal borrowing into the aquifer inside a mountain slope, thus producing fresh water. Also called karīz.
Glossary

qibla  Prayer direction, in the Muslim creed, towards the Ka'ba (q.v.) in Mecca.

quadripartition  The division of the empire by Khusrow I into four quarters or küsts (q.v.), each assigned to an ērān-spāhbed (q.v.).

Qurān  Muslim holy scripture, believed to be the words of God as revealed to the Prophet Muḥammad.

R

Rashnu  Avestan rašn, Middle Persian rāshn: the yazata (q.v.) of Justice, whence his close association with Mithra (q.v.), worshipped in the Rashnu Yasht (q.v.).

ratḥastryān sālār  From Avestan ratbaštara (he who stands on a chariot, warrior): supreme commander of the army. Also ērān-spāhbed (q.v.).

ridda wars  Literally, wars of apostasy: a series of battles against Arab tribes that had presumably left the umma (q.v.) shortly after Muḥammad’s death.

Rig Veda  Sanskrit Rg Veda: oldest Hindu scripture, exhibiting strong linguistic and cultural affinities with the Avestā (q.v.).

S

Sadih  From Persian sad (hundred): Zoroastrian festival of light, celebrated 50 days (=100 days and nights) before Nowrūz (q.v.).

sanad  (plural, isnād). Chain of authorities in the transmission of a tradition or hadīth (q.v.).

satrapy  Avestan xšaθra, Middle Persian shahr: realm, whence province, the head of which was a shahrab (q.v.).

shāhānshāh  King of Kings, official title of the Iranian monarch.

shahrab  Satrap, governor of a satrapy (q.v.) or a royal estate; in the later period, ruler of a shahr (province).

shahrdārān  Literally, holder of a shahr (province or region): in Shāpūr I’s inscription ŠKZ, it refers to royal nobility, but in late Sasanian times it could also refer to other high nobility. Sometimes confused with shahrab (q.v.).

shahrīg  Arabic shahrīj: a member of the dehkān (q.v.) class. Sometimes confused with shahrab (q.v.).

Sorūsh  Avestan svaša, Middle Persian sroš: the yazata (q.v.) of Obedience, right hand of Mithra (q.v.), worshipped in the Sorūsh Yasht (q.v.).

Sōshyant  Avestan sasošānt (he who brings benefit): the redeemer or savior, a Zoroastrian messianic figure, to be born to a virgin from the seed of Zoroaster. To redeem mankind and restore asha (q.v.) at the time of the frašbegird (q.v.), the third and final Sōshyant, acting as a priest, performs the slaughter of the sacred bull, whose sacrificial fat mixed with hōm (q.v.) yields the elixir of immortality.

spāhbed  Middle Persian spāda-pati, Persian ispahbud (q.v.), Armenian (a)sparapet: chief of an army, general. Before Khusrow I’s reforms, spāhbed also designated the supreme commander, a hereditary post that became the gentilitial name of the Ispahbudhān family; after the reforms, a general in charge of one of the four küsts (q.v.). Also ērān-spāhbed (q.v.).
sparapet  Hereditary title of the house of Mamikonean, derived from Parthian *sp’dpty*, Middle Persian *spābed* (q.v.).

sunna  Literally, *way of acting*: precedent, custom.

**T**

tanutēr  Middle Persian *tukbār*: a leading member of an Armenian noble family, *naxanr* (q.v.).

tauroctony  Scene of Mithras (q.v.) ritually slaying a bull. In the depiction, which forms the central mystic dogma of Roman Mithraism and is found in any mithraeum (q.v.), Mithras, wearing a Phrygian cap and pants, slays the bull from above while looking away.

topos  From Greek *τόπος* (place), whence commonplace: a literary theme or meme.

**U**

ʿumma  The Islamic community.

**V**

vāspuhrān  High ranking elite, princes.

vāstryōshān sālār  Middle Persian *wastrā-i ēshān sālār*, from Avestan *vāstriō-fšuiant* (farmer): chief of the agriculturalists.

wastrā-i ēshān sālār  See vāstryōshān sālār.

wizarishn  From Middle Persian *wizārdan* (to separate): time of separation, redemption, whence the end of the material world, after the Sōshyant (q.v.) has defeated the evil forces of Ahriman (q.v.) and his *drug* (q.v.) at *frashegird* (q.v.).

wuzurgān  Grandees.

wuzurg framādār  Supreme leader, prime minister. See also *hazārbed*.

**X**

Xʷadāy-Nāmāg  New Persian *Khudāy-nāmāg*: the *Book of the Lords*, that is, *Kings*, whence *Šahnāma*.

xwarra  See *farr*.

**Y**

Yasht  Any of the Avestan hymns to Ahūrā Mazdā, the archangels (*Amahra-spands*, q.v.), and other *yazatas* (q.v.). Some, like the *Mihr Yasht* (see Mithra) and the *Hōm Yasht* (see hōm), predate Zoroaster.

yazata  Literally, a *being worthy of worship*: any of the lesser deities in the Zoroastrian pantheon, angel.
Glossary

Z

zandık Arabic zindiq: literally reader of the Zand (q.v.), but used in the sense of heretic, especially applied to Mazdakites.

Zand Middle Persian translation of the Avesta (q.v.), together with glosses and commentaries.

Zurvān Avestan zruuan (time): the father of the divine twin brothers Ahūrā Mazdā (q.v.) and Ahriman (q.v.) according to the Zurvanite branch of Zoroastrianism.
Persian and Armenian figures are listed under their gentilitial name (in boldface), when known (conjectural associations are marked ‘∗’; see p. 467).

A
abākhtar (north), listed under küst
Abān
∼ Jadhūyih, listed under Jadhūyih
deity, see Apam Napāt
Abarshahr, see also Nishāpur, 50, 65, 71, 139, 273, 276
‘Abbās b. ‘Abdalmutṭalib, 227
‘Abbāsid
∼ caliphs, listed under Caliph
∼ historiography, 35, 437, 454
‘Abd al-Jabbār b. ‘Abdalrahāmān, 316
‘Abd Rabb al-Kabīr, 309
‘Abdalhamīd, 315
‘Abdallāh b. ‘Abdallāh b. Ṭībān, 248
‘Abdallāh b. ‘Āmir, 257, 271–274, 276, 469
‘Abdallāh b. Khāzim Sulāmī, 278, 469
‘Abdallāh b. Sa‘īd, 435
Abīvard, 318, 417, 418
Abrувān, 61
Abū ‘Āwn b. ‘Abdalmalīk, 316
Abū Bakr, listed under Caliph
Abū Jafar Zarātusht, 62
Abū ‘l-‘Abbās Ṭūsī, 317
Abū ‘l-Khaṣib ‘Umar b. al-‘Alā’, 316–318, 441
Abū Khuzaymah, 317
Abū Maṣūr ‘Abdalrazzāq, 14, 394, 463
† in 962 CE, 14
the prose Shāhnama of ~, 14, 271, 463
Abū Mūsā al-‘Ashrāfī, 237, 239, 245, 248, 257, 469
∼ ‘s call for al-ridā min al-i Muḥammad, 414, 426, 435, 459
† in 755 CE, 315, 437–444, 450
Abū Sīk, listed under Kanārangīyān
Abū ‘Ubayd, 207, 210, 211, 213, 468
Abū ‘Ubaydah Ḥanafī, 438
† in 755 CE, 438
Achaemenid
Darius I, (ruled 549–486 BCE), 358, 359, 394
Darius III, (ruled 380–330 BCE), 19, 29, 358, 385
Vishtaspā, father of Darius III, 29, 385
Achaemenids, 1, 20, 22, 23, 26, 34, 36, 37, 45, 110, 140, 351, 358, 359, 375, 385, 387, 405, 456
Ādargulbād (Adergoudounbades), listed under Kanārangīyān
Ādhar
deity, see Izad-i Ādhar
∼ Farnbagh, listed under fire
INDEX

∼ Gushnasp, listed under fire
∼ Narseh, listed under Sāsānīd
∼ Valash, listed under Kārīn
Adiabene, 50, 347
ādur, see Īzad-i Ādhar
Adur Anāhid, listed under Sāsānīd
ādurbādāgan
north, listed under kūst
province, see Azarbāyjān
Aelian (historian), 358
Afrāsīyāb, 116, 376, 408–410, 413, 414, 441, 444
Agathias (historian), 299
ahl al-buyūtāt, 58, 59, 88, 90, 93
variants: bozorgān; vuzurgān; al-‘uẓammā
ahlamōγ
∼ i frētār, 337
∼ i nask ōzmurd, 337
Aḥnaf, 240, 257, 258, 469
Aḥrā’, 62
ahramōk, see ahlamōγ
Ahura (Lord), listed under Ahūrā
Mazdā, Varuna, or Mithra
Ahvāz, 194, 227, 236–238, 240, 469, 513
variants: bozorgān; vuzurgān; al-‘uẓammā

510
† in 224 CE, 9, 42
Arsaces I, (ruled 247–211 BCE), 19, 24, 25, 300
Kārin, son of Phraat IV, 26
Koshm, daughter of Phraat IV, 26, 110
Mithradates I, (ruled 171–138 BCE), 20, 25, 359, 379, 402
Mithradates II, (ruled 123–88 BCE), 25, 359
Mithradates III, (ruled 57–54 BCE), 359
Mithradates IV, (ruled 129–147?), 359
Orodes II, (ruled 57–38 BCE), 462
Phraat IV, (ruled 38–2 BCE), 26, 110
Phraat V, (ruled 2 BCE–4 CE), 26
Sūren, son of Phraat IV, 26
Tiridates, brother of Vologeses, king of Armenia, 21
Vologeses, (ruled 51–78), 21, 338
Armenian ~, 12, 13, 20, 42–45, 57, 72, 300, 359, 386, 388, 391
Georgian ~, 44
religious policy of ~, 24, 323, 359, 360
Arsakeia, see Rayy
Arshak, listed under Arshakuni
Arshakuni
Arshak II, 338
Arshak III, 57
Artashēs, 43, 300, 338
Khosrov III, 43
† in 614 CE, 43
Khosrov I, 42
Tiran, 338
Tiridates I, 43, 388
Tiridates III, 44, 387
Vrāṃshapuḥ, 43, 338
† in 614 CE, 43
Artaz, 300
artēshṭarān, 47
Asaak, 19
Asāwira, 239–241, 274
Asfādushnas, 156–158
asha (Av. aša), 339, 350, 354, 357, 412, 499
ašamaγya, see ahlamōγ
Ashkaniyān, see Arsacids
Ashtāt, listed under Mihrān
Āsorōstān, 150, 347, 382
Asparapet, listed under Ispahbudhān
aspbed, 98, 100, 101, 105, 115, 117, 216, 296, 364, 499
Aspebedes, listed under Ispahbudhān
asravān, 47
Assyria, see Āsorōstān
Aštāt, see Ashtāt Mihrān
Aštišāt, 390
Āswār, listed under Kārin
ātakhsh, see Izād-i Adhar
āvāran, see āsravān
Atrak, river, 19
Āturpāt, 332, 334, 336, 345, 357
Augusta Antonina, see Constantinople
Avars, 301
Younger ~, 47, 394, 500
‘Ayn Tamr, see Battle of ~
‘ayyārs, 87, 434, 500
Āzādbih, governor of Ḥira, 190, 198, 199, 219, 468
son of ~, 199, 219
azādhān, 29, 48, 500
INDEX

I, variants: Atr(a)patakan; Atropatene; Adûrbdagân
Azarmidukht, listed under Sâsânid

B
Ba‘al, 327
al-Bâb, see Darband
Bâbak Khurramdin, 6, 73, 392, 393, 425, 436, 437, 452, 459
Bâbak
*, listed under Sâsânid
Bâbak-i Behruwan, 89
Bâbakiya, 459
Bahaman Zâdigan, = Shâhin
Bâb-i Sul, 381, 386
Babylonia, 80, 347, 358
Bactria, see Balkh
Badakhshan, 385
Bâdghis, 277, 434, 435, 469
Bâdúsân, listed under Al-i Jâmâsp
Bagyarich, 388
Baghdad, 203, 219

Bagratuni
Smbat, 136–140, 142, 151, 153, 154, 173, 174, 275, 297, 298, 303, 304
*, variants: Khusrov-Shum;
Khusrow Shenûm
† in 617 CE, 138, 298
as governor of Gurgan, 136–139, 297
as governor of Khurasan, 138–140, 142, 297, 300, 303
Varaztirots, 153, 154, 173, 174, 235, 242, 243, 248, 249, 269, 298, 469
*, variants: Khusrov-Shum;
Khusrow Shenûm
† around 643 CE, 249
Bagrewand, 103
Bahan, 499
Bahman, son of Isfandiyar, 135, 143
Bahrain
< Av. Vârôstrayna, 362, 389, 390, 411, 432, 440, 459
> Arm. Vahagn, 389
*, variants: Verethraghna; Vahrâm;
Vahagn (Arm.); Vôrôstrayna (Av.)
~ fire, see fire

~i Ädargulbâd, listed under Kanârangiyan
~i Aturmâh, see below under Mâh Adhar
~i Chûbin, listed under Mîhrân
~i Mâh Adhar, 101, 119–124
*, variants: Bahram-i Mâyâd; Bahram-i Aturmâh;
Wahrâm-i Adurmâh (on seals)
† around 580–585 CE, 122
~ I, II, III, IV, V (Gûr), listed under Sâsânid
~ VI, = Bahram-i Chûbin Mîhrân
deity, 326, 327, 411
Kai ~, listed under Kai
son of Farrukhzad, listed under Ispahbudhân

Bahrâmiyan
Bahram ~, 68
Piruz ~, 68
*Mîhrân, 68
Bahrayn, 227
Bhurasir, see Veh Ardashir
baj, see taxes
Balâsh, see Bilash under Sâsânid
Balkan, 301
Balkh, 20, 73, 74, 76, 126, 139, 175, 266, 322, 405, 406, 426
Greco–Bactrian states, 360
Bâmdad, listed under Mazdak
Baraz, 260, 425
Bardara, 116, 117, 130, 403
barid, 145, 500
Barmakids, 175
Barshawadgan, 40
Bûrusma, 203
Basrah, 36, 190, 192, 227, 236–238, 243, 257, 272
Bäsüya, 434
battle
~ of Ahvaz, 236, 469
~ of Anbar, 200, 201, 468
~ of Ayn Tamr, 168, 201, 206, 468
~ of Bridge, 168, 198, 213–220, 283, 468
*, variants: Battle of al-Qarqas; al-Quss

513
INDEX

∼ of Buwayb, 218, 219, 468
∼ of Carrhae, 462
∼ of Dhât al-Salâsîl, 192–194, 468
∼ of Dûmat al-Jandal, 201, 468
∼ of Fîrâd, 168, 201, 468
∼ of Gaugamela, 358
∼ of Ĥuṣayd, 201, 468
∼ of Isfahân, 197, 213, 241, 247, 253, 469
∼ of Jalâlâ, 222, 234–237, 242, 244, 245, 257, 469
∼ of Kaskar, 201, 211, 212, 216, 468
∼ of Madhâr, 168, 193, 194, 218, 468
∼ of Maqr, 198, 211, 468
∼ of Mutâh, 201
∼ of Namârîq, 168, 207, 211–213, 468
∼ of Nîhâvand, 35, 175, 198, 215, 216, 222, 234, 241–244, 246–248, 252, 275, 469
∼ of Qâdisiya, 11, 35, 157, 186, 197, 216, 220, 222, 224, 226, 228, 230–236, 242, 244, 257, 269, 291, 469
∼ of Râm Hurmurz, 469
∼ of Tawûs, 238
∼ of Tustar, 469
∼ of Ubullah, 190–193, 198, 227, 237, 283, 468
∼ of Ullays, 195, 196, 198, 203, 211, 468
∼ of Veh Ardashîr, 199, 468
∼ of Wâj Rûdh, 248, 249, 278, 469
∼ of Walajah, 168, 195, 468
∼ of Yarmûk, 202
Kai Khusrow’s ∼ at Fârâb, 116
Bâvandîs, see Āl-î Bâvand
Bawi, listed under Ispahbûdhân
Bayhaq, 246
bazm (banquet), 389
Bêt Aramâyê, see Asûristân
Bet-Darâyê, 48
Bêzhan, listed under Karîn
Bihûndêniya, 434
Bihûfard, 6, 354, 393, 426–437, 439, 445, 451, 452, 459
† in 749 CE, 436
followers of ∼, 393, 436
Bihûfardîyê, see Bihûfard, followers
Bîlûsh, listed under Sâsânîd
Bînalîd, 417
Bisêtûn, 394
Bîstâm, 112, 213, 253, 261
Bîthynia, 1
Boe, listed under Ispahbûdhân
Bo lerd, 74
fortress of ∼, 71
gold mines of ∼, 71
Bolum, see Bolberd
Bozorg-Mehr, = *Dâdmîr Kârîn, 114, 126, 329
Brahmans, 328, 332, 419
bridge, see Battle of ∼
Buddhists, 175, 328, 330, 332, 335, 419
Bukayr b. Abdallâh, 278, 279, 469
Bukhârâ, 126, 406
Bulghûr, 314
bull, listed under Fereyðûn, Mihr worship, tauroctony, Taurus bulla, see seals
Bundahîshn, 339, 375, 376, 405, 411, 412, 446, 452
Bundos the Manichean, 344
Bunyân, 237
Bûrandukht, listed under Sâsânîd
Burázîh, see Gurázîh Sûren
Burs, 203
Burzûn Mihr, see fire of ∼
Burzûn Shâh, listed under Mihrân
Burzûnân, 364
Bûst, see Bîstâm
Buwayb, see Battle of ∼
Buyids, 394, 446, 454, 463
Byzantines, passim
Byzantium
city, see Constantinople empire, passim

C
Cabades, = Qubâd under Sâsânîd
Caesaria
∼ in Cappadocia, 141
∼ in Palestine, 177
cæsarpapism, 9, 500
INDEX

Caliph
† in 634, 207, 257
~ Hārūn al-Rashīd, (ruled 786–809), 165
~ Mahdī, (ruled 775–785), 316, 439
~ Mansūr, (ruled 754–775), 315, 316, 437–441, 445, 449, 451
~ Muʿāwiya, (ruled 661–680), 465
~ Mutasim, (ruled 833–842), 62
~ Sulaymān b. ʿAbdalmalik, (ruled 715–717), 310, 311
~ ʿUthmān, (ruled 644–656), 257, 259, 271

Caoses, = Kayūs under Sasanid
Carmenia, 50
Carrhae, see Battle of ~
Caspian
~ Sea, 19, 20, 36, 72, 92, 112, 231, 296, 300, 314
~ gates, 300
Caucasia, 24, 45, 53, 55, 73, 76, 116, 117, 125, 140, 231, 278, 279, 299, 300, 306, 454
Central Asia, 24, 310, 314, 406, 418, 419, 425
Chagād-i Dāītī, see Chinvat Bridge
Chaghānī, 382
Chalcedon, 1, 141
Chihr-Burzēn, = Simāh-i Burzīn
Karīn
Chinvat Bridge, 353, 432, 500
Chionites, see Kidarites
Chishmih-i Sü, 66
Chor (pass), 300
Chorasmia, see Khwārazm
Chosroids, see Arscacids, Georgian
Armenian ~, 12, 44, 349, 386–388, 390–392
Cilicia, 177
Circle of Justice, 59, 93, 342, 343, 346, 347, 352, 354, 356, 357, 368, 380, 390, 400, 457, 458
city
kingly ~, 38, 39, 500
polis, 38, 504
coins
~ of Arscacise I, 25
~ of Azarmidukht, 208
~ of Bārāndukht, 208–209, 217–218
~ of Bāhrām-i Chūbīn, 132
~ of Farrukh Hormozd, 205
~ of Hormozd I, 331
~ of Kai Pirūz, 385
~ of Khurshid Shāh, 378
~ of Khusrow Parviz, 137
~ of Vistāhm (Pirūz), 133
~ of Yazdgird III, 221–223, 246
Arscid ~, 360
confederacy
church–state ~, 35, 324–326, 333–336, 457
Constantine, see Emperor Constantine or Constans
Constantinople, see also Byzantium, 1, 30, 141, 143
Constantius, see Emperor Constantius
Copper Fortress, see Rūyīn Dīzī
Cow, listed under Fereydūn, Mihr
worship, tauroctony
Crassus, 462
Ctesian method, 9, 14, 113, 116–118, 278, 405, 462, 500
Ctesiphon, 35, 41, 68, 77–79, 81, 84, 127, 178, 180, 184, 195, 196, 198–200, 210, 215, 218, 219, 231, 234, 244, 245, 251, 289, 460
cura palatii, 126, 500

515
INDEX

D
Dâbûyids, progeny of Dâbûyih, listed under Ál-i Jâmâsp
Dâbûyih, listed under Ál-i Jâmâsp
Dûd-Bûrûz-Mîhr, see Dûdmîhr Kârîn
Dûdmîhr
~ Kârîn, listed under Kârîn
son of Farrukhân-i Bozorg, listed under Ál-i Jâmâsp
son of Khûrshîd, listed under Ál-i Jâmâsp
Dahae, 19, 20, 23, 25, 504
Dâh-hâk, 40, 354, 370–372, 374
dâ‘î, 416, 435, 449
Damas, 141, 207, 318
Damavand, 40, 47, 90, 253, 305, 309, 310, 369, 370, 372, 373, 469
*, see also Alburz
Dâmgân, 251
Dara, 102, 125, 141
Darband, 215, 216, 231, 242, 279, 280, 299, 300
dâr-i Mihr, 357, 375, 388
*, see also mithraeum, mithradâna
darîgbed, 126, 186, 500
Dasht-i Bûrin, 61
Daskhurants’i (historian), 300
Dastabâ, 243
dastîr, 391, 400, 500
dastgird, see city, kingly
Dastimaysân, 236
dastwar, 323, 324, 500
Datoyean, 139
dâwâ, 414, 416, 500
dayeakordî, 71, 74, 268, 500
Daylam, 40, 47, 72, 248, 302, 311, 442
dehkân, 85, 92, 211, 250, 260, 463, 500, 505
Dênkard, 88, 322, 323, 325, 327, 336, 337, 341, 480
derafsh-i Kavîyân, 117, 217, 371
dev-worship, 322, 328, 331
Dhâr al-Salâsîl, see Battle of ~
Dhû Qâr, 220
Dhu ’l-Hâjjîb, epithet of Bahman
Jâdhûyih, 196, 198, 202, 213, 217, 241, 247, 248, 253
† around 642 CE, 213, 248
Dhu ’l-Manâqib, = Farrukhân-i Bozorg under Ál-i Jâmâsp
dibhérân, 47
Dihistân, 19, 22, 23, 49, 116, 254
~ culture, 23
dihqân, see dehkân
Dîn, 243, 244, 252, 275, 469
Dinawar, 36
Dionysius (historian), 177
diwân, 227, 501
Diyârbakr, see Âmid
dizh
~i Kalânân, 367
Rûyîn ~, 126, 266, 406, 439, 441, 442, 446
Kang ~, 409, 412
driyosan jâdaggw ud dâdvar, see jâdûyih
drug, 322, 412
Dûmat al-Jandal, see Battle of ~
Dumbâvand, see Damavand
Dura Europos, see also mithraeum, at Dura Europos, 22, 389
dvandva, 331, 501
Dvin, 149
dynasticism, 2, 20, 35, 53–56
*, see also feudalism; étatism

E
Edessa, 177
Egyt, 20, 141–143, 335
Elia of Nisibis (historian), 299
Elmant’s, 300
Emperor
~ Constans II, (ruled 641–668), 176
~ Constantine, (ruled 306–337), 335
~ Constantius, (ruled 337–361), 334
~ Gordian III, (ruled 238–244), 400
~ Heraclius, (ruled 610–641), 1, 3, 30, 141, 142, 144, 145, 147–149, 151, 152, 174, 176, 177, 196, 201, 202, 456
~ Julian, (ruled 361–363), 57
† in 363 CE, 57
~ Justinian, (ruled 527–565), 102, 110

516
INDEX

~ Maurice, (*ruled 582–602*), 30, 127, 143, 154
   † in 602 CE, 143
~ Nero, (*ruled 54–68*), 43, 388
~ Philip the Arab, (*ruled 244–249*), 400
~ Phocas, (*ruled 602–610*), 143
~ Tiberius II, (*ruled 574, 578–582*), 93
~ Valerian, (*ruled 253–260*), 400

erān, 411
erān-dibhērbdh, 47, 501

Érānshahr, 33, 39, 40, 407–409
Éšm, see Kheshm
étatism, 2, 9–11, 26, 55, 56, 412, 456
*, see also feudalism; étatism
Euphrates, 177, 198, 389, 462
exaggerators, see ghulāt

F
Fahrān, listed under Āl-i Jāmāsp
Farghānah, 258
Farhād-i Mihr Burz̤in, 68
Faribuzr, listed under Mihrān
Farim, see Kūh-i Kārin
Farnbagh, see fire of Adhar ~
*, variants: far; farrah; xwərə;
khvarenah; p‘ark‘(Arm.); Kavyan
Fortune; x‘arənəh (Av.)
ram as symbol of ~, 48, 367, 391, 500

Farrukh Hormozd, listed under Ispahbudhān
Farrukhān
*, = Farrukh Hormozd
Ispahbudhān
~i Bozorg, listed under Āl-i Jāmāsp
~i Farrukhzād, listed under Ispahbudhān
~i Kuchak, listed under Āl-i Jāmāsp
cousin of Khurshid, listed under Āl-i Jāmāsp
Farrukhzād, listed under Ispahbudhān
Farrukhān Ādhamagan, 146
Farvardigān, 430
Fasā, 344
Faustus of Byzantium (historian), 156
Fereydūn, 77, 354, 370–377, 409, 414
~ and cow worship, 373
feudalism, 24–26, 37, 41, 49, 52–57, 66
*, see also dynasticism; étatism
Fīhīl, 207
Firād, see Battle of ~
Firāk Mihrān, see Shahrvarāz Mihrān
fire
~ of Ādhar Farnbagh, 328, 362, 363, 368, 378, 386, 458
~ of Adhar Gushnasp, 153, 328, 362, 363, 378, 386, 458
~ of Anāhīt-Ardashīr, 332
~ of Bahrām, 327, 362, 412
~ of Farāz-marā-əwar-khudāyā, 61
~ of Kārdādhān, 61
~ of Mājusnasān, 61
~ of Mihr Narsiyān, 61
~ of Zurvāndādžān, 61
~ temple in Karkoy, 364
as a deity, see Êzād-i Ādhar
ordeal by ~, 334, 356–357, 367
Firrim, see Kūh-i Kārin
*, variants: Khusrōu Fīrūz; Pirūz
Khusrōu; Ênew Khusrō; al-Bayrūzān; Bundār
† in 642 CE, 175, 198, 242, 243
INDEX

frashegird (Healing), 339, 501
Fus Farrukh, see Farrukh Hormozd
Ispahbudhān

G
Gandhara, 335
Gandzak, 149, 152, 153, 176
Gāthās, 322, 350, 394, 499, 501
Gaugamela, see Battle of
Gāvbarīh, Jīl-i Jīlāshāh the Cow Devotee, 292, 299, 302, 374, 377, 398, 440, 447, 459
Gawān, see Jābān
Gay, see Isfahān
Gelām, Gelk, see Gilān
Georgia, 43, 44, 48, 73, 74, 102
Gēv, 375
Gītarīg, 339, 346, 374, 429, 501
Gnostics, 330
gōhar, see agnicic
Golōn, see Görgōn Mihrān
Gorāz, see Shahrvarāz Mihrān
Gordian, see Emperor Gordian
Gorgōn Mīlād, 103, 117
Görgōn, see Görgōn Mihrān
gorz, see ox-headed mace
gōsān, 10
Gostahām, = Vistāhm
Gousanastades, see Gushnaspdād
Kanārangīyān
Greco–Bactrian states, see Balkh
Guaramids, see Arsacids, Georgian
Gūdarz, listed under Kārin
gumezishn (Mixture), 339, 501
Gurdūyih, 163
H
hadith, 165, 501, 505
Haftānbūkht, 367
Hājar, 226
Hājjāj b. Yūsuf, 309, 310
Hamadan, 90, 152, 243, 248, 249, 438, 469
hanāmand, 353
hargbed, 61, 501
al-Hārith b. Surayj, 426
Hārrān, see battle, Carrhae
Hārūn al-Rashīd, listed under Caliph
Hāshim b. Utbah, 235, 469
Hāshimiya, 317
Hāshimiya, 425
hazārbed, 60, 62, 63, 73, 100, 104, 501, 506
Hecatompylos, see Qūmis
Hellenistic, 23, 38, 48, 358, 387
Hephthalites, 75, 76, 114, 116, 126, 139, 267, 297, 299, 300, 380–382, 384, 386, 408, 410, 444
Heraclius, see Emperor Heraclius
Herāt, 65, 71, 139, 209, 266, 277, 463
Herodotus, 358
INDEX

hijra, 1, 15, 167–171, 190–195, 199,
200, 202, 214, 220, 235, 248, 253,
281, 283, 284, 317, 422, 449, 465
Hira, 69, 109, 170, 178, 190, 192, 198,
199, 202, 207, 211, 219, 227
Hishám b. Muḥammad, 172
Hormozd
~ I, II, III, IV, listed under Sasanid
~ V, = Farrukh Hormozd

Ispahbudhân
general, 191–196, 468
† around 629 CE, 193, 194, 196
son of Khursâd, listed under Al-i Jâmasp
son of Yazdgird II, listed under Sasanid
Hormozd-Ardashîr, see Ahvâz
Hrev, see Herât
Hudhayfah, 243, 248, 293
hûtî, see hutukhshân
Hulwân, 215, 216, 235, 242, 245, 315,
469
Humayd b. Qah tabah, 435, 449, 450
Huns, 65, 72–74, 299, 300, 382
*, see also Hephthalites, Kidarites
Hurmuzân, xii, 232, 233, 236–238,
240–242, 245, 247, 257, 469
Hurmuzjird, 203
Husayn, 465
† in 680 CE, 465
Hûshang, listed under Sasanid
Hûsayd, see Battle of ~ hutukhshân, 47
Hydaspes, see Vishtasp Achaemenid
Hyrcania, see Gurgân

I
ibâha ‘l-nisâ, 82, 93, 502
Iberia, 44, 50, 103
Iblis, 289, 502
Ibn al-Kalbî, 259
Ibn Ashvath Muḥammad, 309
Ibn Ishäq al-Turk, 425
Ibn Ishâq, 14, 172
Ikramah, 145, 172
Imâm, 293, 414, 425, 502
Indra (dev), 322
Innaios, 333

inscriptions
*, see also Kirdir
~ at Barīm-Kirdir, 332
~ at Naqsh-i Delak, 332
~ at Naqsh-i Rajab, 50
~ at Naqsh-i Rostam, 333
~ at Persepolis, 358
~ of Tiridates I, 388
~ of Taq-i Bustân, 326
Ardashîr I’s ~ at Naqsh-i Rostam
(ANRm), 361
Kirdir’s ~ at Naqsh-i Rajab
(KKRb), 327, 332, 333
Kirdir’s ~ at Naqsh-i Rostam
(KNRm), 327, 332
Kirdir’s ~ at Ka[b]a-i Zartusht
(KKZ), 327, 332
Kirdir’s ~ at Sar Mashhad (KSM),
327, 332, 333, 389
Shápür I’s ~ at Háji Abâd (SH), 48
Shápür I’s ~ at Ka[b]a-i Zartusht
(SKZ), 38, 49, 50, 64, 505
Shápür I’s ~ at Bishápür, 400
Darius’ ~ at Bisetün (Beh), 394
Narseh’s ~ at Paikulî (NPI), 321,
333
Iraq, 414, 444
Iraq, passim, 4, 15, 503
*, see also Mesopotamia
Išbahâd al-bilâd, see erân-spahbed
Isdigiousnas, see Izdagushasp Mîhrân
Isfahân, 49, 133, 136, 139, 197, 213,
238, 241, 242, 244–248, 253, 258,
259, 265, 301, 347, 438, 469, 514
*, see also Battle of ~
Isfandiyâr, listed under Ispahbudhân
Isfandiyârs, 49, 60, 135, 143, 375, 406
Ishmaelites, = Arabs
Ishtar, 387
Isnâd, 145, 162, 193, 218, 505
Ispahbud, xi, 114, 180, 185, 254–256,
265, 295, 302, 304–306, 309–314,
316, 317, 405, 426, 438, 440, 444,
445, 452, 459, 502, 505
*, see also spahbed
Ispahbudhân, 3, 8, 27, 42, 49, 63, 83,
96, 99, 101, 104, 106–108,
110–112, 115, 118, 122, 127–133,
INDEX


Ispahbudhān


†, variants: Parthian and Pahlav aspet; sparapet; Aspebedes (by Simocatta)
named Khurbundād(ūyih);
Kharrād, 107, 290
named Shāpūr, 106, 107, 290–292, 295, 471

Aspebedes, maternal uncle of Khusrow I, 106, 107, 111, 212, 268, 291, 292, 471
† around 532 CE, 111, 268

Bahrām, 279, 306, 308, 469, 471
Bawi, 107, 290, 471

†, variants: Bāv; Boe
Boe, 107, 290–292

Farrukh Hormozd, (ruled 631),

†, variants: Farrukhān;
Khurrūkhan; Farruhān; Fus Farrukh; Zādūhān Farrukh-i Shahrdārān; Pusfarrukh;
Saqrūkh; Khoīrākh Ormizd;
Hormozd V
†, sometimes confused with his son Farrukhzād

†, appears as Bāv in Tarīkh-i Tabaristan; see under Āl-i Bāvand
† in 631 CE, 185–187, 206, 207, 210

Farrukhān-i Farrukhzād, 251, 471

†, variants: al-Zinābī Abū 'l-Farrukhān; Vābī Farrukhān;
Khuhrāzād-Mīhr; Khoīrākhazat
†, sometimes called Farrukhān and confused with his father Farrukh Hormozd

†, appears as Bāv in Tarīkh-i Tabaristan; see under Āl-i Bāvand
† around 665 CE, 293, 294, 306–308, 451

Isfandiyār, 248, 249, 278, 279, 306, 308, 469, 471
†, variants: Jarmīdhih b. al-Farrukhzaż; Isfandiyādh b. al-Farrukhzār

† in 635 CE, 216, 228, 233–235, 244

Shahrām, 251, 471

Suhrāb, 293, 307, 308, 471

Tirūyih, son of Vistāhm, 163, 189, 212, 232, 468, 469, 471

†, variants: Vndoy; Bindūy;i; Binduwān; Bindū; Bindoes
† around 594 CE, 112, 132, 138, 155, 163, 189

520
INDEX

Vinduyih, son of Vistahm, 134, 163, 189, 212, 232, 468, 469, 471

*, variants: Bistam; Wistakhm (on seals); Gostaham; Vstam; Bestam
appears sometimes as Bāz in Tarikh-i Tabaristan; see under Āl-i Bāvand

† in 600 CE, 112, 137, 138, 155, 189, 297

Iṣṭakhr, see Stakhr
Istanbul, see Constantinople

J
Jabal b. Sālim, 461
Jābān, 190, 195, 196, 199, 211–213, 468
jadaggōw, see jādhuyih
jadhuyih, 107, 115, 195, 197, 258, 265, 501, 502
Ābān ~, *= Farrukhzād
Ispahbūdān, 197, 258, 264, 265
Bahman ~, variants: Dhu 'l-Ḥājib;
† around 642 CE, 213, 248
Hormozd ~, 197, 202, 203, 468
Rustam ~, *= *Rustam
Ispahbudhān, 197
Shahrvarāz ~, listed under Mīhrān
Jāhiz, 34, 402
Jālinūs, 157, 158, 213, 216, 217, 225, 226, 232, 460, 468
Jalula; see Battle of ~
Jāmāsp
brother of Qubād, listed under Āl-i Jāmāsp

K
Kaβa, 439, 443, 445, 447, 459, 502, 505
Kaβa-i Zartusht, see inscriptions
Kābul, 86
Kābulshāh, 46
Kadiköy, see Chalcedon
Kai
~ Khusrow, 39, 116–118
~ Bahram, 411, 412, 443, 446, 459
~ Kavad, 39, 385
~ Vishtasp, 385, 406
Kajū, 309
Kalat, 266
Kāmindār, daughter of Narsī, 192
Kamsarakan, 74
Kārinid descent of ~, 42
kanārang, 154, 261, 265–267, 269, 271, 272
Kanārangīyān, 3, 42, 49, 67, 68, 111, 154, 155, 173, 177, 233, 265–272,

521
INDEX


Kanārangiyān
Adhargulbād, 111, 267–269
† around 540 CE, 269
Abū Silt Kanārī, 276
Bahārm, 268, 269
Gushnaspdād, 267, 268
† around 488 CE, 268
*, variants: Kanārā; Kanāz
Kanārā, 154, 232
Salīm, 276
Shahriyar, 232, 233, 269, 469
† in 635 CE, 233, 269
Kandūsān, 309
kārdār, 61, 90
Kardārīgan, 92, 146
Kardarīgas, = Farrukh Hormozd
Ispahbudhān, 149
Karēn, see Karīns
Kārin
spāhbed of Khurshīd, listed under Kārin
son of Sukhrā, listed under Kārin
son of Phraat IV, listed under Arsacid

Kārin
Adhar Valāsh, 302, 303, 307
Aswār, 273, 274, 276, 469
Bīzhan, 117
Burzin Shāh, 273, 274, 276, 469
Dādzurzin, 113, 277
*, perhaps a Ctesian reflection of Dādmīhr below
Dādmīhr, 68, 114, 115, 121, 122, 126, 296, 302, 329, 379, 400
*, variants: Dādzurzinmihr; Burzmihr; Dād-Burz-Mihr (on seals); *Boz-Burz-Mihr; *Dādzurzin
† in 575 CE, 379
Gēv, 117
Gūdarz, 116, 117
Kārin, rebel against the Arabs, 277, 278, 469
† around 654 CE, 278
Kārin, son of Sukhrā, 113, 295
Kārin, spāhbed of Khurshīd, 314–316
Mardānshāh Maṣmughān, 253, 305, 309, 469
Mihr, son of Sukhrā, 379
† in 620 CE, 379
Perozamāt, 42
*, see also Kamsarākan
Qārīn, general, 193–196, 243, 468, 469
† around 630 CE, 194–196
Rahām, 117
Simāh-ī Burzīn, 119–122, 461
*, variants: Chihr-Burzēn (on seals)
† around 580–585 CE, 122
† around 495 CE, 81, 385
*Sunbād, 6, 275, 287, 315–317, 354, 376, 378, 405, 425, 426, 437–452, 458, 459
† in 755, 315–316, 438, 440, 444
Valāsh, 293, 294, 307–309
† around 674 CE, 308, 309
Zarmīhr, 73–75, 77
Zarmīhr, son of Sukhrā, 73, 81, 113, 114, 151, 209, 277, 295, 379
† in 558 CE, 379
Kārin (city), 71
karīz, see qanāt
Karka de Lēdān, 334
Karkeh (river), 334
Karkoy, listed under fire

karīz, see qanāt
522
INDEX

Kārnāmag-i Ardāshīr-i Pāpagān, 46, 366, 367, 378
Kartli, see Iberia
Kaskar, 212
*, see also Battle of ~
Kātishk', 65
Kavād, listed under Kai; for Qubād, see under Sāsānid
Kāveh, 370, 371
Kayānids, 33, 39, 77, 86, 103, 104, 126, 264, 335, 362, 367, 385, 386, 409–411, 458, 460, 462
*, see also Kai
Sāsānid pseudo-genealogy to ~, 33, 77, 335, 385–386
Kayūmarth, 9, 36, 370
Kāvar, listed under Sāsānid
Khālid b. Walīd, 4, 166, 168, 170, 190–193, 199, 200, 202, 281, 478
Khālid b. Khayyāt., 190, 203, 277
kharāj, see taxes
Kharijites, 309, 310
Kharrād-i Mihr Pīrūz, 68
Khashm, see Kheshm
Khazars, 123, 231, 279, 280, 299
Khekwand, 137
Khashm, xii, 407, 411, 445, 502
Khidash, 425
Khosrow, see Xusrāu; Chosroes ~ I (Nowshīrvān), II (Parviz), listed under Sāsānid
~ Shenūm, 140, 174, 235, 242, 243, 248, 249
*, = Smbat or Varaztirots’ Bagratuni
Khurramiya, 425
Khurshīd Shāh, listed under Āl-i Jāmāsp
Khushnavāz, 77
Khusrov, listed under Arshakuni
Khusrov-Shum, = Smbat or Varaztirots’ Bagratuni
Khusrow *, variants: Xusrau; Kisrā; Chosroes ~ I (Nowshirvān), II (Parviz), listed under Sāsānid
~ Shenūm, 140, 174, 235, 242, 243, 248, 249
*, = Smbat or Varaztirots’ Bagratuni
Khizravān ~, 130
Kai ~, listed under Kai
son of Yazgird I, listed under Sāsānid
Khuṭrāniya, 80
khwarāsān (east), listed under küst
Khwārazm, 39, 86, 290, 318, 321, 347, 360, 417, 419
khwarbarān (west), listed under küst
Khwarezmia, see Khwārazm
khwēdōdah, 429, 433, 434, 502
Kidarites, 76, 299
*, see also Hephthalites, Huns
Kirdīr, 327–333, 340, 348, 389, 431
*, see also under inscriptions
Kirmān, 39, 50, 209, 217, 222, 223, 246, 257, 265, 367, 469, 503
*, see also mint of ~
523
INDEX

al-Kirmâni, Juday b. ‘Ali, 426
Komsh, see Qûmis
Kopet Dâgh, 23, 417
∼ culture, 23
Koran, see Qurân
Koshm, see Qûmis
Kopet Dâgh, 23, 417
∼ culture, 23
Kürendagh, 417
Kûshân, 136, 137, 139, 297
Kûst, 39, 49, 95, 157, 503
∼ i khwarbarân, 40, 100, 106, 108, 115, 117, 131, 188, 215, 216, 221, 290, 503
∼ i nêmrôz, 39, 64, 95, 100, 120, 121, 150, 153, 156, 157, 173, 181, 215–217, 221, 407, 462, 503

L
Lafûr, 114, 295
Lakhmids, 69
Lârîjân, 370
Lazistân, 102, 103
letter (as topos)
∼ of Tansar, 40, 85–92, 328, 334, 361, 378

M
mace, see ox-headed mace
al-Madâ’in, see Ctesiphon
Madhâr, see Battle of ∼
Mâh Afrîdhan, 240
Mâh Dinâr, see Nîhâvand
Mâh Island, 158
Mâhâdharjushnas, 179–182, 192–194, 211, 212, 471
∗, variants: Mîh Ādhar Jushnas; Jushnasmâh; Mîhr Hâsis
† in 630 CE, 181, 182, 212
Mâhawayh, see Mâhûy
Mâhûy, 201, 468

Ādhar Valâsh’s ∼ to Yazdgird III, 303
Bahram-i Chûbûn’s ∼ to Mušel
Mamikonean, 128, 129
Farrukzây’s ∼ to the Arabs, 256
Kânârân’s ∼ s to the Arabs, 271–273
Khâlid’s ∼ to general Hormozd, 191, 193
Khâlid’s ∼ to the kings of Persia, 199, 200
Khâqân’s ∼ to Pûrûz, 383
Khosrow I’s ∼ to his pâdhûspân, 83
Khosrow II’s ∼ to Farrukhân, 144, 145, 149, 152
Khosrow II’s ∼ to Shahvarz, 144, 145, 152
Mâhûy’s ∼ to Yazdgird III, 260
Persian nobility’s ∼ to Shâpûr Mihrân, 75
Qubad’s ∼ to Sukhrâ, 79
Rustam’s ∼ to Farrukhzây, 156, 228–230
Shahvarz’s ∼ to Muthannâ, 203
Shirîyih Qubâd’s ∼ to Heraclius, 176
Shirîyih Qubâd’s ∼ to Khosrow II, 154
Vistâhm’s ∼ s to Khosrow II, 135
Yazdgird III’s ∼ to Farrukhzây, 262
Yazdgird III’s ∼ to Mâhûy, 265
Yazdgird III’s ∼ to the Kanârân, 265, 266

M
INDEX

Mahdī, listed under Caliph
Māhfarvārdīn, 426–428, 430
mahistān, 25, 503
Mahoe, see Māhūy
mahr, see marriage, dowry
Mahrspand, 334, 336, 345
Māhūy, 259–263, 265, 266, 277, 292, 469
Māhūyay, 183
Makrān, 336
Mamak, listed under Mamikonian
Mamikonian
Dawit’, 157, 232
Mamak, 133
Mušeł, 127, 128, 154, 399
Mušeł, son of Dawit’, 157, 232, 233, 469
† in 635 CE, 157, 233
Vahan, 71–75, 391
Mamikonians, 128, 129
Manādhir, 237
mang, 330, 431, 432, 503
Mānī, 325, 329–332, 345, 366, 428
† around 276 CE, 331, 332
Manṣūr, listed under Caliph
Manu, 325
Manūchīhr, 77, 342, 354, 375–378, 413, 414, 441, 444, 446, 447
Maqr, see Battle of ~
Mar ‘Ammo, 331
Mardānshāh
pādhūspān of Nimruz, listed under *Šūren
general, 212, 213
† in 631 CE, 212, 213
~ Masmūghān, listed under Kārīn
Pārsīg leader, probably Bahman
† around 642 CE, 213, 248
Margiana, see Marv
Marj al-Rāḥīṣ, 203
Marmara, sea of, 141
marriage
close-kin ~, see khwēdōdah
dowry (mahr), 429
Marv, 50, 139, 238, 246, 257, 259–261, 265, 272, 297, 360, 414, 417, 418, 426, 435, 445, 450
Marv al-Rūd, 39, 259, 426
Marwanids, 239
Maryam, queen, 174, 236
Mashtots’, 44, 386
Maṣqalāth b. Hubayrah al-Shaybānī, 308, 309
† around 676 CE, 309
Maurice, see Emperor Maurice
Maysān, 236
mazālim, 58, 503
Mázandarān, 72, 230, 369
*, see also Ṭabaristān
Mazdak, 40, 114, 289, 326, 342, 344, 345, 428, 434, 439
Zarādushṭ ~ the Older, 344, 345
Mazdakites, 81, 82, 86, 87, 93, 97, 289, 334, 336, 338–341, 344–346, 357, 377, 398, 429, 434, 507
Māziyār, 6, 287, 380, 437, 452, 458
Mebodes, 288
Mecca, 1, 167, 465
Media, 6, 20, 36, 40, 97, 130, 149, 152, 241, 321, 322, 347, 351, 360, 362, 438
Medina, 1, 167, 210, 465
mehean, see mithradāna, dār-i Mīhr
Mehekan, see Mihragān
mēnōg, 330, 339, 346, 503
mercantile economy, see trade
Mermeroes, listed under Mīhrān
iṣbahbadh al-bilād, = Shāpūr Rāzī
Mīhrān
Mesene, 347
Mesopotamia, 19, 37–39, 41, 50, 52, 140, 141, 166, 333, 347, 418
*, see also Iraq

525
religion of ∼, 339, 387
Mher, see Mihr
Mihr (mountain), 364
Mihr (village), 364
mihr duruji, 366, 367, 380, 391, 400, 407
*, see also Mithra
Mihr Ḵāxis, = Māhādharjūnas
Mihr Hormozd, listed under ∗Sūren
Mihr Narseh, listed under Sūren
∼ and Roman Mithraism, see Roman Mithraism
∼ and banquet scene, 389
∼ and hunting scene, 388
∼ and the Circle of Justice, see Circle of Justice
∼ in Armenia, 13, 359, 386–392, 397
∼ in Ferdowsī, 377, 399
Pishdādīs and ∼, 377
the cow in ∼, 364, 374, 375, 398, 447
Mihr, son of Sukhrā, listed under Kārin
Mihrak-i Nūshzādān, 46, 367
Mihrān
∼ al-Hamadānī, listed under Mihrān
∼-i Bahram-i Rāzī, listed under Mihrān
general of Pirūz, listed under Mihrān
sister of Khusrow II, listed under Sāsānīd
son of Bahram-i Chūbin, listed under Mihrān
Mihrān
Ashtād (dībīr), 50
Ashtār, 71–73, 75
Bahram Gushnasp, 125
† in 591 CE, 96, 129, 412
Fariburz, 102, 117
Gorgōn, 101–104, 107, 117, 125, 378, 405, 461, 470
*, variants: Gurgōn Milad; Gorgōn; Gōr-gōn (on seals); Glon; Golon Mihrwandelak
Gorduyih, 81
Izad Gushnasp, 71–75
Izadgushasp, 102, 117, 119–122
† around 580–585 CE, 119
supporter of Bahram-i Chūbin, 119
Mihrān, general of Pirūz, 73–75, 391
Mihrān-i Bahram-i Chūbin, 201, 206
Mihrān-i Bahram-i Rāzī, 232, 235, 245, 469
† around 637 CE, 235
Mihrān-i Hamadānī, 219, 227, 468
† around 631 CE, 219
Mihrānsitād, 103, 104, 117, 124
† around 592 CE, 124
Mihrbundadh, 219
Mihrfrūz, 72, 73
Mirranes, 102
Nastūh, 104, 117, 124
Pirān Gushnasp, 48
Rahām, 68, 71, 300, 379
Sed-hōsh, 101, 102, 104, 116, 117, 461
*, variants: Shēdūsh
Siyavakhsh-i Mihrān-i Chūbin, 206, 249–252, 263, 265, 304, 469
*, = "Siyavakhsh-i Rāzī
Siyavakhsh-i Rāzī, 206, 210, 250
*, = "Siyavakhsh-i Mihrān-i Chūbin
† in 631 CE, 206, 210
Shāpūr Rāzī, 79–81, 101, 103, 104, 111, 268, 269, 379
Shāpūr, 74, 75
INDEX

Shāpūr-i Shahrvarāz, (ruled *631), 202, 204, 205, 207, 210, 471
† in 631 CE, 210
Shahrēn, 48
Shahrīrāz, 279
*Shahrvarāz Jādhuyih, 197, 247, 469
† in 642 CE, 247
†, variants: Gorāz; Pīrag-i Shahrwarāz (on seals); Khoēram
† in 630 CE, 182–184, 203, 207, 209
Shahrvarāz, commander of the cavalry, 219, 468
† around 631 CE, 219
Shahrvarāz, ruler of al-Bāb, 231, 254, 279, 280, 306, 469

Mihrānsitād, listed under Mihrān
Mihrbundādāh, listed under Mihrān
Mihrdād, see Mithradates
Mihrewanak, 103, 378, 399, 400, 402, 404, 447, 458
Bahram-i Chūbin ~, see Bahram-i Chūbin Mihrān
Golon ~, see Gorgōn Mihrān
Mihrigān, 354, 371–373, 375, 388, 503
Mihrjān, see Mihrigān

Mihrijān (village), 372
Mihrijān Qadhaq, 236, 237, 240
mijnord, 74, 392
Milad, = Mithradates I Arsacid mint
~ WYHC, 209, 222
~ of Āmul, 209
~ of Ardashir Khurrah, 217
~ of Gurgān, 209
~ of Herāt, 209
~ of Hormozd Ardashir, 217
~ of Kirmān, 209, 217, 222, 223
~ of Nishāpūr, 209
~ of Nihāvand, 205
~ of Qum, 209
~ of Rayy, 209
~ of Sistān, 217, 221, 222
~ of Stakhhr, 205, 217
~ of Visp-shad-Husrav, 209, 222
Mirian III Chosroid, see also Arsacids, Georgian, 44
Mihrānid descent of ~, 44

Mirūy, 230
Mishkhuryār, father of Manūchihr, 376, 447

*, see also Mihr worship; mijnord
*, variants: Mitra; Mihr; Mher
~ as Apollo, 360
~ as judge, 351–357, 366, 368, 373, 383, 391, 400, 404, 500, 505
~ as the sun, 327, 354, 357, 372, 376, 378, 383, 384, 388–390, 393, 432
~ic mysteries, see Roman Mithraism
eschatological role of ~, 353, 371, 379, 405, 407, 411, 432
mace of ~, see ox-headed mace
three functions of ~, 334, 352–356, 364, 367, 371, 373, 376, 380, 388, 400, 411, 433
mīthradānā, 388
*, see also mithraeum
INDEX

Mithradates, listed under Arsacid
mithraeum, 375, 388, 503, 506
*, see also mithradâna, dâr-i Mihr
~ at Dura Europos, 389
Mithras, 374, 375, 402, 503, 506
*, see also Roman Mithraism
miyânchîgh, see Mithra, as judge
môbad, 33, 46, 61, 62, 66, 68, 90, 91,
114, 120, 288, 289, 303, 327, 331,
344, 365, 368, 375, 378, 403, 404,
412, 427, 431, 436, 458, 501, 503,
504
môbadhân ~, 46, 47, 61, 90, 91, 344,
365, 503
Mu'âwiya, listed under Caliph
mu'âfattish, 88, 89
Mughîrah b. Shubah, 228, 247
Muhammad (Prophet), 4, 6, 162, 167,
193, 226, 255, 271, 282–285, 434,
465, 501, 505
† in 632 CE, 4, 162, 166, 168, 170,
191, 282–284
as Seal of the Prophets, 434
Mundhir, king of Hira, 69
al-Muqanna, 425
Muqarrin, listed under Nu'mân;
Nu'mân; Suwayd
Murghab, 23
~ culture, 23
Musaylimah, 190, 191
Musheł, listed under Mamikonean
Muslimiya, 425
Murshad, see Battle of ~
Mūtā (Daylam), 248, 469
Murtasim, listed under Caliph
Muthannâ b. Hâritha, 166, 178, 192,
202, 203, 207, 210, 211, 218–220,
227, 468
Mystacon, Magister Militum per
Armeniam, 128

N
Nabateans, 36
Nabu, 327
nâf, see agnic
Nahr al-Marât, 192
Nahr Tirâ, 237
Nakhîrjân, see naxarar

Namâriq, see Battle of ~
Namazga VI culture, 23
Nâmdar Jushnas, 180, 181, 196
Namir, 169, 201, 202
Nâna, 327
Nanê, 387
Naranka, ⇔ Andragoras
Narsô, listed under Sasanid
Narsî
brother of Mähâdharjushnas, 192,
211–213, 468, 471
son of Jämâsp, listed under Âl-i
Jâmâsp
Naṣr b. Sayyâr, 426
Nu'mân b. Afgham Naṣrî, 276
Nastûh, listed under Mhrân
Nasu (dev), 322
naxarar, 43, 136, 153, 154, 243, 387,
391, 504
*, variants: naxvadar;
Nakhîrjân; Tukhâr
naxvadar, see naxarar
némroûz (south), listed under kûst
Nero, see Emperor Nero
Nestorians, 419
Nâwâ-Shâbuhr, see Nishâpûr
Nâw Khusrow, see Fûrûzân
Nicanor, 389
Nihâvand, 244
*, see also Battle of ~
*, see also mint of ~
Kûrânid domains of ~, 49, 115, 243
Nikbi ben Massoud (historian), 187
nîmrûz (south), listed under kûst
Nisâ, 22, 266, 276, 305, 318, 359, 389,
417, 418
Nishâpûr, xi, 39, 65, 70, 71, 113, 139,
209, 270–274, 276, 277, 304, 305,
308, 318, 364, 372, 417, 426, 427,
435, 437, 438, 441, 442, 445,
447–450, 463, 469
*, see also mint of ~
Nizak Tarkhân, 260
Nowbahâr, 175
Nowrûz, 363, 371, 378, 402, 503–505
Nu'mân b. Muqarrin, 248, 250–253,
304, 469
Nubia, 143  
Numān b. Muqarrin, 241, 469

O  
oath breaking, see mihr duruji  
Oman, 227  
Ormi, see Urumiya  
Ormozd, see Ahūra Mazdā  
Orodes, listed under Arsacid  
Oshoene, 177  
ōstāndār, 247, 504  
ox-headed mace, 371, 372, 374, 375  
*, variants: gorz-i gāvsar; gurz; mace of Mithra  
Oxus, 126, 139, 229, 240, 276, 383, 406

P  
Padhashkhwār, 40, 47, 288, 289, 294, 295, 300, 370, 408–411, 440–443, 445, 446, 459  
*, see also Ṭabaristān  
padhghuspān, see padhvuspān  
padhvuspān, 83, 143, 157, 158, 181, 197, 247, 248, 274, 307, 504  
Paḥlav, see Parthians  
Panjikant, 419  
Pārmūdīh, 400  
Parnabazids, see Arsacids, Georgian  
Parni, 19, 20, 23, 25, 504  
Pārsīg, passim  
Parsis, 327, 504  
Partav (in Arrān), see Barī-dā  
Parthava, 20, 42, 504  
Parthian and Pahlaw aspet, see Asparapet Ḩispābdān  
Parthians, passim  
Pashütān, 409, 412  
Patizhahar, see Padhashkhwār  
Paykand, 406  
Pekeriç, see Bagayarich  
Perozāpāt, see Barī-dā  
Persepolis, 359  
Persis, 22, 27, 36, 49, 53, 56, 67, 98, 120, 123, 125, 130, 156, 215, 322, 333, 335, 358, 360–362, 402  
Petra, 103  
peymān (contract), see Mithra  
Phabrizius, see Fāruburz Mihrān  
Philip, see Emperor Philip  
Phocas, see Emperor Phocas  
Phraat, listed under Arsacid  
Phraates, ⇔ Phraat V Arsacid  
Phthasouarsan, ⇔ Kayūs under Sāsānīd  
Pirag-i Shahvarāz, see Shahvarāz  
Mihrān  
Persī, 22, 27, 36, 49, 53, 56, 67, 98, 120, 123, 125, 130, 156, 215, 322, 333, 335, 358, 360–362, 402  
Petra, 103  
peymān (contract), see Mithra  
Phabrizius, see Fāruburz Mihrān  
Philip, see Emperor Philip  
Phocas, see Emperor Phocas  
Phraat, listed under Arsacid  
Phraates, ⇔ Phraat V Arsacid  
Phthasouarsan, ⇔ Kayūs under Sāsānīd  
Pirag-i Shahvarāz, see Shahvarāz  
Mihrān  
Persī, 22, 27, 36, 49, 53, 56, 67, 98, 120, 123, 125, 130, 156, 215, 322, 333, 335, 358, 360–362, 402  
Petra, 103  
peymān (contract), see Mithra  
Phabrizius, see Fāruburz Mihrān  
Philip, see Emperor Philip  
Phocas, see Emperor Phocas  
Phraat, listed under Arsacid  
Phraates, ⇔ Phraat V Arsacid  
Phthasouarsan, ⇔ Kayūs under Sāsānīd
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Page Ranges</th>
<th>Additional Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>~ II, Shīrūyih Qubād</td>
<td>191–194</td>
<td>son of Māhādharjushnas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>son of Jāmāsp, <strong>listed under Sāsand</strong></td>
<td>468, 471</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>† around 630 CE, 194</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quchān, 19, 293</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qūhistan, 113, 246, 307, 427</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quintus Curtis (historian), 358</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qūlah, see Kūlā</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qum, 252, 438</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qumis, 39, 90, 112, 137, 139, 250, 251, 253, 255, 296, 315, 417, 442, 447, 460, 469</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qurān, 501, 502, 505</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qutaybah b. Muslim al-Bahili, 223, 310, 311, 314</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>† around 714 CE, 310, 311</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibn Qutaybah, 178</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rádyih Kūh, 266</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rādihkān, 266</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rahām, <strong>listed under Kārin; Mihrān</strong></td>
<td>88, 447</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rāis, 88, 447</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rām Pirūz, 381, 386, 406</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rām Hurmurz, 236, 237, 469, 514</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*, see also Battle of ~</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rashnu, 353, 357, 389, 401, 409, 411, 412, 432, 505</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rāvāśtar, see artēshṭārān</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rathāshṭārān sālār, 61, 63, 505</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ratu, see dastwar</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*, see also mint of ~</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*, variants: Razz; Reyy; Rhaga</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>~ and the Mihrāns, 68, 80, 124, 125, 127, 189, 206, 249, 264, 265, 296, 304, 305, 376, 409, 438, 441, 460</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rev, Iberian king, see also Arsacids, Georgian, 44</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rewan, 71</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhaga, see Rayy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ribā b. ‘Amir, 227</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ridda wars, 4, 162, 166, 190, 193, 237, 282, 284, 505</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rig Veda, 352</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riwand, 364</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rizām b. Sābiq, 425</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roman Mithraism, 6, 24, 350, 358, 359, 374, 375, 388, 389, 402, 459, 503, 506</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romapāda, 355</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rome, see also Byzantium, 20–22, 24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rostam, Kostom, see Rustam</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rowshan Pirūz, 381, 386</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rōyān, see Rūyān</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rūdbār, 229, 230</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*, see also Oxus</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumiyūzan, 143</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*, = Shahvarāz Mihrān</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rūs, 280</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rustaham, <strong>listed under Sūren</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rustam, <strong>listed under Ispahbudhān</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>~ Jadhūyih, <strong>listed under jadhūyih mythical ~</strong>, 76, 118, 375, 462</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rūyān, 40, 135, 136, 307, 376</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rūzbih, 201, 468</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>† around 630 CE, 201</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sābāt, 219, 231</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabzivār, 364</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sād b. ‘As, 272, 293</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sādīh, 363, 378, 402, 505</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sahak I the Great, 43, 60</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sūrenid descent of ~, 60</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saint Acindynus, 387</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saint George the Soldier, 388</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saint Gregory the Illuminator, 44, 387, 390</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sūrenid descent of ~, 44, 131</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saint Sergius, 337</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sālīh-i Miknāq, 309</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Šalim, <strong>listed under Kanārangiyān</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saljuqs, 422</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sām Narimān, 354</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samak, 378</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samak-i ‘Ayyār, 22</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

530
INDEX

Samanids, 394, 454, 463
sanad, see isnad
Sandaramet, see Spandarmad, 387
Saothyant, see Sothyant
Shapuh Mihran, see Shapur Mihran
Saqasayn, 314
Sarakhs, 260, 417, 418
Sari, 261, 307, 308, 311, 317
Saruyih, listed under Al-i Jamasp
Sasanian
∼ historiography, 34–36
∼ propaganda, 9, 10, 22, 33–35, 459
∼ kings, listed under Sasanid
Sasanid
Adhar Narseh, son of Hormozd II, 56
† in 309 CE, 56
Adur Anahid, daughter of Shapur I, 331
Ardashir I, (ruled 224–241), 8, 38, 42, 45–47, 49–51, 56, 64, 83, 85–87, 224, 324, 327, 337, 343, 361, 366, 367, 378, 404
Ardashir II, (ruled 379–383), 42, 57, 58, 335, 368
† in 383 CE, 57
*, variants: Ardashir b. Shiria; Ardashir Shiruyih
† in 630 CE, 169, 181, 183, 188, 196, 198, 199, 209
† in 631 CE, 185–187, 207–210, 217
Babak, 333, 368, 385
*, variants: Bor; Turan Dukht; Dukht-i Zaban; Puran
† in 632 CE, 185, 218, 220
Bahramp I, (ruled 273–276), 331–334
† in 276 CE, 331
Bahramp II, (ruled 276–293), 21, 327, 332–334, 348
† in 293 CE, 327
Bahramp III, (ruled 293), 332
† in 293 CE, 332
Bahramp IV, (ruled 388–399), 58
† in 399 CE, 58
Bilash, (ruled 484–488), 75–78, 267, 379, 382–384, 471
Hushang, 288
Hormozd Ardashir, 21
Hormozd I, (ruled 272–273), 46, 47, 331, 333, 334
Hormozd II, (ruled 302–309), 56, 334
† in 309 CE, 56
Hormozd III, (ruled 457–459), 71, 300, 381, 382, 471
† in 459 CE, 71, 381
† in 590 CE, 96, 123, 127, 132, 155, 409, 413, 444
Byzantine wars of ∼, 123, 146
Hormozd, son of Yazgidgird II, 70
Jamasp, brother of Kushrow I, 110, 111, 268, 471
† around 532 CE, 111
Jamasp, brother of Qubad, (ruled 497–499)
*, listed under Al-i Jamasp

∼’s war against the Turks, 380


∼’s war against the Turks, 139

† in 628 CE, 4, 8, 150, 155, 156, 158, 172–174, 262, 298, 337

armies of ∼, 136, 142, 148, 154

Byzantine wars of ∼, 1, 110, 140–145, 147, 153, 297
deposition of ∼, 140, 142, 147, 148, 151–159, 161, 171, 173, 175, 177, 180, 181, 189, 213, 232, 269, 298, 399

Khusrow III, 155

Khusrow, prince, 67, 69, 109

Mihhrān, sister of Khusrow II, wife of Shahrvarāz, 205, 471

Narseh, (ruled 293–302), 63, 321, 331, 333


∼, variants: Peroz; Firuz

† in 484 CE, 75–77, 298

Hephthalite wars of ∼, 74–77, 299, 380–384


∼, variants: Cabades; Kavad; Kouades

† in 531 CE, 113, 288, 301, 385

Qubād, son of Jāmāsp, 111, 268

Sāsān, 5, 8, 42, 125, 127, 130, 157, 173, 182, 249, 331, 368, 385, 439, 445, 466, 452

Shāpūr I, (ruled 241–272), 8, 21, 38, 46–48, 50, 56, 83, 325, 331, 332, 340, 348, 400, 505

Shāpūr II, (ruled 309–379), 52, 56–58, 83, 92, 128, 326, 334, 335, 340, 345, 347–349, 368

† in 379 CE, 58

Shāpūr III, (ruled 383–388), 57, 58, 349, 368

Shāpūr, son of Kayūs, 289, 471

† circa 579–590 CE, 289

Shāpūr, son of Yazdgird I, 43, 68

† in 420 CE, 43, 68


∼, variants: Shirā b. Kislā; Qubād II

† in 628 CE, 177, 178, 191, 209

Shahriyār, brother of Shirūyih Qubād, 471
† in 628 CE, 175
Yazdgird I, (ruled 399–420), 58–62, 64–69, 109, 110, 266, 325, 335, 340, 347, 348, 363
~ the Sinner, 59, 66, 67, 267, 335
† in 420 CE, 43, 66, 68, 69, 109, 267, 389
† in 457 CE, 71, 300
† in 651 CE, 2, 220, 257, 259, 263, 272, 292, 293
Zarîr, brother of Bilâsh, 76
Sâvih Shah, 399, 400, 402
*, see also küst-i khwarâsân
spâhbed of ~, 108, 109, 131
† around 796 CE, 165
seals
~ of Chihr-Burzên, 99, 121, 122, 461, 470
, ⇒ Simâh-i Burzîn Kârîn
~ of Dâd-Burz-Mîhr, 99, 100, 115, 120, 121, 216, 296, 302, 364, 379, 400, 470
, ⇒ Dâdmihr Kârîn
~ of Gûr-gûn, 99–104, 107, 117, 461, 470
, ⇒ Gûrgûn Mîhrân
~ of Pirag-i Shahrwarâz, 99–102, 110, 142, 150, 152, 153, 182, 470
, ⇒ Shahrvarâz Mîhrân
~ of Sêd-hôsh, 99–102, 104, 107, 116, 117, 461, 470
, ⇒ Sêd-hôsh Mîhrân
~ of Wêch-Shâbûhr, 99–101, 156, 216, 461, 470
~ of Wâhrâm Âdurmûh, 99, 101, 120–122, 124, 470
,  ⇒ Bahram-i Mâh Âdhar
~ of Wistakhm, 63, 99, 104, 107–110, 470
, ⇒ Vistâhâm Ispahbûdân
Sêd-hôsh, listed under Mîhrân
Sefidanj, 414
Seleucia, 20, 389
Seleucids, 19, 20, 37, 321, 360, 361
Seleucus, 19, 389
Shâhanshâh, 48, 56, 182, 463, 505
Shâhîn, 141, 143, 146, 151
shahrab, 38, 49, 238, 505
Shahrâm, listed under Ispahbûdân
Shahrâm Pirûz, 381
Shahrapan Bandakan, 139
shahrâdan, 48, 55, 505
shahrîg, 238, 274, 505
Shahrîrâz, listed under Mîhrân
Shahrîyâr, listed under Kânârângîyân
Shahrkhwâstân, maternal cousin of Khurshid Shâh, 314, 471
Shâhruûd, 364
Shahrvarâz
*, listed under Mîhrân
~ Jâbdûyîh, listed under *Mîhrân ruler of al-Bâb, listed under Mîhrân
Shalâb, 373
Shamṭâ, 175
Shâpûr
*, listed under Mîhrân
~ I, II, III, listed under Sâsânid
~ Kharrâd, ⇒ Asparapet Ispahbûdân son of Yazdgird I, listed under Sâsânid
Shâpûr Râzî, listed under Mîhrân
Shêdôsh, see Sêd-hôsh Mîhrân

533
INDEX

Shemirān, 266
*, variants: Shamilān
Shirāz, 79, 81
Shirin, wife of Khusrow II, 174, 471
Shiruyih Qubād, listed under Sāsānid
Shirzād, 200, 201, 468
Shīz, 333
Shūrūbiya, 230, 457, 460
Siyyūl Oracles, 34
Simāh-i Burzin, listed under Kārin
Simnān, 310
Sirāwand, 427
Sīsāniya, see Bihāfarīd, followers
Sistān, 39, 49, 50, 64, 77, 130, 150,
155–159, 177, 215, 217, 221, 222,
246, 257, 322, 364, 454, 461, 463,
469, 503
*, see also mint of ~
Siunik‘, 349
Siwni
Grigor, 157, 232, 233, 469
† in 635 CE, 157, 233
Step‘an, 133
Siyah, 238–240, 245, 469
Siyahgīrīd, 382
Siyāvakhsh
~i Mihrān-i Chūbīn, listed under Mihrān
~i Rāzī, listed under Mihrān
Slav, 299, 301
slaves, 38, 63, 90
Smbat, listed under Bagratuni
Smbat (Armenian general), 300
Sogdians, 48, 318, 321, 328, 347, 366,
419, 437
Sorūsh, 353, 371, 401, 402, 409, 411,
432, 459, 500, 505
Sōshyant, 412, 505, 506
Spahān, see Iṣfahān
spāḥbed, xi, 61, 94, 95, 98–110, 112,
114–117, 120–123, 125, 128, 129,
131, 132, 138, 142, 143, 150, 151,
153, 155–157, 173, 180, 181, 185,
186, 196, 205, 216, 250, 252, 254,
256, 259, 260, 262, 263, 272,
274–277, 290, 295–298, 302, 305,
314–316, 376, 379, 400, 405, 424,
447, 448, 450, 461, 462, 470,
501–506
*, see also ispahbud
Spandarmad, 49, 387, 499
Spandīyādh, see Isfandiyār
sparapet, see also Asparapet
Iṣpahbudān
Mamikonean ~, 105, 128
Sraoša, see Sorūsh
Stakhīr, 239, 245, 290, 291, 327,
331–334, 385, 469
*, see also mint of ~
*, variants: Iṣṭāqhr; Staxr
Strabo (historian), 25
stūrī, see marriage, substitute
Suflān, 310
Suhrāb, listed under Āl-i Bāvand
Sukhrā, listed under Kārin
Sūl, 253–255, 304, 312, 469
Sulaymān b. ‘Abdalmalik, listed under Caliph
sun worship, see Mithra as the sun
Sunbād, listed under * Kārin
Sūq al-Ahwāz, 237
Suqlāb, see Slav
Surāqāh b. ‘Abdalrahmān, 280
Surāqāh b. ‘Amr, 280, 469
Sūrēn, son of Phraat IV, listed under Arsacid
Sūrēn
* Anak, 106, 131
Ardashīr, 50
Gondofarr, 504
Gurāzīh, 60
Kārdār, son of Mihr Narseh, 61
Kalbūy, 230
* Māhūy, 259–263, 265, 266, 277,
292, 469
Mājusnas, 61
* Mardānshāh, 157, 158, 181, 197
† in 626 CE, 158, 197
* Mihr Hormozd, 157–159, 173, 501
Mihr Narseh, 60–62, 64–66, 68, 70,
71
Rustaham Surena, 64, 76, 462, 504
Rustam, 117, 118
Zurvāndād, 61

534
INDEX

Surena, = Rustaham Sūren
Susa, 236–238, 245, 334, 337
Suwayd b. Muqarrin, 178, 192, 253–256, 303, 469
Syria, 4, 20, 40, 141, 143, 144, 168, 172, 199–202, 280, 281, 318

T
., see also Māzandarān;
Padhashkhwār̄gar
Ṭabasayn, 246, 257
Taghlib, 169, 201, 202
Ṭāhirids, 272, 454
Ṭahmūrāth, 264
Ṭāliqān, 139, 259
Tamīm, 165
Tammīsha, 114, 311, 374
Tansar, 85–87, 328, 332, 338
., see also Letter of Tansar
tanūtār, 140, 154, 174, 506
Ṭaq-i Kūsārā, 84
Tarōn, 128, 390
Tarsus, 177
tauroctony, 374, 375
Taurus (constellation), 373
Ṭawūs, see Battle of ~
taxes, 41, 61, 69, 90, 112, 114, 146, 175, 229, 237, 253, 280, 342, 343, 346
bāj, 79
kharāj, 90, 254, 273, 279, 288, 316, 501, 502
poll ~, 91, 191, 193, 228, 247, 255, 279, 382, 436, 502
reform, 82, 85, 89, 90, 123, 379, 381
Ṭāziyān (Arabs), 407
T'ēodoros Rshṭunī, 280, 469
 prince of Armenia, 176
Thomas of Marga (historian), 175
Tiberius, see Emperor Tiberius
Tigris, 199, 203, 389
Tikrit, 219
Tir, 163, 387, 402
Tiridates, listed under
Arshakuni; Arsacid
Tirmidh, 382
Tirūyiḥ, listed under Ispahbudhān
Tisfūn, see Ctesiphon
tōkhtm, see agnatic
Tōṣar, see Tansar
traitor (as topos), 243, 251
Transcaucasia, 149
Transoxiana, 5, 22, 74, 76, 279, 310, 311, 314, 382, 406, 418, 419, 426, 428, 435, 437, 464
Trdat, see Tiridates Arshakuni
treasury (as topos)
Abū Muslim’s ~ acquired by
Jawhar, 439
Abū Muslim’s ~ acquired by
Sunbād, 315, 438, 440–442, 444, 445, 447
Afrāsīyāb’s ~ acquired by
Padhashkhwār̄gar Shāh, 408, 410, 443, 445
Khāqān’s ~ acquired by Bahram-i Chūbīn, 410, 442, 445
Mihrān’s ~ acquired by
Farrukhzād, 251
Pirūz’s ~ acquired by Sukhrā, 79
Smbat Bagratuni’s ~ acquired by
the Arabs, 243
Sunbād’s ~ acquired by Khurshid, 315, 316, 440, 441, 443
Yazgird III’s ~ acquired by
Farrukhzād, 244, 245, 258
Trogus (historian), 25
True Cross, 176
Tukhrār, see Varaztirot’s Bagratuni
tukhār, see naxar or tanūtār
INDEX

Tukharistan, 139
Tu'mas, 176
Tuń-Huang, 406
Tūrāns, 33, 77, 375, 376, 406, 414
Turkistān, 288, 314, 374
Turkmenistan, 23
Turks, 92, 139, 270, 400, 405, 407, 408, 410, 421, 428
Tūs
   commander of Kān Khusraw, 117
   *Asparapet Ispahbūdān cousin of Khursūd, listed under Āl-i Jāmāsp
Tustar, 237–240, 245
   *see also Battle of ~

U
   Ubaydullāh b. Yazīd, 309
   Ubullah, see Battle of ~; Baṣra
   Ulamā, 324
   Ullās, 190
   *see also Battle of ~
   Umar, listed under Caliph
   Umar b. Nuṣāman, 461
   Umar-i Fannāq, 309
   Umayyads, see also Caliph, 5, 35, 313, 315, 418, 420, 422, 426, 437, 449, 450, 454, 463
   Ummma, 1, 166, 505, 506
   Ummat al-Raḥmān, listed under Āl-i Jāmāsp
Urartā, 43
Urūk, 20, 387
Urumiya, 125, 152
Usayyid, 165, 233
Ushētār, 412
Ushētār-māḥ, 412
Ustaḍsīs, 354, 408, 437
   Utbah b. Farqād, 279
   Utbah b. Ghazwān, 168, 190, 193, 227, 237, 469
   Uthmān, listed under Caliph
   Uyghurs, 406

V
   Vachē, king of Albania, 300
   Vahagn, 389, 390
   < Av. Vṛṣṭravāna, 362, 390, 411, 432, 440, 459
   ~ and Mihir, 390
   ~ as Bahram, see Bahram
   Vahan, listed under Mamikonian
   Vahewuni rebellion, 133–134, 301, 302
   Vakhtang I Gorgasali, 73
   Valakhsh, = Vologeses Arsacid
   Valerian, see Emperor Valerian
   Vand Omīd Kūh, 114, 295
   Vanda Hormozd, son of Khurshīd, listed under Āl-i Jāmāsp
   Vandarand, listed under Āl-i Jāmāsp
   Varāz, 50
   Ardeshir ~, 50
   Varaztirot's Javītān, listed under Bagratunī

Varena, 370
varjāvand, see Hāftānbukht
Varrames, see Bahram Kanārangiyān
Varuna, see also Apmān Napāt, 351, 352, 354, 357, 499
   *variants: Vouruna Apmān Napāt
   Varazvālān, 349
   vāspūhrān, 48, 55, 506
   vastryōṣhyant, see vastryōṣhān
   vastryōshān, 47
   vastryōshān sālār, 47, 61, 63, 506
   Veh Ardeshir, 38, 77, 199, 200, 209, 468, 514
   *see also Battle of ~
   Veh-az-Amīd-Kavād, 209
   Vehrōt, see Ouxus
   Vendidad, see Videvdād
   victory (deity), see Bahram < Av. Vṛṣṭravāna
   Videvdād, 322, 360, 369
   Vilāš, listed under Kārīn
   Vindūyih, listed under Ispahbūdān
   Vis o Rāmīn, 22
   Vishtāspā, listed under Kai;
   Achaemenid
   Vistāhm, listed under Ispahbūdān
   Vohu Manah, see Bahman

536
Vologeses, listed under Arsacid; for Bilāsh, see under Sāsānid
Vram, see Bahram
Vrkan, see Gurgan

W
Wahrām Adurmāh, see seals of ~
Wāj Rūdh, see Battle of ~
Walajah, see Battle of ~
Waqqās, Sād b. Abū, 185, 226, 231, 234, 237, 469
wastār-i ǔshān sālār, see vāstryōshān sālār
wealth (as topos), 227, 238, 251, 280, 314
Wēh-Shābuhr, see seals of ~ probably a Sūren, 156
Wēh-Shāpur, 332
White Forest, 409
Wistakhm, see Vistāhm Ispahbūdān wizarishn (Redemption), 339, 506
wuzurg framādār, 62, 506
wuzurgān, 48, 506

X
Xenophon (historian), 358
Parthian reedition of ~, 159, 262, 264, 462–463

Y
Yamāmah, 190, 193
Yarmūk, see Battle of ~
Yasht, 335, 350, 352, 375, 394
Yazdān, see Izad Gushnasp Mihrān
Yazdgird I, II, III, listed under Sāsānid
Yazdīn, 175
Yazdūnasp, see Izadgushasp Mihrān
Yazid b. Muhallab, 310–313
Yazid b. Siyāh al-Uswārī, 240
Yemen, 40, 116, 117
Yemo, 325
Yēzatvānasp, see Izad Gushnasp Mihrān
Yima, see Jamshīd

Z
Zābulistān, 68, 77, 113, 117, 209, 229, 277, 278, 295, 385, 408
Zād Farrukh, 146–152, 155
*, = Farrukh Hormozd or Farrukhžād Ispahbūdān
Zāmāsp, see Jāmāsp under Āl-i Jāmāsp
Zames, see Jāmāsp, brother of Khusrow I, under Sāsānid
Zamzami, see mōbad
Zand, 124, 326, 336, 341, 342, 403, 428, 507
Zand i Vahuman Yasn, 405, 409, 411, 446
zandik, 165, 332, 341, 342, 345, 349, 428, 507
Zarādushti, see Mazdak
Zarang, 40
Zardmanos, 300
Zārīm, 316
Zarmīhr, listed under Kārīn
Zarmīhr, commander, 201, 468
† around 630 CE, 201
Zayd b. Hārithah, 193
Zīks, 49
al-Zīnābi Abū ’l-Farrukhān, 248,
*, = Farrukhžād Ispahbūdān
zindik, zindiq, see zandik
zinhār (refuge), see Mithra
Zoroaster, 322, 339, 342, 350, 357, 385, 403, 406, 412, 428, 501
regional legends of ~, 321, 322, 369
Zuhrah b. Ḥwiyah, 226, 227
Zurvān, 339, 340, 366, 507
Zurvanism, 331, 334, 339, 340, 365, 366, 392
Zūzan, 427, 435